FACTIONALISM AMONG INDIAN COMMUNISTS

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-00927A004600010002-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 31, 2006
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 21, 1964
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A004600010002-1.pdf529.68 KB
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e 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A08 00100021 August 1964 SPECIAL REPORT FACTIONALISM AMONG INDIAN COMMUNISTS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY GROUP I i r -tided from automatic downgraac and declassification Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1 Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1 Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004600010002-1 ,SECRET Since the Chinese invasion of 1962, the Indian Communist movement has gradually split into two par- allel and contending organizations. The so-called "rightist" official leadership continues to speak for a majority of the 160,000 members of the Commu- nist Party of India (CPI) and remains tactically committed to the parliamentary route to power, to selective cooperation with the ruling Congress Par*.-,-,, on specific issues, and to subservience to Soviet tutelage. The leadership is opposed by a loosely organized group of vigorous centrists and leftist dissidents who--though still divided among themselves over tactics--favor a more militant opposition to the Congress Party's moderate socialism. Although prob- ably not under Chinese control, many leftist dissi-- dents tend to look to Peiping for ideological direc- tion and inspiration. The breach in the CPI stems mainly from domestic differences, many of them as old as the party itself but heretofore tolerated in the interests of unity. Outside pressures, such as the Chinese attack on India and the split in the ii- ternational Communist movement, have served primari?v to deepen the divisions already existing in the CFI and to reduce the value placed on unity. Communist Strength The CPI, even though fac- tionalized, is composed of dedi- cated, hard-working, and--at the lower levels--well-disciplined members, qualitatively equal to those of any other Indian party. Like other Indian parties, the core of this membership is drawn from high and middle caste urban clerical and rural land-holding middle classes; the rank and file of both factions, however, is composed of low and middle caste laborers and peasants. The 60,- 000 hard-core members and espe- cially the 2,000 full-time em- ployees have stood by the party even in periods of government suppression and public censure such as that immediately after the Chinese invasion of 1962. The Communists wer3 strong- est in 1957 when they pilled 10% of the national popular vote and actually came into offi_e in the populous south Indian state of Kerala. Their two-year rule there was inconclusive--Nehru dismissed the Communist govern- ment because of its inaa_:lity to control mounting civil Jisorder. In the 1962 general ele_.--.ions, before the Chinese inva__on of that year, 11 million Iidians (again about 10% of the "ote) supported Communist can.iLdates. In most areas, however, The CPI was already stagnant, aid it has not regained the dynami.ra of the middle 1950s. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1 Approved For Rye ease 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A904600010002-1 JAMMU AND KASHMIR (Status in dispute) 8,000' 55/45 2,000 80/20 13,000 70/30 ?;12,000 67/3:3: 3,000 20/80 *Did not participate in general election "participated in election as part of Assam 9,000 75/25 ESTIMATED FACTIONAL STRENGTH CPI Membership in State-33,000 BOUNDARY RBPRBBENTATlON !9 _ J ? rvorNSCEesABrty rurNOrsrTAnvB II MI N 9HFF ACH AI C L I EN'~ DATAD'EEE. AV AI 4,-E I~l~DEI.K1. P11 DESK, MAN3 PERCENTAGE OF COMMUNIST VOTE IN 1962 GENERAL ELECTIONS Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004600010002-1 Approved For Releas--e 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004AO0010002-1 'E CRE T Unable to influence na- strength is least. The dissi- tional policies directly, the dents challenge the "officials" CPI has been forced to rely in the long-standing centers of upon indirect pressures--labor Communist activity--Kerala, disturbances, passive resistance Andhra, and West Bengal--and in campaigns, propaganda demonstra- these states the rank and file tions, and to a lesser extent, may already be committed to the covert action--to hinder and em- I new leftist party. The rightist barrass the government. The "officials," however, ccntrol most vigor of extraparliamentary, of the formal positions, in the "anti-imperialist" activity has CPI, and will therefore also con- undoubtedly at times conditioned tinue to occupy the ma-.ority of government policy, and has often those state assembly p>>sitions attracted the support of many to which Communists have been Indians with ambivalent feelings elected. toward the West. Advocates of a militant and possibly illegal policy and proponents of a more moderate and even cooperative approach toward India's Congress Party have divided the CPI since its early days. Each faction has at times been dominant, and each has at those times received the support of the Soviet Union. Neither militants nor moderates, however, have ever been a threat to the dominance of the Congress Party. The discouragement and indiscipline resulting from the Communist Party's seven-year stagnation, the rise of an al- ternate pole of Marxist ortho- doxy in Peiping, and the post- invasion suppression of the leftist militants have combined to split the movement organiza- tionally into official and dis- sident parties. The Official Party The official party, headed by S. A. Dange, remains the dominant group. It has an es- tablished national status which the dissidents lack. Its au- thority, however, is most secure in those areas where Communist By their policy of selective support for the Congress Party, the Communist rightists nave avoided having the party outlawed and have even managed to acquire a degree of respectability. In exchange for this status and se- curity, however, they have lost their role as dynamic advocates of social and political ,change. The official Communists in many areas can scarcely be distin- guished in program or tactics from leftist or moderately left- ist Congressmen, especially at election time. In militancy, the CPI has often taken second place to the Hindu-communal Jan Sangh. The CPI, consequently, is not looked upon by the mass of voters as the major re:evolu- tionary alternative to tie Con- gress Party. This positron is held by the rightist conmunal parties, a fact tacitly acknowl- edged even by Nehru in he 1962 elections. Despite the CPI's a ra of respectability, it remains es- sentially a conspiratorial organ- ization operating withii guide- lines determined by Mos tow. This has had its advantages and dis- advantages. Loyalty to Moscow ` I . CRE T Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004600010002-1 Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1 SE CRE T --going back 36 years--has been rewarded by direct and indirect financial support as well as by Moscow's use of its economic and political influence to temper New Delhi's often stringent do- mestic anti-Communist policies. On the other hand, this loyalty has occasionally dic- tated policies contrary to In- dia's strong nationalistic sen- timent with high cost to the party's effectiveness and repu- tation. Under Soviet direction, the CPI enthusiastically sup- ported the British war effort in World War II while national- ist Congress leaders opposed Indian participation from their jail cells. After the war, the CPI followed the Soviet lead in advocating the creation of what was to become India's principal enemy, Pakistan. A subsequent three-year program of armed in- surrection--which ended when Moscow finally sanctioned a switch to parliamentary methods in 1951--nearly destroyed the party. Moscow's support now is a net asset for the right wing, supplying funds, affording some protection from the government, and--to the extent that the USSR has identfied itself with In- dia's economic development and defense--permiting the rightists to draw upon the considerable good will which the Soviet Union has in India. support for the government's in- flexible and bellicose border policy led to a severe government suppression which drove the left- ists underground. They believe party chairman Dange made a deal with the government to protect himself and to identify over a thousand leftists for detention. These leftists, along with some centrists, were forced to organ- ize their own covert group, while the official party, which gave the government its enthusiastic support, continued to function overtly. The official party's condemnation of the Chinese Com- munists was so unrestrained that Dange was criticized even by So- viet leaders. The leftists maintained their covert organization after the government relaxed its sup- pression. At this time the left- ists began to establish parallel overt organizations. Today, a leftist party, par- alleling the official rightist organization, exists in all but the least important of India's 16 states. Although some extrem- ists have probably received Chi- nese money via Nepal and Ceylon, available evidence does not indi- cate any significant measure of control from Peiping. There is, however, substantial sympathy for the more militant Chinese variety of Communism, even though dissident leaders have at times openly criticized Peiping on na- tionalist grounds. The emergence of the dis- sident group as a distinct or- ganization dates from the Chi- nese invasion of 1962. Ini- tially, the leftists' lack of The dissidents will probably organize themselves formally into a separate party at their own party congress scheduled for Oc- tober--a month before the offi- cial CPI congress. They will be SE CRE T Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1 Approved For Relewee 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04Ap0010002-1 SECRET hampered by not having the mem- bership, the financial resources, or the organizational assets of the official party. Moreover, they are themselves divided be- twwen an active group of pro- Chinese extremists and a group of independent "centrists" who are the present leaders of the dissidents' movement. The centrist leaders of the dissident wing are already Fundamentally, th( dissi- dents are reasserting readership of an extremist protest movement of the left, a role sullstantially abandoned by the official party since the middle 1950s. They therefore can be expected to at- tack the Congress Part) with more frequency, with more vigDr, and with even less regard for polit- ical niceties than has previously trolling the pro-Chinese extrem- i leaders are likely to Irv to es- ists, who probably constitute a substantial part of their fol- lowing. Leftist extremism could alienate the more moderate dis- sidents and lead to a splinter- ing of the dissident group. Centrist leaders have indicated that, although they now support the creation of a new CPI, they are not irrevocably committed to this policy. It would, more- over, only be under the most severe stress that the dissi- dents would split at such an early date. The centrist group, repre- sented by such major leaders as former chief minister of Kerala E. M. S. Namboodiripad and Jyoti Basu of West Bengal, therefore probably will dominate the new party at the start. Major left- ists such as P. Sundarayya and M. Basavapunniah will, however, continue to exercise major in- fluence, especially in their home state. Although the dis- sidents will. have more of a co- vert orientation than the offi- cial party, their energies will, like the official party's, be primarily directed toward overt activities. tablish their credentials as the real revolutionary Communist party by organizing demonstrations-- violent where feasible--it every opportunity. The leftists can also be expected to ally with India's numerous "nonpro4ressive" communal and regionalist groups. This type of disruptive )ut po- litically rewarding alliance had been strongly discouraged by the rightist-dominated leadership. A major target of tie left- ists will be to control he 500,- 000-member All India Trade Union Congress, India's second-ranking labor organization, now dominated by rightist Communists. By using wildcat strikes, infiltration, and possibly sabotage, t e dis- sidents will attempt to demon- strate their superior mA-itancy in the labor field as ii the po- litical. The leftist-or.; ented Communist-front peasant organiza- tion, which has 250,000 members, will be another major a-f,a of contention. The allegiance of India's other numerous .;ommunist fronts--most of them lei by right- ists--will be determined by bit- ter battles. In their -onf li_cts with the dissidents, the fronts "h', CRE T Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1 PW* Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1 SECRET will be able to call upon So- viet support and, to a lesser extent, the marginal assistance of the Indian Government. The dissidents, on'the other hand, again will be substantially aid- ed by the fact that the centers of front strength geographically coincide with the centers of dissident strength, and also the influence of the fronts has declined under rightist control. If the existing front groups cannot be won over or split, they will be faced with newly created dissident competition. The key question for the dissidents will be whether the mass of party members is suffi- ciently dissatisfied with Dange's policies to choose militancy. Dange has, to a large degree, been personally discredited by the discovery of letters indi- cating that he had offered his services to British intelligence in the 1920s when he was in jail. The public dispute earlier this year concerning the appropriate party response to this disclo- sure was a major step toward a formal division of the CPI. The government of India has always been quick to sup- press illegal domestic Communist activity and may react to the leftists' more militant program by a wholesale suppression of the dissident party, or more likely, it may harass and im- prison the more radical leftists. Under Nehru, the government tol- erated a large Communist party as a counterweight to India's strong conservative and reac- tionary elements and as a ges- ture to Moscow. India's new and somewhat more conservative government, faced by a continu- ing Chinese threat and still in- secure in its own authority, will be even less reluctant to crack down on those Communists with pro-Chinese tendencies. India's security forces are strongly anti-Communist The dissidents, if they are not suppressed, stand a good chance of becoming the dominant force in the Indian Communist movement. Initially, the split will adversely affect Communist influence. As time passes, how- ever, a new, more vigorous, and more dedicated Communist party, not firmly committed to either the Russinas or the Chinese but addicted to a variation of Mao- ist militancy, could be an even greater threat to India's sta- bility than was the old CPI. If, however, the dissident party succumbs to the disruptive tend- encies which seem endemic in Indian political movements, Com- munist influence in India will have received another serious setback. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1 Approved F Release 20$&/` fi4-RDP79-0091fA004600010002-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1