COMMUNIST UNIONS GAIN IN INDIA'S LABOR MOVEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 17, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

,qW 17 April 1964
COMMUNIST UNIONS GAIN IN INDIA'S LABOR MOVEMENT
State Dept. review completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080002-6
 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080002-6
Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080002-6
 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080002-6
SECRET
17 April 1964
COMMUNIST UNIONS GAIN IN INDIA'S LABOR MOVEMENT
The Communist-dominated All-India Trade Union
Congress (AITUC), India's second largest trade union
federation, reportedly has abandoned the attitude
of moderation it adopted after the Chinese Communist
invasions of Indian territory in late 1962. AITUC
now has opened a new offensive against the ruling
Congress Party and the'labor unions associated with
it, especially the Indian National Trade Union Con-
gress (INTUC), the country's largest federation.
INTUC appears to be in no condition to oppose the
Communist attack effectively. AITUC may wean a sig-
nificant number of adherents away from INTUC and make
major gains in the labor field before government
leaders in New Delhi are moved to take the problem
in hand.
For some six months after
the Chinese invasions of October
1962, Indian labor organizations
acquiesced in the government's
desire for industrial peace and
cooperated in the defense ef-
fort. By mid-1963, however,
the sense of national emergency
had worn off, and labor leaders
had come to feel that manage-
ment had not adhered to the in-
dustrial truce as faithfully as
had labor. A rash of demonstra-
tions and strikes in the latter
half of 1963, sparked by the
labor wings of minor opposition
parties, indicated that the
situation had returned to "nor-
mal. "
Labor unrest centered
around the questions of high
taxes and a compulsory "savings"
scheme which the government had
instituted during the emergency
to encourage small savings. Agi-
tation also hit at the govern-
ment's apparent inability to
prevent marked price rises in
consumer goods, especially food.
Further irritation followed the
publication of government studies
indicating that consumer price
indexes, to which many wages are
pegged, are obsolete and mislead-
ing.
Communist-controlled labor
organizations lagged somewhat be-
hind in the agitation during the
third quarter of 1963, but by
late 1963 AITUC-affiliated unions
had begun to take advantage of
the situation to discredit INTUC
leaders and actions. The Commu-
nists urged higher cost-of -liv-
ing allowances, larger bonuses
for workers, and suggested the
nationalization of banks and
other institutions.
The AITUC is India's oldest
labor federation. It claims
about a million members, although
government authorities allow it
a "verified" membership of only
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080002-6
 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080002-6
SECRET
about half that much. Although
the Communist Party as a whole
lost some political support af-
ter the Chinese invasions, and
on 9 April 1964 the pro-Soviet
and pro-Chinese factions within
the party reached the point of
an open break, the AITUC leaders
--who are mainly pro-Soviet in
outlook--have been able to re-
tain the allegiance of their fol-
lowers and apparently have main-
tained their organization vir-
tually intact. With the possi-
ble exception of AITUC unions
in Calcutta, the party split is
not likely to impair the effec-
tiveness of the AITUC leaders'
campaign.
Much of their success has
also been due to their policy
of concentrating on local labor
issues and on developing pro-
Communist union leaders from
among the workers actually em-
ployed in industrial plants.
Non-Communist union leaders, by
contrast, are frequently out-
siders, not actually employed
in the plant, who have little
knowledge of working conditions
and who seek primarily to use
worker support to further their
political ambitions.
AITUC has become strongly
entrenched in such strategic
fields as ports, railways, posts
and telegraphs, aircraft manu-
facturing, defense production,
heavy industry, and electronics.
Evidently the Communists now
feel sufficiently confident of
their strength to make a major
bid to increase AITUC's influ-
ence.
As a political prelude,
the Communist Party last Septem-
ber mobilized 50,000 persons
from all over India for a mass
march to present to Parliament
a "Great Petition," allegedly
signed by more than 10 million
people, protesting against ris-
ing prices, high taxes, and en-
forced savings. The Communists
presumably also hope to exploit
weaknesses in the Congress Party's
present leadership, the pres-
sures being exerted on New Delhi
by Pakistan and Communist China,
and the evident shortcomings in
India's Third Five-Year Plan.
The AITUC Campaign
The activities of AITUC
during the past six months have
aimed at both organizational ex-
pansion and more widespread agi-
tation. Organizational efforts
have included drives--as at the
steel-producing center in Bhilai
--seeking recognition of Commu-
nist unions as chief bargaining
agents. Communist unions have
also moved into areas neglected
by INTUC as a result of its in-
tramural jurisdictional disputes.
During December, efforts
were under way to form new unions
to compete with pro - Congress
Party unions among the textile
workers in Gujarat State, the
Congress Party's oldest and larg-
est labor stronghold. One Com-
munist meeting held in Ahmedabad,
Gujarat's capital, drew an at-
tendance eight times as large as
that at a simultaneous meeting
being addressed by the then na-
tional labor minister, Gulzarilal
Na nd a .
2 SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080002-6
 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080002-6
'-F V
SECRET
In the agitation field,
AITUC in mid-December organized
a conference to draw up new de-
mands for raises in wages to
match rising costs of living.
Pro-Communist textile unions in
Bombay on 13 and 14 December or-
dered 30,000 members to strike
in protest against high prices
and low wages. On 31 December
they organized an impressive pro-
cession of 10,000 persons in Bom-
bay in support of the same cause.
On 30 March, the Communist-
dominated union at the govern-
ment-controlled Heavy Electri-
cals, Ltd., in Bhopal forced
closure of the plant "for an in-
definite period." The plant had
been plagued by continuing un-
rest resulting from the Commu-
nist union's demands that it be
recognized as representing a ma-
jority of workers. The unrest
involved acts of indiscipline,
intimidation, and sabotage in
defiance of a government defense
edict banning agitational activ-
ity for three months. Also last
month, AITUC attempted a hunger
strike in Calcutta.
One effect of these AITUC
activities has been to cause
Praja Socialist and Socialist
Party leaders to attempt to main-
tain an equally high level of
labor agitation among trade un-
ions affiliated with those
parties. Among other things,
these leaders are discussing
plans for a country-wide, one-day
token strike this spring to pro-
test price rises. The net re-
sult of these combined Communist
and non-Communist efforts has
been to raise the level of labor
agitation significantly through-
out the country in recent months.
INTUC is not now in a posi-
tion to counter the Communist
offensive, even though it is In-
dia's largest labor federation,
claiming about 1.5 million ad-
herents and with a government-
verified membership of approxi-
mately a million. Although INTUC
is formally independent of the
Congress Party, it was founded
by the party's labor wing and
depends in large measure on pro-
tection and patronage by the Con-
gress government in New Delhi.
At present, however, this
affiliation with Congress is
more a source of weakness than
of strength. Throughout the
postinvasion period of 1963,
INTUC's leaders cooperated with
the government in maintaining
labor-management peace and in
supporting unpopular new tax
schemes. Since the national
emergency is still legally in
effect, INTUC still finds it-
self unable to challenge govern-
ment policy on the three major
issues agitating workers through-
out the country--rising prices,
high taxes, and low wages. More-
over, it has not benefited from
the withdrawal of the unpopular
compulsory "savings" scheme.
Furthermore, INTUC suffers
from poor organization, absence
of an attractive program, lack
of a good propaganda machine,
and,especially,from the same in-
tense factionalism among its
leaders as now characterizes
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400080002-6
 0% A%
Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080002-6
SECRET
much of the Congress Party.
INTUC has never developed out-
standing labor organizers. Its
leaders, many of whom are pri-
marily politicians rather than
workers, have never attempted
to develop a tight federation
organization. There still are
many independent unions sympa-
thetic to the Congress Party who
nevertheless compete with INTUC
for workers' loyalties.
gress chief minister, and there
is a serious threat that it and
dozens of other Bihar unions un-
der the present leaders will be
exposed to Communist take-over.
INTUC leaders in virtually
every Indian state are engaged
in petty quarrels and personal
rivalries. In Madhya Pradesh,
for example, the Indore mill
workers' association, once a
strong and well-administered or-
ganization, is being pulled
apart by a contest between the
president of the union and the
state labor minister--once close
associates in building state la-
bor organizations. Not only have
the two factions used consider-
able violence against each other,
but the labor minister has al-
ienated the loyalties of the
union president's wife, who now
is living with the minister.
In Madras, an INTUC na-
tional vice president is engaged
in pirating members--sometimes
with Communist help--away from
well-established unions in Madras
City.
In Bihar, the INTUC organi-
zation at the Tata Iron and Steel
Corporation at Jamshedpur, long
victim of a factional fight
among its leaders, now is being
manipulated by the state's Con-
The Communists are clearly
the residual beneficiaries of
INTUC's disarray, their own
positive efforts aside. In
Mysore State, for example, the
Communists have moved into for-
mer INTUC strongholds among gold
mine and coffee plantation work-
ers, and in Bombay a minor po-
litical party allied with Con-
gress felt compelled to establish
a new textile workers' union be-
cause the crack-up of the INTUC
organization left the field open
to the Communists.
Unless INTUC's politically
oriented leadership is able to
get the Congress Party's house in
order, the AITUC stands to make
further gains. The US labor at-
tache in New Delhi believes the
AITUC has an opportunity to make
a major breakthough. If it
does so, there will be not only
a further debilitating impact on
the Indian Government's effort to
build up military strength against
the Chinese Communists, but Con-
gress Party political leadership
in India will have lost another
source of grass-roots support.
4 SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080002-6
 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080002-6
I%W Nome
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400080002-6