WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004500070001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 10, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For
10 July 1964
CCI No. 4339/64
Copy Na. r74
WEEKLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review
completed
Navy review
completed.
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading acrd declassification
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JLG'11'
C O N T E N T S
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 9 July 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
Page
SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN
Units from the Soviet Black Sea, Baltic and,Northern
Fleets have been cruising the Mediterranean showing the
flag and gaining at-sea experience. This concentration,
the largest since 1960, has no apparent tie-in with Cyprus.
MIKOYAN'S VISIT TO INDONESIA
Russia's first deputy premier scored some gains by
promising :.:Indonesia continued military and economic aid
in exchange for Indonesian support of Soviet attendance
at Afro-Asian meetings.
KHRUSHCHEV IN SCANDINAVIA
During his 16 June to 4 July tour Khrushchev spent
considerable time emphasizing the need to reach a German
settlement before any major disarmament and also tried
to allay Scandinavian suspicions of Russia.
ASIA-AFRICA
AFRICAN SUMMIT MEETING
Leaders of 35 nations in Africa assembling in Cairo from
17-20 July will consider some East-West issues as well as
continental African questions.
INSURRECTION SUPPRESSED IN ALGERIA
The government moved rapidly to put down Co]. ,Chaabane's
rebel movement in the Aures mountains--the latest sign
of widespread dissatisfaction with President Ben Bella's
rule.
BRITAIN'S SOUTH ARABIAN PROBLEM
Last week's agreement that the South Arabian Federation
should become independent by 1968 was marred by the
announced secession of one of the member states.
POLITICAL AND MILITARY RIVALRIES IN LAOS
Rivalries continue to threaten the unity of non-Communist
elements. The military situation remains generally quiet.
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10 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
AREA NOTE
On South Vietnam
CYPRUS IMPASSE CONTINUES
Relations between Greece and Turkey continue to deteriorate
as both countries strengthen their military positions on
the island.
TSHOMBE TO BECOME PREMIER IN CONGO
The former Katangan leader apparently intends to take
tight control of authority in Leopoldville
The prime minister is unlikely to resume his full duties
before mid-August, but cabinet and party leaders gained
experience in coping with India's most pressing problems
during Nehru's final illness.
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25X1
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SECRET
EUROPE
THE CONTINUING ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS
Negotiations for the reconstitution of the center-left
government are under way, but final agreement may be
prevented by deep differences within and between the
Socialist parties regarding socio-economic reforms and
anti-inflation measures.
Page
AREA NOTE 13
On Italy
MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE CHARTER STILL UNWRITTEN
Completion of the MLF charter by the end of the year
appears very much in doubt as London's counter MLF
proposals and the Italian Government crisis delay
agreements.
DE GAULLE'S PLANNED TOUR OF SOUTH AMERICA
The French President will crowd short visits to all ten
nations into his month-long tour but France is unlikely
to undertake any major aid projects.
DEVELOPMENTS AMONG THE PORTUGUESE OPPOSITION
Humberto Delgado's arrival in Algiers signals a new
stage in opposition efforts to overthrow the Salazar
regime with support expected from dissatisfied elements
in Portugal as well as Portuguese in North Africa.
CASTRO'S "OFFER" OF RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE US
Castro's press interview published on 6 July differed
little in substance from previous speeches by the Cuban
leader. His purpose appeared to be to depict Cuba as
a reasonable country eager for a "normalization" of
relations with the US, which, of course, would occur on
Cuba's terms.
VIOLENCE CONTINUES IN BRITISH GUIANA
Governor Luyt has given extensive powers to the security
forces and the Supreme Court in an effort to curb racial
violence. The colony's political parties still differ
on a coalition government and elections.
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN GUATEMALA
A constituent assembly is establishing the rules for
choosing an elected government to replace the current
regime, as renewed terrorist bombings and attacks
increase political-tensions.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued)
Page
y.
VD
AREA NOTE 21
On Haiti
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10 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iv
Labor's renewed threat of agitation for political and
economic concessions and its refusal to arbitrate
differences with the government are causing official
concern for continued overnment stabilit
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SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN
Unusual operations in the
Mediterranean by naval units from
the Soviet Black Sea, Baltic, and
Northern Fleets are probably in-
tended to show the Soviet flag, in
addition to providing at-sea train-
ing, in this region.
One detachment, the Sverdlov-
class cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov and
two large missile-equipped Kashin-
class destroyers, left the Black
Sea on 15 June to pay the navy's
first formal visit to Yugoslavia
since 1957. Subsequently the de-
tachment rendezvoused off the
Tunisian coast with a Black Sea
Fleet tanker and three Baltic Fleet
units--the large Don-class submarine
tender Kotelnikov and two W-class
submarines. No obvious exercise
activity was noted during the ren-
dezvous. The detachment returned
to the Black Sea on 6 July en route
to Rumania for another port call.
The Baltic detachment, which
entered the Mediterranean on 22 June,
has since been joined by two other
Black Sea Fleet ships. On 6 July a
fleet minesweeper of the T-43 class
was sighted near one of the W-class
submarines, and an ocean rescue tug
was reported to be accompanying the
Kotelnikov. The auxiliaries may have
been sent to assist the submarines,
which appear to be having trouble
with their propulsion systems.
A Northern Fleet Z-class sub-
marine has also been sighted not far
from the Baltic ships and may be
operating with them.
This is the largest concentra-
tion of Soviet warships in the Medi-
terranean since 1960 when a cruiser,
two destroyers, and two submarines
from the Black Sea carried out an ex-
ercise with 7 of the 12 W-class
submarines then based in Albania.
There is no evidence that these
operations are related to the Cyprus
situation nor is there yet any indi-
cation whether the Baltic Fleet de-
tachment will return to the Baltic
or be transferred elsewhere.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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MIKOYAN'S VISIT TO INDONESIA
During his 22 June - 2 July
visit to Indonesia., Soviet First
Deputy Premier Mikoyan scored
some modest gains in reasserting
Soviet interest and influence in
the Afro-Asian world. His re-
cent visits to Japan, India,
Burma., and Afghanistan all ap-
peared to have had a similar
purpose.
Despite Indonesian claims,
Mikoyan apparently promised no
substantial increase in mili-
ta.r assistance.
Indo-
nesian Foreign Minister Subandrio
and Army Chief Ya.ni now have
left for Moscow to formalize the
verbal understandings reached
during the visit.
In economic talks, Mikoyan
apparently urged the Indonesians
to rationalize their economy
and try to solve some of their
economic problems. Subandrio
told US Ambassador Jones that
Mikoyan had promised new com-
modity assistance and "sub-
stantial" economic project aid.
It appears, however, that the
"new" project aid will be ap-
plied to Soviet-supported proj-
ects which the Indonesians had
previously suspended.
frontation with "neocolonialist"
Malaysia, but warned repeatedly
that the imperialists are no
"paper tigers."
In discussions with the UK
ambassador in Moscow, Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznet-
sov played down Mikoyan's visit
and agreed that the dispute be-
tween Indonesia and Malaysia
should not be allowed to affect
Soviet-UK relations.
Mikoyan stressed the va.lue
to Indonesia of Soviet assist-
ance, but made it clear that
Moscow expected a "friendlier"
Indonesian attitude on the USSR's
role in Afro-Asian affairs. In
recent months, Soviet spokesmen
have expressed displeasure over
Indonesia's failure to back the
USSR's attendance at the Afro-
Asian "summit" conference sched-
uled for March 1965. Subandrio
now claims that Indonesia will
support Soviet claims to be an
"Asian country"--but says the
USSR will "probably not" be
represented at the conference.
The Soviet delegation also
held two four-hour meetings with
the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI) politburo, apparently to
seek better relations and to
discuss the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Mikoyan gave strong verbal
support for Suka.rno's con-
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KHRUSHCHEV IN SCANDINAVIA
Soviet Premier Khrushchev,
during his visit to Scandinavia
from 16 June to 4 July, reas-
serted Moscow's position that
there can be no real detente on
disarmament progress unless
the German question is settled.
He vigorously underscored the
potential dangers for US-Soviet
relations unless US overflights
of Cuba are terminated. He
strongly indicated,however, that
he would do nothing to jeopard-
ize-President Johnson's chances
for re-election.
Khrushchev's approach backs
up Castro's efforts to convey
the impression that another US-
Soviet crisis may occur if Mos-
cow's warnings go unheeded.
There is no indication, however,
that Soviet leaders expect uni-
lateral Cuban action, and Cuban
officials have indicated opti-
mism that US-Cuban relations will
ease following the US elections.
According to the Swedish
ambassador to the USSR, Khru-
shchev stressed the German ques-
tion more heavily than he has
ever done before in talks with
the head of a foreign govern-
ment. In Norway, Khrushchev
spent more than half his time
on the German issue. He reit-
erated that any reunification
of Germany must be arranged by
the Germans themselves, but with-
out a plebiscite.
Since the signing of the
Soviet - East German Friendship
Treaty, it has become apparent
that Khrushchev wants to under-
score the need for a settlement
of the German question, probably
in anticipation of substantive
talks after the US elections.
Khrushchev reportedly made
no serious attempt to influence
Scandinavian foreign policy. Al-
though he stressed the limita-
tions on Norwegian and Danish
NATO commitments, e.g., opposi-
tion in both countries to having
nuclear weapons on their terri-
tory, he dismissed the subject
of Norway's membership with the
single quip "we do not like it,
but that's it.''
Both in public and private,
he spent considerable time try-
ing to allay Scandinavian suspi
cions and hostility toward Soviet
aims and to counter Scandinavian
disdain for Russia's backwardness.
His efforts probably achieved
some modest success in terms of
promoting bilateral trade and
cultural exchanges.
Most Western observers felt
he was trying to leave a pacific
impression of the Soviet Union
as a world power and of himself
as a world statesman. He was
generally on his "good behavior"
during the trip, and probably
convinced at least some of his 25X1
audience that under his leader-
ship the USSR has "mellowed."
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10 July 64
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Asia-Africa
AFRICAN SUMMIT MEETING
African heads of state
and government will meet in
Cairo from 17 to 20 July for
the first time since they es-
tablished the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) at Addis
Ababa in May 1963.
Although the OAU will be
basically concerned with African
problems it will also consider
some touchy East-West issues.
A preliminary gathering of for-
eign ministers to set the stage
for the "summit" begins 13 July.
All independent African states
except South Africa--a total of
35--are expected to be rep-
resented at Cairo, although this
year apparently fewer heads of
state will attend.
The assembly will take
up the previously hotly contested
issues of locating a permanent
site for the OAU secretariat as
well as of selecting a permanent
secretary general. OAU foreign
ministers were unable to agree
on these at their February meet-
ing in Lagos. Addis Ababa, lo-
cation of the provisional sec-
retariat, probably will be se-
lected as the permanent site.
Leading candidates for secretary
general include Dahomey's Emile
Zinsou and Tunisia's Mongi Slim.
The agenda item "apartheid
and racial discrimination" will
give the radical African states
an opportunity to condemn the
West's economic policies toward
South Africa and possibly to
demand its expulsion from the
UN. It now appears unlikely,
however, that moderate states,
such as Nigeria, will agree to
any strongly worded anti-Western
positions. Considerable dis-
satisfaction has been expressed
over the ineffectiveness of the
"Committee of Nine" established
last year to speed liberation
of territories still under colo-
nial rule. Some new device may
be adopted to give impetus to
this program.
A draft convention for the
denuclearization of Africa will
be considered. The more radi-
cal states, notably Ghana and
Algeria, will probably push for
a strong resolution possibly
containing anti-Western over-
tones. They will probably be
forced to settle for a watered-
down position as a result of
Egypt's presumed opposition and
the moderate states' distaste
for becoming involved in cold
war issues.
Ghana's large delegation
will again be out to realize
Nkrumah's dreams of African
unity under his leadership.
A cool reception is expected
for his formal proposal to es-
tablish a "Union Government
of Africa" and for his pre-
sumed attempt to gain OAU rec-
ognition of the Ghana-sup-
ported All-African Trade Union
Federation. Nkrumah Tay also
press for a denunciation of US
activities in the Leopoldville
Congo.
The assembly is also sched-
uled to discuss the location of
next year's Afro-Asian ("Bandung")
conference and Algeria's offer to
be host.
10 July 64
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Tamanrasset0
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Asia-Africa
INSURRECTION SUPPRESSED IN ALGERIA
Algerian President Ben
Bella apparently rapidly stamped
out the insurrection of Col.
Mohamed Chaabane, who was re-
ported captured on 8 July, and
appears to have stifled other
incipient dissidence.. Algiers
will probably face more serious
and coordinated opposition as
it continues to suffer from mal-
administration, lack of direc-
tion, economic stagnation, and
political apathy at the grass-
roots level.
Chaabane, who was bitterly
opposed to Defense Minister
Boumedienne, had commanded a
military region with headquar-
ters in Biskra since independ-
ence in 1962. He resisted ef-
forts to integrate his former
guerrilla forces into the Al-
gerian Army and to isolate him
from his command by assigning
him to the army general staff.
Ben Bella had secured
Chaabane's election to the cen-
tral committee and political
bureau of the country's only
political party, the National
Liberation Front (FLN),to help
counter Boumedienne's growing
stature as a potential rival.
Chaabane apparently disliked
his role as a political pawn
and--tribal in background and
experience--was suspicious of
the activities of the pro-Marx-
ist intellectuals who strongly
influence the administration.
He fled Algiers in late June
and tried to spark the vast re-
gion of his former command into
revolt.
Mohamed Khider, Ben Bella's
former confederate who is defy-
ing the president from self-im-
posed exile in Europe, may have
timed his recent attacks on Ben
Belld's rule to coincide with
Chaabane's insurrection. The
failure of dissident groups in
the Kabylie and Ouarsenis moun-
tains and in the Oran and Con-
stantine areas to exploit the
diversion of military forces to
deal with Chaabane indicates that
opposition elements are still
fragmented.
Ben Bella, while suppress-
ing Chaabane's rebellion, also
imprisoned or placed under sur-
veillance a number of political
suspects including Ferhat Abbas,
Khider's associate Rabah Bitat,
and other prominent critics.
The FLN central committee also
expelled a number of prominent
political figures from the FLN
and from the National Assembly.
In dealing with the rebel-
lion, Ben Bella may have placed
new strains on his relationship
with Boumedienne.
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SOUTH ARABIA
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Britain's agreement that
the Federation of South Arabia
should become independent by 1968
has been marred by the announced
secession of one of the member
states.
At the conclusion of a con-
stitutional conference in London
it was announced on 4 July that
Britain would also surrender
sovereignty over Aden colony "as
soon as practicable" so that it
would have the same status as
the other sovereign, but pro-
tected, Federation members. It
was agreed that Britain would
retain its military base in Aden,
but as Aden nears independence
it may prove increasingly diffi-
cult to work out satisfactory
detailed arrangements.
Arab nationalist elements
in both Aden and the protectorate
claim that all these moves are
merely designed to give an ap-
pearance of independence while
retaining British dominance.
The Sultan of Fadhli walked out
of the conference the day before
it ended, flew to Cairo, de-
nounced the British "plot," and
declared his state's secession.
He had apparently been consider-
ing this move for some time.
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POLITICAL AND MILITARY RIVALRIES IN LAOS
Political and military
rivalries continue to threaten
the unity of non-Communist ele-
ments in Laos.
The leaders of the 19 April
coup, probably backed by the
powerful Sananikone family, are
pressing for the removal of two
cabinet members who have close
ties with rightist General
Phoumi Nosavan. Phoumi has in-
dicated his disapproval of any
changes.
Within the neutralist camp,
Kong Le continues to have dif-
ficulty holding the loyalty of
his senior officers.
The military situation in
the Muong Soui area remains
quiet. The Pa.thet Lao have the
ability to launch an attack on
Muong Soui at any time, and
enemy build-ups in the area con-
tinue to be reported. Rain has
curtailed air reconnaissance
and strikes against enemy posi-
tions and delayed the reinforce-
ment of the village.
10 July 64
Right-wing forces are de-
ploying in the Vang Vieng and
Muong Soui sectors for an of-
fensive against Pathet La.o
forces in the Phou Khoun area,
in an effort to relieve pressure
on Muong Soui.
In central Laos, the right-
wing commander has reported
troop movements threatening
Thakhet. This area, has been
quiet since February when a
Communist offensive pushed right-
wing and neutralist troops back
to the Mekong Valley.
Prospects for a, meeting
among the three Laotian factions
remain uncertain. Souva.nna ha,s
rejected Souphannouvong's pro-
posal that the talks be held
either in Djakarta or Phnom
Penh. The Pathet Lao chief has
not responded to Souvanna.'s
counterproposal that the meet-
ing be held in New Delhi.
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South Vietnam: In an unprec-
edented pa ern o activity, Viet
Cong military forces launched four
battalion-strength attacks in the
first five days of July, all in
the northern and central provinces.
Harassing and terrorist actions
also have apparently increased in
the northernmost provinces since
1 July. There are some indica-
tions that the Viet Cong may sus-
tain a high tempo of activity
throughout this month. The Viet
Cong's Liberation Front has ap-
CYPRUS IMPASSE CONTINUES
Relations between Greece and
Turkey continue to deteroriate as
both countries strengthen their
military positions on Cyprus.
Several thousand Greek troops
reportedly have been sent to the
island or are about to move there.
The force is probably intended
both to deter Turkish intervention
and to strengthen the anti-Commu-
nist elements on the island. Turk-
ish clandestine troop movements
are continuing, but on a much
smaller scale. The UN estimates
that Turkey can land only about
100 men a week. At the same time,
Ankara has protested the movement
of Greek troops to the demili-
tarized Dodecanese Islands near
Turkey, and has also announced
the deportation of an additional
200 Greek nationals.
Talks involving UN mediator
Tuomioja and Greek and Turkish rep-
presentatives began this week in
Geneva with both sides pessimistic
over the probable outcome. There
is no indication'that either
Athens or Ankara is willing to
make any concessions which could
pealed for intensified action to
commemorate the tenth anniversary
of the Geneva Accords.on 20 July.
The efforts by the Special
Forces to build effective civilian
paramilitary forces for border
surveillance and guerrilla opera-
tions have suffered some setbacks.
Two training camps have come un- 25X1
der heavy attack, and two compa-
nies of mountain tribesmen last
week deserted from another.
lead to a settlement. Both govern-
ments continue to look to Washington
for some idea of what the US would
consider an acceptable solution. The
backing of the entire Greek press
for Prime Minister Papandreou's re-
jection of bilateral negotiations
will probably preclude any immediate
change in Athens' position.
Papandreou, who previously had
been concerned over the return to Cy-
prus of former undergound leader Gen..
Grivas, now regards him as "a posi-
tive factor" and a "kind of guar-
antee to the Western alliance." The
retired Greek general has become in-
creasingly outspoken in favor of
enosis. Papandreou now claims that
Makarios is a dangerous man who is
determined to maintain Cypriot in-
dependence and who is relying more
and more on Communist support.
Canada has stopped the de-
livery of military supplies to both
Greece and Turkey. Officials in
Ottawa have expressed concern that
the Canadian UN contingent on Cy-
prus might be caught in fighting
between Greek and Turkish forces.
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NNO SECRET NW
Moise Tshomb6, whose ap-
pointment as premier of a tran-
sitional Congo government was
to be announced on 9 July, ap-
parently intends to take tight
control of authority in Leopold-
ville. President Kasavubu in-
vited him to form a cabinet
only ten days after the former
Katangan leader returned from
over a year of self-imposed ex-
ile in Europe.
spreading under Adoula. The
countryside now is relatively
quiet, with only some skirmishing
reported in Kivu-Central and
North Katanga. In Stanleyville
--whose inhabitants previously
have been loudly anti-Tshomb6--
the US consul reports favorable
public reaction to Tshombe's
accession to power. His current
popularity seems to rest on the
fact that he is a winner.
Tshombe's future primarily
depends on his success in ending
the dissidence that had been
there.
The USSR has criticized
Tshombe's return to Leopoldville,
but has delayed committing itself
on his becoming premier, appar-
ently awaiting information on
the composition and orientation
of the new government. Moscow
can do little to influence events
in the Congo at the moment, and
probably will continue to seek 25X1
propaganda advantage from West-
ern discomfiture over events
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Asia-Africa
INDIA DURING SHASTRI'S CONVALESCENCE
Indian Prime Minister
Shastri's convalescence from
his mild heart attack is likely
to last until mid-August. He
is, however, already consulting
with senior government and Con-
gress Party leaders at his res-
idence, and a previously planned
July meeting with Pakistan's
President Ayub may still be
held before the end of the sum-
mer.
The new cabinet had been
in office only 17 days when
Shastri'was stricken on 26 June.
Procedures and policies suited
to the somewhat diffuse power
structure of the moderate new
regime had barely been estab-
lished. Ever since Nehru's
stroke in January, however,
senior government and party lead-
ers had been coping with India's
most pressing problems without
the guidance of an effective
prime minister. The additional
confidence they gained from the
smooth succession after Nehru's
death and their mutual interest
in preserving the new power
structure will carry them a
long way during the convales-
cence.
India's problems--always
serious and potentially fatal--
do not appear critically urgent
at the moment. The 850,000-
man Indian Army is now a better
deterrent against Pakistan and
Communist China--the countries
India fears most--than at any
time in the past decade. Con-
tinued implementation of arms
and economic agreements with the
US and the USSR, and Indian am-
bivalence in Laos indicate that
the Shastri government is fol-
lowing India's tested policies
of political, economic, and
military balance between both
East and West. Shastri hopes
to visit both Moscow and Wash-
ington this year.
Domestically, the govern-
ment will probably not soon cor-
rect this year's particularly
serious food shortages and
monetary inflation. No na-
tional elections, however,
are scheduled until 1967, and
even in the one next February
for the once Communist-con-
trolled state of Kerala, these
issues will carry less weight
than purely factional and com-
munal considerations. In
Punjab State, a notoriously
corrupt political boss has been
replaced by a more flexible and
more honest--though untried--
chief minister acceptable to
all factions. This is the re-
gime's first successful exer-
cise of central party power
to solve one of a number of im-
portant political Problems in
the states.
SECRET
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NNO *00
SECRET
Current four-party negotia-
tions to reconstitute a center-
left government will be arduous
and may not succeed. Christian
Democratic and Socialist lead-
ers must cope with strong minor-
ity elements pressing for dia-
metrically opposed courses. The
lack of a viable alternative to
the center-left formula, however,
encourages efforts to reach
agreement.
Moro's personal
attitudes are not known but he
is publicly committed to the
view that anti-inflation action
must not lessen the real value
of wages or lead to cutbacks in
employment.
At the Christian Democratic
directorate meeting on 6 July
the majority faction strongly
criticized the draft bill on
urban planning--a key reform
proposal--and the directorate
issued a relatively vague reso-
lution. Although it did not
set specific conditions for a
new center left, it repeated its
earlier provocative demand for
a "clarification" within the
Socialist Party. Some influen-
tial Christian Democrats will
try to impose conditions which
would oblige the Socialists to
abandon the coalition or reduce
SECRET
them to docile auxiliaries to
the larger party.
One of the Socialists' main
concerns is to prevent further
damage to their party's image
among its electorate. They
originally entered the government
on the premise that it would se-
cure some long-overdue social and
economic reforms. Party leaders
acknowledge that economic diffi-
culties require postponement of
the more costly reforms, and they
fear that further anti-inflation
measures might lead to a rise in
unemployment and a widespread
reduction in the work week.
If adequate phraseology
cannot be found to blur divergent
viewpoints,. the Socialists may
have to balk. Their central com-
mittee meeting last week merely
papered over intraparty differ-
ences, and a large minority holds
that reforms must be carried out 25X1
simultaneously with the anti-in-
flation program
Lombardi
may ec are a new 25X1
coalition's program unacceptable
and demand a party congress.
This could delay, or even pre-
vent, the installation of a new
center-left government.
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Italy: The Italian Govern-
ment has stepped up efforts to
expand trade with Communist
China and a group of Italian
businessmen are scheduled to
leave shortly for a month's trade
mission there. Because of the
current government crisis it is
unlikely that an Italian trade
office will open soon in Peiping,
but industrial interests are in-
creasingly insistent that they
gain access to the Chinese mar-
ket.
Some impetus toward in-
creased trade may have developed
from Socialist Senator Vit-
torelli's recent visit to Pei-
ping.
The Italians made official
contacts with the Chinese in
Cairo, and the two countries
have agreed to a permanent quasi-
official Italian trade office in
Peiping. Rome claims that no
decision has yet been taken on
granting the Chinese similar
facilities in Italy. The Chi-
nese probably would not allow
an Italian office to be estab-
lished, however, without recip-
rocal treatment.
Foreign Minister Saragat,
on 1 July, gave Ambassador Rein-
hardt the impression that Italy
would delay opening its Peiping
office until the Southeast Asia
situation "becomes less critical."
and that Rome will re-examine
these problems late this year.
Saragat also implied to
Reinhardt that he doubts that
present Italian policy, on the
questions of recognition and of
Chinese representation on the
UN, can be continued "much longer"
10 July 64
SECRET
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Now
SECRET
Europe
MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE CHARTER STILL UNWRITTEN
Completion of a charter for
a seaborne multilateral nuclear
force (MLF) by the end of the
year appears increasingly doubt-
ful. By pushing for considera-
tion of its own ideas for
multilateral land-based and air-
borne nuclear deterrents, Lon-
don hopes--at a minimum--to de-
lay an MLF decision as long as
possible. The position Rome
takes will depend on the sta-
bility of whatever government
is in power at the time of de-
cision and the identity of
other prospective MLF partners.
At the 2 July meeting of
the MLF working group, no agree-
ment could be reached on how to
handle the UK proposals. UK
representative Shuckburgh was
unable to reaffirm the Rusk-
Butler agreement of last April
that the working group should
produce plans for an MLF charter
for a. decision by November or
December of this year. He was
rather disparaging in his refer-
ences.to the seaborne force and
equivocal in responding to in-
quiries whether the UK proposals
were intended as an alternative.
Britain's most obvious
intention is to delay the pro-
ceedings of the working group,
but its motives otherwise are
unclear. The Foreign Office
may believe it would help ap-
pease the domestic military op-
position to the MLF if it can
be shown that the UK proposals
are being thoroughly considered.
The government may also be bent
on minimizing the cost of the
MLF either by applying its
principles to existing weapon
systems or by reducing the size
of the MLF fleet. Both
Shuckburgh and Minister of
Defense Thorneycroft have ques-
tioned whether the MLF needs
25 ships and 200 missiles.
British maneuvering may also
reflect a genuine reluctance to
see France further isolated by
the MLF, and a. desire to keep
open the possibility of a later
British initiative toward a
more ostensibly "European"
nuclear arrangement.
The difficulties of the
Italian political situation
make it uncertain that the gov-
ernment in power in December
will be in a position to make
an MLF commitment. In any
event, the Italians probably
would not want to act until
after the British have taken a.
position and would not want to
be the only other continental
participant besides the West
Germans.
SECRET
10 July 64
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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-
NICA1 ACIIA
l`
COSTA RICA
~~----
Probable lie Gaulle Itinerary
COLOMBI
A TZANTIC OCEAN
? Arrive in Guadeloupe
, 20 September
Brasilia
13 Octobe,
PARAGUAY
Anion h
N00 Ob
12 tr_
Sao Paulo Rio de Janeiro
14 October 15 October
uni vluvu ,,1
Buenos AIres?tr
..7.8 Oct-;j ? q
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SECRET
Europe
DE GAULLE'S PLANNED TOUR OF SOUTH AMERICA
French President Charles
de Gaulle's month-long tour of
South America, scheduled to be-
gin 20 September, will allow
him to make at least short
visits to all ten nations. The
crowded itinerary will be
broken up by two three-day
"rest periods" at sea aboard a
French warship. The 73-year-
old President's crowded work
schedule over the la.st month
Some adjustments in the
itinerary may still be made as
a result of the advance visits
now being carried out by gov-
ernment officials. A French
Foreign Ministry official told
the US Embassy that De Gaulle
had decided against visiting
any Central American country.
He is still being urged, how-
ever, to visit one so Central
American presidents can meet
there and receive him.
SECRET
A Foreign Ministry official
said that De Gaulle would make
no offers on the scale of the
$150-million loa.n package to
Mexico. The main emphasis, he
said, would be on technical and
cultural assistance, with no
country receiving more than $10
million for specific projects
French officials are con-
cerned that De Gaulle's visit
may result in considerable
South American disappointment
if there is little solid eco-
nomic assistance. This is re-
flected in efforts to encourage
West Germany to collaborate on
aid projects.
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NWIF NW
SECRET
The arrival of exiled Por-
tuguese opposition leader Hum-
berto Delgado in Algiers on 27
June signals a new stage in ef-
forts to overthrow the Salazar
regime. Delgado will probably
transform the Algiers group of
his Communist-supported Patri-
otic Front of National Libera-
tion (FPLN) into a full-blown
government in exile.
Delgado has been in Brazil
most of the time since his sur-
prisingly strong showing in the
1958 race for the presidency
caused Lisbon to renounce pop-
ular elections for the office.
From self-imposed exile, he re-
peatedly proclaimed his inten-
tion to overthrow Salazar and
restore democratic government.
He has been in Prague since mid-
December and apparently Visited
Moscow at least once in June.
He had originally expected to
reach Algiers six months ago.
His willingness to accept
Communist participation in the
FPLN has probably alienated many
potential supporters. Others
may have been estranged by the
extravagant blueprint for revo-
lution he had reportedly pre-
pared. This called for infil-
trating groups into Portugal
last March to prepare for strikes
and an uprising in May, for a
general revolt in June, and for
an invasion by the Front's armed
forces in August.
On the other hand, Premier
Ben Bella's open support will
give Delgado increased stature
among Salazar's opponents, and
Lisbon will probably be concerned
over his influence on Portuguese
in North Africa. Radio Algiers
has been broadcasting anti-Sala-
zar propaganda to Portugal since
late 1963. The FPLN could become
a rallying point for the 2,000
to 5,000 young Portuguese who
have gone to North Africa, many
to avoid military service in
Angola.
In Portugal, the FPLN could
expect support from dissatisfied
army elements and civilian opposi-
tionists, some of whom mounted
the abortive Beja coup on 1 Jan-
uary 1962. The current trial of
some leading participants in that
move has revealed that their
principal motive was to "re-es-
tablish constitutional freedoms."
Even if Delgado's group
plans no early direct action
against Portugal, his presence
in Algiers may affect the situa-
tion in the African territories,
particularly if it results in
keeping at home a considerable
part of the armed forces and-se-
curity police that would otherwise
be available for overseas duty.
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%me 1%0
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
Fidel Castro's statements
about "normalization" of US-Cuban
relations, as reported in a press
interview which appeared on 6
July, still mean US acceptance of
his regime on his terms. Castro
terms "normalization" a resumption
of trade, but not necessarily a
resumption of diplomatic relations.
The new relationship must be made
to appear the result of a US initia-
tive. The interview was part of
Castro's continuing effort to pre-
sent Cuba as an aggrieved party
anxious to make any reasonable move
toward reducing tensions with its
powerful neighbor.
Castro repeated previous sug-
gestions that he would be willing
to pledge cessation of material
aid to Latin American revolution-
aries if the US promises to stop
supporting subversion, in Cuba. At
the British Embassy reception in
Havana on 12 June, he implied that
an end to the US "policy of ag-
gression" against his regime would
end Cuba's efforts to export its
revolution. During the past two
years, Castro has hinted that the
Cuban revolutionary effort in
Latin America is in retaliation
for US "aggressions" against Cuba.
Castro's promise to stop ma-
terial aid to Latin American rev-
olutionaries would not indicate
any meaningful change since his
public and private statements
strongly suggest that he regards
this as less important than the
"ideological and spiritual" as-
sistance which he believes is in-
herent in his regime's existence.
Castro claims the "example" of
Cuba will "inevitably" lead to a
successful "anti-imperialist rev-
olution" throughout Latin America.
He stated specifically in his
interview that any agreement to stop
material support could not prevent
Cuba from providing Latin American
revolutionaries with "sympathy" and
other forms of nonmaterial assist-
ance. Instances of Cuban material
support for Latin American revolu-
tionaries, such as the arms shipment
to Venezuela last fall, have in
fact been infrequent in recent years
and much less important then the
training, indoctrination and guid-
ance which Havana has been giving.
Evidently he would continue to train
other Latin Americans in Cuba and
to spew out propaganda support-
ing revolution.
He would anticipate, in fact,
that a general relaxation of the
anti-Castro controls in the hemi-
sphere resulting from an antisubver-
sion pledge might enhance Cuba's
abilities to influence the Latin
American revolutionary movement.
Castro hinted in his interview
that the USSR had been counseling
him to improve relations with the
US. It seems likely that his remarks
were motivated somewhat by a desire
to weaken the resolve of other
hemisphere governments before the
OAS meeting of foreign ministers in
Washington on 21 July. The meeting
is to discuss sanctions against Cuba
for its subversive efforts against
Venezuela. late last year.
SECRET
10 July 64
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SECRET
Western Hemisphere
British Guiana appears on
the brink of civil war as one
racial incident follows upon
another. The bombing of a
passenger vessel on the Demerara
River, killing about 30 Negroes
on 6 July, is the most serious
single episode to date. The
Negro population responded by
beating four East Indians to
death, raising the total fatali-
ties since the disturbances
began five months ago to about
a hundred.
The British governor in
Georgetown--who assumed emer-
gency powers on 13 June--is
particularly concerned over
this pattern of reprisals and
counterreprisals and over the
increasing use of firearms and
explosives. According to
British estimates, there are
10,000 licensed shotguns in the
hands of Guianese, mainly
Indians, and quantities of
explosives are assumed to be
available to various dissidents.
Governor Luyt has signed a new
order giving extensive powers
to the security forces and
authorizing the Supreme Court
to flog and jail. for life any-
one illegally handling arms
and explosives. The British
nevertheless anticipate further
violence. In London, a Defense
Ministry spokesman said 100
additional soldiers would soon
be flown to the colony. This
would bring to about 1,100 the
number of British troops
stationed there. As a pre-
cautionary measure, Luyt has
placed East Indians in the
bauxite mining area under
protective custody.
Prospects do not seem good
for reaching a political arrange-
ment which might ease the
situation. Prime Minister
Jagan continues to angle--in-
side and outside British Guiana--
for support of a coalition be-
tween his predominantly East
Indian People's Progressive
Party (PPP) and Forbes Burnham's
People's National Congress.
Burnham, however, is still
adamantly opposed to any coali-
tion arrangement. In a 4 July
letter to the Commonwealth
conference, he blamed Jagan
for the current violence and
for rejecting a Burnham pro-
posal six weeks ago for a pre-
election national coalition
whose sole purpose would be to
deal with the disorders.
Burnham insisted that his party
would not now enter any such
coalition and demanded that
elections be held under propor-
tional representation this
year as planned.
SECRET
10 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET swoo
Western Hemisphere
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN GUATEMALA
Renewed terrorist attacks
in Guatemala may be timed to put
pressure on the new Constituent
Assembly as well as to elicit
greater support from Cuba.
The assembly convened on
6 July to revise the constitu-
tion suspended when Guatemalan
military forces ousted President
Ydigoras on 30 March 1963. The
assembly's members, carefully
selected by the Peralta govern-
ment and confirmed by the 24 May
election, have been charged with
creating the framework of a new
constitutional government which
would exclude all political
groups the government distrusts.
In addition, decrees issued by
the Peralta government would be
made law, election dates and
regulations would be set, and
revisions made in qualifications
for the presidency.
The bombings and other at-
tacks in Guatemala City in the
past two weeks have been on a
minor scale, but the government's
10 July 64
inability to capture any of the
terrorists may encourage activity
by other opposition factions
anxious to discredit the work of
the assembly.
The larger guerrilla at-
tacks which have recently oc-
curred in eastern Guatemala are
possibly more significant. Since
28 June some 15 antiguerrilla
officials or their relatives re-
portedly have been murdered or
captured by "heavily armed
groups" along the highway from
the capital to the Caribbean.
Guatemalan Army uniforms and
weapons are usually stolen in
these attacks.
The guerrillas
may be claiming
cred t or raids they did not
commit, but even so are evidently
operating in larger numbers than
in recent months. The new out-
breaks and the Peralta govern-
ment's inability to suppress the
guerrillas could serve to raise 25X1
political tensions and enhance
the rebels' prestige and draw-
ing power in rural areas.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 19
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'low
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
ARGENTINE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
The General Confederation
of Labor's (CGT) threat to renew
agitation in Argentina for polit-
ical and economic concessions is
causing official concern about
the stability of the government.
The Peronist leaders who
dominate the labor confederation
continue to reject talks with the
government. The last meeting of
the CGT central committee voted
down motions by the "independent"
bloc for talks with President
Illia and, instead, appointed a
Peronist-dominated committee to
recommend plans for further agi-
tation. The independents have
charged that the Peronists are
trying to convert an economic
protest into a revolution.
The new CGT plans may vary
from the eight "operations"
carried out in May and June,
which included sitdowns in nu-
merous plants, holding managers
hostage, and transportation
stoppages.
SECRET
10 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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HAITI
0 25 50
MILES
`JI 1
0
CUBA
^- DOMINICAN
JAM A p
BRITISH
fIONOURAS HAITI PUERTO
;--n Wi RAS RICO
A I:
OVATE A
EL SALVAD NI~ARAGUA
4 T L A _ l ' " I I C 0 C E A _'ti
Ca p-
` aitten
Port-de-Paix =,
ISLAs
BEATA
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SECRET
Haiti: There are indica-
tions is Haitian military
leaders, including Chief of
Staff Constant, are becoming de-
moralized and doubtful of their
ability to deal with the small
but apparently well-armed group
of exiles who invaded Haiti last
week. The rebels, estimated to
number about 30, are apparently
still at large in the mountainous
region northeast of Saltrou,
where they landed. The rebels
are being pursued, but govern-
ment forces. have been unable
to engage them in r-'-tle. The
inability of the Jaitian Army
and militia to maintain contact
with the rebel group Is an in-
10 July 64
creasing psychological advantage
to the rebels.
The government is consider-
ing burning a number of houses
and fields to flush out the reb-
els and to serve as a warning to 25X1
inhabitants not to aid the reb-
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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