FACTIONALISM AMONG INDIAN COMMUNISTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004600010002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 21, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

e 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A08 00100021 August 1964
SPECIAL REPORT
FACTIONALISM AMONG INDIAN COMMUNISTS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
GROUP I i r -tided from automatic
downgraac and declassification
Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1
Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1
 Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004600010002-1
,SECRET
Since the Chinese invasion of 1962, the Indian
Communist movement has gradually split into two par-
allel and contending organizations. The so-called
"rightist" official leadership continues to speak
for a majority of the 160,000 members of the Commu-
nist Party of India (CPI) and remains tactically
committed to the parliamentary route to power, to
selective cooperation with the ruling Congress Par*.-,-,,
on specific issues, and to subservience to Soviet
tutelage. The leadership is opposed by a loosely
organized group of vigorous centrists and leftist
dissidents who--though still divided among themselves
over tactics--favor a more militant opposition to the
Congress Party's moderate socialism. Although prob-
ably not under Chinese control, many leftist dissi--
dents tend to look to Peiping for ideological direc-
tion and inspiration. The breach in the CPI stems
mainly from domestic differences, many of them as
old as the party itself but heretofore tolerated in
the interests of unity. Outside pressures, such as
the Chinese attack on India and the split in the ii-
ternational Communist movement, have served primari?v
to deepen the divisions already existing in the CFI
and to reduce the value placed on unity.
Communist Strength
The CPI, even though fac-
tionalized, is composed of dedi-
cated, hard-working, and--at the
lower levels--well-disciplined
members, qualitatively equal to
those of any other Indian party.
Like other Indian parties, the
core of this membership is drawn
from high and middle caste urban
clerical and rural land-holding
middle classes; the rank and file
of both factions, however, is
composed of low and middle caste
laborers and peasants. The 60,-
000 hard-core members and espe-
cially the 2,000 full-time em-
ployees have stood by the party
even in periods of government
suppression and public censure
such as that immediately after
the Chinese invasion of 1962.
The Communists wer3 strong-
est in 1957 when they pilled 10%
of the national popular vote and
actually came into offi_e in the
populous south Indian state of
Kerala. Their two-year rule
there was inconclusive--Nehru
dismissed the Communist govern-
ment because of its inaa_:lity to
control mounting civil Jisorder.
In the 1962 general ele_.--.ions,
before the Chinese inva__on of
that year, 11 million Iidians
(again about 10% of the "ote)
supported Communist can.iLdates.
In most areas, however, The CPI
was already stagnant, aid it has
not regained the dynami.ra of the
middle 1950s.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1
 Approved For Rye ease 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A904600010002-1
JAMMU
AND
KASHMIR
(Status in dispute)
8,000'
55/45
2,000
80/20
13,000
70/30
?;12,000
67/3:3:
3,000
20/80
*Did not participate in general election
"participated in election as part of Assam
9,000
75/25
ESTIMATED FACTIONAL STRENGTH
CPI Membership in State-33,000
BOUNDARY RBPRBBENTATlON !9 _ J ?
rvorNSCEesABrty rurNOrsrTAnvB II MI N 9HFF ACH AI C L I EN'~ DATAD'EEE. AV AI 4,-E I~l~DEI.K1.
P11 DESK, MAN3
PERCENTAGE OF COMMUNIST VOTE IN 1962 GENERAL ELECTIONS
Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004600010002-1
 Approved For Releas--e 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004AO0010002-1
'E CRE T
Unable to influence na- strength is least. The dissi-
tional policies directly, the dents challenge the "officials"
CPI has been forced to rely in the long-standing centers of
upon indirect pressures--labor Communist activity--Kerala,
disturbances, passive resistance Andhra, and West Bengal--and in
campaigns, propaganda demonstra- these states the rank and file
tions, and to a lesser extent, may already be committed to the
covert action--to hinder and em- I new leftist party. The rightist
barrass the government. The "officials," however, ccntrol most
vigor of extraparliamentary, of the formal positions, in the
"anti-imperialist" activity has CPI, and will therefore also con-
undoubtedly at times conditioned tinue to occupy the ma-.ority of
government policy, and has often those state assembly p>>sitions
attracted the support of many to which Communists have been
Indians with ambivalent feelings elected.
toward the West.
Advocates of a militant
and possibly illegal policy and
proponents of a more moderate
and even cooperative approach
toward India's Congress Party
have divided the CPI since its
early days. Each faction has
at times been dominant, and each
has at those times received the
support of the Soviet Union.
Neither militants nor moderates,
however, have ever been a threat
to the dominance of the Congress
Party. The discouragement and
indiscipline resulting from the
Communist Party's seven-year
stagnation, the rise of an al-
ternate pole of Marxist ortho-
doxy in Peiping, and the post-
invasion suppression of the
leftist militants have combined
to split the movement organiza-
tionally into official and dis-
sident parties.
The Official Party
The official party, headed
by S. A. Dange, remains the
dominant group. It has an es-
tablished national status which
the dissidents lack. Its au-
thority, however, is most secure
in those areas where Communist
By their policy of selective
support for the Congress Party,
the Communist rightists nave
avoided having the party outlawed
and have even managed to acquire
a degree of respectability. In
exchange for this status and se-
curity, however, they have lost
their role as dynamic advocates
of social and political ,change.
The official Communists in many
areas can scarcely be distin-
guished in program or tactics
from leftist or moderately left-
ist Congressmen, especially at
election time. In militancy,
the CPI has often taken second
place to the Hindu-communal Jan
Sangh. The CPI, consequently,
is not looked upon by the mass
of voters as the major re:evolu-
tionary alternative to tie Con-
gress Party. This positron is
held by the rightist conmunal
parties, a fact tacitly acknowl-
edged even by Nehru in he 1962
elections.
Despite the CPI's a ra of
respectability, it remains es-
sentially a conspiratorial organ-
ization operating withii guide-
lines determined by Mos tow. This
has had its advantages and dis-
advantages. Loyalty to Moscow
` I . CRE T
Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004600010002-1
 Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1
SE CRE T
--going back 36 years--has been
rewarded by direct and indirect
financial support as well as by
Moscow's use of its economic and
political influence to temper
New Delhi's often stringent do-
mestic anti-Communist policies.
On the other hand, this
loyalty has occasionally dic-
tated policies contrary to In-
dia's strong nationalistic sen-
timent with high cost to the
party's effectiveness and repu-
tation. Under Soviet direction,
the CPI enthusiastically sup-
ported the British war effort
in World War II while national-
ist Congress leaders opposed
Indian participation from their
jail cells. After the war, the
CPI followed the Soviet lead in
advocating the creation of what
was to become India's principal
enemy, Pakistan. A subsequent
three-year program of armed in-
surrection--which ended when
Moscow finally sanctioned a
switch to parliamentary methods
in 1951--nearly destroyed the
party.
Moscow's support now is a
net asset for the right wing,
supplying funds, affording some
protection from the government,
and--to the extent that the USSR
has identfied itself with In-
dia's economic development and
defense--permiting the rightists
to draw upon the considerable
good will which the Soviet Union
has in India.
support for the government's in-
flexible and bellicose border
policy led to a severe government
suppression which drove the left-
ists underground. They believe
party chairman Dange made a deal
with the government to protect
himself and to identify over a
thousand leftists for detention.
These leftists, along with some
centrists, were forced to organ-
ize their own covert group, while
the official party, which gave
the government its enthusiastic
support, continued to function
overtly. The official party's
condemnation of the Chinese Com-
munists was so unrestrained that
Dange was criticized even by So-
viet leaders.
The leftists maintained
their covert organization after
the government relaxed its sup-
pression. At this time the left-
ists began to establish parallel
overt organizations.
Today, a leftist party, par-
alleling the official rightist
organization, exists in all but
the least important of India's
16 states. Although some extrem-
ists have probably received Chi-
nese money via Nepal and Ceylon,
available evidence does not indi-
cate any significant measure of
control from Peiping. There is,
however, substantial sympathy
for the more militant Chinese
variety of Communism, even though
dissident leaders have at times
openly criticized Peiping on na-
tionalist grounds.
The emergence of the dis-
sident group as a distinct or-
ganization dates from the Chi-
nese invasion of 1962. Ini-
tially, the leftists' lack of
The dissidents will probably
organize themselves formally into
a separate party at their own
party congress scheduled for Oc-
tober--a month before the offi-
cial CPI congress. They will be
SE CRE T
Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1
 Approved For Relewee 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04Ap0010002-1
SECRET
hampered by not having the mem-
bership, the financial resources,
or the organizational assets of
the official party. Moreover,
they are themselves divided be-
twwen an active group of pro-
Chinese extremists and a group
of independent "centrists" who
are the present leaders of the
dissidents' movement.
The centrist leaders of
the dissident wing are already
Fundamentally, th( dissi-
dents are reasserting readership
of an extremist protest movement
of the left, a role sullstantially
abandoned by the official party
since the middle 1950s. They
therefore can be expected to at-
tack the Congress Part) with more
frequency, with more vigDr, and
with even less regard for polit-
ical niceties than has previously
trolling the pro-Chinese extrem- i leaders are likely to Irv to es-
ists, who probably constitute a
substantial part of their fol-
lowing. Leftist extremism could
alienate the more moderate dis-
sidents and lead to a splinter-
ing of the dissident group.
Centrist leaders have indicated
that, although they now support
the creation of a new CPI, they
are not irrevocably committed
to this policy. It would, more-
over, only be under the most
severe stress that the dissi-
dents would split at such an
early date.
The centrist group, repre-
sented by such major leaders as
former chief minister of Kerala
E. M. S. Namboodiripad and Jyoti
Basu of West Bengal, therefore
probably will dominate the new
party at the start. Major left-
ists such as P. Sundarayya and
M. Basavapunniah will, however,
continue to exercise major in-
fluence, especially in their
home state. Although the dis-
sidents will. have more of a co-
vert orientation than the offi-
cial party, their energies will,
like the official party's, be
primarily directed toward overt
activities.
tablish their credentials as the
real revolutionary Communist party
by organizing demonstrations--
violent where feasible--it every
opportunity. The leftists can
also be expected to ally with
India's numerous "nonpro4ressive"
communal and regionalist groups.
This type of disruptive )ut po-
litically rewarding alliance had
been strongly discouraged by the
rightist-dominated leadership.
A major target of tie left-
ists will be to control he 500,-
000-member All India Trade Union
Congress, India's second-ranking
labor organization, now dominated
by rightist Communists. By using
wildcat strikes, infiltration,
and possibly sabotage, t e dis-
sidents will attempt to demon-
strate their superior mA-itancy
in the labor field as ii the po-
litical. The leftist-or.; ented
Communist-front peasant organiza-
tion, which has 250,000 members,
will be another major a-f,a of
contention. The allegiance of
India's other numerous .;ommunist
fronts--most of them lei by right-
ists--will be determined by bit-
ter battles. In their -onf li_cts
with the dissidents, the fronts
"h', CRE T
Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1
 PW*
Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1
SECRET
will be able to call upon So-
viet support and, to a lesser
extent, the marginal assistance
of the Indian Government. The
dissidents, on'the other hand,
again will be substantially aid-
ed by the fact that the centers
of front strength geographically
coincide with the centers of
dissident strength, and also
the influence of the fronts has
declined under rightist control.
If the existing front groups
cannot be won over or split,
they will be faced with newly
created dissident competition.
The key question for the
dissidents will be whether the
mass of party members is suffi-
ciently dissatisfied with Dange's
policies to choose militancy.
Dange has, to a large degree,
been personally discredited by
the discovery of letters indi-
cating that he had offered his
services to British intelligence
in the 1920s when he was in jail.
The public dispute earlier this
year concerning the appropriate
party response to this disclo-
sure was a major step toward a
formal division of the CPI.
The government of India
has always been quick to sup-
press illegal domestic Communist
activity and may react to the
leftists' more militant program
by a wholesale suppression of
the dissident party, or more
likely, it may harass and im-
prison the more radical leftists.
Under Nehru, the government tol-
erated a large Communist party
as a counterweight to India's
strong conservative and reac-
tionary elements and as a ges-
ture to Moscow. India's new
and somewhat more conservative
government, faced by a continu-
ing Chinese threat and still in-
secure in its own authority,
will be even less reluctant to
crack down on those Communists
with pro-Chinese tendencies.
India's security forces are
strongly anti-Communist
The dissidents, if they are
not suppressed, stand a good
chance of becoming the dominant
force in the Indian Communist
movement. Initially, the split
will adversely affect Communist
influence. As time passes, how-
ever, a new, more vigorous, and
more dedicated Communist party,
not firmly committed to either
the Russinas or the Chinese but
addicted to a variation of Mao-
ist militancy, could be an even
greater threat to India's sta-
bility than was the old CPI.
If, however, the dissident party
succumbs to the disruptive tend-
encies which seem endemic in
Indian political movements, Com-
munist influence in India will
have received another serious
setback.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1
 Approved F Release 20$&/` fi4-RDP79-0091fA004600010002-1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600010002-1