BELGIUM'S CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH THE CONGO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004500050003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

se 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500050003-7
OCI No.'0337/64B
Copy No . 57
SPECIAL REPORT
BELGIUM'S CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH THE CONGO
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
FA-CDF 26979C
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GROUP I Excluded from nutomatic
downgrading and declassification
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Belgium gave the Congo its independence four
years ago but still maintains a presence there al-
most as pervasive as that of the colonial era. The
withdrawal of the United Nations military force--
to be completed by 30 June--will once again leave
the Belgians as a potential stabilizing influence
in what has been a steadily deteriorating politi-
cal, military, and--from the Congolese point of
view--economic situation. Meanwhile, most of the
large Belgian commercial enterprises in the Congo
have continued to prosper. Consequently, Belgium
is increasingly interested in finding some way to
bring stability to the Congo in order to assure a
more lastingly favorable environment for the multi-
billion-dollar Belgian commercial investment there.
The Belgians also want to settle the intricate Bel-
gian-Congolese financial differences, and to end
the former colony's continuing drain on the Belgian
treasury.
Vast Belgian business in-
terests and the tens of thou-
sands of Belgians who are pres-
ently in the country still form
the backbone of the Congo's
economy. Damage to the economic
infrastructure during the fight-
ing since independence has so
far been relatively slight. Bel-
gian investment in the Congo
has undergone some depreciation
in capital equipment but, up
to now, has escaped nationaliza-
tion. Consequently, Belgian
fears that independence would
inevitably lead to a severe eco-
nomic decline in Belgium have
proved unjustified. In fact,
Belgium has had a substantial
growth in gross national product
every year since 1960.
company, still has numerous sub-
sidiaries throughout the Congo,
representing a large portion of
Belgium's approximately $3.5-bil-
lion investment in the country.
Its interests, moreover, are by
no means restricted to Union
Miniere, the huge mining complex
in Katanga, but extend through-
out the Congo.
Societe Generale also main-
tains constant liaison with the
Belgian Government and exerts
an influential voice in finan-
cial negotiations between Brus-
sels and Leopoldville. Auguste
Girard, key figure in Societe
Generale, is highly regarded by
Foreign Minister Spaak. In ad-
dition, he is said to have more
influence with Congolese Premier
Adoula than any other Belgian.
The Societe Generale de
Belgique, a gigantic holding
Financial Differences
Belgium and the Congo have
only recently come to tentative
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agreement on a division of the
assets and liabilities of the
colonial government. On inde-
pendence day, 30 June 1960, the
colonial government's public
debt stood at $900 million--
equal to approximately three
fourths of the Congo's annual
gross national product. It is
due in part to large deficits
incurred by the Belgian colonial
administration in 1958 and 1959
in connection with what was to
have been a ten-year develop-
ment plan. To date, much of
the debt has been serviced by
Belgium, whose bill for 1963
was approximately $60 million
in interest payments alone.
Belgium has insisted, how-
ever, that the Congolese Govern-
ment assume part of the load.
Premier Adoula now is agreeable
to settling the debt problem by
taking on a $6-million share of
the annual service due on the
debt. In return, Belgium would
hand over to the Congolese the
colonial government's portfolio
of shares in local public and
private enterprises.
The Belgian Government
valued the portfolio at $760
million at the time of independ-
ence. It contains documents of
full ownership and control of
some 35 Congolese public corpora-
tions, including the main public
transport companies, saving and
lending agencies, public utili-
ties, and social welfare funds.
In addition, about half the value
is made up of income-producing
shares and debt instruments of
large private Belgian-controlled
companies in transport, mining,
manufacturing, and primary agri-
cultural producing industries
which have accumulated over the
years prior to independence,
generally in lieu of royalties
and other cash payments for land
and subsoil concessions. Along
with this portfolio the Congo-
lese Government would acquire
special auditing and monitoring
rights to exercise close super-
vision over both public corpora-
tions and private companies.
In negotiations last March
between Spaak and Adoula, the
Belgian Government tentatively
agreed to turn the portfolio
over to a ten-man management
committee. The Congolese are
to have six representatives on
the committee, while the remain-
der would be chosen from Euro-
pean banks and possibly from
the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development.
Delivery of the portfolio, how-
ever, is contingent on the solu-
tion of a complicated problem
involving certain shares of
Union Miniere which are to be
included.
The problem of payment of
Congolese taxes by Belgian com-
panies in the Congo has also
been a matter of contention be-
tween the two governments.
Since independence the Belgian
companies--in the absence of a.
Belgian-Congolese double taxa-
tion agreement--have continued
to pay their taxes directly to
Brussels. In pre-independence
days, the revenues were divided
between the metropole and the
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colony, and made up about half
of the Congo's income.
The Belgian Government's
economic aid to the Congo is
comparatively small in financial
terms. It consists primarily
of a program of commercial
credit and the supplying of
some 2,000 technicians, the
majority of whom are teachers.
Military Role
The Belgian effort to re-
train the Congolese National
Army has thus far been almost
a. complete failure. Belgian
Army and police officers now
on duty in the Congo, however,
are making a notable contribu-
tion in helping to maintain
existing security. The train-
ing plans, worked out in May
1963, called for Belgium to
complete the retraining of three
battalions of the 25,000-man
force in 1963, and six more by
the end of 1964.
The program, however, has
in the main not gone forward.
Neither Brussels nor Leopold-
ville felt any sense of
urgency as long as the United
Nations forces were on the
scene. Younger Belgian officers
have been discouraged from vol-
unteering for service in the
Congo partly because of old
jealousies between regular army
and former colonial officers.
In , addition, there has been
continuing dissension among
Belgian officers in Leopoldville,
particularly between the old-
timers, who by and large have
been commissioned from the ranks,
and the better qualified recent
arrivals. Moreover, the new-
comers--including Colonel Guil-
laume Logiest, who heads the
mission--ha.ve had difficulty
getting information on Congolese
Army activities.
Another hindrance is the
Congolese aversion to permitting
the Belgians to gain too much
influence. Belgian officers
are generally not allowed to
exercise command authority,
even at the battalion or company
level. Only since the Congolese
commander in chief was beaten
up by army mutineers in late
1963 have Belgian officers in
uniform been able freely to
visit army installations and
units outside Leopoldville.
Another small forward step oc-
curred in February when Logiest
was permitted to assume tempo-
ra.rily the functions of acting
chief of staff.
With the phasing out of
United Nations forces, Belgium
has moved to send additional
officers to the Congo to supple-
ment the 70 on duty as of 7 May.
As training officers, the Bel-
gia.ns can have little short-term
effect, but as tactical advisers
--which many of them are turning
into--they are proving their
worth. Indeed, a. complete col-
la.pse of the central government's
authority in turbulent Kivu Prov-
ince has been avoided largely
because of the arrival there
of a handful of Belgian officers.
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In compliance with a request
from the Congolese commander
in chief, a highly regarded
Belgian Navy officer has recently
been assigned as adviser to the
Congolese armed forces. In
addition, 36 Congolese naval
officers are now being trained
in Belgium as future instructors
in the embryonic Congolese Navy.
Belgium is also providing crews
for US-furnished helicopters.
Possibly Belgium's most
important contribution to in-
ternal security in the Congo
thus far is the provision of
police advisers. Belgians di-
rect and administer the only
sections of Congolese police
which are effective. The pres-
ence of Belgian police officers
in provincial cities is still
an important factor in the pres-
ervation of order in those
areas.
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