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September 11, 1964
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State Dept. review completed. 11 September 1964 OCI No. 0348/64 Copy No. 6 $ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE GROUP I Ex ctu.. ec "rom automoti c downgrac'.ing or-- eciassification Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 AWA Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600040001-9 w w SE CRE T CON T ENT S (Information as of 1200 EDT, 10 Septembek 1964) NEW STATEMENTS ON SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE A two-part article in Red Star sees a future general nuclear war as a short nut-c-e-cisively destructive ex- change of rocket-nuclear weapons with little or no need for conventional forces. KHRUSHCHEV PRESSES FOR COMMUNIST PREPARATORY MEETING Khrushchev's recent remarks reflect Soviet determination to convene a preparatory meeting this Decembe . Moscow is trying to demonstrate that Peiping has exc'uded it- self from the Communist movement. SOVIETS EDGE FORWARD IN CREDIT FIELD Other governments are likely to follow suit now that London has broken the five-year credit line. Private financiers may be less eager, however, to tie up funds in long-term loans to the USSR. Page I UNREST AMONG HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN TRANSYLVANIA A re-emergence of traditional national problems as a significant factor in Eastern European politics may be presaged by Hungarian minority unrest in the Transylvania area of Rumania. KHANH MANEUVERS TO STABILIZE SOUTH VIETNAMESE REGIME The appointment of General Minh as chief of state is evidently another of Khanh's attempts to gain Buddhist support while he reduces the influence of the Dai Viet Party. There has still been no significant Viet Cony; military reaction to Saigon's political difficulties. NEW INDONESIAN MOVES AGAINST MALAYSIA Airdrops of Indonesian troops into Malaya have evoked threats of retaliation from the British. AREA NOTE 7 On India SECRET 11 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Pa,-;4' i Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600040001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 SECRET ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page THE CYPRUS SITUATION A Cypriot Government delegation is to leave shortly for Moscow to discuss possible Soviet aid, while the UN mandate for peacekeeping on the island is likely to be renewed. TSHOMBE SUCCESS AT ADDIS ABABA CONFERENCE The Congolese premier has gained considerable legal stature among the African states as a result of the special Organization of African Unity meeting this week, while his government has generally held its own against the Congo rebel forces. NEW CHINESE COMMUNIST GAINS IN AFRICA Peiping's currently traveling delegates have been cor- dially received in moderate capitals, while Senegal has severed relations with Taiwan. MALAWI'S FIRST CABINET CRISIS After only two months of independence, Prime Minister Banda has had to rally his popular following against fellow ministers who seek to cast off his virtual one- man rule. SECRET 11 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Ripe ii Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 SE CRE T EUROPE (continued) Page SWEDISH NATIONAL ELECTIONS The ruling Social Democratic Party is expected to retain control of the government even without an absolute majority, since the Big Three of the opposition are likely to loose popular votes to a newly organized party, the Christian Democratic Assembly. THE CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 16 President-elect Eduardo Frei received the largest election plurality in more than 50 years but his impressive victory has probably shaken the Communists' belief in a peaceful road to power and may have strengthened the splinter groups sympathetic to Peiping's doctrines. AREA NOTES On Venezuela, Bolivia,and Haiti UNITED NATIONS FINANCING The smaller nations are trying to come up with a com- promise which will satisfy US insistence that the UN charter be upheld regarding dues payments and also give Russia a way to have part of its dues written off. SECRET 11 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY PAGE iii Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 err ~,Mr SECRET The so-called "modernist or "Khrushchevian" view that a future general nuclear war will be a short, decisively destruc- tive exchange of rocket-nuclear weapons with little or no need for conventional forces is ap- parently gaining round in a con- tinuing Soviet debate on military doctrine. Marshal Sokolovskiy and Major General Cherednichenko discuss the idea in a two-part article, "Military Art at a New Stage," in Red Star of 25 and 28 August. Sokolovskiy and Cheredni- chenko had previously expressed a "moderate" viewpoint, as author and contributor, respectively, in the 1962 and 1963 editions of the book Military Strategy. They saw a genera nuc ear war being waged primarily by massive nuclear strikes, but with a sec- ondary and essentially strategic role for large ground forces. The latter would be needed to achieve the final victory by smashing the surviving enemy armed forces, liquidating their bases, and occupying strategi- cally important enemy territory. The recent article, however, leaves little, if any, role for conventional forces in a general nuclear war: "The initial period of the war, in the course of which both sides will use their main stocks of nuclear weapons stockpiled in peacetime, will have decisive importance in the course and out- come of the entire war. It is completely possible that the war will even be ended in that period, since after the exchange of nu- clear strikes it is unlikely that further military operations will be needed. "The Strategic Rocket Force can independently accomplish the missions in a nuclear war. It can deliver such a powerful strike against any area that the com- mitment of troops to that area will turn out to be unnecessary and even impossible. "In a new world war, if the imperialists unleash it, time will have a decisive importance in the victory. Those missions which were accomplished in months and years in the past will be accomplished in the course of min- utes, hours, or several days in a rocket-nuclear war. In our view, an indisputable conclusion follows from this: a thermonu- clear war cannot be long. There- fore, in our opinion, it is nec- essary to prepare in the first place for a short war." The article is also important in that while it relieves the conventional forces of a v impor- tant mission in a general nuclear war, it appears to give these forces a new primary mission-- fighting a relatively protracted non-nuclear local war against a formidable enemy. "...one cannot exclude the possibility of the occurrence of a relatively protracted war, in which nuclear weapons wit) not be used (for example, a local war, which is capable of escalating SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY P:ge 1 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 SECRET into a world conflict). Therefore, one cannot neglect preparing also fora relatively protracted war." The important question of how or where the Soviets would become involved in such a war is not an- swered in the discussion. The article indicates that the debate on Soviet military doctrine initiated by Khrushchev in 1960 is continuing and that even this for- mulation may not be final. In the introduction, the authors state that their observations on the con- tent of military art and the es- sence of the revolutionary change in the methods of armed combat "may or may not coincide with the opin- ions and views expressed by other comrades." They also state that they assume that the military reader will treat their observations critically. In conclusion, the article notes that "it is essential to further elaborate the new mili- tary art, the art of waging a KHRUSHCHEV PRESSES FOR COMMUNIST PREPARATORY MEETING Khrushchev's 7 September speech contained the clearest indications to date that he is trying to maneu- ver Peiping into a position which will enable the USSR to claim that the Chinese have excluded themselves from the Communist movement. In deference to foreign Communist opin- ion, Moscow has denied repeatedly that its motive in calling for "col- lective discussions" is to excommuni- cate the Chinese. It is concentra- ting instead on proving that Peiping's rejection of "principled party dis- cussion" places sole responsibility on the Chinese for "giving the split a formal status." This tactic was evident in Khrushchev's statement that those parties "which have agreed to take part" should proceed with the pre- paratory meeting in mid-December even though Peiping and pro-Chinese parties refuse to attend. He ap- plied the same formula to the pro- posed conference of all parties next year, saying the "only correct so- lution" is for those parties which are "defending the unity" of the Communist movement to discuss ques- tions ripe for solution. Khrushchev's confidence in this course of action probably was strengthened by the agreement of the important Italian part,,., to at- tend the December meeting. The Soviets probably hope the Italian agreement to attend the December gathering will. make it more difficult for the Rumanians to abstain. SECRET 11 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 2 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 SE CRET Substantial numbers of nego- tiations to supply the USSR with industrial equipment on terms ex- ceeding the usual five-year medium term credits are expected to fol- low London's approval of the first 15-year government-guaranteed credit to the USSR. The magnitude of new deals may, however, be limited; the number of eager sel- lers in the West probably exceeds the number of eager financiers. Furthermore, while other Western governments feel under pressure to follow the British lead, they are clearly unenthusiastic. The Japanese Government may be the first to follow the British pattern. Last week, when it pro- vided the usual five-year guaran- tee on the sale of a. $9-million fertilizer plant, Japan permitted private financing for an addition- al three-year period and said it would extend its guarantee should the five-year credit line be broken. Belgium probably will adopt the French position, and the West German Government's Hermes Credit Insurance Company may ex- tend its medium-term credit- guarantee system to cover sales to the USSR. flood gates of credit for tae $3 billion worth of Western chemical equipment and other ma.chiner, and plants the USSR is estimated to need by 1970. It is likeli that other governments will a.lsc Limit the availability of financing as Britain did when it restricted its long-term credit guarantees to the USSR to $280 million. The 3~)vi.ets ? must compete with long-tern: credit demands from other bloc countries and non-Communist underdeveloped countries. Furthermore, some gov- ernments, already faced with in- flation problems, may be reluctant to exacerbate them by apprt,v ing large quantities of new lorg-term credit. Even those Western governments which are pushing exports will probably not wish to see to large sums committed to long-tern loans which, over a period of tine, will finance fewer exports than loans made for shorter periods. Traders have observed the USSR's urwill- ingness or inability to stfp up more than moderately its exports to Western industrial countries and may doubt its ability rc ac- quire enough hard currency to buy what it needs and to repay long- term credits. For its part, Moscow must weigh its need and desire -cr Western equipment against :.he cost of long-term credit. Inte'est charges will add more than a third to the price of the equipmf?rt it has Lust bought from the U};. The credit "break" represents a. success in the Soviet program, } but does not necessarily open the SECRET 11 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY ?a gt 3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 Tifgu Mure, U.S.S.R. Slat- Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600040001-9 SECRET The Commu UNREST AMONG HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN TRANSYLVANIA In the present atmosphere of increasing independence, if not friction, between Moscow and the Eastern European states and among the satellites themselves, tradi- tional national problems may again become a significant factor in Eastern European politics. The million and a half ethnic Hungar- ian minority residing in Rumanian Transylvania provides an interest- ing example. US diplomats have confirmed that Hungarians in sev- eral western Transylvanian towns staged riots and demonstrations during the past three months. There is some evidence that Budapest, which tacitly covets Transylvania. has helped to stir the unrest. Rumanian-Hungarian relations have long been marred by rivalry for the control of Transylvania. Hungarian rule began with the Mag- yar conquest of the great Tran- sylvanian plain in the 11th Century. The Magyars were--and still are-- an individualistic and independent people who look down on others in the region, especially the Ruma- nians, who make up the bulk of the peasantry. Following World War I the Treaty of Trianon (1920) awarded Transylvania to Rumania, thereby increasing the natural hostility of the Hungarian minority for Rumanians. The desire for reunion with Hungary was stimulated and encouraged by Hitler's contempt for the World War I peace treaties. Although Hitler returned northern Transylvania to Hungary at the beginning of the war, the allies subsequently again made northern Transylvania a part of SE I.RET Rumania in the general b