DE GAULLE'S EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004500080002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 17, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

se 2006/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0Vit00080002-5
17 July 1964
OCI No. 0340/64A
Copy No. 55
DE GAULLE'S EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY
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17 July 1964
DE GAULLE'S EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY
President de Gaulle seems to be accelerating
and broadening his efforts to develop France's re-
lations with Eastern Europe. 1
I Further moves
to increase cultural, economic, and technical ties
with the bloc countries can be expected. De Gaulle
is seeking to win support from various Eastern Eu-
ropean leaders for some of his diplomatic initia-
tives elsewhere on the globe, and he may hope to
gain their ultimate acceptance of his concept of a
Europe from the "Atlantic to the Urals." He is mo-
tivated partly by a desire to encourage diversity
among the Communist bloc nations, but he is also in-
tent on a larger role for France in Western attempts
to develop new relationships with Eastern Europe.
De Gaulle's View
Of Eastern Europe
De Gaulle, firmly believing
that national interests transcend
ideological considerations, has
consistently maintained that re-
surgent nationalism would even-
tually disrupt Communist bloc
unity. He probably views the
current Soviet-Rumanian rift as
only one manifestation, albeit
a dramatic one, of a continuing
evolution of the Eastern European
states away from "Russian" domina-
tion. De Gaulle is convinced
that the Eastern European states
will ultimately gain their in-
dependence even though "national
Communist" regimes friendly to
the USSR could well remain in
power.
The French President prob-
ably anticipates that the loosen-
ing of bloc ties would produce
a politically fluid situation
similar to that which prevailed
in Europe before World War II.
Diverse competing national in-
terests would be curbed, how-
ever, by developing political
unity on a confederal basis
broader than the "Six," and
France's geographic position
and diplomatic skill, abetted
by its nuclear force, would
magnify its voice in European
councils. The increasing pos-
sibility that resurgent German
expansionism could be held in
check through a European po-
litical union would, in De
Gaulle's eyes, eventually in-
duce the Eastern European coun-
tries to seek close ties with
Western Europe.
Such ties would not in-
volve the complete estrangement
of the Eastern European states
from the USSR, in re Gaulle's
view. For the longer term, De
Gaulle expects a continued
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Sino-Soviet split to produce a
changed attitude in Moscow, lead-
ing it also to draw closer to
Western Europe. His concept of
a Europe extending from the At-
lantic to the Urals is ill de-
fined, and his assessment of Mos-
cow's basic orientation appears
influenced by his view that there
is serious racial enmity between
the Russians and the Chinese. He
seems to hold that Russia has
traditionally been Western ori-
ented and that the pressure of
Chinese imperialism along "the
world's longest frontier" will
force Moscow to seek its own place
in a larger European context.
De Gaulle probably feels
the change is "in the very nature
of things," but would hesitate to
predict any timetable. He is not
averse to hastening events along
their "inevitable" course, how-
ever, and he may feel that it is
in France's interest to give them
a push in Eastern Europe now. Ru-
mania's recent efforts to expand
Its contacts with the West,
coupled with De Gaulle's fears
of a US-Soviet understanding at
the expense of Western Europe's
interests, have heightened his
desire to strengthen ties with
Eastern Europe before any swift-
moving events limit his flexibil-
ity in the area.
French Initiatives
Paris apparently is cam-
paigning to impress its over-
all foreign policy goals on
various Eastern European govern-
ments and to remind them that,
except for the USSR, France is
2
the only continental power
with world-wide responsibilities
and interests. Minister of
State Louis Joxe, for example,
discussed Southeast Asia and
Cyprus with Tito in late June,
rne rrencn are probably encour-
aging Poland to prod the Chi-
nese into supporting French
views on South Vietnam, although
there is no evidence that the
Poles are responding.
A Rumanian delegation in-
cluding Premier Maurer and For-
eign Minister Manescu, will ar-
rive in France on 26 July to
discuss "economic questions and
other matters of mutual interest.'
The talks are likely to touch
on credits, trade, and East-
West relations, and Maurer may
meet De Gaulle.
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France also is devoting
considerable effort to promot-
ing cultural exchanges with
Eastern Europe. The importance
which De Gaulle attaches to
this cultural drive was evi-
denced last December when Paris
pointed to its cultural inter-
ests in Eastern Europe as a par-
tial justification for raising
to embassy rank its diplomatic
missions in Budapest, Sofia,
and Bucharest. Provisions for
French-language instruction in
universities, the export of
French books, periodicals, and
newspapers, and wider contacts
with Eastern European intellec-
tuals are part of Paris' attempt
at a cultural re-entry into
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Eastern Europe. The French-
Yugoslav cultural accord signed
in June is the first concluded
by France with a Communist coun-
try as contrasted with its 2-year
"protocols" with all other East-
ern European countries except
Czechoslovakia.
France plans to allocate
more funds to Eastern Europe
under its "Second Five-Year
Plan for Overseas Cultural Ex-
pansion" (1965-69) and French
action in the cultural sphere
will be increasingly directed
at Eastern European youth. In
this connection Paris probably
will raise the number of scholar-
ships awarded to bloc students
(288 in 1963).
Paris has signed bilateral
technical and scientific ex-
change agreements with the USSR
and all Eastern European coun-
tries except Czechoslovakia.
More than 80 scientists, none
of them atomic specialists, were
exchanged between the USSR and
France during 1963. Last month
Francis Perrin, French Atomic
Energy Commission director,vis-
ited Bucharest and predicted a
"big development" in French-Ru-
manian scientific relations, par-
ticularly "in the field of nu-
clear physics." On 1 July a
delegation of scientists led by
Andre Marechal, Paris' delegate
general for scientific and tech-
nical research, toured Rumanian
oil and petrochemical facilities
and was received by Deputy Pre-
mier Gaston-Marin.
The French have trade
agreements with the USSR and
all the Eastern European states
except East Germany. France
maintains a favorable balance
with Eastern Europe, excluding
the USSR, and French exports to
the area have increased more
rapidly than those of all other
NATO countries. Paris would
like to sell more machinery,
electrical equipment, and chemi-
cals to Eastern Europe, but it
is hampered by its adherence to
the Berne Union Agreement re-
stricting credits to the bloc
to 5 years. French officials,
however, repeatedly assert that
if the common Western front on
credits is broken, France will
follow suit; in fact, the issue
of credit repayment terms has
been under intensive study in
the French Foreign and Finance
ministries for over a year.
Paris feels that long-term
credits,if selectively extended,
should be a valuable tool in
relations with the Eastern Euro-
pean countries, such as Rumania,
which are seeking to assert
their independence from Moscow.
The French are less enthusiastic
about long-term credits to the
USSR even though it cut purchases
from France sharply in 1963.
Moscow has asserted that it can
do nothing to improve the trade
balance until it received bet-
ter credit terms. A Soviet
delegation now in France to ne-
gotiate for a $3.75-million
petrochemical project is seek-
ing 10-year credits.
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Some Eastern European Reactions
Eastern European reactions
to recent French initiatives
have been mixed. Hungary, for
example, has been cautious but
has responded favorably to French
overtures to extend cultural
agreements and is interested in
expanding trade and technical
relations with France. In re-
cent months there has been a
lively exchange of delegations,
including the "first official
visit in this century" by a
French cabinet official. At the
French Communist Party Congress
in May, Hungary's Deputy Premier
Kallai spoke favorably of De
Gaulle's "sensible foreign pol-
icy steps" while condemning his
"personal concepts."
France's relations with
Czechoslovakia have improved
somewhat over the past two years
--probably on Czech initiative.
Prague's greatest interest is
in commercial relations.. A 2-
year trade agreement signed in
January has probably paved the
way for immediate expanded trade.
French-Yugoslav relations
deteriorated during the Algerian
war, but since it ended Yugoslav
officials have clearly indicated
a desire for better relations
and encouraged the recent visit
of the French minister of state
to Belgrade.
France is one of the few
Western European countries main-
taining diplomatic ties (at lega-
tion level) with Albania. In
his New Year's Eve address to
4
the French people, De Gaulle
included Albania among those
Communist countries whose asser-
tion of greater national inde-
pendence offered long-range ad-
vantages to the West. Neither
country, however, has made any
move to further improve rela-
tions, and no immediate change
is expected.
The deterioration in French-
Bulgarian relations in recent
months is consistent with the
over-all hardening of Sofia's
line toward Western nations.
France will participate, for
the first time, in the Plovdiv
International Trade Fair this
September but the outlook for
better French-Bulgarian rela-
tions is dim.
The Soviet Union
Contacts between Paris
and Moscow have been increasing
since De Gaulle recognized Com-
munist China in January. Recent
examples include French Finance
Minister Giscard d'Estaing's
trip to Moscow, ex-Premier Edgar
Faure's private interview with
Khrushchev, Nikolai Podgorny's
talk with De Gaulle, and the
Paris visit of Khrushchev's son-
in-law. No major developments
have resulted and De Gaulle has
refused to set a date for com-
plying with Khrushchev's long-
standing invitation to Moscow.
De Gaulle continues to be
cautious of Moscow's demarches,
especially over Berlin, but his
assessment of the nature of the
Soviet threat appears to be
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changing. He may believe that
Soviet policy is evolving to the
point where the basis might be
established for eventual negotia-
tions on European questions in
a new context. De Gaulle, mean-
while, seems ready to exploit
the greater flexibility that an
appearance of improved relations
with the USSR would give him.
One of his purposes could be
to present more active French
contacts with Moscow as supple-
menting and balancing his rec-
ognition of Peiping.
His objectives are long
range but he fears events may
move too fast. One fear, cen-
tral to his entire foreign pol-
icy, is the possibility of a
German-Russian agreement from
which France would be excluded.
He wants to be able to deal with
the Russians after they have
drawn closer to Western Europe
and after the need for new
global political balances be-
comes apparent.
Outlook
De Gaulle could seek, in
several ways, to foster develop-
ments he expects to occur re-
gardless of Moscow's policies.
He could move to ease credit
terms to bloc countries, par-
ticularly those demonstrating
a desire for greater economic
independence from Moscow. He
also could attempt to encourage
the Eastern European states,
perhaps starting with Rumania
and Poland, to take steps toward
closer commercial and economic
ties with the EEC. De Gaulle
would be unconcerned about Mos-
cow's reaction since he is con-
vinced the Russians will be even-
tually obliged to adapt them-
selves to new conditions.
De Gaulle might also make
some dramatic gesture toward
further disengaging France from
NATO,partly with the motive of
encouraging by example some of
the Eastern Europeans to work
toward some form of disengage-
ment--over the long term--from
the Warsaw Pact. De Gaulle's
initial goal in such an exer-
cise probably would be to dem-
onstrate that "Europeans" can
pursue courses of action and
maintain interests without the
sanction of the major power
blocs. By arguing that NATO
is disintegrating, he might
hope eventually to persuade Mos-
cow to act on the assumption
that the raison d'etre for the
Warsaw Pact had disappeared and
that the Soviets could serve
their interests equally well
with a series of looser defense
agreements with the Eastern
European states.
The underlying purposes
of any new French initiatives
in the Communist bloc would be
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linked to De Gaulle's concep-
tion of the future of Europe.
He probably feels that his idea
of European unity associating
all nations "from the Atlantic
to the Urals," will become in-
creasingly appealing to the East-
tern Europeans and eventually
to Moscow as the non-European
races exert increasing pressure.
De Gaulle may also hope
that a perceptible movement in
Eastern Europe toward his ver-
sion of European unity will help
him win the support of his EEC
partners--now adamantly with-
held--for his confederal scheme
for Western Europe. In his New
Year's address to the nation
this year he said: "We must
...visualize the day when per-
haps in Warsaw, Prague, Pankow,
Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia,
Belgrade, Tirana, and Moscow,
the totalitarian Communist re-
gime, which still manages to
restrain imprisoned people, will
step by step arrive at a con-
ciliatory evolution together
with our own transformation.
At such time, prospects would
be opened for all of Europe
commensurate with its resources
and capacities."
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