WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004500090001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 24, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release_ 2008/06/02 :
CIA-RDP79-00927A004500090001-5
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24 July 1964
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004500090001-5 sue?
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SECRET
WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued)
Page
AREA NOTE
On Venezuela
AREA NOTE
On Brazil
SECRET
24 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii
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SECRET
Rapid-fire polemics be- a preparatory committee meeting
tween Moscow and Peiping con- will definitely take place this
tinue amid further indications year. In a conversation with a
of intensified Soviet efforts
to set up the earliest possible
meeting of a preparatory commit-
tee of 26 parties to arrange for
a world Communist conference.
A 15 June letter from the
Russian party to the Chinese--
made public by Moscow on 15
July--reaffirmed that a world
meeting must be held without
unnecessary delay, and stressed
that "main efforts should now be
concentrated on holding a pre-
paratory conference." In the
course of attacking Peiping's
delaying and obstructionist
tactics, the letter charged that
only the Chinese and Albanian
parties oppose collective ef-
forts to promote unity, and
claimed that there are "no in-
surmountable obstacles" to con-
vening a world conference. It
repeated the Soviet proposal of
7 March for a preparatory meet-
ing in the near future by rep-
resentatives of the 26 parties
that comprised the drafting com-
mission for the Moscow confer-
ence of 1960.
Publication of this letter
supports other evidence that the
Russian leaders are actively
pressing for preparatory talks.
The Polish ambassador in Moscow
recently claimed in conversation
with his British colleague that
neutralist Asian diplomat in
Peiping in late June, Soviet Am-
bassador Chervonenko reportedly
asserted that active steps to
organize a world conference
should be taken, regardless of
whether China is willing to par-
ticipate.
In an attempt to secure
wide support for an early pre-
paratory meeting, Moscow has ap-
parently exerted a good deal of
pressure upon parties which pre-
viously have been reluctant to
endorse fully the Soviet call
for a world meeting. Polish
party chief Gomulka's 15 June
call for preparatory talks to
start "in the very near future"
was one of the first indications
that the USSR had begun to stress
this approach.
Peiping continues to parry
Russian moves for a world con-
ference by publicizing foreign
Communist party reluctance to
be steamrollered by Moscow.
People's Daily on 21 July front-
paged the full text of a recent
Indonesian Communist Party reso-
lution which warned that failure
was certain if such a meeting
was "forcibly held in a hurry
or without full preparation."
Peiping has just delivered
a violent new attack questioning
SECRET
24 July 64
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1
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IRW
SECRET The Communist World
the authority of the Soviet party
leadership. On 14 July, the
ninth in the series of major di-
atribes which started last Sep-
tember accused Khrushchev of
"phony Communism" and charged
Russian party leaders with at-
tempting to "restore capitalism."
The sharp blast, appearing simul-
taneously in People's Daily and
Red Flag, depicted the USSR as
seething with discontent" be-
cause of the "exploitation by
the privileged stratum."
The Chinese accusations ap-
pear to be in part a reply to re-
cent Soviet charges against the
Chinese party leadership. Fol-
lowing customary Chinese prac-
tice, People's Daily set the
stage for the latest polemical
tract by reprinting four full
pages of Soviet anti-Chinese
statements, including the Pravda
editorials in late April ques-
tioning the legality of the Chi- 25X1
nese party because of its fail-
ure to hold scheduled elections.
THE STRENGTH OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK
Antonin Novotny appears to
have secured his positions as
Czechoslovakia's president and
party first secretary, at least
for the time being. The very
factionalism that threatens the
stability of the party has kept
his opponents divided. He also
has used the concessions they
have won from him during the
past year to demonstrate his
"flexibility" and ability to
operate progressively despite
his dogmatic background and
principles.
Novotny is exhibiting a
new confidence based on these
developments--and probably on
the knowledge that Moscow would
not welcome his ouster at this
tense time in tae international
Communist movement. He probably
will be re-elected president,
but his position is not entirely
secure.
He has been unable to curb
dissident party intellectuals,
although he has won a large meas-
ure of party agreement on the
growing danger of revisionism
which has resulted from outspoken
criticism of the regime.
Slovak pressures for greater
authority, and even for Novotny's
removal, are still strong and
may be growing stronger. New
party factions continue to form,
vying for the support of the
Slovaks and dissident intellec-
tuals.
Structural changes in the
government apparently are still
under consideration. Such think-
ing has grown out of widespread
reappraisal of the basic princi-
ples of economics, government,
and party life, and could produce
a formal watering down of Novotny's
powers as president. Such a de- 25X1
velopment would almost certainly
also lead to a limitation of his
role in the party.
SECRET
24 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 2
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FOREIGN TRADE
OF EAST EUROPEAN.BLOC COUNTRIES'
BY TRADING AREAS
16.9
NON' COOUNTRI?S 1 N1RA S &OTHIrE
:Ej USSR
ER
(ESTIMATED IN BILLION U.S. DOLLARS)
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SECRET
East European trade with
the West is not likely to in-
crease sharply, even though the
bloc countries need equipment
embodying advanced technology
and the West is showing renewed
interest in expanding markets
and exploring new relationships.
products and raw materials con-
stituting a large part of the
satellites' exports will, how-
ever, make repayment difficult.
Political control of Communist
trade may make Western producers
reluctant to become dependent
on East European orders.
The size of the trade and
its rate of growth will be gov-
erned chiefly by the West's
ability to use more East Euro-
pean goods and its willingness
to provide financing for East
European imports from the West.
There are signs that the West
is more willing to provide
credits to Eastern Europe than
to the USSR. This, in part,
stems from the relatively
smaller, although not insignifi-
cant, East European demand for
financing.
The rela-
tively few long-term credits--
over 5 years and running up to
12 years--made available by
West European firms to the bloc,
have all been granted to East-
ern Europe.
Limitations on Western
markets for the agricultural
Prospects for significant
new trade vary widely in dif-
ferent East European states.
Rumania has been able in recent
years to expand its trade on
the ba.sis of its oil, timber
and grain, for which there has
been growing Western demand.
East Germany has procured sev-
eral large Western orders for
industrial equipment, but Czecho-
slovakia, plagued by internal
economic problems, must seek
credit for the plants it needs.
Poland, with agricultural prod-
ucts and raw materials to offer,
is finding it difficult to com-
pete in that more slowly grow-
ing segment of the market, but
is attempting to sell more manu-
factured goods to the West.
For these reasons, bloc
countries will continue to trade
primarily with each other and 25X1
the USSR will remain the pre-
dominant trade partner of each.
SECRET
24 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 3
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