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November 20, 1964
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Approved State Dept. review completed OBI No. 058/64,: Copy No : "~ SECRET CROUP I .Excluded frtim aVEOmotic do~wngradirig_s~nd deelossi#ica~ton Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 F~. 2a November 19~i4 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 ~ -.7i?~~l ~J l C O N T ENT S (Information as of 1200 EST, 19 November 1964) THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page. MOSCOW STILL FIRM ON UNITED NATIONS DEBT ISSUE Soviet envoys are pressing Afro-Asian governments to support Moscow's position and probably to urge the US to back away from a showdown in the General Assembly, MOSCOW AND PEIPING SILENT ON CHOU VISIT TO USSR There are some tentative indications that the new Soviet leadership may have agreed to put off next month's pre- paratory conference to discuss a world Communist meet- ing. As a concession, F~eiping may have agreed to a truce in polemics, although both sides continue indi- rect attacks. FURTHER CHANGES IN SOVIET TOP LEADEP~SHIP The latest shifts seem to destroy the fiction of a dual Kosygin-Brezhnev leadership, leaving Nikolay Podgorny now in the best position to act as a brake on Brezhnev's growing power. CZECHOSLOVAKIA ADOPTS A NEW COURSE Party support for Novotny's independent course in re- lations with the USSR is confirmed by his re-election to the presidency. ASIA-AFRICA UNIFICATION ISSUE AGAIN STIRRING SOUTH KOREANS Reticent events, both on the world scene and locally, have put greater pressure on the Pak government to show some initiative to develop contacts with the North. POSITION OF HUONG GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM Open opposition seems to have subsided for the moment, but armed forces leaders remain lukewarm toward Premier H~nnno^ 25X1 20 Nov 64 CURRENT INTEL~~EN~WEEKLY SUMMARY Page Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 ~ ~ SE C'RE T ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page COMMUKIST AID TO PAKISTAN Communist countries are promoting economic relations, but their aid and trade remain dwarfed by that of the West. AREA NOTE On Sudan AREA NOTE On Israel-Syria LEOPOLDVILLE FORCES MOVING AGAINST STANLEYVILLE A 400-mile movement against the rebel capital is underway. TANZANIA IN TUR1140IL OVER WESTERN "PLOT" Radical elements in Dar es Salaam are using spuri- ous documents to undermine the US position in East Africa and probably to press President Nyerere into giving more active support to dissident movements in the Congo and Malawi, as well as Mozambique. THE MLF AND THE ALLIANCE The search for a way to avoid a crisis in the A1- :Liance over the multilateral nuclear force continues, but the resulting delay may itself be lessening the project's chances for success. SE CRE T 20 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIvENCE WEEKLY SUMb'IARY Page ii 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 SECRET EUROPE (continued) THE EEC AND THE KENNEDY ROUND By an eleventh-hour compromise among themselves, the EEC countries met the 16 November deadline for presenting the exceptions they desire from a general tariff cut, but Kennedy Round negotiators still face hard bargaining in January over this and other important issues. NATIONWIDE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN ITALY Continuation of center-left government at the national level may well depend on the outcome of the local elec- i:ions. Significant losses by the Christian Democrats or Socialists, or important gains by the Communists, would precipitate a cabinet crisis, followed by extreme political instability. BOLIVIAN JUNTA MOVES TO WIN PUBLIC SUPPORT 17 President Barrientos is stumping the provinces, and the junta has abolished the "oppressive" measures and organizations of the ousted Paz regime. POTENTIAL FEDERAL-STATE CLASH IN BRAZIL 18 Attempts by army leaders to oust the leftist governor of Goias have already strained relations between the Castello Branco administration and the important Social Democratic Party, and have brought renewed charges by politicians of undue military influence in civilian affairs. RECI'NT DEVELOPMENTS STRENGTHEN DOMINICAN REGIME triumvirate president Reid has appointed three new cabinet ministers who will be more responsive to him. SECRET 20 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii 25X1 ~ Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 SECRET The Communist SVorld MOSCOW STILL FIRM ON UNITED NATIONS DEBT ISSUE As the 1 December date for convening the 19th General As- aembly approaches, Moscow con- tinues its adamant refusal to pa.y its peacekeeping a.rrea.rs to the UN. Soviet ambassadors in several Afro-Asian countries' are warning local officials that even a.n abstention on a. showdown vote to deprive Moscow of its General Assembly vote will be considered an "unfriendly act." A particularly strong Soviet pitch in New Delhi ha.s stressed that the USSR "will not back down" and "will Leave the UN completely" if it loses the vote. Three Soviet deputy foreign ministers are touring various ca.pita.ls in Asia. and Africa,, probably to press this line. They will probably sug- gest that the Afro-Asians urge the US to back away from an im- mediate confrontation on Article 19 when the assembly convenes. MOSCO~Y AND PEIPING SILENT ON CHOU VISIT TO USSR Moscow and Peiping a,re still :noncommitta.l on the dis- cussions last week between Chou En-la.i and the new Soviet lead- ers. A terse communique issued when Chou left Moscow on 13 No- vember merely listed the partic- ipants from both sides. TASS added only a. brief comment that "the talks were held in a. frank, comra.d,ely atmosphere." High-level bilateral con- tacts, however, have been re- establ.ished a.nd some limited agreement on procedural matters ma.y have been achieved. The an- niversary celebrations in Moscow gave the Chinese a.n opportunity to confer with leaders of other parties a.nd to press for a. post- ponement of the December prepar- atory conference to discuss a. world Communist meeting. The official Yugoslav press service reported on 17 November that the British Communist Party --one of 26 parties invited to Moscow in December--had declared that "if a brief postponement of the committee's work would facilitate China.'s participation, we think it desirable." SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 SECRET The new Soviet leaders have stressed their intention to continue preparing for a world conference, but they prob- ably feel that agreeing to de- La.y preparations will demon- stra.te that they sincerely de- sire to promote unity and soli- darity within the Communist movement. Peiping ma.y have agreed to call a. truce in direct polemics and to attend a later prepa.ra.- tory meeting in order to make it easier for Mosco~~~ to retreat gracefully on the question of a. December conference. Post- ponement of that meeting wa.s clearly one of Peiping's prin- cipal objectives in sending Chou to resume bilateral con- versations--broken off in mid- 1963. It would enable Peiping to carry on the struggle against the new Soviet leaders while still inside the world Commu- nist movement a.nd from a. more a.dva.nta.geous position. The prospect now seems better for a period of bilateral conversations, designed to work out details for a. new prepara- tory meeting. The problems presented by agenda. a.nd composi- tion of the conference a.re so formidable, however, that con- siderable~dela.y seems likely. Major concessions by both sides would be necessary before there would be any prospect for a. genuine settlement of differ- ences. These a.ppea.r unlikely. Both sides have continued indirect attacks by reiterating their opposing positions on fun- da.mental issues. A Pravda edi- torial printed the day ZT ou En- lai left Moscow underscored So- viet views on "pea.ceful coexist- ence" which have been repeatedly denounced by Peiping. The edi- torial declared that Moscow "a.t- tached great importance to the development of normal relations with the main capitalist coun- tries, including the U5 where the recent elections strengthened the positions of more moderate circles." People's Daily on the same day asser a ha.~~resident Johnson, "far from being a. so- called moderate, is a. repulsive and vicious chieftain of US im- pera.lism with his fangs bared." Each side ha.s returned to the tactic of publicizing third- pa.rty criticism of the other. The November issue of Problems of Peace and Socia.lism_, pu is ed in rg argue-Tut con ro ed by the Soviets, contained an article by the head of the World Peace Coun- cil a.tta.cking the Chinese for poisoning the atmosphere with their nuclear test explosion. Peiping ha.s been rebroa.dca.sting remarks by Asian Communists criti- cal of the new Soviet leaders. SECRET Page 2 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 SECRET The Communist World FURTHER CHANGES IN SOVIET TOP LEADERSHIP The personnel changes ap- proved by the Soviet party cen- tral committee on 16 November seem to have destroyed the fic- tion of a dual leadership shared by Premier Kosygin and party First Secretary Brezhnev. Unlike Brezhnev, Kosygin does not ap- pear to have benefited. The per- son now in the best position to act as a brake on Brezhnev's growing power is fellow secre- tary Podgorny, who also profited by the changes, 'T'wo of Brezhnev's close collaborators on the party sec- retariat, Aleksandr Shelepin and Petr Demichev, were promoted to full and candidate membership respectively on the ruling party presidium. An erstwhile rival of Brezhnev, Frol Kozlov, was expelled from the presidium and the secretariat "because of ill- ness." Kozlov had been incapa- citated since April 1963 but had retained his high party posts, presumably at Khrushchev's be- hest. ]podgorny's protege, Ukrai- nian party boss Petr Shelest, was raised from candidate to full member of the presidium. The only other casualties were Vasily Polyakov, who had been deeply involved in Khru- shchev's recent agricultural schemes, and Khrushchev's son- in-law Aleksey Adzhubey. Polya- kov was dropped from the secre- tariat without explanation and Adzhubey was expelled from the central committee for "mistakes in his work." The central com- mittee also elevated eight of its candidates to full member- ship, thereby regaining its full complement of 175 members; the candidates now number 141. Shelepin bossed the Soviet youth organization during the 1950s. He was named head of the secret police (KGB) in 1958, at a time when Brezhnev was appar- ently party secretary for police affairs. Shelepin's success in streamlining the KGB and refur- bishing its public image was a key factor in his elevation to the party secretariat in 1961. Since 1962 he has also been a deputy premier and chairman of the party-state control committee, which ferrets out and punishes mismanagement in the economy. Demichev also became a mem- ber of the secretariat in 1961. A chemical engineer who rose to head the Moscow party organiza- tion, he was chosen to head the central committee bureau for chemical and light industries established in November 1962. Shelest, a specialist in industrial management, made his ,_._~eer in the Ukrainian party apparatus. He became a secre- tary in 1962 and succeeded Pod- gorny as party boss a year later. In addition to the person- nel changes, the plenum reversed Khrushchev's 1962 reorganization of the party into virtually sep- arate organizations for agricul- ture and industry. Khrushchev had argued at the time that bi- furcation would ensure that nei t~her industry nor agriculture would be slighted at the expense of the other. However, it not SECRET 20 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 SECRET only failed to improve economic performance, but created cumber- some overlapping party units which in turn multiplied the number of vested interests in CZECHOSLOVAKIA ADOPTS NEW COURSE Antonin Novotny is develop- ing an independent course for Czechoslovakia's relations with the USSR and--like Rumania last year--is seekin some si n of US support. For two years, party leader Novotny has been gradually ac- ceding to domestic pressures for de-Stal.inization. As a result he has reconsolidated his posi- tion,-and both party and country have experienced change. On the eve of Khrushchev's fall, Czech- oslovakia was on the verge of basic economic changes, which were subsequently announced. Khrushchev's removal gave Novotny an opportunity to ex- press :his increased independence. Along with Rumania's Gheorghiu- Dej, Novotny refused to attend the 7 November Moscow celebra- ti ns. This followed almost th~~e weeks of Czechoslovak com- mentary favorable to Khrushchev, leavened with professions of continued friendship for the USSR. T.n 1963 when Rumania be- gan it:s own move toward independ- ence, the immediate object was The Communist World the party. For this reason, its dissolution seems likely to cause severe dislocations and uncertainties for some time. to gain recognition for its na- tional economic interests within the Soviet bloc. At this time the Czechoslovak regime does not appear to be in disagreement with the Soviet bloc over such a specific issue. However, Novotny may be motivated in part by a desire to secure a favorable bargaining position with Moscow. Prague has been trying to improve relations and to increase trade with the West. Prague now has suggested an in- vitation to the US for a high Czechoslovak official, even for an outwardly insignificrant event or purpose. In a move which will prob- ably be interpreted by Eastern Europeans as a gesture of sup- port for Czechoslovakia, Yugo- slavia has sent Deputy Foreign Minister Nikezic to Prague for an unpublicized visit of two or three days' duration. Novotny's loyalty to Khru- shchev has enhanced his public and political position at home and reportedly he now has almost the total support of his party. This strength was confirmed in his re-election to the resi- dency on 12 November. 25X1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 V ~ SECRET UNIFICATION ISSUE AGAIN STIRRING SOUTH KOREANS South Korean President Pak Chong-huff's unsteady government is facing increasing public pressure to show some new ini- tia.tivE> on the problem of uni- fication with North Korea.. Se~vera.l unrelated events outside: Korea. have recently led Koreans to talk a.nd think more explicitly a.nd at greater length than usual about their major political ambition--the ulti- mate reunification of their country. They see the ouster of Khrushchev, the Chinese Com- munist nuclear explosion, a.nd the victory of the British Labor Party as signs of change in the world, a.nd there ha.s been con- siderable criticism, in the press and elsewhere, of the Pak regime's "sta.gna.nt" foreign pol- icy. In particular, the lack of progress in negotiations for a. settlement of South Korea's problems with Japan is encourag- ing some Koreans to believe that more could be gained from uni- fication with North Korea. than from close a.ssocia.tion with the Japanese, Korea's former rulers. Publication of the details of a poignant meeting at the Tokyo Olympics between a. North Korean girl athlete and her father, a Seoul resident, drama- tized the tragedy of the divided nation for the ma.n in the street In the flood of emotion that followed, 46 South Korean legis- lators sponsored a proposal to establish a family center at Panmunjom where divided families could meet. While government leaders recognize the risk of North Korean propaganda exploita- tion of such a.n a.rra.ngement, they axe unable to oppose the measure openly in the present climate of opinion. Implicit in the new dis- cussion of unification is a. grow- ing conviction that the UN-- which in Korea. means the US-- ca.nnot or will not deal with the problem. The authorities re- Gently removed the editor of a government-subsidized ma.ga.zine who published articles calling for the withdrawal of US troops from Korea. and criticizing the UN formula for unification. The author is suspected to be a. Com- munist, but he is also a. friend of President Pa.k. The Presi- dent recently ha.s twice felt compelled to reaffirm publicly the "una.lterable faith" of the Korean people in the UN for "the ultimate solution of the Korean problem." Nevertheless, the cabinet decided late last month to es- tablish a permanent committee to study unification. This move is unlikely to satisfy the growing pressures, and proposals for contact of one sort or an- other with the North a.nd demands for new initiatives probabl will increase. SECRET 20 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 ~ rr~/ SECRET Asia-Africa POSITION OF HUONG GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM Premier Huong's vigorous defense of his cabinet against its critics, and his firm stand against student demonstrations in Saigon, have strengthened his image and for the moment quieted overt opposition to South Viet- nam's new government. Preoc- cupation with the task of or- ganizing assistance for victims of the floods and typhoons in central Vietnam is serving further to divert public atten- tion fx?om political infighting. Although the government's immediate prospects thus appear slightly brighter, it has yet to face a serious challenge. The High National Council is re- viewing the cabinet's "forma- tion," but so far remains re- luctant either to endorse it or to formally express disapproval. Armed forces leaders have voiced lukewarm support for Huong, but it is by no means clear that they would support him in a crisis. COMMUNIST AID TO PAKISTAN Communist countries have been actively promoting economic relations with Pakistan this year. Before last June, Pakis- tan's only Communist credit was $30 million for oil exploration given by the USSR in 1961. Since then, it has received credits of $11 million for Soviet trac- tors, $60 million from Peiping for economic development and commodity imports, and $14 mil- lion from Czechoslovakia. 20 Nov ~4 Viet Cong military activity has declined for the fourth con- secutive week, and is currently at the lowest levels since early July. The decline has been par- ticularly evident in the northern coastal provinces. A signifi- cant increase in incidents in the south central provinces of Binh Tuy and Khanh Hoa, however, may presage new enemy encroach- ments into an area once con- sidered comparatively secure. _ Further credits seem to be in the offing. A Soviet credit to finance equipment for a trac- tor plant may be discussed later this year, when a Soviet trade team is scheduled to visit Pakis- tan. In addition, the Pakis- tanis claim that Peiping will make economic aid available for their third five-year plan, which begins in mid-1965. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ? Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0 ~ '~ SECRET Implementation of the $60 - million Chinese credit is being discus:>ed now in Peiping, and the first Chinese exports under the pa