CURRENT GOALS OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004500090002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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CUH~tE;NT GOALS OF THE . FRENCH COMMUNxST PARTY
~ENTI~AL, LNTELLIGENCEr AGONY
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24 July 1964
CUR~,ENT GOALS OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY
The French Communist Party (PCF) continues to
base its program on loyalty to Moscow, unseating
the Gaullist regime, and reinstituting parliamentary
supremacy in France. Currently its dominant politi-
cal objective is unity of action with the French
Socialist Party (SFIO) which it would use to help
it to break out of isolation and win caz~trol of the
government. The death of party president.Maurice
Thorez on 11 July will not affect this strategy,
and may intensify efforts toward commom action with
the Socialists and "other elements of the democratic
left," As the Soviet threat to Europe appears to
wane, part of the French left, notably -the SFIO, may
be increasingly attracted by the prospect of a re-
turn to power offered by collaboration with the PCF.
PCF Strength
The PCF is the most tightly
organized major Communist party
in Western Europe and the most
dependably Moscow-oriented. It
is second to the Italian Commu-
nist Party as the most powerful
in domestic politics. In a coun-
try with a population of 4S mil-
lion, the PCF has an estimated
250,000 to 300,000 members, but
it can draw nearly a quarter of
the popular vote in national
elections. Socialist support
would give a new "popular front''
more electoral strength than the
Gaullist Party (UNR), which won
a dominant position with only
one third of the first-ballot
vote in-the 196.7. National Assem-
bly election.
Emergence From Isolation
Communist Party leaders are
now optimistically estimating
their prospects for close ties
with the Socialists as better
than they were in 1936 or 1945.
Tk~y cite as evidence the several
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successful joint .actions of their
respective unions, notably during
the coal strike of March 1963,
and joint efforts in other fields
such as the campaign against a
nuclear strike force,
Anxious to exploit fully
the increasing Socialist commit-
ment to "tactical" electoral co-
operation with them, the Commu-
nists urge their "fellow Marx-
ists" to look at the record.
Beginning with the November 1962
national election, both parties
have gained notably in the number
of national and local representa-
tives. During the November elec-
tion SFIO Secretary General Guy
Mollet directed his followers to
back the Communists in constit-
uencies where the alternative on
the second ballot was a Gaullist.
The PCF reciprocated by withdraw-
ing candidates in 35 constitu-
encies where the Socialists were
the best placed anti-Gaullists.
Although the support diverted
to the Socialists cost the PCF
some loss on the second ballot
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in 1962 (21,8 percent of the
popular vote to 21.3 percent),
the Communists were able to breach
the. isolation they had experi-
enced in the 1950s, and to in-
crease their National Assembly
representation from 10 to 41
seats. In -the March 1964 can-
tonal. elections, through similar.
Socialist cooperation, the PCF
again escaped isolation and al-
most doubled its departmental
General Council seats from 50
to 99, For their part, the So-
cialists in 1962 were able to
increase their electoral strength
from 12.6 percent on the first
ballot to 15,2 percent on the
second, and to increase their
National Assembly seats from 43
to 64. In the 1964 cantonal
elections the SFIO managed, with
PCF support, a modest increase
from 267 to 286 General Council
seats.
SFIO-PCF Dialogue
In January 196:4 the Social-
ists initiated a public dialogue
with the Communists in their
newspaper Le Populaire. They
delin'eatedZ?omm'un s~ positions
with which they felt there could
be no compromise, notably the
PCPs subservience to Moscow,
its ultimate objective of a
single-party state, and its lack
of internal party democracy.
However, they also alluded to
common Marxist goals.
The PCF reply in Pliarch in
L'Humanit~ to the principal So-
Tlis~ accusations seemed half-
hearted and vaguely worded. It
reserved its few eloquent pro-
nouncements to elaborate on so-
cial and political objectives
that should appeal to ali i~~larx-
ists. The PCF urged joint ac-
tion to bring about increased
outlays for education, to end
public financing of church-con-
trolled. schools, to improve hous-
ing, to expand workers' benefits,
and to oppose France's nuclear
policy. Such mutually acceptable
objectives were supported by the
appeal for "-joint action between
Communists, Socialists, and all
other democrats" to defeat "the
personal po~~~er of De Gaulle" and
'"re-establish" democratic insti-
tutions in France, This call
for action,: by stressing legis-
lative sxzpremacy, appealed di-
rectly to Guy Mollet, SFIO sec-
retary general, the only major
non-Communist political figure
publicly committed to this theme.
The PCF response to the Socialist
challenge tried to blur the basic
ideological differences between
the two parties with a siren song
detailing the immediate advan-
tages of closer collaboration,.
Fealty to Moscow
and Party Discipline
The PCPs campaign to win
SFIO converts to a "popularr
front" has been accompanied by
relentless efforts to assure
strict uniformity within its
own ranks, At the 17th party
congress in May the leadership
reaffirmed its Moscow orienta-
tion and warned the relatively
small pro-Chinese elements and.
the somewhat larger "impartial"
segment to conform. The congress
vigorously decried the "deforma-
tions and schismatic activity of
the leaders of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party" and called for a
world Communist conference to
condemn their actions,
Party presic',ent Thorez'
death an 11 July is not expected
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to alter the sthong pro-Soviet
stance of the PCF in the current
Soviet-Chinese feud.
The "impartial" PCF member-
ship includes the Un~.on of Com-
munist Students (UDC) which
follows the Italian Communist
lead and argues that the Chinese
"should be heard." The PCF
failed to coerce the students
by forcing the dissolution of
their congress last spring, anct
later withdrew support of their
publication when it wished to
print an article by Italian Com-
munist Party secretary general
Togliatti in preference to one
by Thorez. The students never-
theless published the controver-
sial article. The party congress
therefore decided to merge the
UEC and other party youth groups
into a single body directly under
top party control.
Greater Internal Democracy
The party congress tried to
balance its disciplinarian tactics
with a show of internal democ-
racy,,; both to help persuade its
own Italian-oriented deviation-
ists and to impress the Social-
ists. In the interest of "ad-
vancing democracy within the
PCF" a resolution was adopted
calling far the election by se-
cret ballot of party officials
at all levels including the cen-
tral committee. The ''democratic
centralism" of the PCF, however,
remains essentially unaffected,
since the one candidate permitted
to run for each vacancy must be
confirmed by nominating commis-
sions controlled by the pax?ty
organization. Voters may simply
approve ar c)isapprove a candi-
date selected by the central
authority. Critics in the party
who urged a free voter Selection
of officials were admonished
for being "overly attached to
bourgeois democracy."
Other ef:Forts to present
an image of "rl.emocratization"
seem equally unconvincing. The
most striking internal initia-
tive, perhaps, was the replace-
ment of old-guard "Stalinist"
Maurice Thorez as secretary gen-
eral by Waldeck-kdochet, a A+Ios-
cow-trained agricultural special-
ist, This was partly to appease
the more liberally inclined PCF
elements as well as old-line
Socialists who found it diffi-
cult to forget caustic exchanges
of the past. Waldeck-k~ochet,
however, is a proven party stal-
wart, and Thorez had been as-
signed to the newly created post
of party president with the under-
standing that he would remain
active in the party affairs.
Thorez' death aboard a Soviet
liner on 11 July.. precludes an
evaluation of just how his au-
thority may have been affected.
It is doubtful, however, that
his death will greatly influence
the organizational procedures
of the F - chet
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-CIi~PS~L'~"pow r e iT~scenes"
for the past few years.
The party congress also
reorganized the central commit-
tee, ostensibly to inject some
young blood into the party leader-
ship. The ages of nearly one
third of the ?0 full members now
average in their mid-30s; but
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most members were previously
alternates and are tested ortho-
dox leaders of the provincial
organizations, The secretariat,
which was decreased in strength
from seven to five members, now
includes a new one, a 31-year-
old former mechanic from pro-
vincial France.
Outlook
The meager relaxation of
"democratic centralism" confirms
the Socialists' criticism that
the PCF prohibits freedom of
choice within its own organiza-
tion. The SFIO's appetite, how-
ever, for mutually beneficial
pragmatic cooperation remains
unimpaired. This is apparent
in its preparation for the mu-
nicipal elections scheduled
for early 1965,
The recently passed munic-
ipal election law introduced
a rigid list system in cities
of aver 30,000 population, re-
moving the option of ticket
.splitting and party combinations
on the second ballot. Parties,
consequently, must form viable
combinations on the first ballot.
The Gaullist LTNId, sponsored the
law to farce polarization and
to win the smaller center and
center-left parties to the Gaul-
list banner because of their
presumed fear of a leftist, Com-
munist-dominated "popular front."
The SFIO is thereby encouraged
into further arrangements with
the PCF to score in the municipal
elections. Socialist leaders
allege, however, that such ar-
rangements will-continue to be
purely tactical.
The PCF has avoided desig-
nating a candidate for the pres-
idential race, which must con-
stitutionally be held before
the end of 1965. It continues
to insist that it will not sup-
port the SFIO candidate, Gaston
Defferre, unless some understand-
ing on a common platform is
reached between-the two parties.
Defferre has stated publicly
that as the only viable candidate
of the left he can count on PCF
support without making any com-
mitments to the Communists. The
arithmetic of the elections would
clearly indicate, he points out,
that if the PCF presented a can-
didate, the Communists would
place second after De Gaulle in
plurality votes on the first
ballot, and would thus be pitted
against the general in the run-
off. Virtually all non-Commu-
nists would then probably rally
to De Gaulle as the better of
the alternatives, inflicting a
stunning defeat on the PCF. To
avoid such an anti-Communist
coalescence--and incidentally an
impressive Gaullist victory--
the PCF must cooperate with the
more universally acceptable
SFIO and acquiesce in a Social-
ist candidate. The PCF, despite
this cogent argument, is still
demanding some. quid pro quo for
such cooperation, and at
the recent party congress
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Waldeck-Rochet flatly declared
that the PCF would not support
the .SFIO candidate without a
clear statement on a common
program,
It is probable that this
"electoral arithmetic" looms
large in Waldeck-Rocket's think-
ing, and that he may ultimately
settle for less than a common
platform to support the SFIO
presidential candidate. A re-
laxation of PCF resolve on this
issue, however, may encourage a
further reappraisal of the par-
ty's position on current issues,
and party elements eager to cap-
italize on Thore~' death caulcl
insist on a more open approach
to other parties an all questions.
This implies a threat to
direct controls by Moscow, but
it also suggests a real danger
far the splintered democratic
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surer sing y ree of appre- 25X1
hension concerning collab rat'
with the Communists.
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