WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7
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RIPPUB
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S
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26
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December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 6, 2008
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1
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Publication Date: 
April 17, 1964
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
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State Dept. review completed. SECR25Xi 25X1 Jov-nyrod-iny and decioshitication Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 SECRET (Information as of 1200 EST, 16 April 1964) 25X1 MOSCOW CONTINUES ANTI-CHINESE OFFENSIVE Soviet pronouncements since Khrushchev's return from Hungary continue to condemn Peiping aggressively, but contain no further allusion to a world conference, sug- gesting that Moscow is reluctant to make this issue a test of allegiance among Communist parties. FOOD SUPPLIES STILL TIGHT IN THE USSR There has been a small improvement in the food situa- tion in Moscow, probably as a result of the wheat im- ports, but food supplies remain poor in other areas. MOSCOW CONCERNED OVER INTERNAL ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITY In the past few months the regime has shown a renewed willingness to combat anti-Soviet propaganda, rumor- mongering, and grumbling about internal conditions-- particularly food shortages--through scare tactics and selective arrests by the secret police. PEIPING EXPANDING WESTERN COMMERCE THROUGH TRADE FAIRS The Chinese Communists last week opened a major trade fair in Japan, and have sent shows to Latin America and Africa. This year will also see a flurry of Western trade fairs in China. PEIPING EXTENDS NETWORK FOR POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION New political departments in the party central committee, in industrial ministries, and probably in enterprises-- patterned after the political indoctrination system used in the army--will give the party center closer control over all levels of Chinese society. Page SECRET 17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 ..r SECRET `' THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page PEIPING SCORES GAINS AT AFRO-ASIAN PREPARATORY MEETING The Chinese Communists did not get all they wanted at the 10-15 April meeting in Djakarta to prepare for the second Afro-Asian conference, but they probably gained ground in their drive to dominate the Afro-Asian movement. SHARP INCREASE IN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM The Viet Cong have launched seven major attacks in eight days, and government forces have counterattacked strongly. LEADERS OF LAOTIAN FACTIONS TO HOLD NEW TALKS As a move toward bringing the Pathet Lao back into the cabinet, Premier Souvanna intends to propose moving the seat of government temporarily from rightist-controlled Vientiane to Luang Prabang. ELECTIONS IN GABON FAIL TO STRENGTHEN MBA'S POSITION The strong showing by opposition parties has further weakened President Mba's already shaky position. SECRET 17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 SECRET ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page SOUTHERN RHODESIAN PRIME MINISTER OUSTED The change of leadership will accelerate the drift among the dominant white minority toward extreme and inflexible positions on racial and political issues. SPORADIC FIGHTING CONTINUES IN CYPRUS UN troops, as well as the Turkish Army contingent, have been fired on. Makarios has been in Athens for consul- tations. The Turkish Government is increasing its pres- sure on Greek residents of Turkey. NEW BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT INSTALLED Interim President Castello Branco's cabinet reflects a strong emphasis on career officials of pro-Western ori- entation. The "institutional act" decreed last week'by the military gives the new regime greatly increased pow- ers to deal with the pressing problems it has inherited. SECRET 17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 .111W NN00 SECRET WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) UNCERTAINTY CONTINUES IN CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL RACE Some opponents of Communist-Socialist candidate Allende fear that Radical candidate Duran's re-entry into the campaign will favor Allende by taking votes away from Christian Democrat Frei. PRE-ELECTION TENSION IN GUATEMALA Disgruntled rightists and leftists barred from next month's elections for a constituent assembly may try to cause trouble, thereby encouraging guerrilla activity and possibly the reimposition of a state of siege. SECRET 17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iv Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 `A.r :qwy SECRET The Communist World Soviet pronouncements follow- ing Khrushchev's return from Hun- gary continue aggressive condemna- tion of Chinese "splitting activi- ties." In a report to the Soviet people on 12 April, Khrushchev re- iterated the "opinion" expressed in the Soviet-Hungarian communiqud that it is necessary "to give a resolute rebuff to the anti-Lenin- ist conceptions and subversive ac- tivities of the Chinese leaders." This "report," however, avoided any allusion to a world party con- ference, and Khrushchev proposed only "systematic meetings and con- sultations" to deal with the Chi- nese problem. No authoritative Soviet comment on this issue has been forthcoming since Pravda',, 3 April publication of Su- s o 's speech calling for such a confer- ence and of an editorial revealing its proposed timetable. were clearly aimed at stimulating suspicions of Chinese intentions among foreign parties and at per- suading them that the only way to protect their own interests is to support the Soviet position. He charged that the Chinese hope to "establish their own hegem- ony" in the world Communist move- ment and "foist their anti-Leninist, adventurist line" on foreign parties. The USSR, on the other hand, has restored the "Leninist principle" of equality and independence among all parties. Khrushchev, in effect, is trying to convert Moscow's in- ability to enforce centralized dis- cipline into an advantage in the struggle with the Chinese. But this emphasis on polycentric autonomy of all parties is incompatible with Soviet pressures to form a solid phalanx in the movement to condemn the Chinese. Although the USSR is publish- ing foreign party declarations fav- oring a conference, it clearly rec- ognizes the obstacles involved and hesitates to make the issue a cru- cial test of allegiance to Moscow. Izvestia editor Adzhubey recently admitted that there were "certain problems" and that a conference would "almost certainly" not be convened before fall. In the immediate future, the Soviets have little choice but to concentrate on winning maximum for- eign support in denouncing what Khrushchev has termed Peiping's "foul betrayal" of the "revolution- ary cause." The two main themes of Khrushchev's speeches last week Khrushchev's only answer to this dilemma has been to predict that Peiping's "absurd aspirations" will end in "shameful failure" and that the world movement will over- come its present difficulties and "emerge even stronger and more tem- pered from the struggle against the separatists." The Chinese clearly feel that the tactics they have been pursuing are paying high dividends. When asked why they have not yet directly answered the Soviets, Chinese offi- cials have reportedly stated, "What's the rush? We've still to print two more articles answering the Soviet party's open letter of last July." SECRET 17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 SECRET FOOD SUPPLIES STILL TIGHT IN THE USSR The Soviet diet is still suffering from the effects of last year's crop failure. In Moscow there has been a small improvement in the situation since midwinter, probably as a result of the wheat imports, but food supplies remain poor in other areas. In Moscow, wheat flour was still unavailable as of 1 March. However, white bread is avail- able frequently--although not in abundance--and rice and po- tato flour are plentiful. The capital is obviously receiving preferential treat- ment. Only low-grade dark bread was sold in a number of cities visited by Western embassy of- ficers in February, and butter and milk were scarce. In Yer- evan only soggy dark bread was generally available, and but- ter, when put on sale, was rap- idly sold out--citizens com- plained of waiting in queues for four hours at a time. In Odessa the Indian resident con- sul reported that his houseboy, when fetching milk, was fre- quently stopped by people ing to know his source of ply. want- sup- The USSR's food situation is not likely to change much for the better--and could get worse--until the new crops be- gin to be harvested in June and July. MOSCOW CONCERNED OVER INTERNAL ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITY Moscow seems increasingly concerned over signs of politi- cal disaffection among the population, and may be prepared to impose stricter measures against "anti-Soviet activities." During the past few months, the regime has shown a renewed willingness to combat anti- Soviet propaganda, rumor mon- gering, and grumbling about in- ternal conditions--particularly food shortages--through scare tactics and selective arrests by the secret police. last fall, the KGB has charged several citizens with dissemi- nating antiregime propaganda materials--both foreign and domestically produced--and with expressing "harmful political opinions." Those adjudged po- litically immature and properly repentant have been released with stern and well-publicized warnings. In almost every case, however, at least one defendant has gone to prison. SECRET 17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY P4 ge 2 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 SECRET The effect of antiregime prop- aganda on the nation's youth seems to be a source of particular con- cern. Most press accounts have claimed that the "provocative leaf- lets and rumors" were aimed prima- rily at young people, some of whom admittedly were influenced by hos- tile ideology." Youth boss Sergey Pavlov reportedly told a Komsomol conference last month that politi- cal disaffection among young peo- ple had reached "a rather alarming degree" in several provincial cities. While there is no confirmation of his remarks, every city mentioned in the report was either the site of KGB arrests for anti-Soviet ac- tivity or the scene of a strike over food shortages last fall. The Communist World Press treatment of these oc- currences reflects a clear attempt to counter the influence of for- eign broadcasts without a resump- tion of jamming and to discourage indiscriminate contacts with for- eign tourists. Most of those ar- rested allegedly listened to the Voice of America, and some were accused of dispensing propaganda received from Western travelers. By depicting the culprits as greedy or well-to-do or as drunk- ards and idlers, Moscow is also seeking to suggest that economic crime and unacceptable social behavior are only a step removed from anti-Soviet activity. Peiping is stepping up its com- mercial contacts with the West through an expanded program of trade fairs. The first Chinese Communist trade fair in Japan since 1955 opened at Tokyo on 10 April for a three-week stand, and in June will move to Osaka for another three weeks. The fair consists of at least 10,000 "exhibitions" of con- sumer and industrial products. Last year, Japanese firms held trade fairs in Peiping and Shang- hai. These increased commercial contacts are contributing to the growth of Sino-Japanese trade, which may reach a total of about $200 million this year, about 40 percent above last year's $137 mil- lion. Peiping has also sent trade fairs to Latin America and Africa. The trade show which played Mexico City last year is now in Santiago, Chile. It had been scheduled to move to Brazil this spring prior to the change in regime there. Peiping has also announced plans to take part in the Casablanca trade fair this year and to build a permanent trade pavilionin Cas- ablanca. Another Chinese trade fair recently played in Algiers and Bamako, Mali. This year will see a flurry of Western trade fairs in China, the first--except for two small ones in mid-1963--since the Com- munist regime took over. The UK will stage a scientific instru- ments show in April,an exhibition of mining and construction equip- ment in June, and a large-scale general industrial trade fair in November in which more than a hun- dred firms will take part. This fall France will display products in the field of automation and machine measuring and control, and an exhibition of a wide range of French industrial products is planned for late 1965. West German firms are also reportedly planning a trade fair in Peiping late this year or early in 1965. SECRET 17 Apr 64 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 The political departments referred to below are responsible for indoctrination and surveillance. They should not be confused with the party committees and branches which exist in all military units and economic enterprises and which exercise supreme authority except in emergency situations where military commanders may make independent decisions. The political department is headed by a director. This individual is distinct from the ranking party authority in military units and economic enterprises. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT INDUSTRY AND COMMUNICATIONS Level of Command Corresponding Political Department Level of Responsibility STATE COUNCIL CENTRAL COMMITTEE STATE COUNCIL of the Government of the Party of the Government Ministry of General Political Staff Office for Industry National Defense Department and Communications Political Departments Military Regions Industrial & Communications and Districts in Military Regions Ministries and Bureaus and Districts Political Departments Commands Down in Commands Down t.: Industrial & Communications to Regiments Enterprises Regiments Corresponding Political Department Political Department for rdusily and Comrnunicuhons of the Censral Ccrnrni!'ee Political Department in Irdustry and Cnmmunicodons /vu tries a 13 acs New Department Existence probable Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 SECRET The Communist World PEIPING EXTENDS NETWORK FOR POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION The Chinese Communists have recently created new political departments in the party central committee, in industrial ministries, and probably in enterprises. These are designed to give the party closer direction and control over the growing amount of political work being carried on at all levels of Chinese society. The creation of permanent new indoctrination departments suggests that Peiping, concerned over its long-standing failure to arouse popular enthusi- asm for its programs, now intends to sustain indoctrination at a high level rather than rely on periodic campaigns as in the past. The new organs, patterned after the system for political indoctri- nation used by the People's Libera- tion Army (PLA), are the outgrowth of a campaign that began last Jan- uary to have the "whole country learn from the PLA." A new In- dustry and Communications Political Department under the central com- mittee for the first time gives the party center direct supervision over political work in economic as well as military units. The new body, the first new central com- mittee department formed since about 1957, is analogous to the PLA's General Political Department, also directly subordinate to the central committee. Political departments also have been established in the 15 industrial and communications minis- tries and in two bureaus, according to a 3 April announcement made fol- lowing the First National Political Work Conference on Industry and SECRET 17 Apr 64 Communications. The meeting was convened by the State Economic Com- mission--China's annual planning body--and presided over by its chair- man, Po I-po. Po's role in the con- ference and the selection of his long-time proteg4, Ku Mu, to head the new central committee depart- ment reinforce the impression that Po's stature in the party is rising. for a long time to come. it intends to continue subjecting all elements of society to heavy doses of political indoctrination Peiping has not yet spelled out any reorganization plans it might have for enterprises, but has strongly implied that military-type political sections are being set up at this level. These bodies proba- bly will take over responsibility for conducting "study groups" and political campaigns and for approving awards and promotions--functions previously performed by labor unions and the party committee. Setting up an independent political sec- tion will not, however, change the essential role of the party com- mittee, which remains the supreme authority in all enterprises. Although regime propaganda claims that economic production is the ultimate aim of all political indoctrination, the immediate ob- jective of the new political organs is "to prevent the inroad of bour- geois ideas and the influence of modern revisionism." By creating permanent indoctrination departments Peiping has clearly indicated that CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 SECRET Chinese Communist efforts to exploit the preparatory ses- sions for the second Afro-Asian Conference, which were held in Djakarta from 10 to 15 April, have on balance been successful. Although the Chinese did not get all they wanted, they probably gained ground in their drive to dominate the Afro-Asian movement. Peiping has consistently supported the idea of a "Second Bandung" conference, and its keen interest in the preliminary meet- ings was demonstrated by the speed with which it responded to a last-minute invitation. The formal Indonesian bid to the 22- nation conclave was apparently received by the Chinese on 6 April. Three days later Foreign Minister Chen Yi was on his way to Djakarta to head a strong delegation. Chen achieved a major Chi- nese objective at Djakarta by blocking an Indian attempt to secure a place for the USSR at the full conference. By exclud- ing the Russians, Peiping has sought to ensure that its at- tempts to identify the Soviet Union with former colonial op- pression will not be effectively opposed. Moscow's sensitivity to continued Chinese attacks of this sort is demonstrated in Pravda's charge on 15 April that TH-e-CH-inese are attempting to use the Afro-Asian movement for their own selfish aims "with a view to splitting and weakening this movement." The Chinese are probably also pleased by the decision to hold the second Afro-Asian con- ference in Africa. (The actual meeting place remains to be de- cided). This will enable them to parade Chinese importance in a key area, to refresh the con- tacts established by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi during their African tour last winter, and to work for an enlargement of the per- manent Chinese presence. Heavy African representation at the meeting will provide a sympa- thetic audience for the militant, subtly racist Chinese line against colonialism. Peiping is probably less happy over the delay of almost a year before the full Afro- Asian conference is convened. The decision at the preliminary sessions to hold the plenary meeting in March 1965 robs the Chinese of an opportunity to counterbalance the rival con- ference of nonaligned nations --pushed by Tito and Nasir-- which is scheduled for this fall. During the intervening months the Chinese can be expected to redouble their efforts to woo the Africans. Chen Yi's major speech to the delegates at Djakarta on 11 April probably sets the line Peiping will fol- low. Chen stressed the bonds of unity between all Afro-Asian states, binding despite differ- ences between them, and urged the necessity for militant strug- gle against imperialism--which "will not step down from the stage of history of its own ac- cord." SECRET 17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 SECRET SHARP INCREASE IN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM Both Communist and South Vietnamese Government military activity increased sharply during the past few days. The Viet Cong launched seven major attacks in eight days. Six of these attacks were in the delta area. A train- ing camp just south of Saigon was raided by a Viet Cong company, and two district capitals further south in the delta were hit by Viet Cong battalions. The re- maining attacks involved Viet Cong company-size units against government outposts. Communist small-scale and terrorist attacks also increased, especially against hamlets and transportation routes. The Viet Cong appear in part to be reacting to increased aggressive- ness and frequency of government operations throughout the country. They may also have believed that government pressure in the delta would relax as military units were relocated following corps boundary shifts there. Government forces have counterattacked strongly, and casualties have been high on both sides. Government para- military forces also appear to have put up stiff resistance against larger attacking Viet Cong forces, and morale apparent- ly remains good. On the political front, rumors of an imminent split between General Khanh and civilian members of his govern- ment have subsided. Several leading ministers publicly endorsed Khanh's position at a recent press conference in which he defended the abolition of the advisory Council of Notables and again outlined his plans for further democratization of his regime. Criticism of Khanh's moves has appeared in several Saigon newspapers, however, and uneasi- ness persists in government circles. SECRET 17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 "-%W w LEADERS OF LAOTIAN FACTIONS TO HOLD NEW TALKS Laotian Premier Souvanna is about to open new talks with right- ist leader General Phoumi and Pa- thet Lao chief Souphannouvong. The three factional leaders will try to reach accord on measures directed toward national reunifi- cation. Souvanna has indicated that a prime objective of the talks will be to bring back into the cab- inet the Pathet Lao ministers who withdrew to the Plaine des Jarres a year ago, ostensibly for reasons of personal safety. To facilitate their return, the neutralist leader has indicated he will propose that the seat of government be shifted at least temporarily from rightist- controlled Vientiane to Luang Prabang. Souvanna will also push for the formation of the inte- grated national army and the tri- partite police force agreed on in 1962. The Communists, meanwhile, have intensified their campaign to discredit Phoumi's rightist faction. On 30 March Prince Sou- phannouvong lodged a protest with the Geneva co-chairmen alleging that South Vietnamese forces are present with the rightist forces in southern Laos. In a parallel move the North Vietnamese on 12 April delivered a note to Sou- vanna charging that rightist forces had raided a North Vietnamese vil- age and warning of "extremely grave consequences," if such ac- ELECTIONS IN GABON FAIL TO STRENGTHEN MBA'S POSITION The alleged victory of pro- French President Mba's supporters in Gabon's 12 April legislative elections cannot be expected to strengthen his already shaky posi- tion. Mba's principal opponents, including Jean Aubame, the popular leader of the provisional govern- ment formed after the abortive February coup, are all in prison. However, opposition elements made an unexpectedly strong showing in the election which may well be followed by more moves to oust Mba, possibly by violence. The lists of Mba-approved can- didates were opposed by a number of parties, almost all of which were recently formed regional or- ganizations. Mba's people claimed large pluralities in most rural areas, where other parties were prevented from campaigning. However, unofficial returns indi- cate that opposition elements to- gether had a clear majority of the popular vote. In a relatively more populous region in the north, where anti-Mba and anti-French sentiment is particularly high, Mba's list won less than 10 percent of the vote, while the list of Aubame supporters garnered 75 per- cent. It appears, however, that the results the government will announce will give Mba a 31-16 majority in the National Assembly. This outcome depends on the offi- cial claim that his men won in two regions--one of which sur- rounds Libreville, the capital-- where early returns indicated the opposition parties would be vic- torious. Mba may have fixed the returns there. The strong showing of the opposition will increase pressure on Mba to compromise with it. How- ever,he has shown no willingness to do so., and his principal oppo- nents are unlikely to accept any- thing short of his ouster. SECRET 17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 9 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 The forced resignation of Prime Minister Field on 13 April is the latest indication that Southern Rhodesia's 200,- 000 whites are still drifting toward more extreme and inflex- ible positions, both on racial matters and on the question of the territory's independence. Their continued intransigence seems likely to accentuate the trend toward violence among the 3.7 million Africans. A majority within Field's Rhodesian Front party had long been dissatisfied with his leadership. In particular, this group felt he had not been forceful enough in his efforts to secure Southern Rhodesia's independence from Britain. Ian Smith, Field's successor, can be expected to press harder for independence, while using the formidable battery of existing security legislation to control the African nationalists. Southern Rhodesia already has virtually de facto independ- ence, but the drive for com- plete sovereignty under the present constitution--which assures white control for many years--has become an emotional issue for the whites. Britain has said that formal independ- ence can come only when the constitution provides a broader base for African representation. Sentiment is strong among the whites for a unilateral declaration of independence, despite the fact that an inde- pendent Southern Rhodesia under white control would have great difficulty obtaining interna- tional recognition. Field seems to have been convinced that independence would be a questionable blessing at best, but Smith and the majority of the Rhodesian Front apparently are willing to press forward willy-nilly. Field's wing of the party might eventually split with Smith and join the relatively liberal white opposition party of Sir Edgar Whitehead. Defec- tion of only three members of the Rhodesian Front would leave it in a minority in the legis- lature. Such a development might provide an opening for the return to politics of Sir Roy Welensky, last premier of the defunct Rhodesian Federa- tion and still the most popular figure in Southern Rhodesia. Welensky formerly occupied a fairly conservative position in the white political spectrum, but, with the recent shift to- ward the right, he now appears relatively moderate. Even if he does re-enter politics, how- ever, his considerable politi- among the white electorate. cal abilities would be chal- lenged by the extremist drift SECRET Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 ;v Kormakitj Temh os Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 SECRET The expected arrival of the Finnish and Irish contin- gents this coming week will bring the UN peace-keeping .force to near its full strength of 7,000. Meanwhile, British and Canadian UN troops, who have been trying to arrange cease-fires, have been fired on by both sides. Fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots has been con- centrated mainly in the Kyrenia Pass area, with sporadic firing along the "Green Line," which separates the two communities in Nicosia. The Turkish Army contingent north of Nicosia has also been fired on, and its com- mander has warned that further attacks will lead to retalia- tion. Ankara has stepped up its attacks on Greek privileges in Turkey and apparently is trying to use this kind of pressure to force Athens to make concessions over Cyprus. Some Turks are de- manding that the government move against the 60,000 ethnic Greeks who are Turkish citizens, and even against Orthodox Patriarch Athenagoras, as well as against some 10,000 Greek citizens re- siding in Turkey. So far, how- ever, Ankara has confined most of its moves to the latter group. It has abrogated the 1930 treaty which gives Greek citizens spe- cial privileges, ordered the deportation of an increasing number of Greek residents, en- forced business and professional restrictions on Greek nation- als, and revoked the Turkish citizenship of some secondary figures in the Orthodox Patri- archate. Ankara has also re- stricted Greek travel privileges in Turkey and extended Turkish territorial waters from six to twelve miles, an action which will adversely affect Greek fish- ing interests. Turkish-US relations are also being strained by the Cy- prus controversy. The Turks complain more and more that the US is either unable or unwill- ing to bring pressure on Greece and on Makarios to ease the pres- sure on the Turkish Cypriots. Anti-Americanism is increasing in the press and among student groups. A left-wing columnist in a widely circulated independ- ent newspaper has called for a review of US base rights in Turkey. SECRET 17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Iq Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 SECRET Western Hemisphere NEW BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT INSTALLED The almost complete preoc- cupation of Brazil's leaders with the purge of Communists and other subversives from the government and armed forces is yielding to the task of devis- ing administration policies. The new president, General Hum- berto Castello Branco, assumed office on 15 April after his election by Congress to fill the unexpired term of ousted President Goulart. He will serve until January 1966, when the winner of the election sched- uled for October 1965 takes over. Widely respected in and out of the military, Castello Branco is generally regarded as an intellectual with no personal political ambitions. Although he lacks political experience, he is considered the Logical choice to give unity to the provisional leadership. The makeup of the new ad- ministration reflects a strong emphasis on career officials of pro-Western orientation. Both the foreign minister and the minister of finance, for example, have had long govern- ment experience in their fields. The three military ministers, notably War Minister Costa e Silva, are likely to exercise important influence on govern- ment policy in general. 17 Apr 64 The new government inher- its a number of major problems, including Brazil's huge exter- nal debt, and inflation that continues to increase at the rate of more than 8 percent a month. There is also heavy pressure for social reforms and for overhauling the Communist- ridden labor movement. Castello Branco possesses greatly increased executive powers to deal with these prob- lems as a result of the so- called "institutional act" de- creed last week by the military command which overthrew Goulart. For example, Congress now is required to act within 30 days on bills proposed by the admin- istration. Failure to do so will constitute approval. The president also has been granted authority to propose constitu- tional amendments. The "clean-up operation" against Communists and other extreme leftists continues, al- though at a somewhat slower pace. The military have revoked the mandates of some 40 congress- men and suspended their politi- cal rights, as well as the rights of many others. In the armed forces more than 120 officers, including approximately 25 gen- erals and admirals,have been transferred to reserve status for political reasons. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 15 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 SECRET Western Hemisphere Argentina, Colombia, Chile, and Peru are among the growing number of Latin American govern- ments which have announced they will continue relations with Brazil, but Mexico still has reservations. There is consid- erable pressure on the new re- gime to sever relations with Cuba. Castello Branco report- edly said he intends to take a hard line on Cuba and has not ruled out a complete break. Havana's ambassador returned to Cuba with many of his staff shortly after the anti-Goulart revolt began. UNCERTAINTY CONTINUES IN CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL RACE The three-way Chilean presi- dential race is settling down to hard campaigning, after the interruption caused by Senator Duran's withdrawal and subse- quent renewal of his candidacy. The large Radical Party (PR), for which Duran now is running, shows signs of closing ranks to deny support to Senator Salvador Allende, nominee of the Communist-Socialist front (FRAP). Some militant left- wing Radicals earlier had wanted the party to endorse Allende formally, and threatened to back him in any event. A few apparently are persisting in this desire. Sepulveda, who would have pre- ferred a single candidate-- presumably Frei--to oppose Allende, added that the PDC left wing's hostile attitude toward the Chilean right may drive Liberals and Conservatives into the Duran camp. Duran reportedly has indi- cated that if he finishes second, he will fight for election by Congress, which makes the final decision in the event no candi- date receives a majority. Its present center-right majority and large PR delegation would strongly favor him over either Allende or Frei. Frei reportedly believes that this now is Duian's strategy. Speculation continues about the possible effects of Duran's candidacy on the fortunes of Allende and the Christian Demo- cratic (PDC) candidate, Senator Eduardo Frei. Liberal Party chairman Sepulveda has expressed the fear that Duran will take Liberal and Conservative votes away from Frei, which would give Allende the victory by "divid- ing the democratic forces." To counter the Communist- Socialist appeal to the peasant vote, the PDC plans to increase its party workers in rural areas from 70 to 600. The PAC ex- pects some Socialists will come out for Frei, but this would be significant mainly for its propaganda value. SECRET 17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 SECRET Western Hemisphere There is rising dissatisfac- tion in Guatemala among both right- ists and leftists barred from par- ticipation in the elections for a constituent assembly on 24 May. Any attempt by these or other op- position elements to cause trouble would give new opportunities to guerrilla forces. It could also lead the Peralta regime to reim- pose the state of siege it lifted on 30 March. The largely civilian adminis- tration under Colonel Peralta has a good record of economic and so- cial accomplishment in the year since Guatemalan military leaders ousted President Ydigoras. Before lifting the state of siege, however, Peralta took pains to ensure gov- ernment control over future politi- cal activity through decree legisla- tion and some preventive arrests which were politically ill advised. Participation in the May election is to be restricted to three mod- erate leftist-to-centrist parties favored by the regime. This has encouraged parties on the outside to work together. Parties which supported leftist former Presi- dent Juan Jose Arevalo reportedly are again forming an opposition alli:- ance. Some of their leaders are said to be discussing opposition tactics with guerrilla leaders. At the same time, rightists--includ- ing representatives of Ydigoras and perennial candidate Cruz Sala- zar--are also working to arouse public opinion against Peralta's schedule for a return to consti- tutionality by 1965. They may join leftists in efforts to post- pone the elections and broaden the ground rules for political activ- ity. If wealthy rightists conclude that they have no chance to regain power electorally, they might try to oust Peralta. On 11 April, guerrillas op- erating in the mountainous areas of Izabal Province murdered a second army officer whom they had marked for elimination because of his role in the government's extensive antiguerrilla efforts. The guerrillas' continued ability to make lightning attacks on specific targets of their own choice indicates that they are prepared to take advantage of political tensions and that they SECRET 17 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7 I/Lf L.IL\LJ & .SFCRF,T Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080001-7