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September 4, 1964
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Copy No - WEEKLY SUMMARY State Dept. review completed. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY C R ET GR 1U P I x >vded from aufomai e Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600030001-0 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 var SECRET (Information as of 1200 EDT, 3 September 1964) PEIPING STRIKES ANOTHER BLOW AT MOSCOW CONFERENCE It is trying to convince leaders of other parties that Moscow's proposal for a "unity" conference will lead to a formal split. The USSR, however, appears determined to go ahead with the preparatory meeting. AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES Crop prospects are improved over a year ago, largely be- cause the grain crop in the USSR promises to be the best since the estimated record harvest in 1958. RECENT MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA There has been a relocation of a cruise missile storage base and the transfer of additional sub-chasers to Cuba. CHINESE MERCHANT FLEET EXPANDING INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS Peiping is stepping up domestic construction and pur- chases of western ships to bolster its merchant fleet. CHEMICAL FERTILIZER AVAILABILITY IN COMMUNIST CHINA Net imports have apparently dropped enough to offset the 20-percent increase in domestic production this year, with the result that last year's total of 4.5 million tons is unlikely tobe bettered. KHANH RESUMES LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH VIETNAM He remains under heavy pressure from Buddhists, political and student groups, however, and his relations with Generals.Khiem and Minh remain unclear. SECRET 4 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600030001-0 SECRET ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page LAOS TALKS MAKE LITTLE PROGRESS 7 In their initial meetings in Paris neither Premier Souvanna nor Pathet Lao leader Souphannouvong have shown an inclination to compromise. AREA NOTE On India AFGHAN KING PUSHES CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM The plans to modernize political institutions face a major test in an extraordinary congress of tribal chiefs next week. CYPRUS TROOP ROTATION CRISIS DEFERRED 10 Ankara's postponement of the scheduled rotation of its troops put off a threatened showdown CONGO GOVERNMENT GAINS IN KATANGA 11 Rebels have cleared all major towns there, but are still virtually unopposed in the north. 25X1 25X1 SECRET 4 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600030001-0 *ftol SECRET EUROPE (continued) Page AREA NOTE 15 On Italy DISSENSION IN THE SPANISH COMMUNIST PARTY Pro-Chinese elements have formed their own organization and the party itself has purged important proponents of a soft line in domestic affairs. HAITIAN REBELS STILL SUCCESSFUL Rebel forces continue to harass government troops, in- flicting moderate casualties. New weapons might help the army, but the government would still have to over- come the poor morale of its forces. BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT FACES GROWING POLITICAL PRESSURES 17 Castello Branco's government is being pressed by left- ists, opportunists and hard-line elements of the military, but the regime plans to continue its socioeconomic reforms while watching the opposition's strength. COLOMBIAN CAMPAIGN AGAINST COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS The army is finding the highly organized Communist guer- rillas in the Marquetalia region an elusive force which evades a head-on attack in favor of ambushes. SECRET 4 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 SECRET PEIPING STRIKES ANOTHER BLOW AT MOSCOW CONFERENCE Peiping's abusive open letter to the central committee of the Soviet Communist Party on 30 August is its latest ma- neuver to block the preparatory meeting of representatives from 26 key parties called by Moscow to discuss problems of unity by 15 December. Although the Chi- nese do not declare explicitly that they will boycott the gath- ering, their letter is designed to convince leaders in other parties that cooperation with Moscow's proposal will create a formal split. Apprehensions on this score have acted as a brake on Moscow's previous efforts to force a showdown with Peiping. The Chinese assert that Russian efforts to call a meet- ing are illegal and declare that they will never take part in such schismatic activities or share the "responsibility for splitting the international Communist move- ment." To forestall a rebuttal that Chinese obstructionism is blocking attempts to solve the unity problem, Peiping once again urges the necessity for an inter- national Communist conference. They insist, however, that it must be preceded by "ample prep- arations"--which should include thorough consultations among "all the fraternal parties." North Korea promptly echoed the Chinese line in an editorial in Nodong Sinmun on 31 August whichhbitter y denounced Moscow's maneuvers for the preparatory meeting and an early conference. Like the Chinese, the Koreans 4 Sept 64 avoid saying specifically and directly that they are turning down the Russian invitation. Making it perfectly clear that they are talking about Moscow's proposal, they condemn moves which would lead to a split and declare they will never partici- pate in a conference which would lead to this result. The Chinese and Korean at- tacks on the proposal for a pre- paratory meeting will probably encourage the growth of opposi- tion to the Russian scheme inside the Communist world. The other Far Eastern parties invited to the meeting--North Vietnam, Japan, and Indonesia--can be expected to back the Chinese view. Mos- cow's idea has not been received with enthusiasm even by all the normally pro-Soviet parties and thus far only nine of those in- vited have come out in favor of the December meeting. The Rus- sians can expect at least another eight parties to accept their in- vitation eventually, but it is not yet clear whether Moscow will be able to secure the participa- tion of the important Rumanian and Italian parties. The Rumanians apparently still hope to get Moscow to alter, if not abandon, its plans for a meeting in December. The Chinese sent a high-ranking delegation to Rumania's independence day celebration and are doing every- thing they can to encourage these efforts. Soviet trouble-shooter Podgorny reportedly failed to get assurances of cooperation during SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page I Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600030001-0 SECRET his visit to Bucharest on 27-28 munist unity is intense activity July and in a series of recent on the part of Communist pa_'ties." press conferences Rumanian of- ficials carefully evaded ques- tions concerning the conference. Bucharest still has not published the text of the Russian proposal. Moscow is trying to appear determined to go ahead with the preparatory meeting. In a 27 August speech in Prague Khru- shchev declared "we cannot sit with arms folded and wait until all is resolved through the laws of history." The Soviet premier warned that "an essential condi- tion for the restoration of Com- If the Russians carry through with their plans it appears likely that Peiping will counter b-r or- ganizing a meeting of its own supporters. It hinted at tiis intention on 19 August by pAb- lishing a New Zealand party reso- lution--issued during July--which opposed any meeting without ade- quate preparations and suggested a conference of parties which shared this view for "coord:i.na- tion of policy" if Moscow at- tempted to force its plans on the rest of the Cnmmnni=t world. AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES As of August 1964, crop prospects in the Communist world looked better than a year ago, largely because the grain crop in the USSR promises to be the best since the estimated record harvest of 1958. Crops in the European satellites probably will be no more than average, while the harvest outlook in China is for some improvement over 1963. By late August, over half the USSR's grain harvest was in. Harvesting was nearing comple- tion in the Ukraine, Moldavia, and North Caucasus and was well under way in the crucial new lands area. Bad weather there in the next few weeks could cause large losses because of the per- ennial difficulties with machin- ery and transport, a compressed harvesting schedule caused by a two-week delay in the ripening of crops, and a lack of adequate storage facilities. Khrushchev's recent trip highlighted the im- portance attached to completing the harvest satisfactorily. The production of vegetables and potatoes in the central and western regions of the USSR suf- fered somewhat from a hot, dry June. Good rainfall in July, however, has improved the coadi- tion of spring crops in most of the European USSR, and fair]-, satisfactory crops of corn, sugar beets, and sunflowers are expected. In the European satellit=es, the forecast is for another medi- ocre agricultural year. Onlrv Hungary is expected to increase SECRET 4 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 2 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 grain production significantly over the below-average 1963 crop, and only in Hungary and Rumania is the outlook for fall-harvested crops favorable. Yugoslavia's wheat harvest was down an estimated 15 percent from last year, and re- portedly is 1.2 million tons short of domestic needs. There may be a bumper crop of corn, however, unless the weather turns bad. The livestock feed situation looks bet- ter than at the same time last year. Inadequate precipitation, un- usually hot weather, and low soil moisture have contributed to the generally poor outlook. Except for Rumania, which apparently will be a net exporter of grain again in 1964, all these countries will depend on Western sources for a large share of their grain imports in 1964-65, in spite of the good Soviet harvest. SECRET grain and tubers in 1964 may pos- sibly exceed the 175-180 million tons produced last year. In Communist China, the early harvest--principally winter wheat and early rice--has been completed and is tentatively estimated to be 10-15 percent above last year's poor harvest. The acreage of late harvest grain appears to be some- what larger than last year's. Grow- ing conditions for the fall crops, although less favorable than a month ago, remain fair to good in most of the major agricultural areas. Barring unfavorable weather from now until these grains are harvested (September-November), the fall grain harvest may equal or possibly exceed last autumn's estimated 117 million tons (ex- cluding tubers). Assuming tuber production equal to last year's estimated 27 million tons (grain equivalent), the total harvest of Red China's contracts with the West for the delivery of grain in 1964 so far amount to 5.3 mil- lion metric tons, worth about $350 million. A deal with France is also under way for as ,much as 430,000 metric tons. The North Vietnam situation continues to be favorable. The spring rice crop may have equal- led the record harvest of 1959, and growing conditions for the important fall rice crop were favorable through early August. Prospects are poor in North Korea, where drought and a ty- phoon have damaged rice and corn. Several aspects of Cuban foreign trade for the first half of 1964 reflect intensified ef- forts to boost the domestic food supply. The first seven months of 1964 saw record imports of fertilizer and a continued in- crease in imports of foodstuffs. Cuba's sugar harvest is es- timated to have been about 3.8 million metric tons, the same as in 1963. Sugar exports for the first six months of 1964 were 2 million tons, also about equal to exports for the first half of last year. The coffee harvest has begun, and because of the damage caused by hurricane Flora last year, will probably be below average. This year's hurricane, Cleo, apparently did no significant damage to crop areas. 4 Sept 64 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 -.No, %wool Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 SECRET Havana. San Jose is more centrally Two Soviet SO-I - c Gss sub- located and is less vulnerable to chasers towed by Soviet 2val tugs maritime raids. In addition, con- I also arrived in Cuba dur rg August. A cruise missile storage and support area established at Guerra in late 1962 has been moved to San Jose de las Lajas, southeast of struction activity at La Sierra, near Cienfuegos, suggests that this site--abandoned in November 1962 --may be reoccupied. tary supplies and some equipment Three other SO-Is delive.'Ed last Komar guided-missile Boa winter, on which Cubans lave been training, were recently -ransferred to the Cuban Navy. utii r --ov1ec- supplied naval. craft, usE?c pri- marily for coastal patro and anti- raider activity, includes six Khronshtadt-class subcha$=ers, 24 P-4 and P-6 torpedo boats , and 12 CHINESE MERCHANT FLEET EXPANDING INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS Peiping is expanding its in- ternational shipping operations and is stepping up domestic construc- tion and purchases of Western ships to bolster its merchant fleet. Chinese vessels have recently begun operating a new cargo line between Shanghai and Nampo, North Korea. A Netherlands trade dele- gation, just back from China, in- dicated that Chinese ships will start calling at Dutch ports before the end of the year. The Chinese are also interested in opening a shipping service to Japan and to African ports. Until recently most of Pei- ping's international shipping ac- tivity had been limited to South- east Asia with only very limited service to Africa and Europe. In the last few months, however, Chi- nese cargo ships have made five trips to Mediterranean ports and have called at Japan, North Korea, Zanzibar, and Tanianyika for the first time. Now that Chinese trr-ie with the free world is increaL iag, more of Peiping's trade will be sea- borne and an increased anount will probably be carried in its own ships. This year, Peiping has built several dry-cargo Srnips for its merchant fleet. It has also purchased several more it the West, its first significant purcnasesof Western vessels since 1901. In addition, British, Frenct, Dutch, and Japanese shipbuilding delega- tions, which visited PeiF iag this year, have apparently concluded some deals for vessels pcs-ibl.y in the 10,000-ton to 1 5, 000- c >n class. Peiping's internaticn3l ship- ping operations are still limited, however, and the bulk of its sea- borne trade will continue co be carried in foreign bottoms. . SE CRE T 4 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 SECRET CHEMICAL FERTILIZER AVAILABILITY IN COMMUNIST CHINA The total of domestic and imported chemical fertilizer available in 1964 will probably remain at the 1963 level of about 4.5 million tons, far short of China's needs. The regime's plans for future production are still modest even though Chinese literature has recognized chemi- cal fertilizers as offering the most promising path to higher agricultural yields. Efforts to expand the in- dustry during the recent years of agricultural crisis will raise output in 1964 by about 40 percent over 1960. Domestic production this year will prob- ably increase about 20 percent over 1963 to reach 3.5 million tons. This increase, however, will probably be offset by a cut in :imports. Imports from Japan this year have about dou- bled over 1963, but there have been drastic cuts in purchases from NITREX, the European com- bine which supplied most of China's previous imports. The industry appears to have achieved full capacity pro- duction after several years of serious technical difficulties in operating and maintaining the complex equipment in the larger and newer plants. Improved use of existing facilities and sup- plies of raw materials made pos- sible the high percentage in- creases in 1963 and 1964 but has just about reached tie end of the line where further in- creases are concerned. At least five more new plants are scheduled for the industry. Three of the seven large nitrogenous fertilizer plants started in 1958 have yet to be completed and one or two plants from Italy and a i3ritish- Dutch urea plant have ye- to be delivered. The completi)n of these plants and further Expan- sion of existing plants .nay raise domestic output by 1967 LO sub- stantially more than 4 mi-:.lion tons. Imports to supple-nent this production will be 9-..mited by world availability to a maxi- mum of about three millic)n tons. The press once mentioned an unofficial domestic produc- tion goal of eight million tons by 1972. To meet this goal, however, sustained heavy invest- ment will be needed in support- ing fields such as machine build- ing and mining as well as in the chemical fertilizer industry it- self. Technical difficulties, although apparently diminishing as experience is gained in the equip- ment characteristic of he indus- try, are likely to persist and re- tard expansion for some years to come. Even if the eight -million- ton goal is achieved, tie avail- able fertilizer will st-11. meet only a small part of China's needs. SECRET 4 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY s-s-.ge 5 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 SE CRET General Khanh resumed ac- tive leadership of the caretaker government after having briefly absented himself in Dalat. A government spokesman claims that Khanh has received new affirma- tions of support from Vietnam's military leadership. The status of the ruling military triumvi- rate of Khanh and Generals Khiem and Minh established last week is unclear. The situation remains vola- Student leaders in Sai.r-n tile. The Buddhists promised a appear to be abiding by the wo- two months moratorium of their month moratorium which they =Tong protests to permit the organiza- with the Buddhists, granted he tion of a more democratic, civil- I government. In the importas- ian-oriented government. They I northern cities of Hue and .)si are now threatening a two-day Nang, however, student agit ! ion fast to protest alleged police is continuing. In Hue, a n.=W brutality toward arrested Bud- "People's Revolutionary Cou-i il" dhist rioters. The Buddhists has been formed under the 1 ;d- had already induced the govern- ership of extremist profess,)?s. ment to release all but 16 of The Council's initial commui.:ques 509 demonstrators arrested in call for sweeping democrati-- re- the wake of last week's religious forms, but deny that it cong:_ders rioting in Saigon. itself to be an autonomous 4()v- ernment for Central Vietnam. In The long-simmering dispute between Khanh and southern Dai Viet leader Nguyen Ton Hoan erupted this week into an acri- monious public exchange result- ing in Hoan's resignation as deputy premier for pacification. The Dai Viets enjoy considerable army support, particularly by certain commanders of troops in and around Saigon. If Khanh continues to try to reduce Dai Viet influence, he might provoke a coup attempt. Da Nang, student vigilante zr?oups have been ferreting out fornor Diemists. The Viet Cong appear t; be pursuing at least a short-term policy of watchful waiting -;i connection with the crisis. In the week ending on 29 August the rate of enemy military acti-,1?ty dropped substantially from tat of the previous week. SECRET 4 Sept 64 Pa g? 6 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600030001-0 SE CRET LAOS TALKS MAKE LITTLE PROGRESS Laotian leaders meeting in Paris have failed to achieve any substantial progress in their ef- forts to ease the current politi- cal and military impasse. Premier Souvanna, in initial talks with. Pathet Lao chief Sou- phannouvong, has shown little in- clination to compromise. On 28 August he proposed that the rival forces jointly occupy the Plaine des Jarres, which has been under Communist control since the out- break of fighting last spring. The Communists have in effect re- jected this, terming it a "cover" for rightist penetration of "lib- erated areas." Pathet Lao chief Souphannou- vong, for his part, has put for- ward what appear to be maximum positions on several key issues. He has called for an end of US support to Souvanna, undertaken without tripartite approval, cit- ing particularly the operations of Air. America in supplying re- lief provisions to refugee. groups throughout the country. The Com- munists have also reiterated their demands that T-28 attacks against India: Nationwide demonstra- tionsTed-by each of the two fac- tions of the divided Communist Party have failed to establish either wing as the leader of the urban discontent over food prices and shortages. Government firm- ness, lack of support from the non-Communist opposition parties, and accelerated efforts to reduce prices and improve distribution Pathet Lao positions cease and that the cabinet existing prier to the rightist coup of last ApriL be re- stored. In spite of these divergences, the Lao leaders have continued to express optimism over ch2nces for some sort of agreement. Souvanna's room for maneuver, however, ap- pears to be narrowly circumscribed by the opposition of strong right- ist elements to any accommodation with the Pathet Lao. I Souvanna, under pressure from the Wrench as well as the Pathet Lao, were to make major concessions, rightist elements might unite to )%erthrow his coalition government The military situat.on re- mains generally quiet. Rightist forces, however, are continuing their clearing operations against scat- tered Pathet Lao units west of Vang Vieng and Muong Kassy, while Meo guerrillas have begun efforts to retake territory southeast of the Plaine des Jarres whi4.h was lost to the Pathet Lao ea:-?lier this year. have greatly lessened tle effec- tiveness of the proteste. Nevertheless, the strain on India's public security is likely to continue until the October har- vests. September may bE the most trying period, especial"y if the opposition parties carry through with plans to call a 24-hour nation- wide strike. .S'E CRET 4 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 AFGHAN KING PUSHES CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM The future of the reform- minded, pro-Western Afgha.n Gov- ernment under King Zahir Shan and Prime Minister Yusuf faces a. major test next week. An ex- traordinary congress of tribal chiefs has been called to pass on proposals for a. more liberal constitution. The "Pushtoon- istan" issue--Kabul's long-stand- ing demands for self-determina- tion for Pushtoon tribes living across the border in Pakistan? probably will also be discussed. The government's plans in- clude establishing a. more modern and independent judiciary, grant- ing increased power to the Leg- islature, and limiting the monarchy by formally separating it from the executive branch of the government. Despite this last feature, the King is keenly aware that the orderly development of more demo- cratic institutions will require his own firm support for the foreseeable future. Indeed, Zahir's support and guidance has been essential in bringing the cabinet and constitution drafters to the present stage of the long-term reform plans. The King's cousin, former prime minister Prince Daud, leads the opposition. He riled the country with an iron hard for ten years until his resigna- tion in March 1963. Daud specifi- cally objects to provisions ex- cluding members of the royal family from the cabinet. TYe King designed this exclusion to a1 lay some fears that Da.ud it ight one day return to power. The tribal elders seem likely to support the King, des- pite qualms about liberal rt-form, disappointment over the King's moderate Pushtoonistan poli,.?y, and a possible attempt by Daud to address the congress. Z d it remains the most powerful a'd most popular national leade . After over a year of cautiois maneuvering against Da.ud an 1 his followers, Zahir has been i;i- creasin 1 firm dealin wit them. SECRET 4 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600030001-0 Khartourn Harad 0 Washha .Abs Rayda Hallah,~~--. U_ ran 11dda . Mecca Taif Riyadh * Wadi al J:,. ETHIOPIA W~ * Addis Ababa K(UKRA~ Marib ~'' Sirwah Jihannah SAUDI A Qatabah BEIHAN STATE: Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600030001-0 SECRET CYPRUS TROOP ROTATION CRISIS DEFERRED The Turkish Government is facing mounting domestic criti- cism in the wake of its agree- ment to postpone "for a short time" the rotation of part of its army contingent on Cyprus. President Makarios adamantly refused to grant permission for the rotation which had been scheduled for 31 August. The Turkish decision put off for the moment what threatened to be a showdown with Nicosia and Athens. Inonu called the Grand National Assembly into special session on 3 September to discuss Cy- prus---primarily in the light of the collapse of negotiations at Geneva--and is expected to ask for a vote of confidence. As the opposition parties appear poorly prepared and disinclined to take over while the Cyprus dispute continues, the govern- ment appears likely to survive. Bitterly critical reports in the Turkish press, alleging that the US is supporting a "Greek solution" for Cyprus, had led to anti-US demonstrations in major Turkish cities. The government, which may have given tacit approval to some of the earlier demonstrations, now ap- pears to have taken the neces- sary precautions to keep the situation under control. In a communique following Makarios' recent visit to Nasir, Egypt pledged to support Cyprus in defending its territory against intervention and joined in con- demning foreign military bases in the area. Greek Cypriot press reports that Nasir promised large amounts of military aid have not been confirmed.) Makarios recently ren_?wed his call for enosis--union with Greece--but insisted that 'yprus be demilitarized. This word rule out not only future miii- tary bases, but the existing two British bases as well. Makarios probably hopes by this means to pose as leader of the long-time drive for enosis while retaining the diplomatic stp- port of the'Soviet bloc and the nonaligned nations for the UN General Assembly session b+?gin- ning in November. On Cyprus, there is glow- ing belief among UN and US of- ficials that new violence -,_s likely if the economic blockade of the Turkish Cypriots continues. The Greek Cypriots eased the restrictions somewhat this week, SECRET 4 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 10 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 -ow SECRET logo; but supplies of food, fuel, clothing and medicines remain dangerously low. There has been little change in the military situa- CONGO GOVERNMENT GAINS IN KATANGA The over-all Congo military situation has brightened some- what with government gains in the south. The rebels in the north, however, continue to move unopposed down the Congo River from Stanleyville, be- cause the government has no de- pendable reinforcements. The northern rebels now control Lisala on the Congo River, and face little opposi- tion from there through Coquil- hatville to Leopoldville. The insurgents' rapid advance may stimulate disorders in the capi- tal. There appears to be no opposition to the rebel occupa- tion of both Kibali-Ituri and Uele provinces. The insurgents have expanded their control to the Sudan border at Aba in Ki- bali?-Ituri, and are reportedly at Bondo on the western border of Uele Province. The fall of Bunia in eastern Kibali-Ituri may be imminent. 4 Sept 64 tion, although the Greek ='yp- riots have improved their tacti- cal positions in the nortnwest to increase the effectiv=?aess of their siege of Turkis7 Cyp- riot areas Government forces r ~1 ain the initiative in the so.ith. The capture of Albertvile, the rebel capital, on 31 Augist by some 1,000 army troops mt,ving from Kabalo was the most drama- tic victory. Manono, tht. last rebel stronghold in Katarga, has also been recaptured Bukavu, the capital of Kivu Centiale Province, remains in government control and the morale ar..d phys- ical condition of the army gar- rison there improves daily. Mercenaries continue to arrive, mainly from Soutb Af- rica. This polyglot grotp of South Africans, Southern ttno- desians, British, French, Ital- ians, and Portuguese, now 100 strong, figures prominently in Belgian military plans for the Congo. In Leopoldville, Antoine Gizenga, silent since his re- cent release from prison, now openly opposes Tshombd: lie leftist former Stanleyvilao? SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Pag= 11 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0 REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO Prr;.in: e !:c~:nr} hat-na' c-~pi:al Pr,,nn(e Capital Ap;:roximato are>, ui GABON:,, v G 4 SEPTEMBER t964 NORTHERN RHODESIA Pmvlti Mpl boundaries Gm e been ,ntc r,?u.(rlcd from xrsting - i1 h.) 4@Q75 sand irxie1(ipenCe rep?rt5 and e n,1! dcftnitea i _ '. ; f" _ ,