THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY TODAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004600090003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 16, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

lease 2007/04/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600090003-2
16 October 1964
OCI No. 0353/64A
Copy.No. 5 55
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
?~-10R1 `CAF Pages 1 hru 1
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ONTA`CNS T T)PORMAT= -')N .AF'FECT-
T3F:FF:N +, OF THE. UNI'T`E]) STATES
EVEL AT ON OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
HORIVI ) T'F'.T _SON I PROT-TIBYFED RY LAW
,
eei with specific dissemination
rfi tae orovisions of DO D J/7,
wi rhin the +- -cimework of
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EO 12356 1.3 (a) (5)
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under conditions where the
party was able to secure power
in cooperation with a broad
range of popular forces in re-
acting, for example, to an at-
tempted coup from the right.
They believed.that'the Italian
Communist Party and, in fact,
all Western European Communist
parties, could best achieve
power gradually by tactical
alliances with other leftist
parties to transform the
"bourgeois state" by reform.
Since Togliatti's death,
party leaders have emphasized
that his policies will be con-
tinued in toto. It has always
been an absolute necessity to
emphasize party unity, and it
is particularly so now on the
eve of the national municipal
elections next month.
EO 12356 1.3(a)(4)
EO 12356 1.3(a)(5)
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EO 12356 1 )(4)
EO 12356 1.3(a)(5)
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The Italian Communist Party (PCI) is the second
largest, and the most influential Communist party
in a developed country. It is the leading exponent
in the non-Communist world of greater autonomy for
national Communist parties within a framework gen-
erally acceptable to Moscow. Although PCI member-
ship is declining, the party has captured slightly
over a quarter of the national vote in Italy, and
its ability to attract support is now at an all-
time high.
The Role of Togliatti
Palmiro Togliatti, one of
the last of the Comintern lead-
ers of the mid-1920s, helped
establish the PCI in 1921 and
was its unchallenged boss for
almost 30 years before his
death last August. His pres-
tige and political ability en-
abled him to control internal
rivalries for power and facili-
tated effective party disci-
pline. Togliatti always favored
and, whenever possible, pushed
for refinements and changes in
classic Marxist doctrine in the
best interests of PCI, but never
to the extent of outright con-
flict with the USSR. In his
last "testament"--as in 1956--
for example, he pressed for
fuller and more rapid "de--Stalini-
zation." Although the PCI was
forced to pull back in 1956,
the publication of the final
testament emphasized more
strongly than ever before its
determination to maintain a pub-
lic image of autonomy in order
to push strategies tailored to
fit circumstances in Italy.
Togliatti, like the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union,
(CPSU), was convinced that rev-
olution by armed struggle would
be disastrous in Italy except
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The basic differences of
opinion within the party are
matters of interpretation of
the party line, particularly
what tactics are to be followed
toward the center-left. These
cannot be readily categorized
as representing right or left
"factional" positions. The
large "center" of the party Is
more or less in general agree-
ment on policies.
Atlhough the party as a
whole is concerned over how to
adapt itself to the conditions
of an increasingly affluent
society, the main point of dif-
ference among its members is
how far and how fast it must go
in this process. The "right-
ists" argue that the PCI can-
not remain permanently in op-
position without eventually
facing demoralization and dis-
integration. They, therefore,
stress the need to achieve
power within the limits imposed
by the democratic system. In
this connection, the party has
made a strong attempt to ob-
scure its essentially authori-
tarian and subversive nature
and develop a public image as
a democratic force prepared to
step down, once in power, if
its popular mandate were Cost.
The right wing also favors join-
ing forces with other parties
on the left in promoting spe-
cific projects which they think
will push Italy toward the
gradual acceptance of Socialism.
In general, the positions
held by the right wing are in
line with those that Togliatti
propounded although the "right,"
in contrast with the "left,"
advocates that tactics be em-
ployed to permit a broader and
more rapid adaption to the
changing Italian society.
The party's "left" has
severely criticized the leader-
ship particularly for not having
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made a stronger effort to block
the formation of the center-left
government and wants a much
more aggressive opposition to
it. Leftists' deplore the
party's "moderate" stand against
the government as little more
than "bourgeois" democratic op-
position, and argue that pres-
ent policies will result in the
loss of party integrity. The
left-wingers argue that as the
PCI moves to the right in its
attempt to transform the state
from within--which they realize
is necessary--it runs the danger
of being transformed and loses
its Communist character.
The Party "Democracy" Problem
A debate is now intensify-
ing among the party's rank and
file over the lack of intra-
party democracy in determining
party policies. In Togliatti's
day, policy formulation, to a
considerable degree, was a one-
man operation. His decisions
stuck because the party organiza-
tions were tightly disciplined
and because the membership had
faith in the PCI's mission. The
present debate, if Longo fails
to control it, could turn symp-
toms of discontent among the
cadres into outright factional-
ism which would severely under-
mine party unity.
Party leaders publicly in-
sist that "democratic centralism"
be used in such a way as to per-
mit meaningful participation by
the cadres in party decision
making. At the party's Confer-
ence on Organization last March,
Ingrao and other left-wingers
vigorously pushed this line,
but they were pulled up short
by Togliatti. Whether or not
his successors can control the
left on this issue remains to
be seen, but the odds appear to
be against it.
The Membership Problem
In the past decade, member-
ship in the PCI has dropper: by
almost 25 percent--513,000--
and that of its youth organiza-
tion (FGCI) by 60 percent--
290,000. The party anticipated
that membership losses would
occur as a result of its adapta-
tion to socioeconomic changes
in Italy, but it probably did
not anticipate losses on this
scale. Although all party lead-
ers express concern publicly
over membership losses, tht.s
is somewhat exaggerated and is,
in part, an attempt to spur
party cadres to intensify their
activities.
The party, moreover, is
troubled by the fact that the
gap between its voting strength
and its membership is greatest
in industrial centers even
though the number of industrial
workers in Italy has been ris-
ing sharply. The FGCI member-
ship drop in part reflects the
inclusion of many of these into
the PCI proper; the failure to
attract young. members in any
significant numbers is a nag-
ging worry.
The party,nonetheless.
remains the second largest force
in Italian politics. Its mem-
bership is as large as, or
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ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY & YOUTH
MOV M N"
(FGCI) MEMBERSHIP
DATA
PCI
(In hundred thousands)
2
200
,
-
2,145,317
100
2
,
2
000
s
,
900
1
,
1,800
1,700
--1,631,889\ -
1,600
None"
FGC1
(In hundred thousands)
500
430,908
400
---- -
-
-
300
- -
--
200
142,256
100
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
1961 1
962 1963 1964
ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP BY OCCUPATION
1954
163
NO.
NO.
g6
Workers (in industry) 856,314 40.0
643,733
39.5
Laborers and Salaried
Employees 382,257 17.8
206,684
12.7
Sharecroppers and
Tenant Farmers 262,227 12.2
173,975
10.7
Farm Owners 84,317 3.9
91,374
5.6
Craftsmen, Tradesmen,
& Small- Entrepreneurs 112,063 5.2
101,818
6.2
Professional Men
Intellectuals & Teachers 11,398 0.5
9,496
0,6
Office & Technical
Workers 47,433 2.2
36,828
2.2
Students 6,252 0.3
5,313
0,3
Housewives 289,148 13.5
Employed at Domicile
202,327
15,565
12.4
1.0
Pensioners
113,986
7,0
Others 93,903 4.4
29,451
1.8
?Critica Marxists, Sept: Dec. 1963 issue, pp. 196-7
*'* As of 15 June; L'Unito
***as of 10 April; L'Unita
!iIn 1954 t
he category "Pensioners" and this group was probably distributed among theother categories and in that for "Others."
Similar
ly there was no category for those "Employed at Domicile," who were in
cluded in the category "Housewives,"
641002 2 e
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larger than,, that of the Chris-
tian Democrats. In the April
1963 parliamentary elections
it won 7.8 million votes, a
gain of over one million in
five years. The gain attests
to the party's ability to ex-
ploit the "opening to the left"
for its own purposes as well
as its excellent organizational
structure. One out of every
four Italians votes for the
party out of disenchantment
with the failure of previous
governments to enact socioeco-
nomic reforms and through a con-
viction that the PCI is the
most effective instrument for
forcing successive governments
to adopt policies that will con-
tribute to a better way of life.
The PCI and the Center-Left
Since 1955, the Socialist
Party (PSI) of Pietro Nenni has
painfully moved away from close
cooperation with the Communists.
In January 1964, a significant
number of Socialists, represent-
ing much of the party's pro-Com-
munist left wing, renounced
Nenni's party and founded the
Italian Socialist Part of Pro-
The Socialist participa-
tion in the government since
last December is the most seri-
ous potential threat that the
PCI's "national unity" tactic
has suffered since the en
F"'e war,
EO 12356 1.3(a)(4)
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Faced with the fact of the
center-left, Togliatti stressed
that a "real turn to the left"
--that is, genuine progress on
the reform front--was out of the
question without the PCI. He also
asserted that the Socialist lead-
ers had been seduced by the Chris-
tian Democrats into compromising
the very "class character" of
their party.
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CHAMBER OF
DEPUTIES
DEMOCRATS
(PSDI)
(P SI)
62
MONARCHISTS
(PDIUM)
NEO-FASCISTS
(MSI)
SOCIALISTS
(PSI)
GOVERNMeNT CO
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS
(CD)
`, )
19 (PLI)_
*The Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) was created on 12 January 1964 as a result of a
split in the PSI. PSIUP parliamentarians, before the split, represented much of the pro-Communist left wing
of the PSI. In some respects, PSIUP's positions on political issues would place it to the left of the PCI.
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
SOCIAL
DEMOCRATS
(PSDI)
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It is too early to predict
how the PCI's efforts to cope
with problems posed by Togliatti's
death will turn out. It would
appear, however, that the party's
present high caliber leadership,
together with its strong organi-
zational structure will fore-
stall any significant loss of
strength in the foreseeable fu=
ture. "K I
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