WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9
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RIPPUB
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S
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26
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December 21, 2016
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July 7, 2008
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1
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Publication Date: 
November 27, 1964
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SUMMARY
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Approved State Dept. review completed SUMMARY CJENTRAL LNTELLIGENcE AGENCY OFFICE or' CURRENT INTELLIGENCE GROUP I Excluded-from automatic ,downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 25X1 SECRET November 19 64 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 SECRET (Information as of 1200 EST, 25 November 1964) PEIPING PREPARES FOR NEW ATTACKS ON MOSCOW The Chinese Communists have harshly restated their position in the Sino-Soviet dispute and apparently are insisting on a conciliatory Soviet gesture as the price of a continued truce in polemics. REVISION OF THE SOVIET CHEMICAL PROGRAM Some revision of the program is apparently under way, but the chemical industry will probably retain its high priority for at least the rest of the decade. RUMANIA PLANS FURTHER INCREASE IN TRADE WITH WEST Bucharest plans to buy a billion dollars'worth of machinery, equipment, and complete plants between 1.966 and 1970. PEIPING EXPANDS NONBLOC TIES Five African nations have recognized Communist China this year, and several others are likely to follow. In Western Europe, Peiping is angling for trade pacts and establishment of trade and press offices. AGITATION AGAINST HUONG REGIME IN SOUTH VIETNAM The premier has remained firm against street demon- strations, but appears to be facing an increasingly open challenge from Buddhist and other elements. KERALA COMMUNISTS ENHANCE PROSPECTS FOR FEBRUARY ELECTIONS 6 New Delhi's failure to cope with food shortages in the southern Indian state and the local Communists' will- ingness to cooperate despite their party split may bring them a victory in the February elections. SECRET 27 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 vmv~ SECRET ASIA-AFRICA (continued) CONGOLESE REBEL CAPITAL FALLS Tshomb6's government, however, still does not exercise effective control over much of the Congo, and his ad- ministrative problems remain as formidable as ever. PRESSURES AGAINST AHIDJO GOVERNMENT IN CAMEROON This federation of former French and British terri- tories seems to be in for a period of turbulence which will test moderate President Ahidjo's ability to stay in power. GUINEAN ECONOMIC CRISIS BRINGS REPRESSIVE MEASURES President Tourd has reorganized his party, shifted government personnel, and imposed new measures against corrupt economic practices, while averting a political showdown at least temporarily. SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO ALGERIA The current high rate of deliveries is likely to continue for some time. EUROPE SECRET 27 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 Nftv~ SECRET `''~ EUROPE (continued) Page FRENCH LABOR CONFEDERATION DROPS CHRISTIAN LABEL By abandoning its exclusively Christian orientation, the CFDT hopes to attract some of the 7 million unor- ganized French workers and eventually unite with the Socialist union in a "militant" non-Communist force. EFTA REACTS TO WILSON GOVERNMENT TRADE POLICIES Concern among the UK's partners in the European Free Trade Association over the unfavorable effects of London's new import surcharges may lead to closer cooperation within the seven-nation trade bloc. AREA NOTES 13 On Italy and Spain NEW AGITATION IN PANAMA ON THE CANAL ISSUE Communist-led student demonstrations early this week were broken up with only a minimum of violence, but the Communists and extreme nationalists plan new agi- tation in the form of a general strike. CASTRO MOVES AGAINST PROMINENT OLD-LINE COMMUNIST The removal of Joaquin Ordoqui from his party and gov- ernment posts probably does not signal any sweeping purge of the old guard. Castro can be expected to continue utilizing the struggle between Cuba's "old" and "new" Communists to maintain his own position. POLITICKING IN BOLIVIA The maneuvering to work out alliances for the promised elections continues. Junta leader Barrientos' efforts to create his own political organization belie his an- nouncement that he will not run for the presidency. BRAZILIAN FEDERAL-STATE DISPUTE CONTINUES While a 23 November Supreme Court decision appears to favor the Goias State governor, hard-liners in the mil- itary may yet force President Castello Branco to approve some kind of limited federal intervention in the state. URUGUAY'S PLURAL EXECUTIVE SYSTEM UNDER FIRE Some leaders consider the present system frustrating and almost impossible to work. Reforms are antici- pated, but the opposition Colorado Party will stall for political gain. SECRET 27 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page, iii Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 SECRET The temporary truce in the Sino-Soviet polemic since Khru- shchev's ouster appears peril- ously close to collapse. On 20 November Peiping broadcast a, harsh Red Flag editorial clearly intende~l_a.s an ultimatum to the new Soviet leaders. It demands sweeping concessions by Moscow as the 'price for any improve- ment in Sino-Soviet relations. The Chinese have carefully restated their position on all major issues in the Sino-Soviet conflict. The language is un- compromising and carries the tica.l maneuver. As a minimum price for maintaining the truce, Peiping probably would demand some clear indication that Mos- cow will postpone the prepara- tory Communist conference pro- posed for 15 December. Order- ing this "illegal" meeting was one of the twelve principal crimes listed in Red Flag's indictment of Khrus1ic e y putting all the blame for this step on him, the Chinese give Brezhnev and Kosygin the option of backing off gracefully by repudiating his decision. implied threat that unless Brezh-I Thus far the Soviets have nev and Kosygin make at least given no hint of pulling back a. gesture toward meeting Pei- on any major issue, and have ping's terms, they face immedi- publicly reaffirmed Khrushchev's ate resumption of full-scale attacks, which the Chinese sug- gest were a major factor in bringing down Khrushchev. The hint that direct polem- ics may start again soon was strengthened by publication in People's Daily on 21 November of excerp s from anti-Chinese articles printed in the Novem- ber issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism. The Chin se cliarge a authors of these arti- cles with "assailing and slander- ing" -the Chinese party and note bitterly that the publication was edited by a, member of the central committee of the Soviet party. Peiping's latest attack provides Moscow no leeway for compromise on ba.sic issues. How- ever, by refraining from direct criticism of the new leaders, it gives them some room for tac- policies in the most sensitive areas of Sino-Soviet controversy. Brezhnev, in a speech on 20 No- vember, took pains to endorse the principle of "peaceful co- existence" and to declare Mos- cow's determination to further "improve the international at- mosphere." Moscow, however, ha.s not mentioned the 15 December date proposed by Khrushchev for the preparatory conference and its position on this immediate tac- tical question remains equivo- cal. In joint statements with the Argentine and Greek parties, the Soviet leaders recently stressed their intention to "con- tinue the work of preparing a new conference," but they scrupu- lously avoided any mention of the methods they intend to use to achieve this end or the date that a preparatory conference might be held. SECRET Page 1 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 SECRET REVISION OF THE SOVIET CHEMICAL PROGRAM Some revision of the Soviet chemical program is apparently un- der way, but the chemical industry will probably retain its high pri- ority for at least the rest of the decade. The head of the State Commit- tee for the Chemical Industry stated on 5 November that although the industry's growth rate might decline somewhat, it would never- theless increase 50 percent faster than the composite industrial rate of growth. An authoritative Pravda article recommends that de- velopme:nt of the chemical industry be concentrated in those lines of- fering the quickest and largest return since it will be unable to fill all the economy's requirements by 1970. The pattern of capital invest- ment over the next few years will probably reflect a changing empha- sis among the various branches of the chemical industry and at least some of the original production goals for 1966-70 are likely to be lowered. Revision of the chemical pro- gram may result either from dislo- cations within the industry or from broader considerations of general resource allocation. RUMANIA PLANS FURTHER INCREASE IN TRADE WITH WEST Bucharest intends to buy a billion dollars'worth of machinery, equipment, and complete plants from the West between 1966 and 1970, ac- cording to the chief of the State Planning Commission. This is about twice as much as Rumania has or- dered from the West in the past five years. Already, deals worth several hundred million dollars are being discussed in the US and Western Eu- rope. A provisional $35-million contract has just been concluded with Japan for two oil tankers and eight ore carriers. If the import goals are to be met, Rumania will probably re- quire additional credits as well as expanded markets for its prin- cipal exports, which include pe- troleum, foodstuffs, timber, and wood products. The ships being purchased from Japan can be used in the export drive, and increased purchases of ore for the new Galati steel complex can be used to gen- erate markets in underdeveloped countries for Rumanian manufactured goods. Bucharest will also try to get potential suppliers of indus- trial plants to take payment in goods produced in these plants. The export drive may cause Rumania to divert some trade from Eastern Europe to non-Com- munist countries which since 1961 have accounted for about 30 per- cent of Rumania's total trade. The USSR, however, is likely to remain Rumania's most significant trading partner. It supplies important in- dustrial materials and equipment and buys Rumanian manufactured goods. It accounted for 42 percent of Ru- mania's total trade last year, rais- ing its share about 2 percent from 1960. 25X1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 SECRET The Communist World PEIPING EXPANDS NONBLOC TIES The breakthrough achieved by Communist China last January in gaining recognition from France has been an important factor in Peiping's drive for wider international acceptance. The Chinese campaign has been gaining increased momentum in recent months. Several coun- tries have reportedly been de- ferring action only until after the US elections and the UN de- bate on Chinese representation. So far this year five Afri- can nations have recognized Com- munist China--Tunisia, Congo (Brazzaville), the Central Afri- can Republic, Zambia, and Da- homey. This brings to 17 the number of African nations cur- rently committed to Peiping as compared with 15 which still recognize Taipei. A bandwagon swing toward Communist China seems to be developing even among moderate leaders. Several former French ter- ritories in West Africa may soon renounce Taipei in favor of Peiping. Last week the Ameri- can ambassador in Chad was offi- cially informed that recognition of Communist China was "possi- ble." Cameroon has also shown signs of edging toward recogni- tion of Communist China. In Mauritania the foreign minister has hinted to the US envoy that his country may decide to recog- nize Communist. China within the next few weeks. Senegal recently severed relations with Taiwan and apparently will soon establish ties with Peiping. Ethiopia's Emperor agreed during Chou En-lai's visit last winter to "normalize" relations, but he has not yet taken formal action. Peiping's ambassador in Cairo arrived in Addis Ababa last week and is reportedly attempting to pursuade the Ethiopians to fol- low through. While Western European gov- ernments have made no recent moves toward recognition of Peiping, European businessmen remain fasci- nated by a "vast untapped China market." Peiping therefore con- tinues to angle for trade pacts and the establishment of trade and press offices--footholds which the Chinese have long used as the opening wedge for broader ties. By early December Peiping is expected to have concluded a trade agreement with the Austrian Cham- ber of Commerce providing for permanent Chinese trade represen- tatives in Vienna. In Italy a trade accord and exchange of per- manent trade missions have also been under intermittent negotia- tion, and there are indications that the Italians have not been unreceptive to Chinese probing on political recognition. In West Germany a New China News Agency office was re-established, and dis- cussion of possible formalization of trade ties may be in progress. The Chinese Communists have already set up a press mission in Ottawa, and the Canadians have indicated that additional contacts short of formal recognition m be under onsideration. SECRET 27 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 SECRET AGITATION AGAINST HUONG REGIME IN SOUTH VIETNAM South Vietnam's Premier Huong has dealt firmly with agitation against his government, but he appears to be facing an increasingly open challenge. Police and paratroops broke up two demonstrations on 22 Novem- ber in Saigon. Despite Huong's subsequent appeals for disci- pline, new demonstrations have occurred and disorders have spread among high school students. Political and Bud- dhist circles seem increasingly restive. There are indications that the demonstrations were first set off by various professional politicians as well as by Brig- adier General Do Mau, a. vice premier under Khanh and critic of Huong. Although Buddhist leaders have denied initial involvement and have publicly counseled restraint, they admit extensive Buddhist participa- tion. Reviving tactics used in the pa.st, Buddhist leaders are now levying demands for the dissolution of the government and the release of all arrested rioters against an implied threat of large-scale demon- strations. A list of specific demands made b:y the influential Tam Chau, coupled with similar demands published in a Saigon paper considered a mouthpiece of Bud- dhist monk Tri Quang, raises the possibility of a concerted Buddhist campaign to force the High National Council to bring down Huong's government. Chau had previously been pushing for revision of the Huong cabinet, and up to now Quang's followers have set their sights on gaining control of a. new National Assembly. The High National Council is turning its attention to the procedures for creating a new assembly, but the extent to which it will be elected or appointed is still unclear. Military support for the Huong government in the event of con= tinued public demonstrations remains uncertain. Viet Cong military activity declined both in scale and intensity for the fifth con- secutive week. Armed attacks and ambushes dropped sharply from 21 to 10--none of which was large scale. Most of the 414 incidents reported consisted of hamlet harassment and sabo- tage against government railroads and highways. The most signifi- cant act of terrorism was the explosion of a time bomb in a. snack bar at the Saigon airport on 18 November. On the government side, the largest heliborne operation to da.te was launched northwest of Saigon on 18 November but produced insignificant results in terms'of the over 100 helicopters and 12 Vietnam battalions involved. Four search and destroy operations in the northern coastal province of Quang Na.m inflicted heavy losses on Viet Cong units, however. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 5 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 V"W SECRET Asia-Africa KERALA COMMUNISTS ENHANCE PROSPECTS FOR FEBRUARY ELECTIONS Kerala's Communists will regain control of the state government if current trends continue through the statewide elections now scheduled for February. The southern Indian state has been ruled directly from New Delhi ("President's Rule") since Sep- tember when the local govern- ment run by the Congress Party was brought down by defections from its slim majority. That government had been elected nearly five years ago, after extensive local unrest gave New Delhi the legal excuse to intervene and to dislodge the then Communist government. When the Congress-run ministry in Kerala fell, there seemed to be general relief that the weakened local Congress Party would get some breathing space 'before having to contest the February elections. Party leaders in New Delhi apparently counted on the Congress defec- tors to play no significant role in the elections, and so no effort was made to heal the party breach. They also seemed to count on the schism in Indian Communist ranks to prevent the local Communists from achieving their undoubted potential to gain the support of nearly half the electorate. Congress was clearly play- ing for a draw in February, with no party winning. This would enable New Delhi to impose additional six-month increments of President's Rule until the local Congress organization improved its position. Events have been moving against the Congress, however. Perhaps most important of all has been the central government's failure to cope with the critical food shortages in Kerala, which are still causing severe distress among the nearly 20 million people there. At the same time, the Communists in Kerala, al- though functioning as two sepa- rate parties, have shown increas- ing willingness--especially since Khrushchev's ouster--to work out electoral adjustments in a way which will preserve much of their over-all strength. The more leftist party has, in addition, shown considerable eagerness to join in support of almost any other non-Congress candidates, including those put up by the Muslim League and other splinter groups with local strength. A Communist ministry would no doubt soon dissipate its election-forged unity, but a period of power--however short- lived--would nonetheless damage Prime Minister Shastri's pres- tige and give a fillip to the Communists throughout India at a time when their fortunes are sagging badly. SECRET 27 N)V 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 6 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 SECRET CONGOLESE REBEL CAPITAL FALLS Despite the capture of Stan- leyville this week, Moise Tshom- bC's government still is far from exercising effective mili- tary control of the Congo. His administrative problems, more- over, remain as formidable as ever. Despite the psychological shock to the rebels over losing their capital, government forces face a protracted period of mop- ping up pockets of opposition and of controlling unruly youth gangs in the liberated areas. Tshombe's troops continue to en- counter considerable resistance at several points on the shrink- ing periphery of the rebel-held area, and some of their own lines are far from secure. The future of the former Stanleyville regime is unclear. Government troops found no significant leaders in the for- mer capital city. One evacuee stated that he saw rebel "presi- dent" Gbenye speeding out of the town just after the Belgian paratroops dropped. Early this PRESSURES AGAINST AHIDJO GOVERNMENT Cameroon evidently is in for a period of heightened in- ternal turbulence which will severely test moderate Presi- dent Ahidjo's ability to sur- vive in office. Since leading Cameroon to independence in 1960, Ahidjo has faced enormous problems in attempting to preside over this complex federation of former week insurgent military-leaders were reported to be in far north- eastern Congo. They may try to fight on from a new base or to establish a government in exile. Tshombe's dependence on mercenaries and foreign aid for his government's military successes re-emphasizes the weakness of his own administra- tion. The tribal rivalries, regional inequities, and cor- ruption that gave rise to the rebellion and fed local sup- port for it remain..With the Congolese Army no more effec- tive as a fighting force than it ever was, Tshombd probably will feel obliged to retain mercenaries even after the rebellion collapses. In the circumstances an intensifi- cation of opposition to him from radical African states may be expected, as they see his total dependence on the United States and European French and British territories. In recognition of the country's basic regional, religious, and tribal cleavages, he has at- tempted to distribute; government posts equitably on geographic and ethnic bases. However, con- trol of the powerful ruling party, the Cameroon Union (UC), has remained with northern Mus- lim political bosses. SECRET 27 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 SECRET Southern resentment, al- ways high, now has apparently reached explosive proportions. Disparate southern elements are making new efforts to coalesce with a view to fielding a single opposition candidate for the presidential election scheduled for next spring. However, Ahidjo's repressive measures against the-population in an op- position stronghold following parliamentary elections earlier this year raise doubts as to how many of the southerners would be willing to challenge him openly. Some may instead make com- ton cause with an apparently growing number of high-level gov- ernment officials who have be- come disaffected, in part be- cause they feel that Ahidjo is slipping too far to the left in his attempts to shore up his po- litical position, ameliorate Cameroon's economic difficul- ties, and keep in step with other African states. Ahidjo has in recent months accepted a Soviet Embassy in Yaounde, formally proclaimed a policy of nonalignment, and given serious consideration to the establish- ment of diplomatic ties with Pei- ping. He apparently has also acquiesced in the clearly il- legal action by a pro-Communist faction in assuming control of the government-sponsored trade union last month. Meanwhile, a series of well-organized guerrilla attacks since early November has breathed new life into the rebellion in the southwest directed by the clandestine wing of the Cam- eroon People's Union (UPC), once the country's leading national- ist party. This rejuvenation, accomplished despite intense factional strife among exiled UPC leaders, revealed that the rebels in the field--mostly Bamileke tribesmen--have ob- tained new supplies of modern small arms. These supplies evidently come from foreign benefactors, but their exact origin has not been estab- lished. SECRET Page 8 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 SECRET 25X1 GUINEAN ECONOMIC CRISIS BRINGS REPRESSIVE MEASURES Continuing economic dete- rioration in Guinea has resulted in a government and party shake- up and in the adoption of strin- gent new measures against cor- rupt economic practices. A threatened political showdown apparently failed to materialize. Ever since Guinea's noncon- vertible currency was introduced in March 1960, it has depressed the domestic economy and put a premium on illicit trade. An estimated 60 percent of Guinea's exportable products are smuggled to neighboring countries and sold for convertible currency, and many of its imports probably are similarly diverted. Police. and party officials join exten- sively in these activities. The government's exhortations for a mending of ways has neither al- tered the practices nor improved sagging public morale. On 8 November President Tourd, during a highly publicized mass meeting, announced a return to tight state control of trade, confiscation of illegal gains, regulation of rented housing, and imposition of stiff prison sentences for currency manipula- tion, smuggling, or tribal activ- ity designed to undermine the regime. Extensive personnel shifts in the top ranks of the government and a broad party re- organization accompanied these measures. Despite indications that im- portant political elements felt threatened by the new program, the ruling party's national coun- cil and the National Assembly pro- vided the customary rubber-stamp approval on 19 November. Tourd apparently believes, however that to attack the root of the problem by entering some form of interna- tional clearing arrangement would imply a derogation of sovereignty. Popular unrest therefore is likely to continue, regardless of more appeals from Tour6 and stepped-up police action. SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO ALGERIA The Soviet military aid program for Algeria is in full swing. Last week's delivery of six AN-12 transport aircraft had been preceded by the arrival of at least ten shipments of mili- tary cargo since m.id-1964 (see chart). This high rate of deliveries is likely to continue for some time. Shipments apparently began after Algerian military trainees completed their courses in the bloc and began to return home late this past summer. The first Algerian military personnel went to the bloc for formal training in early 1963. Since that time it is believed about 670 personnel have participated in aviation SECRET 27 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 SOVIET DELIVERIES TO ALGERIA SINCE MID.;-1964 MI G-17 JET AIRCRAFT 20 MIC;-F5 JET AIRCRAFT 'A K-18 PROP-DRIVEN TRAINER AIRCRAFT 1$ Ml-4 HELICOPTERS AN1-12 TURBOPROP TRANSPORTS 6 P4 MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS 6 1-3454 MEDIUM TANKS 150-200 A tMORED VEHICLES Szme ARTILLERY Some COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT/RADAR Some TRUCKS some Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 SE CRE T courses, communications instruc- tion, ar~d naval training. Groups are still being sent to the USSR. Since July about 250 naval and air trainees are known to have arrived back in Algeria. Some Soviet technicians have been in Algeria since mid-1963 operating specially outfitted tanks to de-mine Algeria's bor- ders. Others who arrived this year are reportedly training Al- gerian soldiers on Soviet armor. A large influx of Soviet military technicians is expected soon to assemble, maintain, and instruct in the use of newly arrived arms. The Soviet-Algerian military aid arrangements--the October 1963 pact and other understand- ings reached when Ben Bella vis- ited Moscow last May--probably call for delivery of additional aircraft, including more advanced jet fighters. In view of the emphasis on naval training and Algeria's access to the sea, the USSR also is expected to deliver more naval craft, probably ad- ditional motor torpedo boats, and other types of patrol craft. In addition to the current deliveries the USSR made two shipments of miscellaneous equip- ment during the Algerian-Moroccan altercation in late 1963. At that time Cuba sent in some tanks of Soviet origin, and Egypt pro- vided some air and naval craft. Most of the Egyptian-supplied equipment has been withdrawn. SECRET 27 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 10 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 SECRET The recent decision of France's 450,000 member CFTC to "deconfessionalize" and change its name to the French Democra- tic Labor Confederation (CFDT) may have long-range political implications. Approved by 70 percent of the confederation's leadership, this move is poten- tially the most significant de- velopment in the French labor movement since the Socialist Worker Force (FO) broke off from the Communist-dominated General Labor Confederation (CGT) in 1947. By eliminating its exclu- sively Christian orientation the CFDT hopes first to attract some of the 7 million unorganized French workers to its banner. It also sees the move as facili- tating a link with the FO and forging a "unified and militant" non-Communist labor force roughly equal in size to the million- member CGT. Such a labor movement, CFDT leaders maintain, would not only be able to bargain more effec- tively, but could exact from em- ployers a greater role for labor participation in economic plan- ning--ranging from the plant level to the national plane. In the political realm, they see such a disciplined national labor union eventually becoming a ral- lying point around which the non- Communist parties of the left might coalesce. It is unlikely, however, that the disarrayed French political parties are pre- pared to subordinate the ideolog- ical refinements that keep them apart in the interest of making common cause behind a program laid out by the unions. For the present the FO is suspicious of the CFDT action. This is partly due to fears that it may lose control over its own followers, some of whom appar- ently are willing to compromise their Marxist creed in the in- terest of a united labor move- ment. For its part, the CGT, in step with the current Commu- nist line, is trying to expand its base to the right. It re- gards the deconfessionalization action as an opportunity to en- hance the prospects of "prag- matic" working arrangements with the unions that make up the CFDT. The 30-percent minority of the CFTC leadership that opposed deconfessionalization objected that the elimination of specific reference to the Christian so- cial ethic deprives the confed- eration of a meaningful ideology to oppose Marxism. Indeed, they predict that the Communists will infiltrate and eventually domi- nate the new CFDT. As a conse- quence, they are contemplating the establishment of a separate union which would operate under the old CFTC banner. This could lead to an even greater fragmen- tation of the French labor move- ment. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 11 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 Impi SECRET Europe The strong reaction of the UK's European Free Trade Associa- tion partners to the Wilson gov- ernment's new import barriers reflects their serious concern over EFTA's future. These coun- tries--Portugal, Austria, Switz- erland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and associate-member Finland-- were already dubious of EFTA's ability to safeguard their in- terests in the Kennedy Round and worried by certain trade developments in the Common Mar- ket. Closer EFTA cooperation may--initially at least--result from the demands now made on Britain by its partners. London's new import sur- charges, imposed to avert a bal- ance-of-payments crisis--came at a time when the other EFTA members had for the first time increased their exports to the UK more rapidly than to the EEC. These countries fear their ex- port losses resulting from the new British action will generate domestic pressures for counter- measures. They are also con- cerned that the British policies will create a drag on all their economies. They therefore pressed Britain to accelerate the EFTA tariff reductions pro- gram. This attempt to obtain favored treatment from the UK immediately ran into strong ob- jections from the US and the EEC. At an EFTA ministerial meet- ing in Geneva last week, Britain agreed to consider exempting from the new levies export orders placed before 26 October. It also reassured its partners that the UK would start reducing its surcharges "in a matter of months." More significant, how- ever, was an agreement to ob- serve a provision in the EFTA convention calling for joint examination of economic policies likely to affect member states. A permanent committee now has been authorized to do this, and Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker went a step further in urging regular meetings of EFTA foreign ministers. At Geneva, several of the EFTA countries were also con- cerned that the list of items the EEC wishes exempted from the general Kennedy Round tariff reduction would hit them espe- cially hard. These countries are accordingly anxious lest the Kennedy Round serve eventually only to confirm rather than break down the barriers between the two blocs. As the prospects for the Kennedy Round have waxed and waned over the past months, so have suggestions for ways of overcoming the division between the Six and the Seven. The latest proposal was floated by West German State Secretary Lahr at last week's meeting of the Western European Union--which groups the Six with the UK. His idea that relations between the EEC and EFTA be handled by a new "secretariat" was opposed only by the French, who remain suspicious of anything that may look like British EEC door. SECRET 27 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 12 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 SECRET Italy: The stability of the center-left coalition that governs Italy may be further weakened by the results of this week's provin- cial and municipal elections. It is still too early to make exact comparisons with results in 1963, but it is fairly certain that the Christian Democrats lost slightly, and that Socialist losses consider- ably exceed what the party's lead- ers had earlier considered politi- cally manageable. The Communists registered their largest postwar vote, in part because of the gov- ernment's failure to move ahead with promised social and economic reforms. Premier Aldo Moro and his sup- porters in the Christian Democratic Party can make a. case that their party's showing justifies continua- tion of a center-left government. Moro, however, will still have dif- ficulty :in getting his badly divided party to be more forthcoming on re- forms, particularly as some elements in the party will try to exploit the Socialists' weakened posi- tion either to delay or further water down the reform program. Whether Socialist leader Nenni is able to keep his party in the coalition will depend largely on what kind of a. deal Moro now will be able to offer the Social- ists for their continued partici- pation. Those Socialists who are urging that their party pull out will probably try to force this action at a party congress pres- ently planned for next February or March. The issue could come to a. head sooner. This is likely to happen if it becomes necessary for Parliament to elect a, succes- sor to ailing President Segni. The choice of a, successor is a highly divisive issue both within 25X1 the Christian Democratic Party and between that party and its coalition partners. Spain: Efforts to obtain a law de1T-nTng the rights of non- Catholics in Spain received a set- back when the Vatican Council re- cently failed to vote on the schema, supporting freedom of religion. No further progress on the Spanish draft legislation is likely before the next council session, the date of which has not yet been set. Foreign Minister Ca.stiella,with an eye to improving relations with nations having large Protestant populations and generally to refur- bish Spain's image abroad, has been working for a, religious rights law since 1957. In early September, the proposed draft law was approved by the three archbishops represent- ing the Spanish metropolitans, who make church policy in Spain. When Castiella presented the project to the Cabinet, however, he is said to have encountered stiff opposi- tion from a majority of the minis- ters. This opposition eventually resulted in an announcement last month that further action was be- ing postponed until such time as the Vatican Council registered its view on religious freedom. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 SECRET NEW AGITATION IN PANAMA ON THE CANAL ISSUE The Panamanian Government won the first round this week against a new upsurge of Com- munist-led agitation on the canal issue. Communists and extreme nationalists, however, plan new demonstrations which will further test the viability of the new Robles administra- tion. Prompt and effective ac- tion by Panamanian security forces on 23 November broke up Communist-led student demonstra- tions with only a minimum of violence and without providing the martyrs which some extrem- ist factions had hoped for. The demonstrators nevertheless had shown good organization and evi- dence of prior planning by their leaders. The government won another important point early the next day when a secret session of the legis- lature passed a vote of confi- dence in Foreign Minister Eleta. Eleta's position on the canal negotiations with the United States had been called into ques- tion by Jorge Illueca, recently forced out as Panama's chief ne- gotiator in the talks. It was the public recriminations be- tween Eleta and Illueca--a favorite of the ultranationalist students--that the Communists had seized on as a pretext for the agitation. The resolution passed by legislature assured the Pana- manian people that there has been no change in the negotiators' de- termination to obtain a new ca- nal treaty "that embodies the just Panamanian demands." It re- affirmed the position adopted by the previous Panamanian Gov- ernment after the January 1964 riots and sustained by the new government: that the 1903 treaty must be abrogated. The Communist and extrem- ist agitators are expected to make every effort to regain the initiative in their con- tinuing campaign to exploit the canal negotiations as an effec- tive nationalist issue against Panama's ruling oligarchy. Within hours of the dispersal of the student demonstrators, Communist leaders were in con- tact with extremist labor lead- ers in an effort to promote a general strike. CASTRO MOVES AGAINST PROMINENT OLD-LINE COMMUNIST The Castro regime's recent suspension of a long-time Com- munist, Major Joaquin Ordoqui, from his high party and govern- ment posts is a further reflec- tion of the competition between Cuba's "old" and "new" Commu- nists. The move against Ordoqui, however, probably does not sig- nal a sweeping purge of the old guard Ordoqui, a leading Commu- nist for almost 30 years before Castro came to power, had been a member of the national direc- torate of the government's party machine and a deputy minister of the armed forces. He was prob- ably removed to settle a politi- cal account resting on his as- sociation with Marcos Rodriguez, SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 14 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 SECRET Western Hemisphere another "old" Communist who was executed earlier in the year af- ter a sensational trial which found him guilty of betraying student revolutionaries to Ba- tista's police. At the trial, Ordoqui was accused of having protected Rodriguez. He was subsequently reprimanded in pub- lic by Castro for "improprie- ties. " Castro probably put off ac- tion against Ordoqui until the considerable passions aroused by the Rodriguez trial had sub- sided. The trial was more than a judgment of Rodriguez; it was an explosive confrontation Politicking in anticipation of elections at some future date is now in full swing in Bolivia. Junta President Barrientos him- self, despite his public dis- claimer on 18 November of presi- dential ambitions, is acting like a candidate. He continues to stump the countryside drum- ming up popular support, and he is making efforts to create his own political organization. There is speculation that Barrientos will resign from the junta just before the elections and run for president with the support of the Bolivian Social- ist Falange (FSB) and several minor rightist parties. He is also rumored seeking an alliance with the left. Meanwhile other groups are busy trying to make alliances. Nothing firm has emerged from between the "old" and "new" Communists. It ended in an un- easy compromise only after Cas- tro personally intervened in defense of the "old" Communists, but permitted the execution of Rodriguez to proceed. The Ordoqui case probably does not presage any basic change in the intramural strug- gle between the "old" and "new" Communists. Castro, moreover, can be expected to continue uti- lizing their differences,as he has in the past, to maintain his own dominant position.F these discussions, but the smaller parties are lining up either with ex - Vice President Juan Lechin's National Leftist Revolutionary Party (PRIN) on the left, or with the FSB on the right. Former president Hernan Siles Zuazo sees the possibil- ity that a third group will emerge. This one would be based primarily on the remnants of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), which ruled Bo- livia for 12 years before Paz Estenssoro's overthrow. Siles is currently attempting to re- vive and reorganize the MNR as his own political machine. There are reports that he may take his forces into a national front with the PRIN and other leftist groups. SECRET 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 SECRET Brazilian President Cas- tello Branco is still grappling with the month-long dispute arising from the federal govern- ment's effort to remove Governor Borges of Goias State from of- fice on charges of subversion. A 23 November decision by the Brazilian Supreme Court granted Borges immunity from ar- rest unless such action is au- thorized by the state legisla- ture. Borges would thus appear to have won the first round, since his Social Democratic Party (PSD) controls the legislature and President Castello Branco has pledged to respect the court's decision. However, the PSD has hesi- tated in the past to take a strong antigovernment position on controversial issues, so the legislature may buckle under federal pressure to get at Bor- ges. One indication of such pressure might be read into the firmly worded presidential com- muniq,ud--issued immediately fol- lowing the announcement of the court decision--warning that the government would not tolerate subversion and counterrevolution in Goias and would take whatever steps were necessary to preserve local security. This blunt statement may also have been designed in part to assuage growing pressures on President Castello Branco, par- ticularly from the hard-line military, to intervene directly in Goias. Many of those support- ing this course evidently regard Borges as an unwelcome vestige of the ousted Goulart regime. This element may yet force Cas- tello Branco to approve some kind of federal intervention. The federal government reportedly has begun sounding out certain key political figures for sup- port of such intervention, should it become necessary. Although the Goias issue is the government's most difficult political problem to date, it does not presently appear to threaten the country's long-range prospects for stability. Offi- cials are nevertheless concerned by reports that opposition groups plan to exploit the situation by creating further unrest in Goias SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 16 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 SECRET Western Hemisphere Uruguay seems to be moving toward some sort of showdown over reformation of the country's cumbersome plural executive sys- tem of government. Public senti- ment for a change in this cum- bersome system is growing. At the same time the atmosphere in Montevideo is increasingly con- ducive to military coup plotting. In early November, the largest faction of the ruling Blanco party came out in sup- port of constitutional reform. This move presumably was moti- vated to a considerable degree by a desire to head off pressure for changes by unconstitutional means. The Blanco reformists,how- ever, have chosen a difficult path. They must somehow gain the support of the opposition Colorado Party. At the same time they must cope with fac- tions in the Blanco party itself which are becoming increasingly restive and impatient for quick action. Colorados want to postpone any change until after the 1966 elec- tions, which they hope to win un- der the present system. The military meanwhile is becoming increasingly disturbed by the deteriorating political situation, as well as a falter- ing economy that is marked by mounting inflation. More im- mediately, it is concerned over what it considers unequal pay compared with the salaries paid to the legislators. A group of senior officers is apparently seeking a hearing before the NCG in which they intend to push for government action to reduce labor strife,crack down on smug- gling, enforce tax collection, and halt the inflationary spiral. At the moment, a more forceful approach is inhibited by the absence of a leader or group of leaders of sufficient stature who would be willing and able to assume responsibility for disrupting the present arrange- 25X1 SECRET 27 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/07/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030001-9