WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004600070001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 2, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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WEEKLY SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
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(Information as of 1200 EDT, 1 October 1964)
Page
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
In its 15 years' existence, East Germany has achieved
only limited recognition outside the Communist world.
Even within the bloc, Ulbricht finds he does not always
receive a friendly audience.
AREA NOTE
On North Vietnam Industry
AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
As of mid-September agricultural prospects were generally
good, but China and Eastern Europe are continuing to
import grain.
SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME'S TROUBLES GROW
Khanh's command in Saigon is shaky, and the influence
of the non-Communist "People's Revolutionary Committee"
is spreading in some major provincial centers.
CAMBODIA PRESSES BID FOR PEIPING'S SUPPORT
Sihanouk's suspicions of South Vietnam have been rein-
forced by recent events, and he seeks closer ties with
Communist China to counter the threat.
PRESSURES ON KASHMIR MORATORIUM INTENSIFY
Incidents along the cease-fire line have increased, and
political turmoil in Indian-held Kashmir has intensified.
THE CYPRUS SITUATION
A new confrontation over Turkish troop rotation may be
shaping up, and the estrangement between Makarios and
Grivas is growing.
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
NATIONS CONVENING FOR NONALIGNED CONFERENCE
At least 49 nations will be represented at the meetings
opening in Cairo on 5 October. Tito will be staking a
strong claim to personal leadership, and is expected to
support many Soviet positions.
Page
CONGO GOVERNMENT HOLDS OWN AGAINST REBELS
Rebel attacks have been repulsed in several areas, and
Leopoldville has plans to resume the offensive. Tshomb('s
diplomatic position is not faring as well.
DAHOMEY SLIDING TO THE LEFT
The trend is most evident in the foreign relations of
the once strongly pro-Western country, and appears to
stem from economic causes.
EEC GRAIN PRICE UNIFICATION: ROUND II
France has decided to go all out to bring about EEC
agreement on a unified grain price by 15 December.
Member states' internal problems and administration
arrangements for the agreement may be delaying factors.
DE GAULLE'S LATIN AMERICAN TRIP
The French President's rapport with individual Latin
American leaders has not been as good as it has been
with the large and enthusiastic crowds which greeted
him during the first half of his tour.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
COLOMBIA'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS
Political, economic, and military pressures may under-
mine President Valencia's government. Its viability
will probably be tested this month when a supplementary
budget comes up for a vote in Congress.
PANAMA'S NEW ADMINISTRATION
President-elect Marco Robles seems anxious to correct
his country's internal problems and to maintain amicable
relations with the US. Pre-election deals, a small
National Assembly majority, and Communist subversion
may limit his effectiveness.
BRITISH GUIANA ELECTIONS SCHEDULED
Governor Luyt announced that general elections will be
held on 7 December. Political parties have until 30
October to file the names of their candidates for the
53-member legislature.
AREA NOTE 17
On Ecuador
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The German Democratic Re- plishment of any note this year
public,founded 15 years ago on was the conclusio.i on 12 June
7 October 1949 by Moscow's fiat, of a Friendship Treaty with the
has achieved only limited diplo- USSR.
matic recognition outside the
Communist world. Walter Ulbricht,
the regime's Stalinist dictator,
also sees his hard-line policies
becoming more and more anachro-
nistic when compared to those
of the other countries of East-
ern Europe.
Neither the atmosphere of
change in Eastern Europe nor the
detente in East-West relations
is to East German liking. Al-
ready, four of the Eastern Euro-
pean states have concluded trade
agreements with the Federal Re-
public, often at the expense of
East German interests and despite
the regime's protests. Khrushchev
is planning to visit West Germany,
sometime early next year, in part
to explore the possibilities for
improved relations. The peace
treaty so long sought by Ulbricht
is no longer treated as an urgent
matter in bloc policy statements.
In an effort to win more
consideration for East German
interests, Ulbricht has visited
five of the Eastern European
countries in the last few months.
He did not find his audiences
particularly receptive, however,
especially when he sought to
lessen the lure of trade with
West Germany. His only accom-
Since the erection of the
Wall in August 1961, the East
German leadership has acted
with a new-found confidence---
at least in domestic affairs.
A few opponents of Ulbricht have
even been released from prison.
Aside from the 20 September elec-
tion of Willi Stoph to succeed
the late Otto Grotewohl as pre-
mier, there have been no lead-
ership changes in over a year.
Moreover, there is no evidence
of significant personnel changes
in the lower echelons of the
part or government
The regime believes it
scored a success this summer in
its long-time efforts to win
some measure of acceptance from
the Federal Republic. It in-
sists that the new Berlin pass
agreement and agreements on re-
pair of the Hof Bridge and new
train paths to Berlin were con-
cluded on an "official" level
and constitute a measure of rec-
ognition by the West Germans.
Bonn, predictably, denies that
anything more than "technical-
level" understandings have been
involved. It is resisting East
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German efforts to upgrade the
semiofficial Trusteeship for
Interzonal Trade (IZT) and has
refused recent East German re-
quests for trade concessions
which could have led in this
direction.
Although it is premature
to speak of an East German na-
North Vietnam Industry:
North Vietnam's difficulties
with heavy industry are under-
scored by the seven-year lapse
between the inauguration of the
first industrial plan and the
completion on 20 September of
the country's second modern
blast furnace. With this sec-
ond furnace, domestic pig iron
capacity reached 200,000 tons
annually. However, steel-mak-
ing facilities have not kept
pace. Most of the small quan-
tity of pig iron produced by
the first furnace was exported
to Japan.
Domestic industry cannot
support either the military es-
tablishment or rapid economic
growth. Only simple small arms
and ammunition are manufactured
ular opinion.
tionalism, there is tentative
evidence that some categories
of people--notably the youth--
are beginning to think of them-
selves as East Germans, rather
than as simply Germans. At the
same time, much of the populace
continues to resent the per-
vasive controls of its Stalinist
regime and to ridicule the few
concessions it has made to pop-
at home. All POL, finished met-
allurgical products, railroad
stock, aircraft, vehicles, and
most complex machinery, spare
parts, industrial chemicals,
and electrical equipment are
still imported from Communist
countries. During the last 10
years, bloc countries have pro-
vided about a billion dollars
in economic aid, but planned
production goals nevertheless
have had to be reduced fre-
quently, most recently in 1961.
Current regime announcements
imply that only a few major
targets of the 1961-65 plan
have a chance for fulfillment.
About 70 percent of the coun-
try's limited factory output
still comes from nonstrategic
food-processing, textile, and
raw materials industries.
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AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Output in all growing areas
of the USSR is not uniformly as
favorable as in the record year
of 1958, but good crops of grain,
corn, sugar beets, sunflowers,
and cotton are being harvested.
It is tentatively estimated that
total grain production this year
will be about 120-125 million tons,
about the same as in 1958. Pro-
duction of grain per capita, how-
ever, is likely to be about 10
percent less than six years ago
because of the population increase
of about 21 million since then.
By mid-September that part
of total grain production procured
by the state--as opposed to that
left on the farms for feed, seed,
and food--had already exceeded the
45 million tons procured in all of
1963. In order to build up de-
pleted state reserves, the state
may buy more than the record 57
million tons taken in 1958 and
1.962. The state procurement plan
of 67 million tons will probably
not be fulfilled despite the op-
timism expressed by Soviet offi-
cials in late August.
Record harvests of sugar beets
and oilseeds are probable, and the
prospects for animal husbandry are
favorable, given the good supplies
of feedstuffs now being procured.
Meat production in 1964, however,
will be well below the 10.2 million
tons produced in 1963 because of
the need to rebuild herds this year.
The cotton harvest will probably
be somewhat below the 5.2 million
tons harvested last year.
Prospects for the late autumn
harvest in Communist China are
fair to good, with improved condi-
tions in South and Southwest China
offsetting the continued deteriora-
tion of growing conditions in North
Central, and East China during Au-
gust. Partly because of the in-
crease in population a record 6.4
million tons of wheat have already
been purchased abroad even though
the total crop of grains and tubers
will probably exceed the 175-180
million tons produced in 1963.
Eastern Europe's harvest of
small grains probably will be only
marginally better than the below-
average crop of 1963. This year's
corn crop is developing favorably,
but may be lower than in 1963 be-
cause of the smaller sown area.
Prospects for sugar beets are less
favorable than a year ago. Grain
imports this year will probably be
close to the 5.2 million tons
bought a year ago.
Prospects in North Korea con-
tinue to be unfavorable, but in
North Vietnam the fall rice crop,
which usually accounts for about
two thirds of the annual rice har-
vest, is reportedly growing well.
Cuba's production, except for sugar,
will probably decline slightly com-
pared to 1963, with an apparent
improvement in livestock and green
vegetables failing to compensate
for decreases in grains, root
crops, and tubers. Total food
supplies may not fall this year
inasmuch as food imports during 25X1
the first half of 1964 were higher
than during the same period last
year.
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SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME'S TROUBLES GROW
Suppression of the Rhade
uprising has eased some of the
tensions in South Vietnam dur-
ing the past week, but new
difficulties threaten General
Khanh's position.
Khanh's forceful action
against the Rhade paramilitary
units in Darlac and Quang Due
provinces restored Saigon's
authority over them, but it may
undo much of the progress made
in inducing the tribesmen to
join the fight against the Viet
Cong. Harsh reprisals and
reneging on promises to the
Rhade could lead to further up-
risings.
Khanh's command of his own
government is shaky. The group
of young generals who saved him
from the 13 September coup at-
tempt has apparently succeeded
in forcing him to exile General
Khiem, a member of the ruling
triumvirate. A 17-man High
National Council, charged with
drawing up a provisional con-
stitution and selecting a pro-
visional national assembly, was
formally inaugurated on 26 Sep-
tember.
In central Vietnam, the
influence of the "People's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Revolutionary Committee" is
spreading. Local chapters
have been established in a
number of coastal towns. Le
Khac Quyen, the power behind
the first committee set up
in Hui, is already exerting,
influence on the national
scene, and has been appointed
to the High National Counc"l.
Although the Committee is not
known to be Communist in-
spired, it may become a point
of Viet Cong infiltration.
Buddhists and Catholics
have been stepping up their
charges and countercharges, and
violence could break out at any
time. The Viet Cong have been
trying to further the dissen-
sion by spreading disruptive
rumors.
Communist military ac-
tivity has declined somewhat.
In the past week Viet Cong -
initiated incidents declined
to 700 from the previous week's
unusually high figure of 975.
The Communists struck hart
at railroad lines, primarily
in the northern provinces, in
what may be an attempt to
interdict links with SaigOD.
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CAMBODIA PRESSES BID FOR PEIPING'S SUPPORT
Prince Sihanouk's concern
for guarantees of Cambodia's
neutrality and borders has been
given new urgency by recent
events in South Vietnam. He
fears that Saigon's frustrations
will be vented in aggression
against Cambodia. Sihanouk con-
siders the 5 September skirmish
at the Cambodian border village
of Koh Rokar, reports of re-
newed Khmer Serei ("Free Cam-
bodia") activity, and hostile
statements from Saigon, as sup-
porting his long-standing sus-
picion that South Vietnam is
only looking for a pretext for
a Cambodian venture.
Sihanouk hopes that a
closer association with Commu-
nist China will counter the im-
mediate threat and also act as
a hedge against what he views
as the somewhat more distant
but equally dangerous threat of
a unified Vietnam under Hanoi's
hegemony. At the same time,
he fully realizes that conclud-
ing any agreement with Peiping
and Hanoi, unless backstopped
by strong Chinese guarantees,
will give Saigon precisely the
pretext he says it seeks.
Sihanouk is now in Peiping
in search of support. In
speeches prior to his departure,
he indicated that he was put-
ting the highest priority on
getting a statement from the
Chinese that an attack on Cam-
bodia would be treated as an
attack on China. Although Pei-
ping has previously pledged its
"all-out support" and its de-
termination to "stand behind"
Cambodia if it is attacked by
the US or its "lackeys," Si-
hanouk now apparently finds
this insufficient.
In the past the Chinese have
been most cautious in responding
to Sihanouk's overtures, and
there are no indications that
they are willing to give him the
guarantees he wants now. The
Chinese have provided the en-
thusiastic reception that the
Cambodian Chief of State has
come to expect in Peiping, and
they will probably offer some
military hardware for his para-
military forces. They probably
will be less accommodating, how-
ever, on political support.
Under these circumstances,
Sihanouk can be expected to move
cautiously in discussions in Pei-
ping with the North Vietnamese and
representatives of the South Viet-
namese Communist National Libera-
tion Front.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Pag?: 6
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PRESSURES ON KASHMIR MORATORIUM INTENSIFY
.-The Kashmir dispute, which
has simmered along through the
summer, soon may again dominate
Indo-Pakistani difficulties.
The casualty rate along the
cease-fire line has climbed to
its highest level since 1949;
109 persons were killed in the
past four weeks. Inside Indian-
held Kashmir, sharply intensified
political turmoil has raised
new doubts about the ability of
the state government to maintain
even the outward appearance of
stability.
Since Nehru's death last
May, India and Pakistan have
been observing a diplomatic
moratorium on the dispute to
allow India's new leadership to
get established. Pakistan has
hoped that significant progress
might come once Prime Minister
Shastri was fully in control.
India's interests are served,
however, by prolonging this
moratorium indefinitely. It
seeks no change in the status
quo and remains principally
interested in pacifying the
various challenges to its con-
trol over the main valley.
Despite Shastri's conciliatory
line, he is in no position to
consider making significant--
and unpopular--concessions at a
time. when he faces serious
domestic food and price diffi-
culties and discord within the
Congress Party.
For the immediate future,
New Delhi is likely to con-
centrate on strengthening the
facade of normal state govern-
ment in Kashmir, upon which it
bases much of its claim that
the territory has been fully
integrated into the Indian
Union. The eight-month-old
Sadiq government, installed
under Shastri's personal
supervision before Nehru's
death, has just weathered a
challenge from former prime
minister Bakshi. To accomplish
this, however, it was necessary
to jail Bakshi and to suspend
the state legislature.
Sheikh Abdullab's prom-
inent position within Indian-
held Kashmir nevertheless
remains the critical factor
for New Delhi. Congress Party
leaders have hoped that grow-
ing strife between rival
Kashmir grouts would undercut
the Sheikh's standing, for his
demands for self-determination
have been worrisome. If any-
thing, however, Abdullah's
position among the Kashmiri
masses is growing stronger.
Like the Pakistanis, he has
recently been showing greater
impatience with the lack of
progress toward a Kashmir
solution and has been hinting
at the possible use of force
from within the valley.
In the absence of some
meaningful sign from India,
the Ayub government remains
doubtful about the value of
holding the ministerial-level
talks proposed for late October
and November. Unless some
such sign is forthcoming soon,
Pakistan may step up pressure
on the cease-fire line and
try to encourage additional
Kashmiri unrest against Sadig
and New Delhi.
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THE CYPRUS SITUATION
Relative calm continues on Cy-
prus but a new confrontation over
Turkish troop rotation may be de-
veloping. The unity of the Greek
Cypriots, meanwhile, is threatened
by the growing estrangement between
President Makarios and General
Grivas.
UN Secretary General Thant's
26 September announcement of an
agreement to permit part of the
Turkish contingent on Cyprus to be
rotated in return for opening of
the Turkish-controlled Nicosia-
Kyrenia highway appears to have
been premature. The Turkish Cyp-
riots have protested that they were
not consulted and have refused to
go along with the agreement. An-
kara denies that there is any re-
lationship between rotation and
opening of the road. Makarios in-
sists the rotation will not be per-
mitted unless the road is opened
and armed Turks and Turkish Cyp-
riots removed from the immediate
vicinity.
Meanwhile, Grivas, and at
least two Greek Cypriot newspapers,
have criticized Makarios' recent
attempts to secure weapons from
Egypt and the USSR. They allege
that only Greece has supplied ma-
terial aid in the past, and should
be the only country to supply it
in the future. They also insist
that enosis--union with Greece--
should be the government's goal,
rather than the official one of
"uncommitted independence."
Makarios, most of his cabi-
net, a majority of the Greek Cyp-
riot press, and the large Cypriot
Communist Party were placing great
hopes on the recent negotiations
in Moscow. Nicosia's Commerce Min-
ister Araouzus said on 30 Septem-
ber that Moscow had agreed to sup-
ply both economic and military aid,
including some weapons. Details
are not yet available.
Greek Cypriot Communists,
after reassuring Makarios of their
support, have issued a statement
criticizing "disruptive elements"
in the community--an obvious ref-
erence to Grivas and others op-
posing the current drift toward
reliance on Communist and non-
aligned nations. The pro-Makarios
press has printed increasingly
critical references to the Greek
Embassy in Nicosia, the Greek Gov-
ernment, and any Cyprus solution
involving Greece. As if to empha-
size his reliance on countries
other than NATO-member Greece, Ma-
karios will attend next week's
conference of nonaligned nations
in Cairo.
The disclosure that Swedish
members of the UN forces on Cyprus
were transporting arms for the Turk-
ish Cypriots has not been exploited
by Makarios to restrict further UN
freedom of movement in Cyprus. This
appears to be part of his present
campaign to present an impression
of reasonableness prior to the de-
bate on Cyprus at the forthcoming
session of the UN General Assembly.
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At the second nonaligned
conference opening in Cairo on
5 October, many delegations will
be vying to advance their own
claims to leadership. The dele-
gates, while pressing various
national causes, will probably
pass resolutions less favorable
to Western than to Soviet interests.
More nations will be repre-
sented at this conference than
at its predecessor in Belgrade
three years ago, when represen-
tatives of 26 nations gathered.
Delegations from at least 49 na-
tions will be at Cairo, largely
because a new definition of non-
alignment permits the presence
of some nations with defense ties
with the West, as well as the
bloc. In addition to all Arab
and most African and self-styled
neutralist Asian nations, nine
Latin American countries and Fin-
land will send observers. Cuba
will be a full participant.
Behind the scenes, the So-
viet Union will be trying to in-
fluence the conference to take
positions not only hostile to
the West, but tending to support
its ideological stand in rela-
tion to Peiping. Moscow hopes
the Cairo meeting will score a
greater propaganda success than
the Second Afro-Asian Conference,
scheduled for March, which Com-
munist China will attend.
There are indications that
Yugoslavia will support the So-
viet position on many agenda
items, notably disarmament and
nuclear weapons. The absence
of U Nu and Nehru, who exerted
a moderating influence at Bel-
grade, will aid Tito's hopes
to play a dominating role at
Cairo. The Indians seem to
view the conference as an op-
portunity to reassert India's
leadership among the nonaligned,
but they will be handicapped by
Shastri's lack of Nehru's ac-
knowledged stature. Nasir has
given little indication of the
role he hopes to play as con-
ference host.
Indonesia's Sukarno appar-
ently hopes to gain support for
his concept of a conference of
"new emerging forces" which
would replace both the nonaligned
and the Afro-Asian groupings.
He has so far blocked an invi-
tation to Malaysia, and can also
be expected to attack Western
activities as Southeast Asia.
Other issues likely to arise
include the problems of divided
nations (Germany, Korea, Viet-
nam), colonialism, and economic
development and cooperation.
Final arrangements are being
made by the foreign ministers
who convened on 1 October.
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