WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 17, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

State Dept. review completed.
SECR25Xi 25X1
Jov-nyrod-iny and decioshitication
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SECRET
(Information as of 1200 EST, 16 April 1964) 25X1
MOSCOW CONTINUES ANTI-CHINESE OFFENSIVE
Soviet pronouncements since Khrushchev's return from
Hungary continue to condemn Peiping aggressively, but
contain no further allusion to a world conference, sug-
gesting that Moscow is reluctant to make this issue a
test of allegiance among Communist parties.
FOOD SUPPLIES STILL TIGHT IN THE USSR
There has been a small improvement in the food situa-
tion in Moscow, probably as a result of the wheat im-
ports, but food supplies remain poor in other areas.
MOSCOW CONCERNED OVER INTERNAL ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITY
In the past few months the regime has shown a renewed
willingness to combat anti-Soviet propaganda, rumor-
mongering, and grumbling about internal conditions--
particularly food shortages--through scare tactics and
selective arrests by the secret police.
PEIPING EXPANDING WESTERN COMMERCE THROUGH TRADE FAIRS
The Chinese Communists last week opened a major trade
fair in Japan, and have sent shows to Latin America and
Africa. This year will also see a flurry of Western
trade fairs in China.
PEIPING EXTENDS NETWORK FOR POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION
New political departments in the party central committee,
in industrial ministries, and probably in enterprises--
patterned after the political indoctrination system used
in the army--will give the party center closer control
over all levels of Chinese society.
Page
SECRET
17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i
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..r SECRET `'
THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page
PEIPING SCORES GAINS AT AFRO-ASIAN PREPARATORY MEETING
The Chinese Communists did not get all they wanted at
the 10-15 April meeting in Djakarta to prepare for the
second Afro-Asian conference, but they probably gained
ground in their drive to dominate the Afro-Asian movement.
SHARP INCREASE IN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Viet Cong have launched seven major attacks in
eight days, and government forces have counterattacked
strongly.
LEADERS OF LAOTIAN FACTIONS TO HOLD NEW TALKS
As a move toward bringing the Pathet Lao back into the
cabinet, Premier Souvanna intends to propose moving the
seat of government temporarily from rightist-controlled
Vientiane to Luang Prabang.
ELECTIONS IN GABON FAIL TO STRENGTHEN MBA'S POSITION
The strong showing by opposition parties has further
weakened President Mba's already shaky position.
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
SOUTHERN RHODESIAN PRIME MINISTER OUSTED
The change of leadership will accelerate the drift
among the dominant white minority toward extreme and
inflexible positions on racial and political issues.
SPORADIC FIGHTING CONTINUES IN CYPRUS
UN troops, as well as the Turkish Army contingent, have
been fired on. Makarios has been in Athens for consul-
tations. The Turkish Government is increasing its pres-
sure on Greek residents of Turkey.
NEW BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT INSTALLED
Interim President Castello Branco's cabinet reflects a
strong emphasis on career officials of pro-Western ori-
entation. The "institutional act" decreed last week'by
the military gives the new regime greatly increased pow-
ers to deal with the pressing problems it has inherited.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued)
UNCERTAINTY CONTINUES IN CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL RACE
Some opponents of Communist-Socialist candidate Allende
fear that Radical candidate Duran's re-entry into the
campaign will favor Allende by taking votes away from
Christian Democrat Frei.
PRE-ELECTION TENSION IN GUATEMALA
Disgruntled rightists and leftists barred from next
month's elections for a constituent assembly may try to
cause trouble, thereby encouraging guerrilla activity
and possibly the reimposition of a state of siege.
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`A.r :qwy
SECRET The Communist World
Soviet pronouncements follow-
ing Khrushchev's return from Hun-
gary continue aggressive condemna-
tion of Chinese "splitting activi-
ties." In a report to the Soviet
people on 12 April, Khrushchev re-
iterated the "opinion" expressed in
the Soviet-Hungarian communiqud
that it is necessary "to give a
resolute rebuff to the anti-Lenin-
ist conceptions and subversive ac-
tivities of the Chinese leaders."
This "report," however, avoided
any allusion to a world party con-
ference, and Khrushchev proposed
only "systematic meetings and con-
sultations" to deal with the Chi-
nese problem. No authoritative
Soviet comment on this issue has
been forthcoming since Pravda',,
3 April publication of Su- s o 's
speech calling for such a confer-
ence and of an editorial revealing
its proposed timetable.
were clearly aimed at stimulating
suspicions of Chinese intentions
among foreign parties and at per-
suading them that the only way to
protect their own interests is to
support the Soviet position.
He charged that the Chinese
hope to "establish their own hegem-
ony" in the world Communist move-
ment and "foist their anti-Leninist,
adventurist line" on foreign parties.
The USSR, on the other hand, has
restored the "Leninist principle"
of equality and independence among
all parties. Khrushchev, in effect,
is trying to convert Moscow's in-
ability to enforce centralized dis-
cipline into an advantage in the
struggle with the Chinese. But this
emphasis on polycentric autonomy of
all parties is incompatible with
Soviet pressures to form a solid
phalanx in the movement to condemn
the Chinese.
Although the USSR is publish-
ing foreign party declarations fav-
oring a conference, it clearly rec-
ognizes the obstacles involved and
hesitates to make the issue a cru-
cial test of allegiance to Moscow.
Izvestia editor Adzhubey recently
admitted that there were "certain
problems" and that a conference
would "almost certainly" not be
convened before fall.
In the immediate future, the
Soviets have little choice but to
concentrate on winning maximum for-
eign support in denouncing what
Khrushchev has termed Peiping's
"foul betrayal" of the "revolution-
ary cause." The two main themes
of Khrushchev's speeches last week
Khrushchev's only answer to
this dilemma has been to predict
that Peiping's "absurd aspirations"
will end in "shameful failure" and
that the world movement will over-
come its present difficulties and
"emerge even stronger and more tem-
pered from the struggle against the
separatists."
The Chinese clearly feel that
the tactics they have been pursuing
are paying high dividends. When
asked why they have not yet directly
answered the Soviets, Chinese offi-
cials have reportedly stated, "What's
the rush? We've still to print two
more articles answering the Soviet
party's open letter of last July."
SECRET
17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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FOOD SUPPLIES STILL TIGHT IN THE USSR
The Soviet diet is still
suffering from the effects of
last year's crop failure. In
Moscow there has been a small
improvement in the situation
since midwinter, probably as a
result of the wheat imports,
but food supplies remain poor
in other areas.
In Moscow, wheat flour was
still unavailable as of 1 March.
However, white bread is avail-
able frequently--although not
in abundance--and rice and po-
tato flour are plentiful.
The capital is obviously
receiving preferential treat-
ment. Only low-grade dark bread
was sold in a number of cities
visited by Western embassy of-
ficers in February, and butter
and milk were scarce. In Yer-
evan only soggy dark bread was
generally available, and but-
ter, when put on sale, was rap-
idly sold out--citizens com-
plained of waiting in queues
for four hours at a time. In
Odessa the Indian resident con-
sul reported that his houseboy,
when fetching milk, was fre-
quently stopped by people
ing to know his source of
ply.
want-
sup-
The USSR's food situation
is not likely to change much
for the better--and could get
worse--until the new crops be-
gin to be harvested in June
and July.
MOSCOW CONCERNED OVER INTERNAL ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITY
Moscow seems increasingly
concerned over signs of politi-
cal disaffection among the
population, and may be prepared
to impose stricter measures
against "anti-Soviet activities."
During the past few months,
the regime has shown a renewed
willingness to combat anti-
Soviet propaganda, rumor mon-
gering, and grumbling about in-
ternal conditions--particularly
food shortages--through scare
tactics and selective arrests
by the secret police.
last fall, the KGB has charged
several citizens with dissemi-
nating antiregime propaganda
materials--both foreign and
domestically produced--and with
expressing "harmful political
opinions." Those adjudged po-
litically immature and properly
repentant have been released
with stern and well-publicized
warnings. In almost every case,
however, at least one defendant
has gone to prison.
SECRET
17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
P4 ge 2
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SECRET
The effect of antiregime prop-
aganda on the nation's youth seems
to be a source of particular con-
cern. Most press accounts have
claimed that the "provocative leaf-
lets and rumors" were aimed prima-
rily at young people, some of whom
admittedly were influenced by hos-
tile ideology." Youth boss Sergey
Pavlov reportedly told a Komsomol
conference last month that politi-
cal disaffection among young peo-
ple had reached "a rather alarming
degree" in several provincial cities.
While there is no confirmation of
his remarks, every city mentioned
in the report was either the site
of KGB arrests for anti-Soviet ac-
tivity or the scene of a strike
over food shortages last fall.
The Communist World
Press treatment of these oc-
currences reflects a clear attempt
to counter the influence of for-
eign broadcasts without a resump-
tion of jamming and to discourage
indiscriminate contacts with for-
eign tourists. Most of those ar-
rested allegedly listened to the
Voice of America, and some were
accused of dispensing propaganda
received from Western travelers.
By depicting the culprits as
greedy or well-to-do or as drunk-
ards and idlers, Moscow is also
seeking to suggest that economic
crime and unacceptable social
behavior are only a step removed
from anti-Soviet activity.
Peiping is stepping up its com-
mercial contacts with the West
through an expanded program of trade
fairs.
The first Chinese Communist
trade fair in Japan since 1955
opened at Tokyo on 10 April for a
three-week stand, and in June will
move to Osaka for another three
weeks. The fair consists of at
least 10,000 "exhibitions" of con-
sumer and industrial products.
Last year, Japanese firms held
trade fairs in Peiping and Shang-
hai. These increased commercial
contacts are contributing to the
growth of Sino-Japanese trade,
which may reach a total of about
$200 million this year, about 40
percent above last year's $137 mil-
lion.
Peiping has also sent trade
fairs to Latin America and Africa.
The trade show which played Mexico
City last year is now in Santiago,
Chile. It had been scheduled to
move to Brazil this spring prior
to the change in regime there.
Peiping has also announced plans
to take part in the Casablanca
trade fair this year and to build
a permanent trade pavilionin Cas-
ablanca. Another Chinese trade
fair recently played in Algiers
and Bamako, Mali.
This year will see a flurry
of Western trade fairs in China,
the first--except for two small
ones in mid-1963--since the Com-
munist regime took over. The UK
will stage a scientific instru-
ments show in April,an exhibition
of mining and construction equip-
ment in June, and a large-scale
general industrial trade fair in
November in which more than a hun-
dred firms will take part. This
fall France will display products
in the field of automation and
machine measuring and control,
and an exhibition of a wide range
of French industrial products
is planned for late 1965. West
German firms are also reportedly
planning a trade fair in Peiping
late this year or early in 1965.
SECRET
17 Apr 64
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The political departments referred to below are responsible for indoctrination and surveillance. They should
not be confused with the party committees and branches which exist in all military units and economic
enterprises and which exercise supreme authority except in emergency situations where military commanders
may make independent decisions. The political department is headed by a director. This individual is
distinct from the ranking party authority in military units and economic enterprises.
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
INDUSTRY AND COMMUNICATIONS
Level of Command Corresponding Political Department Level of Responsibility
STATE COUNCIL
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
STATE COUNCIL
of the Government
of the Party
of the Government
Ministry of
General Political
Staff Office for Industry
National Defense
Department
and Communications
Political Departments
Military Regions
Industrial & Communications
and Districts
in Military Regions
Ministries and Bureaus
and Districts
Political Departments
Commands Down
in Commands Down t.:
Industrial & Communications
to Regiments
Enterprises
Regiments
Corresponding Political Department
Political Department for
rdusily and Comrnunicuhons
of the Censral Ccrnrni!'ee
Political Department in
Irdustry and Cnmmunicodons
/vu tries a 13 acs
New Department
Existence probable
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SECRET The Communist World
PEIPING EXTENDS NETWORK FOR POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION
The Chinese Communists have
recently created new political
departments in the party central
committee, in industrial ministries,
and probably in enterprises. These
are designed to give the party
closer direction and control over
the growing amount of political
work being carried on at all levels
of Chinese society. The creation
of permanent new indoctrination
departments suggests that Peiping,
concerned over its long-standing
failure to arouse popular enthusi-
asm for its programs, now intends
to sustain indoctrination at a high
level rather than rely on periodic
campaigns as in the past.
The new organs, patterned after
the system for political indoctri-
nation used by the People's Libera-
tion Army (PLA), are the outgrowth
of a campaign that began last Jan-
uary to have the "whole country
learn from the PLA." A new In-
dustry and Communications Political
Department under the central com-
mittee for the first time gives the
party center direct supervision
over political work in economic as
well as military units. The new
body, the first new central com-
mittee department formed since about
1957, is analogous to the PLA's
General Political Department, also
directly subordinate to the central
committee.
Political departments also
have been established in the 15
industrial and communications minis-
tries and in two bureaus, according
to a 3 April announcement made fol-
lowing the First National Political
Work Conference on Industry and
SECRET
17 Apr 64
Communications. The meeting was
convened by the State Economic Com-
mission--China's annual planning
body--and presided over by its chair-
man, Po I-po. Po's role in the con-
ference and the selection of his
long-time proteg4, Ku Mu, to head
the new central committee depart-
ment reinforce the impression that
Po's stature in the party is rising.
for a long time to come.
it intends to continue subjecting
all elements of society to heavy
doses of political indoctrination
Peiping has not yet spelled
out any reorganization plans it
might have for enterprises, but has
strongly implied that military-type
political sections are being set up
at this level. These bodies proba-
bly will take over responsibility
for conducting "study groups" and
political campaigns and for approving
awards and promotions--functions
previously performed by labor unions
and the party committee. Setting
up an independent political sec-
tion will not, however, change the
essential role of the party com-
mittee, which remains the supreme
authority in all enterprises.
Although regime propaganda
claims that economic production is
the ultimate aim of all political
indoctrination, the immediate ob-
jective of the new political organs
is "to prevent the inroad of bour-
geois ideas and the influence of
modern revisionism." By creating
permanent indoctrination departments
Peiping has clearly indicated that
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
Chinese Communist efforts
to exploit the preparatory ses-
sions for the second Afro-Asian
Conference, which were held in
Djakarta from 10 to 15 April,
have on balance been successful.
Although the Chinese did not get
all they wanted, they probably
gained ground in their drive to
dominate the Afro-Asian movement.
Peiping has consistently
supported the idea of a "Second
Bandung" conference, and its keen
interest in the preliminary meet-
ings was demonstrated by the
speed with which it responded to
a last-minute invitation. The
formal Indonesian bid to the 22-
nation conclave was apparently
received by the Chinese on 6
April. Three days later Foreign
Minister Chen Yi was on his way
to Djakarta to head a strong
delegation.
Chen achieved a major Chi-
nese objective at Djakarta by
blocking an Indian attempt to
secure a place for the USSR at
the full conference. By exclud-
ing the Russians, Peiping has
sought to ensure that its at-
tempts to identify the Soviet
Union with former colonial op-
pression will not be effectively
opposed. Moscow's sensitivity
to continued Chinese attacks of
this sort is demonstrated in
Pravda's charge on 15 April that
TH-e-CH-inese are attempting to
use the Afro-Asian movement for
their own selfish aims "with a
view to splitting and weakening
this movement."
The Chinese are probably
also pleased by the decision to
hold the second Afro-Asian con-
ference in Africa. (The actual
meeting place remains to be de-
cided). This will enable them
to parade Chinese importance in
a key area, to refresh the con-
tacts established by Chou En-lai
and Chen Yi during their African
tour last winter, and to work
for an enlargement of the per-
manent Chinese presence. Heavy
African representation at the
meeting will provide a sympa-
thetic audience for the militant,
subtly racist Chinese line against
colonialism.
Peiping is probably less
happy over the delay of almost
a year before the full Afro-
Asian conference is convened.
The decision at the preliminary
sessions to hold the plenary
meeting in March 1965 robs the
Chinese of an opportunity to
counterbalance the rival con-
ference of nonaligned nations
--pushed by Tito and Nasir--
which is scheduled for this
fall.
During the intervening
months the Chinese can be expected
to redouble their efforts to
woo the Africans. Chen Yi's
major speech to the delegates
at Djakarta on 11 April probably
sets the line Peiping will fol-
low. Chen stressed the bonds
of unity between all Afro-Asian
states, binding despite differ-
ences between them, and urged
the necessity for militant strug-
gle against imperialism--which
"will not step down from the
stage of history of its own ac-
cord."
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17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SHARP INCREASE IN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Both Communist and South
Vietnamese Government military
activity increased sharply during
the past few days. The Viet Cong
launched seven major attacks in
eight days. Six of these attacks
were in the delta area. A train-
ing camp just south of Saigon
was raided by a Viet Cong company,
and two district capitals further
south in the delta were hit by
Viet Cong battalions. The re-
maining attacks involved Viet
Cong company-size units against
government outposts.
Communist small-scale and
terrorist attacks also increased,
especially against hamlets and
transportation routes. The
Viet Cong appear in part to be
reacting to increased aggressive-
ness and frequency of government
operations throughout the country.
They may also have believed
that government pressure in the
delta would relax as military
units were relocated following
corps boundary shifts there.
Government forces have
counterattacked strongly, and
casualties have been high on
both sides. Government para-
military forces also appear to
have put up stiff resistance
against larger attacking Viet
Cong forces, and morale apparent-
ly remains good.
On the political front,
rumors of an imminent split
between General Khanh and
civilian members of his govern-
ment have subsided. Several
leading ministers publicly
endorsed Khanh's position at a
recent press conference in which
he defended the abolition of the
advisory Council of Notables and
again outlined his plans for
further democratization of his
regime.
Criticism of Khanh's moves
has appeared in several Saigon
newspapers, however, and uneasi-
ness persists in government
circles.
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17 Apr 64
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"-%W w
LEADERS OF LAOTIAN FACTIONS TO HOLD NEW TALKS
Laotian Premier Souvanna is
about to open new talks with right-
ist leader General Phoumi and Pa-
thet Lao chief Souphannouvong.
The three factional leaders will
try to reach accord on measures
directed toward national reunifi-
cation.
Souvanna has indicated that
a prime objective of the talks
will be to bring back into the cab-
inet the Pathet Lao ministers who
withdrew to the Plaine des Jarres
a year ago, ostensibly for reasons
of personal safety. To facilitate
their return, the neutralist leader
has indicated he will propose that
the seat of government be shifted
at least temporarily from rightist-
controlled Vientiane to Luang
Prabang. Souvanna will also push
for the formation of the inte-
grated national army and the tri-
partite police force agreed on in
1962.
The Communists, meanwhile,
have intensified their campaign
to discredit Phoumi's rightist
faction. On 30 March Prince Sou-
phannouvong lodged a protest with
the Geneva co-chairmen alleging
that South Vietnamese forces are
present with the rightist forces
in southern Laos. In a parallel
move the North Vietnamese on 12
April delivered a note to Sou-
vanna charging that rightist forces
had raided a North Vietnamese vil-
age and warning of "extremely
grave consequences," if such ac-
ELECTIONS IN GABON FAIL TO STRENGTHEN MBA'S POSITION
The alleged victory of pro-
French President Mba's supporters
in Gabon's 12 April legislative
elections cannot be expected to
strengthen his already shaky posi-
tion. Mba's principal opponents,
including Jean Aubame, the popular
leader of the provisional govern-
ment formed after the abortive
February coup, are all in prison.
However, opposition elements made
an unexpectedly strong showing in
the election which may well be
followed by more moves to oust Mba,
possibly by violence.
The lists of Mba-approved can-
didates were opposed by a number
of parties, almost all of which
were recently formed regional or-
ganizations. Mba's people claimed
large pluralities in most
rural areas, where other parties
were prevented from campaigning.
However, unofficial returns indi-
cate that opposition elements to-
gether had a clear majority of the
popular vote. In a relatively
more populous region in the north,
where anti-Mba and anti-French
sentiment is particularly high,
Mba's list won less than 10 percent
of the vote, while the list of
Aubame supporters garnered 75 per-
cent.
It appears, however, that
the results the government will
announce will give Mba a 31-16
majority in the National Assembly.
This outcome depends on the offi-
cial claim that his men won in
two regions--one of which sur-
rounds Libreville, the capital--
where early returns indicated the
opposition parties would be vic-
torious. Mba may have fixed the
returns there.
The strong showing of the
opposition will increase pressure
on Mba to compromise with it. How-
ever,he has shown no willingness
to do so., and his principal oppo-
nents are unlikely to accept any-
thing short of his ouster.
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The forced resignation of
Prime Minister Field on 13
April is the latest indication
that Southern Rhodesia's 200,-
000 whites are still drifting
toward more extreme and inflex-
ible positions, both on racial
matters and on the question of
the territory's independence.
Their continued intransigence
seems likely to accentuate the
trend toward violence among the
3.7 million Africans.
A majority within Field's
Rhodesian Front party had long
been dissatisfied with his
leadership. In particular,
this group felt he had not been
forceful enough in his efforts
to secure Southern Rhodesia's
independence from Britain. Ian
Smith, Field's successor, can
be expected to press harder for
independence, while using the
formidable battery of existing
security legislation to control
the African nationalists.
Southern Rhodesia already
has virtually de facto independ-
ence, but the drive for com-
plete sovereignty under the
present constitution--which
assures white control for many
years--has become an emotional
issue for the whites. Britain
has said that formal independ-
ence can come only when the
constitution provides a broader
base for African representation.
Sentiment is strong among
the whites for a unilateral
declaration of independence,
despite the fact that an inde-
pendent Southern Rhodesia under
white control would have great
difficulty obtaining interna-
tional recognition. Field
seems to have been convinced
that independence would be a
questionable blessing at best,
but Smith and the majority of
the Rhodesian Front apparently
are willing to press forward
willy-nilly.
Field's wing of the party
might eventually split with
Smith and join the relatively
liberal white opposition party
of Sir Edgar Whitehead. Defec-
tion of only three members of
the Rhodesian Front would leave
it in a minority in the legis-
lature. Such a development
might provide an opening for
the return to politics of Sir
Roy Welensky, last premier of
the defunct Rhodesian Federa-
tion and still the most popular
figure in Southern Rhodesia.
Welensky formerly occupied a
fairly conservative position in
the white political spectrum,
but, with the recent shift to-
ward the right, he now appears
relatively moderate. Even if
he does re-enter politics, how-
ever, his considerable politi-
among the white electorate.
cal abilities would be chal-
lenged by the extremist drift
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SECRET
The expected arrival of
the Finnish and Irish contin-
gents this coming week will
bring the UN peace-keeping
.force to near its full strength
of 7,000. Meanwhile, British
and Canadian UN troops, who
have been trying to arrange
cease-fires, have been fired
on by both sides.
Fighting between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots has been con-
centrated mainly in the Kyrenia
Pass area, with sporadic firing
along the "Green Line," which
separates the two communities
in Nicosia. The Turkish Army
contingent north of Nicosia has
also been fired on, and its com-
mander has warned that further
attacks will lead to retalia-
tion.
Ankara has stepped up its
attacks on Greek privileges in
Turkey and apparently is trying
to use this kind of pressure to
force Athens to make concessions
over Cyprus. Some Turks are de-
manding that the government move
against the 60,000 ethnic Greeks
who are Turkish citizens, and
even against Orthodox Patriarch
Athenagoras, as well as against
some 10,000 Greek citizens re-
siding in Turkey. So far, how-
ever, Ankara has confined most
of its moves to the latter group.
It has abrogated the 1930 treaty
which gives Greek citizens spe-
cial privileges, ordered the
deportation of an increasing
number of Greek residents, en-
forced business and professional
restrictions on Greek nation-
als, and revoked the Turkish
citizenship of some secondary
figures in the Orthodox Patri-
archate. Ankara has also re-
stricted Greek travel privileges
in Turkey and extended Turkish
territorial waters from six to
twelve miles, an action which
will adversely affect Greek fish-
ing interests.
Turkish-US relations are
also being strained by the Cy-
prus controversy. The Turks
complain more and more that the
US is either unable or unwill-
ing to bring pressure on Greece
and on Makarios to ease the pres-
sure on the Turkish Cypriots.
Anti-Americanism is increasing
in the press and among student
groups. A left-wing columnist
in a widely circulated independ-
ent newspaper has called for a
review of US base rights in
Turkey.
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Western Hemisphere
NEW BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT INSTALLED
The almost complete preoc-
cupation of Brazil's leaders
with the purge of Communists
and other subversives from the
government and armed forces is
yielding to the task of devis-
ing administration policies.
The new president, General Hum-
berto Castello Branco, assumed
office on 15 April after his
election by Congress to fill
the unexpired term of ousted
President Goulart. He will
serve until January 1966, when
the winner of the election sched-
uled for October 1965 takes over.
Widely respected in and
out of the military, Castello
Branco is generally regarded as
an intellectual with no personal
political ambitions. Although
he lacks political experience,
he is considered the Logical
choice to give unity to the
provisional leadership.
The makeup of the new ad-
ministration reflects a strong
emphasis on career officials
of pro-Western orientation.
Both the foreign minister and
the minister of finance, for
example, have had long govern-
ment experience in their fields.
The three military ministers,
notably War Minister Costa e
Silva, are likely to exercise
important influence on govern-
ment policy in general.
17 Apr 64
The new government inher-
its a number of major problems,
including Brazil's huge exter-
nal debt, and inflation that
continues to increase at the
rate of more than 8 percent a
month. There is also heavy
pressure for social reforms and
for overhauling the Communist-
ridden labor movement.
Castello Branco possesses
greatly increased executive
powers to deal with these prob-
lems as a result of the so-
called "institutional act" de-
creed last week by the military
command which overthrew Goulart.
For example, Congress now is
required to act within 30 days
on bills proposed by the admin-
istration. Failure to do so
will constitute approval. The
president also has been granted
authority to propose constitu-
tional amendments.
The "clean-up operation"
against Communists and other
extreme leftists continues, al-
though at a somewhat slower
pace. The military have revoked
the mandates of some 40 congress-
men and suspended their politi-
cal rights, as well as the rights
of many others. In the armed
forces more than 120 officers,
including approximately 25 gen-
erals and admirals,have been
transferred to reserve status
for political reasons.
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SECRET Western Hemisphere
Argentina, Colombia, Chile,
and Peru are among the growing
number of Latin American govern-
ments which have announced they
will continue relations with
Brazil, but Mexico still has
reservations. There is consid-
erable pressure on the new re-
gime to sever relations with
Cuba. Castello Branco report-
edly said he intends to take a
hard line on Cuba and has not
ruled out a complete break.
Havana's ambassador returned
to Cuba with many of his staff
shortly after the anti-Goulart
revolt began.
UNCERTAINTY CONTINUES IN CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL RACE
The three-way Chilean presi-
dential race is settling down
to hard campaigning, after the
interruption caused by Senator
Duran's withdrawal and subse-
quent renewal of his candidacy.
The large Radical Party
(PR), for which Duran now is
running, shows signs of closing
ranks to deny support to Senator
Salvador Allende, nominee of
the Communist-Socialist front
(FRAP). Some militant left-
wing Radicals earlier had wanted
the party to endorse Allende
formally, and threatened to
back him in any event. A few
apparently are persisting in
this desire.
Sepulveda, who would have pre-
ferred a single candidate--
presumably Frei--to oppose
Allende, added that the PDC
left wing's hostile attitude
toward the Chilean right may
drive Liberals and Conservatives
into the Duran camp.
Duran reportedly has indi-
cated that if he finishes second,
he will fight for election by
Congress, which makes the final
decision in the event no candi-
date receives a majority. Its
present center-right majority
and large PR delegation would
strongly favor him over either
Allende or Frei. Frei reportedly
believes that this now is Duian's
strategy.
Speculation continues about
the possible effects of Duran's
candidacy on the fortunes of
Allende and the Christian Demo-
cratic (PDC) candidate, Senator
Eduardo Frei. Liberal Party
chairman Sepulveda has expressed
the fear that Duran will take
Liberal and Conservative votes
away from Frei, which would give
Allende the victory by "divid-
ing the democratic forces."
To counter the Communist-
Socialist appeal to the peasant
vote, the PDC plans to increase
its party workers in rural areas
from 70 to 600. The PAC ex-
pects some Socialists will come
out for Frei, but this would
be significant mainly for its
propaganda value.
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SECRET Western Hemisphere
There is rising dissatisfac-
tion in Guatemala among both right-
ists and leftists barred from par-
ticipation in the elections for a
constituent assembly on 24 May.
Any attempt by these or other op-
position elements to cause trouble
would give new opportunities to
guerrilla forces. It could also
lead the Peralta regime to reim-
pose the state of siege it lifted
on 30 March.
The largely civilian adminis-
tration under Colonel Peralta has
a good record of economic and so-
cial accomplishment in the year
since Guatemalan military leaders
ousted President Ydigoras. Before
lifting the state of siege, however,
Peralta took pains to ensure gov-
ernment control over future politi-
cal activity through decree legisla-
tion and some preventive arrests
which were politically ill advised.
Participation in the May election
is to be restricted to three mod-
erate leftist-to-centrist parties
favored by the regime.
This has encouraged parties on
the outside to work together. Parties
which supported leftist former Presi-
dent Juan Jose Arevalo reportedly are
again forming an opposition alli:-
ance. Some of their leaders are
said to be discussing opposition
tactics with guerrilla leaders. At
the same time, rightists--includ-
ing representatives of Ydigoras
and perennial candidate Cruz Sala-
zar--are also working to arouse
public opinion against Peralta's
schedule for a return to consti-
tutionality by 1965. They may
join leftists in efforts to post-
pone the elections and broaden the
ground rules for political activ-
ity. If wealthy rightists conclude
that they have no chance to regain
power electorally, they might try
to oust Peralta.
On 11 April, guerrillas op-
erating in the mountainous areas
of Izabal Province murdered a
second army officer whom they had
marked for elimination because
of his role in the government's
extensive antiguerrilla efforts.
The guerrillas' continued ability
to make lightning attacks on
specific targets of their own
choice indicates that they are
prepared to take advantage of
political tensions and that they
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