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OCI No. 0359/64C Copy No. 5.7 I -17 ISSUES BErORE THE 19tH UNITED NA. 'IQNS NEHA ASS MBL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF C..URrRENT 1 1 : CIA.,-RDP79-0Q92Z,A0047Q400QQ4- T E,, L. L, G: E N,,C E 27 Npvembgr 1964 ;SECRET GROUP I 'txcluded from cbtomwtic c ~vngradine 'and declo si Fic Lion Approved For Release 20Q6/10/11 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6 Approved For R~ease 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-0092704700030004-6 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC. SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. DISSEMINATION CONTROLS This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, If marked with specific dissemination controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7, the document must be handled within the framework of the limitation so imposed. Approved For -00927A004700030004-6 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6 SE CRE T ISSUES BEFORE THE 19TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY For many months the UN membership has been preoccupied with avoiding a crisis over the Ar- ticle 19 payments issue. Unless a Last-minute solution is found, a. serious confrontation is in prospect when the General Assembly convenes on L December for its 19th session. The outcome is still in doubt, and even if a showdown can be avoided--perhaps by adjourning the assembly for a few months--the UN's role in future peacekeep- ing operations appears bound to be modified. Another critical question facing this session is the perennial Chinese representation issue. For the first time, a resolution to seat Communist China in place of Taiwan could receive a majority. Among other issues, Southeast Asia's prob- lems may receive increased attention, Cuba may launch a diplomatic offensive against the US from the floor of the assembly, and disarmament and co- lonialism will be spotlighted. Such perennial is- sues as the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Korean item will also appear. All told there are already over 90 items scheduled, and this session's de- bate is certain to be unusually important and dif- ficult. The Soviet Union's refusal to pay its share of the cost of the UN operations in the Congo and Middle East has cast a heavy shadow over the session. Moscow and others in the bloc risk los- ing their vote in the assembly when it: convenes on 1 December. Soviet officials have indicated they do not want to see Soviet relations with the UN or the US seriously damaged, but thus far they have adamantly refused to pay their arrears. The pos- sibility of a last-minute token payment by Moscow cannot be to- tally discounted, but the Soviets would probably insist that their stand "in principle" has not changed while negotiations con- tinued. The war of nerves seems likely to come to a head on the opening day of the assembly. The outcome may affect the entire future of the UN. The last few weeks have seen intensified efforts by both great and small UN mem- bers to avoid a showdown. In addition to the original 21-mem- ber group appointed to deal with a wide range of problems bearing on financing and peacekeeping operations, a number of smaller groups have also taken up the SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6 Approved For RLase 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927-- 4700030004-6 SE CRE T A. Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, never- theless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the fail- ure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member. problem. Because of the strongly prevailing fear of being caught in a US-Soviet squeeze and pro- voking a Soviet walkout, however, only one proposal of any promise has been put forward. This for- mula, promulgated by four UN am- bassadors, calls for creation of a "voluntary rescue" fund to which all members would be asked to contribute in order to alle- viate the UN's financial prob- lems. This would give the USSR and France--which also faces pos- sible loss of its vote in Janu- ary--a face-saving method to pay their arrears before the assem- bly convened. Serious divisions have appeared among the four am- bassadors, however, and their plan may be modified along lines not acceptable to the US. If no solution is reached in advance of the session, cur- rent General Assembly President Sosa-Rodriguez has the unenviable task of ruling on whether the USSR will be deprived of its vote. He is reluctant to do so, but may not be able to avoid the issue. There is considerable un- certainty as to how events will unfold on 1 December. The US UN mission believes the US has sufficient support to deprive the USSR of its voting rights in the assembly but expects wholesale abstentions. The USSR has told some UN delegations it would consider a vote against it an unfriendly act, and has threatened to leave the assem- bly and perhaps withdraw from the UN if subjected to an ad- verse ruling. Not only is the voting situation unclear, but the timing and wording of one or many resolutions that may be put to a vote will probably re- main in doubt until the assem- bly convenes. Even if a last-minute com- promise solution can be arranged, the United Nations and particu- larly its peacekeeping functions will have been significantly af- fected by the prolonged strug- gle over the payments question. Even if the USSR made a contri- bution, it still in a sense will have won its point that the Se- curity Council must be given more authority over peacekeep- ing operations. Henceforth it will be considerably more dif- ficult for the General Assembly to institute and levy funds for such operations under powers de- rived from the 1951 "Uniting for Peace" resolution unless the great powers concur. It will probably he impossible to force a permanent member of the Se- curity Council to pay for an SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030004-6 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6 . SE CRE T operation it finds politically objectionable. Conversely, a shift back to the authority originally en- visaged for the Security Coun- cil promises to displease many smaller UK members which col- lectively make their weight felt through action initiated by the General Assembly. This may in time result in a greater co- hesiveness among the smaller UN members and could force the great powers into countermoves to strengthen their own community of interests. Chinese Representation The Chinese representation question may be the most crucial one before the assembly if the Article 19 issue is surmounted. It now appears that a strong res- olution calling for the seating of Peiping and the removal of Na- tionalist China from the UN will for the first time come precar- iously close to, or even achieve, a simple majority vote in the as- sembly. (see Page 4).. While no UN member has officially indi- cated it would switch its sup- port from Taiwan to the mainland as a result of Peiping's nuclear detonation, that event has en- hanced Communist China's prestige among many nonaligned countries and could provide an additional incentive for certain wavering countries to vote for its admis- sion. Whether Peiping actually at- tains a majority will hinge on the decisions of only a few Af- rican and Middle Eastern coun- tries. France, Congo (Brazza- ville), the Central African Re- public, Kenya, and Zambia seem certain to add new votes to Peiping's total. Dahomey is probably also in Communist China's column now. Cyprus, Malaysia, Sierre Leone, Malawi, Malta, Chad, Senegal, and per- haps a few other West African and some Arab states are still uncertain and presumably open to persuasion. At any rate, last year's 41 to 57 vote against seating Peiping is cer- tain to be considerably closer this session. Some countries have indi- cated unwillingness to vote for a strongly worded resolution like the one introduced by Al- bania last year which made no provision for Taiwan's continued membership. Kuwait, for ex- ample, has indicated that if separate votes are taken it would vote to seat Peiping, and against removing Taiwan; and if the resolution called for both, Kuwait would not support it. Thus the wording of this year's resolution, which will be in- 25x1 troduced by Cambodia and co- sponsored by a few African coun- tries, could be a key factor. sug- gest that e Gaulle ay be ac- tively maneuvering on Peiping's behalf and he may soon make pub- lic his intentions. Paris may introduce a moderately worded amendment to the expected strong SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6 Approved For R VOTE ESTIMATE ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN UPCOMING GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR SEATING OF COMMUNIST CHINA: 51 SECRET OPPOSED: 49 ABSTAIN : 15 NO FOREIGN DISSEM Afghanistan Yes Kuwait Abstain Albania Yes Laos Yes Algeria Yes Lebanon Abstain Argentina No Liberia No Australia No Libya No Austria Abstain Luxembourg No *Belgium No Malagasy No Bolivia No *Malawi Abstain( 2) Brazi I No *Malaysia Abstain( 1 ) Bulgaria Yes Mali Yes Burundi Yes *Malta No(2) Burma Yes *Mauritania Abstain Byelorussia Yes Mexico No Cambodia Yes Morocco Yes Cameroon Abstain( I ) Nepal Yes * Canada No Netherlands Abstain Central African Republic Yes (1) New Zealand No Ceylon Yes Nicaragua No * Chad Yes(1 Niger No Chile No Nigeria Abstain China No Norway Yes Colombia No Outer Mongolia Yes Congo (Brazzaville) Yes(1) Pakistan Yes Congo (Leopoldville) No Panama No Costa Rica No Paraguay No Cuba Yes Peru No * Cyprus Yes Philippines No Czechoslovakia Yes Poland Yes * Dahomey Yes(I Portugal Abstain Denmark Yes Rumania Yes Dominican Republic No Rwanda No Ecuador No Saudi Arabia Abstain El Salvador No * Senegal Yes(1) Ethiopia Yes(2) Sierrd Leone Abstain Finland Yes Somalia Yes France Yes South Africa No Gabon No Spain No Ghana Yes Sudan Yes Greece No Sweden Yes Guatemala No Syria Yes Guinea Yes Tanganyika-Zanzibar Yes Haiti No Thailand No Honduras No Togo No Hungary Yes Trinidad and Tobago Abstain Iceland Abstain Tunisia Yes India Yes Turkey No Indonesia Yes Uganda Yes Iran No Ukraine Yes Iraq Yes USSR Yes Ireland No UAR Yes Israel Abstain United Kingdom Yes *Italy No United States No Ivory Coast No Upper Volta No Jamaica No Uruguay No Japan No Venezuela No Jordan No Yemen Yes Kenya Yes(2 ) Yugoslavia Yes *These states moving in direction of voting for Communist China and bear closest watching. Zambia 1963 TOTALS Yes(2) Countries changing their 1963 vote or voting for the first time. For seatong of Communist China: 41 (1 ) Voted No last year Opposed: 57 (2) Did not vote last year Abstain: 12 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6 1 SECRET resolution. French officials have reportedly been abroad laying the groundwork for seating Peiping. Although the Chinese Com- munists have shown an increased flexibility in their drive for international recognition, they remain adamant in their opposi- tion to a "two-Chinas" solution. They appear content to bide their time, convinced they will be seated on their own terms, prob- ably before too long. In 1961 the General Assem- bly voted 61 to 34 to consider the Chinese representation issue an "important question," thereby requiring a two-thirds vote to seat Peiping. In the US view, this ruling stands unless for- mally reversed by a subsequent vote in the assembly. Should the assembly decide to reconsider, the ruling could presumably be overturned by a simple majority. It appears that some countries which plan to vote for Communist China are willing to uphold the two-thirds requirement should that be put to a vote. France, however, will vote against the important-question ruling. Even if the 1961 rule is maintained, but Peiping receives a majority, Chiang Kai-shek might withdraw from the UN. Laos and Southeast Asia Certain Laotian officials have shown interest in appeal- ing to the UN as a means of se- curing an end to the military in- tervention of Laos' Communist neighbors. Laotians generally are disillusioned with the In- ternational Control Commission, and there is a growing feeling that a remedy for the prolonged instability in the country must soon be found. A prominent Lao- tian has sounded out US officials on the advisability of asking the Security Council, or failing there, the General Assembly, for a detachment of UN forces to help seal the frontiers. Premier Souvanna Phouma has sounded out Moscow on whether it would lend support to such a re- quest, but he has apparently re- ceived no response. The UN probably would find it difficult to respond effec- tively to a Laotian appeal un- less a crisis situation--such as a major offensive by the Pathet Lao--existed at the time. Under these circumstances the UN might find sufficient support to dis- patch an observer group. In 1959, the Security Council, re- sponding to a Laotian request, had authorized the sending of a four-member observer team to in- vestigate charges that North Viet- namese troops were moving into the country. The introduction of a UN ob- server presence into Laos--al- though unlikely at the present time--could open the way to an even deeper UN involvement in other crisis areas of Southeast Asia. In recent years, the UN has assisted in the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia, sent a team to "ascertain" the popular will in Sabah and Sarawak prior to the formation of Malaysia, and sponsored the 1962 Gusing mission designed to ease strained Thai- Cambodian relations. SE CRE T Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6 Approved For Re+ase 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A'Iy64700030004-6 SECRET The United Nations' re- sponsibilities for keeping the peace and mediating the dispute in Cyprus promises to come up several times during the 19th session. As long as the security situation on Cyprus remains rela- tively stable, the focus of the dispute will be the assembly de- bate which will probably start after the first of the year. President Makarios or his for- eign minister is expected to at- tend the debate, for which the President has laid the ground= work by his moderating tactics toward the Turkish Cypriots. Makarios will probably seek sup- port for the unrestricted inde- pendence of Cyprus, and judging by the ardent pro-independence sentiments of the great majority of UN members, he is likely to receive strong backing. Turkey for its part will try to have the treaties on Cyprus recognized as valid but may find itself on the defensive. The Security Council faces the question of extending the mandate for the UN Force in Cy- prus (UNFICYP) when the present one expires on 26 December. The operation requires voluntary fi- nancing and the Scandinavians have indicated willingness to maintain their contingents on the island. Although the opera- tion is generally recognized to have been instrumental in pre- venting civil war on the island, it has nevertheless not been popular in various parliaments and finance ministries, and it may be necessary to reduce the 6,000-man force, perhaps even to an observer group. Makarios has indicated his willingness to keep a UN force on Cyprus, but he may believe that a re- duced force and a more restricted mandate would give him greater maneuverability. The most important develop- ment in the Cyprus matter is ex- pected about March, when UN me- diator Galo Plaza submits a re- port on his efforts to find a permanent solution to the dis- pute. Plaza has indicated that unless the principal parties can reach an agreed solution he will recommend an independent Cyprus with minority guarantees. He may also suggest a subsequent referendum on self-determination. Plaza personally believes union of Cyprus with Greece would best serve Western interests, but in the absence of agreement to it he apparently feels unfettered independence is the only alter- native. Makarios will know how to use a UN report along these lines to support his own efforts to achieve a fully sovereign Cy- prus. Heartened by support from the nonaligned countries at the recent Cairo conference, from the Soviet Government, and from Algeria, Cuba is expected to take its promised diplomatic of- fensive against the US to the floor of the General Assembly. Cuba apparently hopes thus to use world opinion to force SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030004-6 SE CRE T Washington to move toward ac- ceptance of the Castro regime. The Cairo conference denounced US economic pressures on Cuba and called on the US to evacuate Guantanamo and settle its dif- ferences with Havana. Cuba can be expected to repeat these de- mands and perhaps call on the General Assembly, in addition, to denounce US violations of Cuban airspace. Among other Latin American issues, Bolivia may present its case against Chile for alleged interference with Bolivia's right of passage to the sea. Argentina may embarrass its Western friends by pressing its claims to sovereignty over the British-held Falkland Islands. The Afro-Asians are de- termined to pursue in the com- ing session their bitter at- tacks on all forms of colonial- ism. The communique of the Cairo conference of nonaligned nations gave greatest attention to the condemnation of colonial- ism, neocolonialism, and racial discrimination--calling for eco- nomic sanctions and even use of force to defeat the colonizing powers. Portugal, South Af- rica, and Rhodesia will come under particularly heavy attack. The Arabs will probably state their case against Britain for its refusal to implement UN res- olutions on Aden, Oman, and the South Arabian peninsula. The US, UK, and France may come in for criticism for not grant- ing independence to their Carib- bean possessions, and to their Pacific trust territories. South Africa's apartheid policies and its hold on South West Africa will again be de- nounced, and pressures for sanc- tions against Pretoria are likely to increase. The Security Coun- cil has established a special committee to study the effect various economic measures would have on the economy of South Af- rica, and the committee is con- sidering everything--up to a com- plete embargo enforced by a blockade. Even if Rhodesia does not unilaterally declare its inde- pendence, the Salisbury govern- ment and possibly the UK will come in for heavy criticism. If Ian Smith's government does de- clare its independence, it will find itself faced with the same violent opposition now being ex- perienced by South Africa. Portugal rounds out the list as one of the least popular governments in the eyes of Afro- Asians. Already in trouble for its Angola policy, Portugal may now face even greater problems in the UN as a result of the re- cent stirrings in Mozambique. As before, majority sentiment in the UN will urge the US to support sanctions against a NATO ally. The UN membership is likely to exert heavier pressure than ever for progress on disarmament. The General Assembly will SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030004-6 Approved For Reuse 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A 700030004-6 SECRET probably offer substantive rec- ommendations and show a greater reluctance to leave issues with die 18-Nation Disarmament Con- i'erence in Geneva, where so lit- tle has been achieved. to attack the presence of for- eign bases on its soil. As on such political ques- tions as colonialism, the West There are already six items may also find itself under fire on the assembly's agenda relat- on economic matters. tng to disarmament, including proposals for general and com- plete disarmament, further re- striction of nuclear testing, a ban-the-bomb conference, and agreement on nondissemination of nuclear weapons. In addi- tion, U Thant has called for dis- armament talks among the five nuclear powers and there already is growing feeling that Peiping should be included in any dis- armament talks under UN auspices as a result of the Chinese nu- clear detonation. Nondissemination proposals are likely to be of chief inter- est. The Cairo conference urged all states to conclude nondis- semination agreements, and pro- posals for the denuclearization of Africa, the Indian Ocean area, and Latin America may be dis- cussed. The Soviet Union will have ample opportunity to ex- ploit this sentiment by launch- ing a campaign against the multi- lateral nuclear force (MLF). In- dia and the UAR have already in- dicated some opposition to the MLF on grounds it may constitute nuclear proliferation. France for reasons of its own may be able to increase UN opposition to the MLF. Cuba may take advantage of the disarmament discussions At the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva last summer, a group of 75 (now 77) less developed countries formed a surprisingly cohesive bloc which at times produced overwhelming majorities for panaceas for their problems which were largely unpalatable to the more developed. In ef- fect UNCTAD took on the appear- ance of a confrontation of the poor and the rich, with the lat- ter on the defensive. The "haves" were constrained to argue that the "have-nots" must focus more on their responsibili- ties and cannot expect, for ex- ample, to attain higher prices for their goods merely by pro- ducing large votes. In UNCTAD the less developed nations have erected within the UN framework a piece of machinery geared primarily to considering the formulation of new trade and development programs for their benefit. During the current ses- sion the prospects are that res- olutions will be passed for- malizing institutional arrange- ments and endorsing the rec- ommendations made by UNCTAD last June. In brief, the poorer countries desire higher prices for their commodities and lower prices for manufactured goods SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030004-6 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030004-6 rr.. SE CRE T and they may try to commit the wealthier countries to transfer capital to them, to provide greater access to their primary products, and generally to elimi- nate discriminatory measures against the developing countries. UNCTAD could also provide a springboard for an assault on trade principles such as most- favored-nation treatment as em- bodied in GATT--a forum allegedly serving the rich nations at the expense of the poor. Hardy Perennials The assembly will again be faced with several "hardy peren- nial" issues such as the Arab- Israeli dispute, the Korean item, Kashmir, and Tibet. The Arabs may be confident this year that they will win greater support for their case against Israel, and the recent Israeli-Syrian clash may add heat to the debate. Specifically, the Arab states will again resist efforts to rectify abuses of the refugee relief program, claiming such moves are in reality de- signed to reduce the UN's role in supporting the refugees. The Arabs will try to obtain recogni- tion for the new "Palestine Lib- eration Organization," which as- pires to represent all Palestin- ians. In opposition to Arab maneu- vers, the Israelis can usually expect either the support or the neutrality of the Western powers and of many African, Asian,and Latin American countries. As a countermove, Israel may sponsor or encourage another resolution advocating direct negotiations between it and the Arab states --a proposal the Arabs have consistently rejected because of the implicit recognition of Israel such negotiations would involve. Each year since 1954 the General Assembly has voted for a resolution calling for the "achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea under a repre- sentative form of government, and full restoration of inter- national peace and security in the area." The resolution has not brought unification any closer, and the annual debate may even prove disadvantageous to South Korea. The Seoul gov- ernment is still anxious to up- hold the UN's competence in uni- fication even though it is in- creasingly doubtful that the UN can accomplish anything. If the resolution achieves fewer votes this year than last, opposition elements in South Korea may ac- cuse the government of allowing international support to dwindle away. Other governments will want pet resolutions passed either to bolster support at home or give themselves a lift on the international scene. The Dalai Lama will have such sympathizers as Nicaragua and El Salvador sponsor a resolution regretting the Tibetans' loss of human rights, Tshomb6 may provoke an African walkout if he appears before the assembly to present his case on the Congo, and the landlocked nations may declare for their right of passage to the sea. The issues are endless, often tiring, if not seemingly ludicrous, but nevertheless ever present and sometimes even vital to the gov- ernments concerned. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030004-6 Approved For Reuse ?&fty P79-00927A4700030004-6 SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6