WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004400110001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For
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(Information as of 1200 EDT, 7 May 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page
MOSCOW CHALLENGES LEGALITY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP 1
A new Soviet attack on the Chinese party challenges the
legality of its leadership and current policies on the
ground that, since it failed to hold a congress in 1961
as party rules required, the "plenipotentiary powers of
the central committee have expired."
USSR CUTS PUBLISHED ECONOMIC INFORMATION
The USSR's statistical digest for 1963, issued last
month, is a third smaller than the 1962 edition, and
omits data previously provided on key economic sectors.
ULBRICHT BEGINS BLOC CONSULTATIONS
The East German leader, concerned about the growing iso-
lation of his hard-line regime as a result of moves by
his Communist neighbors toward detente with the West, will
meet this month with Hungary's Kadar-and with Khrushchev.
NORTH KOREA WINS WIDER RECOGNITION OUTSIDE THE BLOC
Indonesia is the latest of eight non-Communist coun-
tries to recognize North Korea. Especially important
to Pyongyang is the probability that the Indonesians
now will work actively on its behalf at the UN.
LAOTIAN RIGHTISTS PUSH ROLE IN GOVERNMENT
Leaders of the 19 April coup apparently were behind
the reorganization General Phoumi announced this week
in the name of Premier Souvanna. Both Pathet Lao and
neutralists are suspicious of this maneuvering.
NEW MOVES BY SAIGON REGIME TO COMBAT VIET LONG
The government is adopting new political measures to
undercut the Viet Cong's appeal, and continues mili-
tary moves aimed mainly at Communist base areas.
SECRET
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
ADDITIONAL SOVIET ECONOMIC AID FOR INDIA
The USSR will help build the first stage of India's
Bokaro steel plant, will provide assistance to expand
the Bhilai steel complex--an earlier Soviet aid proj-
ect--and will probably offer additional large-scale aid
for India's second five--year plan beginning in 1966.
AREA NOTE
On Kashmir
SOUTH ARABIAN TENSIONS EMBITTER BRITISH-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS 8
Military and political frustrations are continuing to
plague both Britain and Egypt in the southwest corner
of the Arabian peninsula as relations between the two
countries further deteriorate.
THE CYPRUS SITUATION
Wh~.le the island has been relatively calm, diplomatic
efforts to ease tensions and achieve a political solu-
tion have made no progress.
PROBLEMS OF THE NEW TANGANYIKA-ZANZIBAR UNION
Dar-es-Salaam is moving cautiously in assigning Tan-
ganyikans to key posts on Zanzibar, and the Zanzibari
leaders are trying to retain the greatest possible
authority, especially in foreign relations.
PROVINCIAL DISSIDENCE FURTHER STRAINS CONGO ARMY
Renewed disturbances in Kivu, which are at least partly
extratribal in nature, are drawing army units away from
other trouble spots and are in a remote area difficult
to police.
UNREST GROWING IN UPPER VOLTA
Dissatisfaction with gro-Western President Yameogo's
autocratic rule may be building toward an explosion.
SECRET
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SECRET
NATO OF THE EVE OF ITS SPRING MINISTERIAL MEETING
France's withdrawal of its naval officers from the inte-
grated commands and the increasing Greek-Turkish antag-
onism are symptomatic of the political difficulties fac-
ing NATO. The decision not to include defense ministers
at this year's meeting reflects lack of progress in deal-
ing with defense issues.
DE GAULLE RETURNS TO WORK
His resumption of an active schedule supports the offi-
cial pronouncement that his recent operation was without
complications. De Gaulle probably has still not decided
whether or not to seek another seven-year term.
PROBLEMS OF ITALY'S CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT
Rightist and leftist opponents are capitalizing on the
government's dilemma of having to take unpopular "aus-
terity" measures while it is trying to project the im-
age of a center-left coalition committed to a program.
of reforms which will be costly to implement.
AREA NOTES
On EEC and the Kennedy Round and on Malta 1?
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
HAVANA AND MOSCOW CONTINUE OFFENSIVE AGAINST US OVERFLIGHTS 18
Castro's May Day speech stressed his independence of the
USSR on this issue, suggesting that his ultimate goal is
to draw the US into bilateral talks on US-Cuban differ-
ences. Khrushchev's May Day speech maintained Moscow's
firm support for Castro's political offensive.
SECRET
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SECRET '~''
WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
TROUBLED ATMOSPHERE IN PANAMA FOR ELECTION WEEKEND
There is widespread uneasiness as the bitterly contest-
ed campaign for the 10 May national election draws to a
close, and violent clashes sparked by government forces,
opposition groups, and Cuban-trained revolutionaries--
all armed--could erupt at any time.
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DOMINICAN TAXI DRIVERS' STRIKE 20
The strike has developed into a test of strength be-
tween the ruling triumvirate, which wants a period of
calm before calling elections, and those parties which
believe the regime and its military backers will never
allow fair elections.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
There is a growing feeling in Chile that the best way
to keep the Communist-Socialist candidate out of the
presidency this fall is to leave the issue to Congress,
which must choose between the two leading contenders
if no one receives a majority of the popular vote.
On Argentina
SECRET
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CHINESE COMMUNIST NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL PARTY CONGRESSES SINCE 1956
The 1956 Chinese Communist Party Constitution requires that a national party congress be formed every
five years and meet annually. Plenary sessions of the party central committee, which is responsible for
party work when the congress is not in session, are required twice yearly (See Chart Item A). Provincial
party congresses, which must also convene annually, have three-year terms (See Chart Item B).
The chart shows how the Chinese Communists have ignored party statutes on the holding of party
congresses. The next national congress, the 9th, is now three years overdue. Not a single province or
special municipality has held all its congresses on schedule since 1956, and fourteen of these jurisdictions
(or half the total) have apparently failed even to form a new congress.
Figure in blue indicates which Session met during given year.
Figure in red indicates which Congress met during given year.
Figure in i ~~ indicates which :;:" ~~ ~:.=r?, met during given year.
Asterisk (*) indicates date is uncertain because meeting was not announced.
SHANSI
__ _ __ _ .
INNER MONGOLIA
AUTONOMOUS REGION
LIAONING
.........................
__.
KIRIN
FIEILUNGKIANG
SHENSI
KANSU
_. __ _._
NINGHSIA-HUI
AUTONOMOUS REGION
_. __ _..
TSINGHAI
AUTONOMOUS REGION
_.. _.
SHANTUNG
KWANGSI-CHUANG
AUTONOMOUS REGION
SZECHWAN
KWEICHOW
YUNNAN
TIBET WORK COMMITTEE
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SECRET
Moscow now has come out with
a series of slashing attacks on
the Chinese Communist Party which
challenges the legality of both
the party leadership and its cur-
rent policies. The main Soviet
argument, carried by Pravda on 28
and 29 April, is that ping has
not convened a party congress since
1956, although party rules call
for one every five years, and that
therefore the "plenipotentiary
powers of the central committee
have expired." Pravda also noted
that since 1956 ~Tie~~iinese party
has increased from almost Llmillion
to 18 million members and that the 7
million new members have been de-
prived of their right to elect
their leaders or express their
views on current policies.
Peiping's failure to hold a
congress in 1961 was actually due
not to perversity but to the many
difficulties then facing the lead-
ership. With the crash of the
Great Leap Forward echoing in
their ears and the Sino-Soviet
dispute still in a somewhat ambir;_
uous phase, Chinese leaders un-
doubtedly deemed it inappropriate
to hold a congress at that time.
Since then, however, the un-
certainties that prevented a con-
vocation have been reduced, and
pressure for a new congress is un-
doubtedly mounting. Peiping has
nevertheless given no hint of its
plans, and, because preparations
for a congress take many months
(11 months' notice was given for
the eighth congress), the Chinese
would have to start at once in
order to hold one by the end of
the year. Moscaw now has faced
them with a dilemma: if they were
suddenly to announce plans for a
congress it would appear to be
merely a defensive response to the
Soviet attack; however, if they
try to avoid this stigma, they
leave themselves open to further
attacks on the legality of their
actions.
There are pressing internal
reasons far calling a congress.
Many of the decisions made at the
eighth congress support current
Soviet doctrinal views and thus
are completely at variance with the
present positions of the Chinese
leadership. These decisions, al-
though hopelessly outdated, are
nevertheless legally still in
force, a point often made by Mos-
cow and the pro-Soviet Communist
parties. There is also an urgent
need to bring new life into the
party leadership and to remove
deadwood, while confirming the
roles of the active members of the
present leadership--tasks that le -
gally can be accomplished only at
a party congress.
If Peiping decides it must
hold a congress soon, tactical con-
siderations arising from the Sino-
Soviet dispute might make this fall
a good time to be engaged in prep-
arations. The Chinese have indi-
cated they prefer to put off a
meeting of world Communist parties
until next year, and would want to
hold their own congress first so
that they could face their enemies
fully armed with new national party
decisions. Such timing would give 25X1
Peiping an excuse to reject any
renewed Soviet call for an interna-
tional meeting this fall.
SECRET
8 May 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1
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SECRET
USSR CUTS PUBLISHED ECONOMIC INFORMATION
Following a very poor
per-
to permit detailed analysis.
formance by the economy in
1963,
The one national income chart
Moscow has sharply reduced
the
printed is an index of yearly
economic information it is
mak-
change expressed as a percent-
ing public. The USSR's statisti-
cal digest for 1963, issued last
age of the year 1940.
month, is one third--about
140
One useful fact was
re-
pages--smaller than the 1962 edi-
leased: total investment
rose
tion.
only 2.7 percent in 1963.
This
figure is well below the
very
The key agricultural and
investment sections have been
drastically shortened. There
is no production data on the
grain crop, estimated to be the
worst in a number of years. Pro-
duction in the New Lands, which
experienced a major crop failure,
is not mentioned.
Information on the growth
of national income is too scanty
mediocre 4.9-percent increase
achieved in 1962 and is the low-
est rate ever recorded in So-
viet statistics for this category.
A larger compilation called
"The National Economy of the
USSR," which generally appears
in early autumn, may contain
some of the information con-
spicuously absent from the pres-
SECRET
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ULBRICHT BEGINS BLOC CONSULTATIONS
East German party boss
Ulbricht's deep concern about
the growing political isolation
of his regime in the Soviet bloc
is reflected in his plans to
meet this month with Hungary's
Kadar and Khrushchev. Ulbricht's
basic and probably inescapable
dilemma is his inability to join
his Communist neighbors' moves
toward detente with the West
without destroying the Stalinist
underpinnings of his power.
Ulbricht is in Hungary now
heading the first East German
party-government delegation to
visit there since the 1956 rev-
olution. An East German cor-
respondent writing from Buda-
pest implied that economic re-
lations--"not easy in any case"
--will play only a minor role
in the visit. He suggests UL-
bricht's main concern will be
relations between the East Ger-
man and Hungarian parties in
view of "Chinese attempts at
splitting."
Kadar 's relatively moder-
ate, de-Stalinized regime stands
in sharp contrast to Ulbricht 's
dogmatic police state. Kadar
would prefer to "heal" the Sino-
Soviet rift, while Ulbricht
favors taking "a resolute stand"
against Peiping--whose propaganda
is attractive to hard-line ele-
ments in his party. Budapest
is improving its relations with
the West, particularly with Bonn,
but East Germany is committed to
anti-Western and especially anti-
West German policies. It is un-
likely that these basic differ-
ences will be resolved, but any
public reconciliation would im-
prove Ulbricht's image and make
the visit a propaganda success.
The USSR, which Ulbricht
is visiting at the end of May
for the third time this year,
is responsible for some of his
main problems. The East German
regime is still smarting from
the Soviet "backdown" on Berlin
and on a German peace treaty and
has been forced to continue to
support Moscow's "flexible"
policy on Germany.
Ulbricht will probably
seek Khrushchev's help in clari-
fying East Germany's anomalous
position in Eastern Europe.
Since the Soviet leader appears
unwilling to make the Berlin and
German question a major test of
East-West strength, it is likely
that Ulbricht will have to be
content with the standard props -
ganda support which his party-
government visit will evoke.
SE C'RET
8 May 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
North Korea's intensive
drive for wider international
recognition has recently scored
new successes, with the promise
of more to come. These are the
result of visits by two North
Korean delegations to the free
world; one to Africa and the
other to Southeast Asia. The
one succeeded in establishing
full diplomatic relations with
Indonesia, and the other report-
edly received assurance that Ghana
also will recognize Pyongyang.
Six of the eight non-Communist
states which now recognize the
North Korean regime have granted
recognition since the beginning
of 1963 .
Recognition by Indonesia
is a major victory for Pyongyang
and may encourage some wavering
neutralist nations to follow
suit. An important factor for
Pyongyang is the probability
that Indonesia now will work ac-
tively on behalf of North Korea
at the United Nations.
The North Korean parliamen-
tary delegation which visited In-
donesia, Cambodia, and Ceylon in
April and May also signed a cul-
tural and scientific cooperation
agreement with Cambodia.
The North Korean delegation
to Africa returned to Pyongyang
on 28 April after a 2-month swing
through Ghana, Guinea,Senegal,
and Niger. The most notable
achievement of this group was
the reported agreement with
Ghana. The delegation also
signed a cultural agreement with
Niger. Guinea already recognizes
North Korea.
Other countries recognizing
North Korea include Algeria,
Yemen, the United Arab Republic,
Mali, and Zanzibar. Although
the Ugandan Government has rec-
ognized North Korea, vigorous
South Korean activity in Uganda
has been instrumental in prevent-
ing accreditation of North Ko-
rean diplomatic representatives.
ROK representatives have also
effectively blocked Pyongyang's
efforts in Kenya, where Seoul
now has a charge. The status
of North Korean relations with
Zanzibar is unclear, pending
clarification of the situation
resulting from its merger with
Tanganyika.
The Republic of Korea still
holds a three to one advantage over
North Korea in terms of interna-
tional recognition. Seoul's pres-
ent strong position has been gained
by intensive diplomatic efforts un-
dertaken since the fall of Presi-
dent Rhee in 1960. Pyongyang's 25X1
present strenuous efforts, however,
will probably reduce South Korea's
advantage.
SECRET
8 May 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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`"' SECRET `"~
Rightist elements in Laos are
pushing a reorganization of the
government in the face of Pathet
Lao opposition.
General Phoumi on 5 May an-
nounced that Premier Souvanna had
agreed to changes in the cabinet
ostensibly designed to improve its
efficiency. The changes specified
involve replacing two left-leaning
neutralists now out of the country,
and naming a successor to the late
foreign minister, Quinim Pholsena,
who was assassinated in April 1963.
Phoumi also indicated that the two
Pathet Lao ministers, Prince Sou-
phannouvong and Phoumi Vongvichit,
would be "temporarily" replaced
pending their return to Vientiane.
going through the motions of re-
storing power to Souvanna, but
would continue to "manipulate,
harass and intrigue" behind the
scenes. Another neutralist leader,
Minister of Interior Pheng Phong-
savan, remains in the Soviet Em-
bassy where he fled following the
coup. He has refused to join Sou-
vanna on the grounds that his per-
sonal safety is not assured.
Souvanna, who met with Sou-
phannouvong on 4 May, apparently
remains hopeful of working out a
solution. Publicly he has main-
tained that he is in authority.
This announcement, although
ostensibly having Souvanna 's ap-
proval, apparently was instigated
by the leaders of the 19 April
coup.
The Pathet Lao, however, con-
tinue to oppose any change in the
cabinet lineup. They have charged
that Phoumi's announcement was
"dangerous" and that the rightists
are bent on destroying the coali-
tion government. They have de-
manded the dissolution of the coup
committee and called for a renewal
of tripartite talks.
Neutralist elements, too,are
suspicious of right-wing intentions
and see little prospect for an early
solution to the present government
crisis. General Soukan Vilaysarn,
a key Souvanna aide, on 4 May as-
serted that rightist leaders were
The military situation con-
tinues fluid. On the northern
edge of the Plaine des Jarres,
Pathet Lao units have moved just
to the west of Phou San and pose
a threat to the road linking the
neutralist headquarters at Muong
Phanh with Muong Kheung, a major
post approximately 10 miles to the
north. In the area east and south-
east of the plain, Communist
forces have continued their pres-
sure against right-wing regular
and guerrilla forces. Three
rightist battalions have been
driven from positions southeast of
Ban Ban which they had used as
bases for interdiction raids
against Route ?. Farther south, a
build-up of Pathet Lao troops has
been reported above Tha Thom. 25X1
SECRET
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"'~ SECRET `''
The Khanh government in
South Vietnam continues to
demonstrate awareness of the
importance of socio-economic
reforms to bolster its military
effort against the Viet Cong.
Saigon is taking steps to
allocate some $20 million direct
to provincial administrations
to speed up local pacification
programs. The government has
also formulated liberal new
credit terms which would enable
peasants to acquire land at
small cost, as well as new
measures to curb profiteering
by provincial officials and
absentee landlords. Such moves,
if properly implemented, could
do much to recapture the psycho-
logical initiative from the
Communists.
On 30 April, General Khanh
granted amnesty to some 2,000
political prisoners. The amnesty
announcement stressed the govern-
ment's intent to utilize national
resources for schools and social
welfare rather than to maintain
prisons.
Government military activ-
ity continues at a relatively
high rate, taxgeted primarily
against Viet Cong base areas.
A major government operation
has been in progress since 25
April in the Communist-controlled
Do Xa area of the northern prov-
ince of Quang Ngai. Government
forces have captured a sizable
quantity of weapons and supplies
but have established little con-
tact with the Viet Cong regi-
mental elements reported to be
in the area. Large-scale
government operations in the
delta provinces of Chuong Thien
and Kien Phang have brought
similar results.
The Viet Cong have shown
an increased effectiveness in
antiaircraft fire involving
not only small arms but also
30 - and 50-caliber machine
guns. Over 40 aircraft were
hit--and three brought down--
by Viet Cong ground fire on the
opening day of the Quang Ngai
operation. Communist ground fire
is also suspected in the crash
of the US Army Caribou trans-
port on 5 May in the delta
province of Dinh Duong in which
ten Americans and five Viet-
namese were killed.
A major problem in the
government's counterinsurgency
effort is the increasing number
of desertions, coupled with a
lag in conscription and recruit-
ment. The desertion in the
regular forces doubled during
the first three months of 1964,
and has increased substantially
in the paramilitary forces,
which bear the brunt of local
clashes with the Viet Cong. At
the same time, the government
has failed both to establish new
recruitment quotas and to fill
existing conscription quotas.
US military authorities esti-
mate that, even if the quotas
were filled, the present down-
ward trend in troop strengths
could not be reversed before
August.
SECRET
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SECRET
Moscow is providing new
assistance for India's basic
industries. After several months
of negotiation, the USSR re-
cently agreed to help build the
first stage of the Bokaro steel
project. Another Soviet-aided
steel project, the highly suc-
cessf ul plant at Bhilai completed
in 1961, is being expanded to
an annual capacity of 1 million
tons to 2.5 million tons--also
with Moscow's assistance. Ad-
ditional large-scale Soviet aid
for heavy industry is expected
for India's fourth five-year
plan, which begins in 1966.
A
Soviet team will soon go to New
Delhi to work out details. Con-
struction is expected to begin
by the end of the year and, ac-
cording to Indian Steel Minis-
ter Subarmaniam, the first stage
--with a capacity of 1.5 million
tons a year--is scheduled to be
in operation by 196?. India then
plans to expand Bokaro's annual
Kashmir: The current talks
between l~r me Minister. Nehru and
Sheikh Abdullah, recently freed
popular hero of Kashmir, have
dealt thus far mainly in gener-
alities, with no serious effort
to come to grips with such crit-
ical issues as Kashmir's con-
stitutional status. Each side
appears to be only probing the
other''s defenses. The Indian
position apparently has hardened
recently in response to mounting
capacity to 4 million tons by
1972.
The USSR, which recently
tightened up its foreign aid
criteria, had been reluctant to
assume full responsibility for
this long-term project. India's
move to reduce project costs to
more manageable levels along with
possible participation of Western
countries, presumably influenced
Moscow's decision to offer assist-
ance. The total foreign exchange
cost of the Bokaro plant, if ex-
panded to 4-million-ton capacity,
is estimated at about $500 million.
Since 1955 the Soviets have
given India about $800 million
in economic aid, their largest
program outside of the Communist
world. Almost all of it has
been for heavy industrial proj-
ects, and mare than a quarter of
it went into the Bhilai steel
complex. Other Soviet-aided
projects are centered in the gov-
ernment-owned oil extraction and
refining and electric ower in-
dustries.
pressure by New Delhi politicians
to stand firm. The Indians ap-
parently plan at this point to
restrict discussions to a general
exchange of views aimed at allow-
ing the heated Kashmir question
to cool off. Specifics could
then be considered in meetings
held after the current UN Secu -
rity Council deliberations on the
disputed state have ended and the
Indian Parliament has ad:lourned
late this month.
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8 May 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page
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firs ,5~+'L;11L'1' ~ Asia-Africa
Military and political
frustrations are continuing to
plague both Britain and Egypt
in the southwest corner of the
Arabian peninsula as relations
between the two countries fur-
ther deteriorate.
President Nasir seems in-
creasingly concerned with his
inability to end the drawn-out
guerrilla war in Yemen, where
40,000 Egyptian troops now are
deployed--a new high. He vis-
ited Yemen during the last week
in April, apparently with the
primary purpose of shoring up
the shaky and internally divided
republican regime. A govern-
mental reorganization announced
while he was there will red
the role of
President Sallal.
In addition, Nasir approved
the assignment of important
positions to Yemeni personal-
ities previously noted for their
anti-Egyptian attitudes--in
particular the new premier,
Hammud~ al-Jayf i. This attempt
to broaden the government's
appeal will probably lead in
time to some diminution of the
present close Egyptian-Yemeni
governmental relations. Nasir
presumably calculates, however,
that Egyptian military and
economic aid will continue to
give him a major voice in
Yemeni affairs.
ability to resist his troops.
He has identified Britain as the
principal enemy of the republic,
apparently in the hope of making
it more difficult for Saudi
Arabia to continue to support
the royalists. Nasir may also
calculate that the broadening of
the republican regime will in-
crease chances for reaching a
compromise with the Saudis over
the Yemeni problem. Saudi Crown
Prince Faysal_, however, wilt
probably regard these moves as
a sign of weakness.
Thp British, for their part,
have become increasingly con-
cerned that Nasir's campaign
against them has the primary aim
of driving them out of South
Arabia -an area over which Yemen
has trad it Iona 11 y c 1 a imed
sovereignty. They are further
alarmed over evidence that Egyp-
tian-financed subversion and
sabotage in the federation has
been stepped up. The present
British campaign against long-
troublesome rebels in the Radfan
area north of Aden, like the
recent attack on the Yemeni fort
at Harib, is probably designed
primarily as a show of strength
and determination. British
authorities in the federation
are also likely to allow in-
creased aid to reach the royalists
in Yemen and may start up a sub-
version campaign. of their own
within the republic.
At the same time, Nasir
has stepped up his propaganda
campaign against the British
position in Aden and the South
Arabian Federation. He believes
that aid from the federation
plays a major part in the
Yemeni royalists' continuing
Although Nasir shows no signs
that he wants or expects a direct
military confrontation with the
British, he is 7.ikely to respond 25X1
by renewing efforts at subversion
and sabotage within the federation.
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8 May 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 8
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~' iJL' l..lCL' l
While Cyprus has been rela -
tively calm, military positions
on the island are unchanged,
and considerable diplomatic ac-
tivity has not yet brought any
progress toward a settlement.
Both communities on Cyprus
and the governments in Athens
and Ankara have praised UN Sec-
retary General Thant's 29 April
report to the Security Council,
but all offered qualifications
to his recommendations. Thant
called for renunciation of the
use of force and for restoration
of normal conditions by such
means as establishing freedom
of movement, evacuating and
eliminating all fortified posi-
tions, disarming irregular bands,
and reintegrating Turkish Cyp-
riots into the police force.
UN mediator Tuomioja, who
has now visited Ankara, Athens
and London told 125X1
that his preliminary think- 25X1
ing favored continuation of a
unitary state with existing
Turkish Cypriot political privi-
leges sharply reduced. To pro-
tect the Turkish community, he
would safeguard remaining minor-
ity rights with an "international
presence" in both the judicial
and police structures. Tuomioja
has rejected for now any "radical
solution"--such as partition or
union with Greece.
Retired Greek Army General
Karagiannis, appointed to head
the newly authorized 25,000-man
Greek Cypriot Special Security
Force, recently returned to
Athens from Cyprus to report
to former Cypriot underground
leader George Grivas.
~ Makarios, possibly
under pressure from Grivas or
Karagiannis, has indicated that
members of the security force
will be recruited on a voluntary
basis, rather than by conscrip-
tion, as a means of keeping the
Communists out.
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~'
SECRET
The union of Zanzibar with
Tanganyika has yet to show much
practical effort. Foreign Min-
ister Kambona, the prime mover
behind the union, has left on
a three-week trip abroad, and
Zanzabari leaders are taking an
increasingly independent line.
Dar-es-Salaam is moving
cautiously in assigning Tangan-
yikans to key Zanzibar posts---
still occupied by pro-Communists
--in order to avoid the impres-
sion of a Tanganyikan takeover.
The plan to bring elements of
Zanzibar's army and police to
the mainland for training and
integration is not yet under
way. Followers of Zanzibar's
former Foreign Minister Babu
have not been disarmed.
Babu clearly does not want
to move to Dar-es-Salaam to take
up his new economic planning
fob and apparently intends to
be as difficult as possible.
He has refused to alter Zanzi-
bar's customs duties, has or-
dered Zanzibar radio to step
up its anti-Western propaganda,
and has delayed the assignment
of a Tanganyikan to the Commu-
nist-controlled information of-
fice.
The presence of many Com-
munist dignitaries at Zanzibar's
May Day celebrations--and in-
ducements from the East Germans
--evidently bolstered the con-
fidence of the island's pro-
communist leaders and encour=
aged them to try to retain some
independence in foreign affairs.
On 6 May Karume declared publicly
that the United Republic would
continue to pursue the fareign
policies of both Tanganyika and
Zanzibar, including diplomatic
relations with East Germany.
The East Germans are making
a mayor effort to consolidate
their position before Kambona
returns from Bonn. On 6 May the
West German cabinet agreed in
principle to take over all East
German aid projects on Zanzibar
on the understanding that only
Bonn would be recognized. ~
on 5 May, the union government
announced establishment of dip-
lomatic relations with Rumania,
which will be the eighth Com-
munist country with an embassy
in Dar-es-Salaam.
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