WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 27, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved
State Dept. review completed
SUMMARY
CJENTRAL LNTELLIGENcE AGENCY
OFFICE or' CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
GROUP I Excluded-from automatic
,downgrading and declassification
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25X1 SECRET
November 19 64
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(Information as of 1200 EST, 25 November 1964)
PEIPING PREPARES FOR NEW ATTACKS ON MOSCOW
The Chinese Communists have harshly restated their
position in the Sino-Soviet dispute and apparently
are insisting on a conciliatory Soviet gesture as
the price of a continued truce in polemics.
REVISION OF THE SOVIET CHEMICAL PROGRAM
Some revision of the program is apparently under way,
but the chemical industry will probably retain its
high priority for at least the rest of the decade.
RUMANIA PLANS FURTHER INCREASE IN TRADE WITH WEST
Bucharest plans to buy a billion dollars'worth of
machinery, equipment, and complete plants between
1.966 and 1970.
PEIPING EXPANDS NONBLOC TIES
Five African nations have recognized Communist China
this year, and several others are likely to follow.
In Western Europe, Peiping is angling for trade pacts
and establishment of trade and press offices.
AGITATION AGAINST HUONG REGIME IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The premier has remained firm against street demon-
strations, but appears to be facing an increasingly
open challenge from Buddhist and other elements.
KERALA COMMUNISTS ENHANCE PROSPECTS FOR FEBRUARY ELECTIONS 6
New Delhi's failure to cope with food shortages in the
southern Indian state and the local Communists' will-
ingness to cooperate despite their party split may
bring them a victory in the February elections.
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27 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
CONGOLESE REBEL CAPITAL FALLS
Tshomb6's government, however, still does not exercise
effective control over much of the Congo, and his ad-
ministrative problems remain as formidable as ever.
PRESSURES AGAINST AHIDJO GOVERNMENT IN CAMEROON
This federation of former French and British terri-
tories seems to be in for a period of turbulence which
will test moderate President Ahidjo's ability to stay
in power.
GUINEAN ECONOMIC CRISIS BRINGS REPRESSIVE MEASURES
President Tourd has reorganized his party, shifted
government personnel, and imposed new measures against
corrupt economic practices, while averting a political
showdown at least temporarily.
SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO ALGERIA
The current high rate of deliveries is likely to
continue for some time.
EUROPE
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EUROPE (continued) Page
FRENCH LABOR CONFEDERATION DROPS CHRISTIAN LABEL
By abandoning its exclusively Christian orientation,
the CFDT hopes to attract some of the 7 million unor-
ganized French workers and eventually unite with the
Socialist union in a "militant" non-Communist force.
EFTA REACTS TO WILSON GOVERNMENT TRADE POLICIES
Concern among the UK's partners in the European Free
Trade Association over the unfavorable effects of
London's new import surcharges may lead to closer
cooperation within the seven-nation trade bloc.
AREA NOTES 13
On Italy and Spain
NEW AGITATION IN PANAMA ON THE CANAL ISSUE
Communist-led student demonstrations early this week
were broken up with only a minimum of violence, but
the Communists and extreme nationalists plan new agi-
tation in the form of a general strike.
CASTRO MOVES AGAINST PROMINENT OLD-LINE COMMUNIST
The removal of Joaquin Ordoqui from his party and gov-
ernment posts probably does not signal any sweeping
purge of the old guard. Castro can be expected to
continue utilizing the struggle between Cuba's "old"
and "new" Communists to maintain his own position.
POLITICKING IN BOLIVIA
The maneuvering to work out alliances for the promised
elections continues. Junta leader Barrientos' efforts
to create his own political organization belie his an-
nouncement that he will not run for the presidency.
BRAZILIAN FEDERAL-STATE DISPUTE CONTINUES
While a 23 November Supreme Court decision appears to
favor the Goias State governor, hard-liners in the mil-
itary may yet force President Castello Branco to approve
some kind of limited federal intervention in the state.
URUGUAY'S PLURAL EXECUTIVE SYSTEM UNDER FIRE
Some leaders consider the present system frustrating
and almost impossible to work. Reforms are antici-
pated, but the opposition Colorado Party will stall
for political gain.
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The temporary truce in the
Sino-Soviet polemic since Khru-
shchev's ouster appears peril-
ously close to collapse. On 20
November Peiping broadcast a,
harsh Red Flag editorial clearly
intende~l_a.s an ultimatum to the
new Soviet leaders. It demands
sweeping concessions by Moscow
as the 'price for any improve-
ment in Sino-Soviet relations.
The Chinese have carefully
restated their position on all
major issues in the Sino-Soviet
conflict. The language is un-
compromising and carries the
tica.l maneuver. As a minimum
price for maintaining the truce,
Peiping probably would demand
some clear indication that Mos-
cow will postpone the prepara-
tory Communist conference pro-
posed for 15 December. Order-
ing this "illegal" meeting was
one of the twelve principal
crimes listed in Red Flag's
indictment of Khrus1ic e y
putting all the blame for this
step on him, the Chinese give
Brezhnev and Kosygin the option
of backing off gracefully by
repudiating his decision.
implied threat that unless Brezh-I Thus far the Soviets have
nev and Kosygin make at least given no hint of pulling back
a. gesture toward meeting Pei- on any major issue, and have
ping's terms, they face immedi- publicly reaffirmed Khrushchev's
ate resumption of full-scale
attacks, which the Chinese sug-
gest were a major factor in
bringing down Khrushchev.
The hint that direct polem-
ics may start again soon was
strengthened by publication in
People's Daily on 21 November
of excerp s from anti-Chinese
articles printed in the Novem-
ber issue of Problems of Peace
and Socialism. The Chin se
cliarge a authors of these arti-
cles with "assailing and slander-
ing" -the Chinese party and note
bitterly that the publication
was edited by a, member of the
central committee of the Soviet
party.
Peiping's latest attack
provides Moscow no leeway for
compromise on ba.sic issues. How-
ever, by refraining from direct
criticism of the new leaders,
it gives them some room for tac-
policies in the most sensitive
areas of Sino-Soviet controversy.
Brezhnev, in a speech on 20 No-
vember, took pains to endorse
the principle of "peaceful co-
existence" and to declare Mos-
cow's determination to further
"improve the international at-
mosphere."
Moscow, however, ha.s not
mentioned the 15 December date
proposed by Khrushchev for the
preparatory conference and its
position on this immediate tac-
tical question remains equivo-
cal. In joint statements with
the Argentine and Greek parties,
the Soviet leaders recently
stressed their intention to "con-
tinue the work of preparing a
new conference," but they scrupu-
lously avoided any mention of
the methods they intend to use
to achieve this end or the date
that a preparatory conference
might be held.
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REVISION OF THE SOVIET CHEMICAL PROGRAM
Some revision of the Soviet
chemical program is apparently un-
der way, but the chemical industry
will probably retain its high pri-
ority for at least the rest of the
decade.
The head of the State Commit-
tee for the Chemical Industry
stated on 5 November that although
the industry's growth rate might
decline somewhat, it would never-
theless increase 50 percent faster
than the composite industrial rate
of growth. An authoritative
Pravda article recommends that de-
velopme:nt of the chemical industry
be concentrated in those lines of-
fering the quickest and largest
return since it will be unable to
fill all the economy's requirements
by 1970.
The pattern of capital invest-
ment over the next few years will
probably reflect a changing empha-
sis among the various branches of
the chemical industry and at least
some of the original production
goals for 1966-70 are likely to be
lowered.
Revision of the chemical pro-
gram may result either from dislo-
cations within the industry or from
broader considerations of general
resource allocation.
RUMANIA PLANS FURTHER INCREASE IN TRADE WITH WEST
Bucharest intends to buy a
billion dollars'worth of machinery,
equipment, and complete plants from
the West between 1966 and 1970, ac-
cording to the chief of the State
Planning Commission. This is about
twice as much as Rumania has or-
dered from the West in the past
five years.
Already, deals worth several
hundred million dollars are being
discussed in the US and Western Eu-
rope. A provisional $35-million
contract has just been concluded
with Japan for two oil tankers and
eight ore carriers.
If the import goals are to
be met, Rumania will probably re-
quire additional credits as well
as expanded markets for its prin-
cipal exports, which include pe-
troleum, foodstuffs, timber, and
wood products. The ships being
purchased from Japan can be used
in the export drive, and increased
purchases of ore for the new Galati
steel complex can be used to gen-
erate markets in underdeveloped
countries for Rumanian manufactured
goods. Bucharest will also try to
get potential suppliers of indus-
trial plants to take payment in
goods produced in these plants.
The export drive may cause
Rumania to divert some trade
from Eastern Europe to non-Com-
munist countries which since 1961
have accounted for about 30 per-
cent of Rumania's total trade. The
USSR, however, is likely to remain
Rumania's most significant trading
partner. It supplies important in-
dustrial materials and equipment and
buys Rumanian manufactured goods.
It accounted for 42 percent of Ru-
mania's total trade last year, rais-
ing its share about 2 percent from
1960. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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The Communist World
PEIPING EXPANDS NONBLOC TIES
The breakthrough achieved
by Communist China last January
in gaining recognition from
France has been an important
factor in Peiping's drive for
wider international acceptance.
The Chinese campaign has been
gaining increased momentum in
recent months. Several coun-
tries have reportedly been de-
ferring action only until after
the US elections and the UN de-
bate on Chinese representation.
So far this year five Afri-
can nations have recognized Com-
munist China--Tunisia, Congo
(Brazzaville), the Central Afri-
can Republic, Zambia, and Da-
homey. This brings to 17 the
number of African nations cur-
rently committed to Peiping as
compared with 15 which still
recognize Taipei. A bandwagon
swing toward Communist China
seems to be developing even
among moderate leaders.
Several former French ter-
ritories in West Africa may
soon renounce Taipei in favor
of Peiping. Last week the Ameri-
can ambassador in Chad was offi-
cially informed that recognition
of Communist China was "possi-
ble." Cameroon has also shown
signs of edging toward recogni-
tion of Communist China. In
Mauritania the foreign minister
has hinted to the US envoy that
his country may decide to recog-
nize Communist. China within
the next few weeks. Senegal
recently severed relations with
Taiwan and apparently will soon
establish ties with Peiping.
Ethiopia's Emperor agreed
during Chou En-lai's visit last
winter to "normalize" relations,
but he has not yet taken formal
action. Peiping's ambassador in
Cairo arrived in Addis Ababa last
week and is reportedly attempting
to pursuade the Ethiopians to fol-
low through.
While Western European gov-
ernments have made no recent moves
toward recognition of Peiping,
European businessmen remain fasci-
nated by a "vast untapped China
market." Peiping therefore con-
tinues to angle for trade pacts
and the establishment of trade
and press offices--footholds which
the Chinese have long used as
the opening wedge for broader ties.
By early December Peiping is
expected to have concluded a trade
agreement with the Austrian Cham-
ber of Commerce providing for
permanent Chinese trade represen-
tatives in Vienna. In Italy a
trade accord and exchange of per-
manent trade missions have also
been under intermittent negotia-
tion, and there are indications
that the Italians have not been
unreceptive to Chinese probing on
political recognition. In West
Germany a New China News Agency
office was re-established, and dis-
cussion of possible formalization
of trade ties may be in progress.
The Chinese Communists have already
set up a press mission in Ottawa,
and the Canadians have indicated
that additional contacts short of
formal recognition m be under
onsideration.
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AGITATION AGAINST HUONG REGIME IN SOUTH VIETNAM
South Vietnam's Premier
Huong has dealt firmly with
agitation against his government,
but he appears to be facing an
increasingly open challenge.
Police and paratroops broke up
two demonstrations on 22 Novem-
ber in Saigon. Despite Huong's
subsequent appeals for disci-
pline, new demonstrations have
occurred and disorders have
spread among high school
students. Political and Bud-
dhist circles seem increasingly
restive.
There are indications that
the demonstrations were first
set off by various professional
politicians as well as by Brig-
adier General Do Mau, a. vice
premier under Khanh and critic
of Huong. Although Buddhist
leaders have denied initial
involvement and have publicly
counseled restraint, they admit
extensive Buddhist participa-
tion. Reviving tactics used in
the pa.st, Buddhist leaders are
now levying demands for the
dissolution of the government
and the release of all arrested
rioters against an implied
threat of large-scale demon-
strations.
A list of specific demands
made b:y the influential Tam Chau,
coupled with similar demands
published in a Saigon paper
considered a mouthpiece of Bud-
dhist monk Tri Quang, raises
the possibility of a concerted
Buddhist campaign to force the
High National Council to bring
down Huong's government. Chau
had previously been pushing for
revision of the Huong cabinet,
and up to now Quang's followers
have set their sights on gaining
control of a. new National
Assembly.
The High National Council
is turning its attention to the
procedures for creating a new
assembly, but the extent to
which it will be elected or
appointed is still unclear.
Military support for the Huong
government in the event of con=
tinued public demonstrations
remains uncertain.
Viet Cong military activity
declined both in scale and
intensity for the fifth con-
secutive week. Armed attacks
and ambushes dropped sharply
from 21 to 10--none of which
was large scale. Most of the
414 incidents reported consisted
of hamlet harassment and sabo-
tage against government railroads
and highways. The most signifi-
cant act of terrorism was the
explosion of a time bomb in a.
snack bar at the Saigon airport
on 18 November.
On the government side, the
largest heliborne operation to
da.te was launched northwest of
Saigon on 18 November but produced
insignificant results in terms'of
the over 100 helicopters and 12
Vietnam battalions involved. Four
search and destroy operations in
the northern coastal province of
Quang Na.m inflicted heavy losses
on Viet Cong units, however.
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Asia-Africa
KERALA COMMUNISTS ENHANCE PROSPECTS FOR FEBRUARY ELECTIONS
Kerala's Communists will
regain control of the state
government if current trends
continue through the statewide
elections now scheduled for
February.
The southern Indian state has
been ruled directly from New Delhi
("President's Rule") since Sep-
tember when the local govern-
ment run by the Congress Party
was brought down by defections
from its slim majority. That
government had been elected
nearly five years ago, after
extensive local unrest gave
New Delhi the legal excuse to
intervene and to dislodge the
then Communist government.
When the Congress-run
ministry in Kerala fell, there
seemed to be general relief
that the weakened local Congress
Party would get some breathing
space 'before having to contest
the February elections. Party
leaders in New Delhi apparently
counted on the Congress defec-
tors to play no significant
role in the elections, and so
no effort was made to heal the
party breach. They also seemed
to count on the schism in
Indian Communist ranks to
prevent the local Communists
from achieving their undoubted
potential to gain the support
of nearly half the electorate.
Congress was clearly play-
ing for a draw in February, with
no party winning. This would
enable New Delhi to impose
additional six-month increments
of President's Rule until the
local Congress organization
improved its position.
Events have been moving
against the Congress, however.
Perhaps most important of all
has been the central government's
failure to cope with the critical
food shortages in Kerala, which
are still causing severe distress
among the nearly 20 million
people there. At the same time,
the Communists in Kerala, al-
though functioning as two sepa-
rate parties, have shown increas-
ing willingness--especially
since Khrushchev's ouster--to
work out electoral adjustments
in a way which will preserve
much of their over-all strength.
The more leftist party has, in
addition, shown considerable
eagerness to join in support of
almost any other non-Congress
candidates, including those put
up by the Muslim League and
other splinter groups with local
strength.
A Communist ministry would
no doubt soon dissipate its
election-forged unity, but a
period of power--however short-
lived--would nonetheless damage
Prime Minister Shastri's pres-
tige and give a fillip to the
Communists throughout India at
a time when their fortunes are
sagging badly.
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CONGOLESE REBEL CAPITAL FALLS
Despite the capture of Stan-
leyville this week, Moise Tshom-
bC's government still is far
from exercising effective mili-
tary control of the Congo. His
administrative problems, more-
over, remain as formidable as
ever.
Despite the psychological
shock to the rebels over losing
their capital, government forces
face a protracted period of mop-
ping up pockets of opposition
and of controlling unruly youth
gangs in the liberated areas.
Tshombe's troops continue to en-
counter considerable resistance
at several points on the shrink-
ing periphery of the rebel-held
area, and some of their own
lines are far from secure.
The future of the former
Stanleyville regime is unclear.
Government troops found no
significant leaders in the for-
mer capital city. One evacuee
stated that he saw rebel "presi-
dent" Gbenye speeding out of
the town just after the Belgian
paratroops dropped. Early this
PRESSURES AGAINST AHIDJO GOVERNMENT
Cameroon evidently is in
for a period of heightened in-
ternal turbulence which will
severely test moderate Presi-
dent Ahidjo's ability to sur-
vive in office.
Since leading Cameroon to
independence in 1960, Ahidjo
has faced enormous problems in
attempting to preside over this
complex federation of former
week insurgent military-leaders
were reported to be in far north-
eastern Congo. They may try to
fight on from a new base or to
establish a government in exile.
Tshombe's dependence on
mercenaries and foreign aid
for his government's military
successes re-emphasizes the
weakness of his own administra-
tion. The tribal rivalries,
regional inequities, and cor-
ruption that gave rise to the
rebellion and fed local sup-
port for it remain..With the
Congolese Army no more effec-
tive as a fighting force than
it ever was, Tshombd probably
will feel obliged to retain
mercenaries even after the
rebellion collapses. In the
circumstances an intensifi-
cation of opposition to him
from radical African states
may be expected, as they see
his total dependence on the
United States and European
French and British territories.
In recognition of the country's
basic regional, religious, and
tribal cleavages, he has at-
tempted to distribute; government
posts equitably on geographic
and ethnic bases. However, con-
trol of the powerful ruling
party, the Cameroon Union (UC),
has remained with northern Mus-
lim political bosses.
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Southern resentment, al-
ways high, now has apparently
reached explosive proportions.
Disparate southern elements are
making new efforts to coalesce
with a view to fielding a single
opposition candidate for the
presidential election scheduled
for next spring. However,
Ahidjo's repressive measures
against the-population in an op-
position stronghold following
parliamentary elections earlier
this year raise doubts as to
how many of the southerners
would be willing to challenge
him openly.
Some may instead make com-
ton cause with an apparently
growing number of high-level gov-
ernment officials who have be-
come disaffected, in part be-
cause they feel that Ahidjo is
slipping too far to the left in
his attempts to shore up his po-
litical position, ameliorate
Cameroon's economic difficul-
ties, and keep in step with
other African states. Ahidjo
has in recent months accepted
a Soviet Embassy in Yaounde,
formally proclaimed a policy of
nonalignment, and given serious
consideration to the establish-
ment of diplomatic ties with Pei-
ping. He apparently has also
acquiesced in the clearly il-
legal action by a pro-Communist
faction in assuming control of
the government-sponsored trade
union last month.
Meanwhile, a series of
well-organized guerrilla attacks
since early November has breathed
new life into the rebellion in
the southwest directed by the
clandestine wing of the Cam-
eroon People's Union (UPC), once
the country's leading national-
ist party. This rejuvenation,
accomplished despite intense
factional strife among exiled
UPC leaders, revealed that the
rebels in the field--mostly
Bamileke tribesmen--have ob-
tained new supplies of modern
small arms. These supplies
evidently come from foreign
benefactors, but their exact
origin has not been estab-
lished.
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GUINEAN ECONOMIC CRISIS BRINGS REPRESSIVE MEASURES
Continuing economic dete-
rioration in Guinea has resulted
in a government and party shake-
up and in the adoption of strin-
gent new measures against cor-
rupt economic practices. A
threatened political showdown
apparently failed to materialize.
Ever since Guinea's noncon-
vertible currency was introduced
in March 1960, it has depressed
the domestic economy and put a
premium on illicit trade. An
estimated 60 percent of Guinea's
exportable products are smuggled
to neighboring countries and
sold for convertible currency,
and many of its imports probably
are similarly diverted. Police.
and party officials join exten-
sively in these activities. The
government's exhortations for a
mending of ways has neither al-
tered the practices nor improved
sagging public morale.
On 8 November President
Tourd, during a highly publicized
mass meeting, announced a return
to tight state control of trade,
confiscation of illegal gains,
regulation of rented housing,
and imposition of stiff prison
sentences for currency manipula-
tion, smuggling, or tribal activ-
ity designed to undermine the
regime. Extensive personnel
shifts in the top ranks of the
government and a broad party re-
organization accompanied these
measures.
Despite indications that im-
portant political elements felt
threatened by the new program,
the ruling party's national coun-
cil and the National Assembly pro-
vided the customary rubber-stamp
approval on 19 November. Tourd
apparently believes, however that
to attack the root of the problem
by entering some form of interna-
tional clearing arrangement would
imply a derogation of sovereignty.
Popular unrest therefore is likely
to continue, regardless of more
appeals from Tour6 and stepped-up
police action.
SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO ALGERIA
The Soviet military aid
program for Algeria is in full
swing. Last week's delivery of
six AN-12 transport aircraft had
been preceded by the arrival of
at least ten shipments of mili-
tary cargo
since m.id-1964 (see chart). This
high rate of deliveries is likely
to continue for some time.
Shipments apparently began
after Algerian military trainees
completed their courses in the
bloc and began to return home
late this past summer. The first
Algerian military personnel went
to the bloc for formal training
in early 1963. Since that time
it is believed about 670 personnel
have participated in aviation
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SOVIET DELIVERIES TO ALGERIA SINCE MID.;-1964
MI G-17 JET AIRCRAFT 20
MIC;-F5 JET AIRCRAFT
'A K-18 PROP-DRIVEN TRAINER AIRCRAFT 1$
Ml-4 HELICOPTERS
AN1-12 TURBOPROP TRANSPORTS 6
P4 MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS 6
1-3454 MEDIUM TANKS 150-200
A tMORED VEHICLES Szme
ARTILLERY Some
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT/RADAR Some
TRUCKS some
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courses, communications instruc-
tion, ar~d naval training. Groups
are still being sent to the USSR.
Since July about 250 naval and
air trainees are known to have
arrived back in Algeria.
Some Soviet technicians have
been in Algeria since mid-1963
operating specially outfitted
tanks to de-mine Algeria's bor-
ders. Others who arrived this
year are reportedly training Al-
gerian soldiers on Soviet armor.
A large influx of Soviet military
technicians is expected soon to
assemble, maintain, and instruct
in the use of newly arrived arms.
The Soviet-Algerian military
aid arrangements--the October
1963 pact and other understand-
ings reached when Ben Bella vis-
ited Moscow last May--probably
call for delivery of additional
aircraft, including more advanced
jet fighters. In view of the
emphasis on naval training and
Algeria's access to the sea, the
USSR also is expected to deliver
more naval craft, probably ad-
ditional motor torpedo boats,
and other types of patrol craft.
In addition to the current
deliveries the USSR made two
shipments of miscellaneous equip-
ment during the Algerian-Moroccan
altercation in late 1963. At
that time Cuba sent in some tanks
of Soviet origin, and Egypt pro-
vided some air and naval craft.
Most of the Egyptian-supplied
equipment has been withdrawn.
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The recent decision of
France's 450,000 member CFTC to
"deconfessionalize" and change
its name to the French Democra-
tic Labor Confederation (CFDT)
may have long-range political
implications. Approved by 70
percent of the confederation's
leadership, this move is poten-
tially the most significant de-
velopment in the French labor
movement since the Socialist
Worker Force (FO) broke off from
the Communist-dominated General
Labor Confederation (CGT) in
1947.
By eliminating its exclu-
sively Christian orientation
the CFDT hopes first to attract
some of the 7 million unorganized
French workers to its banner.
It also sees the move as facili-
tating a link with the FO and
forging a "unified and militant"
non-Communist labor force roughly
equal in size to the million-
member CGT.
Such a labor movement, CFDT
leaders maintain, would not only
be able to bargain more effec-
tively, but could exact from em-
ployers a greater role for labor
participation in economic plan-
ning--ranging from the plant
level to the national plane. In
the political realm, they see
such a disciplined national labor
union eventually becoming a ral-
lying point around which the non-
Communist parties of the left
might coalesce. It is unlikely,
however, that the disarrayed
French political parties are pre-
pared to subordinate the ideolog-
ical refinements that keep them
apart in the interest of making
common cause behind a program
laid out by the unions.
For the present the FO is
suspicious of the CFDT action.
This is partly due to fears that
it may lose control over its own
followers, some of whom appar-
ently are willing to compromise
their Marxist creed in the in-
terest of a united labor move-
ment. For its part, the CGT,
in step with the current Commu-
nist line, is trying to expand
its base to the right. It re-
gards the deconfessionalization
action as an opportunity to en-
hance the prospects of "prag-
matic" working arrangements with
the unions that make up the CFDT.
The 30-percent minority of
the CFTC leadership that opposed
deconfessionalization objected
that the elimination of specific
reference to the Christian so-
cial ethic deprives the confed-
eration of a meaningful ideology
to oppose Marxism. Indeed, they
predict that the Communists will
infiltrate and eventually domi-
nate the new CFDT. As a conse-
quence, they are contemplating
the establishment of a separate
union which would operate under
the old CFTC banner. This could
lead to an even greater fragmen-
tation of the French labor move-
ment.
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Europe
The strong reaction of the
UK's European Free Trade Associa-
tion partners to the Wilson gov-
ernment's new import barriers
reflects their serious concern
over EFTA's future. These coun-
tries--Portugal, Austria, Switz-
erland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
and associate-member Finland--
were already dubious of EFTA's
ability to safeguard their in-
terests in the Kennedy Round
and worried by certain trade
developments in the Common Mar-
ket. Closer EFTA cooperation
may--initially at least--result
from the demands now made on
Britain by its partners.
London's new import sur-
charges, imposed to avert a bal-
ance-of-payments crisis--came
at a time when the other EFTA
members had for the first time
increased their exports to the
UK more rapidly than to the EEC.
These countries fear their ex-
port losses resulting from the
new British action will generate
domestic pressures for counter-
measures. They are also con-
cerned that the British policies
will create a drag on all their
economies. They therefore
pressed Britain to accelerate
the EFTA tariff reductions pro-
gram. This attempt to obtain
favored treatment from the UK
immediately ran into strong ob-
jections from the US and the EEC.
At an EFTA ministerial meet-
ing in Geneva last week, Britain
agreed to consider exempting from
the new levies export orders
placed before 26 October. It
also reassured its partners that
the UK would start reducing its
surcharges "in a matter of
months." More significant, how-
ever, was an agreement to ob-
serve a provision in the EFTA
convention calling for joint
examination of economic policies
likely to affect member states.
A permanent committee now has
been authorized to do this, and
Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker
went a step further in urging
regular meetings of EFTA foreign
ministers.
At Geneva, several of the
EFTA countries were also con-
cerned that the list of items
the EEC wishes exempted from the
general Kennedy Round tariff
reduction would hit them espe-
cially hard. These countries
are accordingly anxious lest the
Kennedy Round serve eventually
only to confirm rather than
break down the barriers between
the two blocs.
As the prospects for the
Kennedy Round have waxed and
waned over the past months, so
have suggestions for ways of
overcoming the division between
the Six and the Seven. The
latest proposal was floated by
West German State Secretary Lahr
at last week's meeting of the
Western European Union--which
groups the Six with the UK. His
idea that relations between the
EEC and EFTA be handled by a
new "secretariat" was opposed
only by the French, who remain
suspicious of anything that may
look like British
EEC door.
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Italy: The stability of the
center-left coalition that governs
Italy may be further weakened by
the results of this week's provin-
cial and municipal elections. It
is still too early to make exact
comparisons with results in 1963,
but it is fairly certain that the
Christian Democrats lost slightly,
and that Socialist losses consider-
ably exceed what the party's lead-
ers had earlier considered politi-
cally manageable. The Communists
registered their largest postwar
vote, in part because of the gov-
ernment's failure to move ahead
with promised social and economic
reforms.
Premier Aldo Moro and his sup-
porters in the Christian Democratic
Party can make a. case that their
party's showing justifies continua-
tion of a center-left government.
Moro, however, will still have dif-
ficulty :in getting his badly divided
party to be more forthcoming on re-
forms, particularly as some elements
in the party will try to exploit
the Socialists' weakened posi-
tion either to delay or further
water down the reform program.
Whether Socialist leader
Nenni is able to keep his party in
the coalition will depend largely
on what kind of a. deal Moro now
will be able to offer the Social-
ists for their continued partici-
pation. Those Socialists who are
urging that their party pull out
will probably try to force this
action at a party congress pres-
ently planned for next February
or March.
The issue could come to a.
head sooner. This is likely to
happen if it becomes necessary
for Parliament to elect a, succes-
sor to ailing President Segni.
The choice of a, successor is a
highly divisive issue both within 25X1
the Christian Democratic Party
and between that party and its
coalition partners.
Spain: Efforts to obtain a
law de1T-nTng the rights of non-
Catholics in Spain received a set-
back when the Vatican Council re-
cently failed to vote on the schema,
supporting freedom of religion. No
further progress on the Spanish
draft legislation is likely before
the next council session, the date
of which has not yet been set.
Foreign Minister Ca.stiella,with
an eye to improving relations with
nations having large Protestant
populations and generally to refur-
bish Spain's image abroad, has been
working for a, religious rights law
since 1957. In early September,
the proposed draft law was approved
by the three archbishops represent-
ing the Spanish metropolitans, who
make church policy in Spain. When
Castiella presented the project to
the Cabinet, however, he is said
to have encountered stiff opposi-
tion from a majority of the minis-
ters. This opposition eventually
resulted in an announcement last
month that further action was be-
ing postponed until such time as
the Vatican Council registered its
view on religious freedom.
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NEW AGITATION IN PANAMA ON THE CANAL ISSUE
The Panamanian Government
won the first round this week
against a new upsurge of Com-
munist-led agitation on the
canal issue. Communists and
extreme nationalists, however,
plan new demonstrations which
will further test the viability
of the new Robles administra-
tion.
Prompt and effective ac-
tion by Panamanian security
forces on 23 November broke up
Communist-led student demonstra-
tions with only a minimum of
violence and without providing
the martyrs which some extrem-
ist factions had hoped for. The
demonstrators nevertheless had
shown good organization and evi-
dence of prior planning by their
leaders.
The government won another
important point early the next day
when a secret session of the legis-
lature passed a vote of confi-
dence in Foreign Minister Eleta.
Eleta's position on the canal
negotiations with the United
States had been called into ques-
tion by Jorge Illueca, recently
forced out as Panama's chief ne-
gotiator in the talks. It was
the public recriminations be-
tween Eleta and Illueca--a
favorite of the ultranationalist
students--that the Communists
had seized on as a pretext for
the agitation.
The resolution passed by
legislature assured the Pana-
manian people that there has been
no change in the negotiators' de-
termination to obtain a new ca-
nal treaty "that embodies the
just Panamanian demands." It re-
affirmed the position adopted
by the previous Panamanian Gov-
ernment after the January 1964
riots and sustained by the new
government: that the 1903 treaty
must be abrogated.
The Communist and extrem-
ist agitators are expected to
make every effort to regain
the initiative in their con-
tinuing campaign to exploit the
canal negotiations as an effec-
tive nationalist issue against
Panama's ruling oligarchy.
Within hours of the dispersal
of the student demonstrators,
Communist leaders were in con-
tact with extremist labor lead-
ers in an effort to promote a
general strike.
CASTRO MOVES AGAINST PROMINENT OLD-LINE COMMUNIST
The Castro regime's recent
suspension of a long-time Com-
munist, Major Joaquin Ordoqui,
from his high party and govern-
ment posts is a further reflec-
tion of the competition between
Cuba's "old" and "new" Commu-
nists. The move against Ordoqui,
however, probably does not sig-
nal a sweeping purge of the
old guard
Ordoqui, a leading Commu-
nist for almost 30 years before
Castro came to power, had been
a member of the national direc-
torate of the government's party
machine and a deputy minister of
the armed forces. He was prob-
ably removed to settle a politi-
cal account resting on his as-
sociation with Marcos Rodriguez,
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Western Hemisphere
another "old" Communist who was
executed earlier in the year af-
ter a sensational trial which
found him guilty of betraying
student revolutionaries to Ba-
tista's police. At the trial,
Ordoqui was accused of having
protected Rodriguez. He was
subsequently reprimanded in pub-
lic by Castro for "improprie-
ties. "
Castro probably put off ac-
tion against Ordoqui until the
considerable passions aroused
by the Rodriguez trial had sub-
sided. The trial was more than
a judgment of Rodriguez; it was
an explosive confrontation
Politicking in anticipation
of elections at some future date
is now in full swing in Bolivia.
Junta President Barrientos him-
self, despite his public dis-
claimer on 18 November of presi-
dential ambitions, is acting
like a candidate. He continues
to stump the countryside drum-
ming up popular support, and he
is making efforts to create his
own political organization.
There is speculation that
Barrientos will resign from the
junta just before the elections
and run for president with the
support of the Bolivian Social-
ist Falange (FSB) and several
minor rightist parties. He is
also rumored seeking an alliance
with the left.
Meanwhile other groups are
busy trying to make alliances.
Nothing firm has emerged from
between the "old" and "new"
Communists. It ended in an un-
easy compromise only after Cas-
tro personally intervened in
defense of the "old" Communists,
but permitted the execution of
Rodriguez to proceed.
The Ordoqui case probably
does not presage any basic
change in the intramural strug-
gle between the "old" and "new"
Communists. Castro, moreover,
can be expected to continue uti-
lizing their differences,as he
has in the past, to maintain his
own dominant position.F
these discussions, but the
smaller parties are lining up
either with ex - Vice President
Juan Lechin's National Leftist
Revolutionary Party (PRIN) on
the left, or with the FSB on
the right.
Former president Hernan
Siles Zuazo sees the possibil-
ity that a third group will
emerge. This one would be based
primarily on the remnants of
the Nationalist Revolutionary
Movement (MNR), which ruled Bo-
livia for 12 years before Paz
Estenssoro's overthrow. Siles
is currently attempting to re-
vive and reorganize the MNR as
his own political machine. There
are reports that he may take
his forces into a national front
with the PRIN and other leftist
groups.
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Brazilian President Cas-
tello Branco is still grappling
with the month-long dispute
arising from the federal govern-
ment's effort to remove Governor
Borges of Goias State from of-
fice on charges of subversion.
A 23 November decision by
the Brazilian Supreme Court
granted Borges immunity from ar-
rest unless such action is au-
thorized by the state legisla-
ture. Borges would thus appear
to have won the first round,
since his Social Democratic Party
(PSD) controls the legislature
and President Castello Branco
has pledged to respect the court's
decision.
However, the PSD has hesi-
tated in the past to take a
strong antigovernment position
on controversial issues, so the
legislature may buckle under
federal pressure to get at Bor-
ges. One indication of such
pressure might be read into the
firmly worded presidential com-
muniq,ud--issued immediately fol-
lowing the announcement of the
court decision--warning that the
government would not tolerate
subversion and counterrevolution
in Goias and would take whatever
steps were necessary to preserve
local security.
This blunt statement may
also have been designed in part
to assuage growing pressures on
President Castello Branco, par-
ticularly from the hard-line
military, to intervene directly
in Goias. Many of those support-
ing this course evidently regard
Borges as an unwelcome vestige
of the ousted Goulart regime.
This element may yet force Cas-
tello Branco to approve some
kind of federal intervention.
The federal government reportedly
has begun sounding out certain
key political figures for sup-
port of such intervention,
should it become necessary.
Although the Goias issue is
the government's most difficult
political problem to date, it
does not presently appear to
threaten the country's long-range
prospects for stability. Offi-
cials are nevertheless concerned
by reports that opposition groups
plan to exploit the situation by
creating further unrest in Goias
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Western Hemisphere
Uruguay seems to be moving
toward some sort of showdown
over reformation of the country's
cumbersome plural executive sys-
tem of government. Public senti-
ment for a change in this cum-
bersome system is growing. At
the same time the atmosphere in
Montevideo is increasingly con-
ducive to military coup plotting.
In early November, the
largest faction of the ruling
Blanco party came out in sup-
port of constitutional reform.
This move presumably was moti-
vated to a considerable degree
by a desire to head off pressure
for changes by unconstitutional
means.
The Blanco reformists,how-
ever, have chosen a difficult
path. They must somehow gain
the support of the opposition
Colorado Party. At the same
time they must cope with fac-
tions in the Blanco party itself
which are becoming increasingly
restive and impatient for quick
action.
Colorados want to postpone any
change until after the 1966 elec-
tions, which they hope to win un-
der the present system.
The military meanwhile is
becoming increasingly disturbed
by the deteriorating political
situation, as well as a falter-
ing economy that is marked by
mounting inflation. More im-
mediately, it is concerned over
what it considers unequal pay
compared with the salaries paid
to the legislators. A group of
senior officers is apparently
seeking a hearing before the
NCG in which they intend to push
for government action to reduce
labor strife,crack down on smug-
gling, enforce tax collection,
and halt the inflationary spiral.
At the moment, a more forceful
approach is inhibited by the
absence of a leader or group of
leaders of sufficient stature
who would be willing and able
to assume responsibility for
disrupting the present arrange-
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