WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004700050001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 11, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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(Information as of 1200 EST, 10 December 1964)
UNITED NATIONS Page
TRUCE POSTPONES SHOWDOWN OVER ARTICLE 19 ISSUE
The US-Soviet agreement to avoid a showdown, however,
depends on cooperation from all UN members in avoiding
any General Assembly vote through much of December as
negotiations to solve the financing issue continue.
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
SOVIET BUDGET AND ECONOMIC PLAN FOR 1965
Incomplete reports on the 1965 Soviet budget and plan
suggest that the orientation of the economy will re-
main essentially unchanged, but that some modifications
are being made in favor of the consumer.
EAST GERMANY REVIEWS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POLICIES
In their first publicized party conclave since Khru-
shchev's ouster, East German:leaders sought to convey
an image of confidence and stability, but few of them
tried to gloss over the regime's chronic weaknesses.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND USSR ISSUE CAUTIOUS COMMUNIQUE
A modus vivendi governing future Czechoslovak-Soviet
relations seems to have been worked out during Antonin
Novotny's visit to Moscow last week.
PEIPING SEEKS CLOSER TIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Foreign Minister Chen Yi's recent meetings with govern-
ment leaders in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Burma are part
of Communist China's campaign to gain influence through
more frequent high-level political contacts abroad.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S 1964 FOREIGN AID PROGRAM
Peiping has offered a record $255 million in economic
aid to free world countries so far this year, most of
it to Africa and the Middle East.
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11 Dec 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page
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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The tempo of fighting has picked up, but political
pressures on Premier Huong have eased for the moment.
CEYLONESE GOVERNMENT FALLS
The loss of a vote of confidence climaxed a period of
mounting dissatisfaction over Prime Minister Bandara-
naike's economic policies and alliances with Marxists.
Elections are set for March.
CONGOLESE REBELS RECEIVE FOREIGN AID
Radical African states are sending in some arms, and,
if they send troops as well, the rebels could regain
the initiative from the Congolese Government.
SUDAN'S RACIAL PROBLEM FLARES ANEW
Rioting in Khartoum involving Negroid southerners has
frightened the month-old civilian regime. The Commu-
nists may see advantage in further inflaming racial
tensions.
RADICAL BRAZZAVILLE REGIME STIFLING DOMESTIC OPPOSITION 13
The government is encouraging a campaign of violence
against elements opposed to its rapid progress to the
left.
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ASIA-AFRICA-(continued) Page
YEMENI ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS FOUNDERING 14
Scheduled truce talks have been postponed indefinite-
ly, and squabbling among various Yemeni factions is
increasing despite Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's evident
desire for peace.
NEW PROPOSALS FOR TALKS ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION 15
Although these plans strongly endorse economic inte-
gration, they only hint at a federated Europe and make
major concessions to De Gaulle's views on political
cooperation.
ITALIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
The process of electing a successor to President Segni,
who resigned on 6 December, seems certain to increase
strains on the center-left coalition and give the Com-
munists a new focus for their efforts to break it up.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OUSTER OF CUBAN LABOR MINISTER
Martinez Sanchez was the logical whipping boy for the
low labor productivity now plaguing the regime, and his
removal may have been only indirectly related to the
current rumors of tensions within the Cuban leadership.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued)
BOLIVIAN JUNTA SETS ELECTION DATE
Political activity now confined primarily to smoke-
filled rooms will soon move into the open. Lawless-
ness still prevails in many areas of the country.
REACTION TO PERON'S ATTEMPTED RETURN TO ARGENTINA
The Peronists who sought Peron's return may now turn
to subversive methods, while the neo-Peronists--those
who advocate?Peronism without Peron--will probably
find more public and official sympathy for their ef-
forts to return to politics by legal means.
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11 Dec 104 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page
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`.rte NOW
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TRUCE POSTPONES SHOWDOWN OVER ARTICLE 19 ISSUE
The eleventh-hour agreement
between the US and USSR to avoid
a showdown over the Article 19
financing :issue has been welcomed
by the UN membership generally,
but could be disrupted at any
time. The agreement depends on
the cooperation of all UN members
in avoiding a General Assembly
vote through much of December
while the general debate contin-
ues. Only a very limited amount
of other business can be conducted
on a no-objection or acclamation
basis, and a call for a vote--
which any member may demand at
any time--would immediately raise
the question of the eligibility
of those in arrears to participate.
Secretary General Thant is
expected to take advantage of the
truce to establish a small com-
mittee--probably composed of
permanent members of the Security
Council and a few prominent neu-
trals--to study ways of solving
the financing issue. Thant's
illness, however, may temporarily
slow this project. Foreign Min-
ister Gromyko has indicated the
USSR's willingness to make a con-
tribution to the UN under the so-
called "Pazhwak plan"--named for
the Afghan UN ambassador--but has
not specified when or how much
Moscow will pay. Furthermore,
many details of this plan remain
unclear and may be unacceptable.
A French UN official theo-
rizes that the USSR accepted the
temporary nonvoting arrangements
only to delay a showdown until
after 1 January, when France will
also be threatened with loss of
its assembly vote. He believes
the possibility of a vote to ap-
ply Article 19 will be greatly
diminished after the first of
the year.
The most serious threat
both to the present truce and to
the negotiations it was designed
to permit is the impatience of
the Afro-Asians with the nonvot-
ing arrangement and their eager-
ness to have the assembly proceed
with its normal business. Many
of them believe that the loss-of-
voting provision of Article 19 can
be ignored pending agreement on
a voluntary contribution plan,
and that the question of the
amount and date of a Soviet bloc
contribution to the UN should
not be pressed.
The UN's future peacekeeping
role is bound to be affected by
the prolonged dispute. Gromyko
recently stated his interest in
exploring with the US future ar-
rangements for peacekeeping opera-
tions. The Soviets have long
maintained that the Security
Council is the only body that can
make binding decisions in this
field. The US and France have
also recognized the necessity of
limiting the power of the assembly
to establish and assess for fu-
ture operations, but plans to en-
hance the authority of the Se-
curity Council could produce a
backlash in the assembly, where
the small countries make their
weight felt. Despite their eager-
ness to avoid a US-USSR clash
during the present session, the
small nations would be quick to
resent and oppose anything like a
big power "deal" which seriously
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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The Communist World
SOVIET BUDGET AND ECONOMIC PLAN FOR 1965
I Ko-.
sygi s few remarks on the
drafting of the 1966-70 plan
indicate that it too will give
greater attention to the
consumer.
In language reminiscent
of Khrushchev's last major
speech, Kosygin said that heavy
industry is able to produce
considerably more capital
equipment for agriculture,
light industry, and consumer
services because it now is
satisfying the priority needs
of economic development and de-
fense? Projected increases in
both cash and real income are
accompanied by planned signifi-
cant rises in consumer goods
and services and in the promise
of a record year in housing
construction to reverse the de-
cline in annual additions
since 1960.
This shift is reflected
also in the narrowing of the
gap between rates of increase
in production of consumer and
capital goods. Heavy industrial
output is scheduled to grow at
the rate claimed for this year--
8.2 percent--but production of
consumer goods will increase by
7.7 percent compared with 6.5
percent in 1964.
Kosygin's figures indicate
that in 1964 the rate of growth
of investment recovered some-
what from the 1961-63 lows. The
1965 plan calls for more recovery,
but not enough to support annual
additions to output like those
achieved in the late 1950s or
those implied by the long-term
goals approved at the 22nd
party congress in 1961.
The scheduled increase in
industrial production falls
short of the goal announced in
1963. The chemical program re-
tains the priority given it by
Khrushchev but is not expected
to meet his original goals. In
other industrial sectors pro-
jected rates of increase do not
indicate a major change of em-
phasis (see table on reverse
of this page).
The increase in appropria-
tions for agriculture is less
than had been indicated by the
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11 Dec 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SELECTED (OFFICIAL) SOVIET ECONOMIC DATA FOR 1964 AND 1965
Percentage Increases Over the Output of the Previous Year
Data for 1965 are Soviet scheduled increases over 1964 output. Data
for 1964, for the most part, are increases scheduled for 1964 and est-
imated from Soviet 1965 goals that were promulgated in 1963.
Industrial Production 7.8
Group A (Capital Goods)
Group B (Consumer Goods)
8.2
6.5
8.1
8.2
7.7
Chemical Industry 1
6.6
About 15
Fertilizer 2
8
31
Plastics & Resins 2
8.5
28
Cellulose 1
5.8
20
Paper 1
4.0
12
Electric Power
9.7
12.5
Natural Gas 2
0
11
(combined figure,
Crude Oil 7
.7
gas & of I)
Metallurgy (Steel, 4.7)
X
6.0
Machine Building &
Metal Working
Refrigerators
Housing
Freight Turnover
r GROUP 7
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d~wngroding and declassification
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1964-65 plan,suggesting that the
regime expects its easing of re-
strictions on private agriculture
to make up some of the differ-
ence, especially in animal hus-
bandry. Long-term agricultural
development was singled out as
"a task of paramount importance."
The regime expects investment
and other measures to overcome
"completely" the lag in agri-
cultural production by 1970.
The reauction in specified
defense expenditures of 500
million rubles makes the ex-
plicit military budget equal to
12.9 percent of all government
expenditures. This year, when
planned military spending had
been cut by 600 million rubles,
the military allocation was
14.5 percent of the total budget.
Actual military appropria-
tions, however, do not necessar-
ily follow even the trend of
admitted outlays for defense,
and are probably partly concealed
in such categories as appropri-
ations for science. In 1963 it
was stated that allocations to
science in 1965 would increase
slightly over 1964--5.4 billion
rubles compared with 5.2 bil-
lion rubles. There has been
no final figure in the available
summaries.
Kosygin's brief remarks
on the future administration of
the economy may prove to be the
most significant at this ses-
sion of the Supreme Soviet. He
proposed the eventual replace-
ment of centralized control with
a system based on consumer con-
tracts in all branches of the
economy. He also supported in
strong terms some of the propos-
als for liberalizing the economy
that Soviet economists have
been discussing over the last
several years.
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EAST GERMANY REVIEWS ECONOMIC AND
The image which East German
leaders sought to convey during
their party's first publicized
conclave since Khrushchev's
ouster was one of confidence
and stability. The published
reports of the seventh plenum
of the party central committee
last week indicate that the meet-
ing was :preceded by a sober stock-
taking; indeed, politburo mem-
ber Erich Honecker made use of
a public opinion poll, East Ger-
many's first, to support his de-
mand for effective party agita-
tion at the precinct level. Few
of the speakers attempted to
gloss over the regime's chronic
weaknesses. Their tone was mode-
rate, relatively realistic, and
free of the stridency which so
often is the hallmark of East
German party pronouncements.
Only one speaker, ideolo-
gist Kurt Hager, alluded to the
sixth central committee plenum,
held in secret, presumably some-
time in October, to deal with
the thorny issue of Khrushchev's
ouster. That plenum had been
scheduled for 4 October, the eve
of the 15th anniversary of the
founding: of the "German Demo-
cratic Republic," but apparently
was not held as planned.
The seventh plenum approved
further experimentation with the
"new" system of economic plan-
ning and management introduced
early last year. Experiments
with this system, which gives
industrial managers more author-
ity in fulfilling their assigned
quotas, are already in operation
to some extent in most enter-
prises. Alfred Neumann, chief
of the economic council, pro-
vided no figures on the fulfill-
ment of the 1964 plan or details
of the 1965 plan. He called for
additional price reforms and
further management incentives
and stressed the need to improve
the quality of manufactured goods
and to increase the use of the
latest technology.
For the post-Khrushchev pe-
riod, the regime laid down a
conservative program. It ruled
out the adoption of practices--
possibly multiple election lists
--which, in the words of one
speaker, would mean a reversion
to the outworn habits of "bour-
geois democracy" and reaffirmed
"democratic centralism" over a
"one-sided emphasis" on decen-
tralization of political author-
ity. East German intellectuals
were put on notice that the party
leadership has no intention of
watering down its cultural poli-
cies at the behest of "revision-
ists" in or out of the bloc and
that "bourgeois decadence and
abstractionism" will not be tol-
erated.
Most of the speakers can-
didly admitted that the regime
lacks the effective support of
the East German populace, par-
ticularly insofar as its poli-
cies toward West Germany are
concerned. The plenum called
for a pervasive indoctrination
campaign which presumably will
make use of its new found public
opinion takers.
As expected, the bulk of
the remarks on foreign policy
were directed at the Federal
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Republic--particularly at the
recent pre-electoral statements
by both Christian Democrats and
Socialists in favor of the MLF
and of a "policy of movement" to-
ward the bloc. There was no
threat, however, as there had
been a month earlier in the Volks-
kammer, of a bloc countermove
to MLF. Also lacking were ref-
erences to the need for separate
German peace treaties and set-
tlement thereby of the "West Ber-
lin situation." Walter Ulbricht
reacted strongly to Western spec-
ulation about a renewed four-
power role in Germany, indist-
ing that reunification can be
negotiated only by the Germans
themselves, and must await the
overthrow of the "monopolist-
capitalist government in West
Germany.
Although the plenum clearly
indicated that Ulbricht is firmly
in control, despite pretensions to-
ward "collectivity," it threw some
doubt on the status of the rest of
the leadership. Premier and pol-
itburo member Willi Stoph, who ac-
ceded to the premiership in Sep-
tember and has been touted as a
likely successor to Ulbricht as
first secretary, seems to have
taken no part in the proceedings.
When referring to the delegation
which Ulbricht and Stoph led
jointly to the Soviet anniversary
in November, the politburo report
mentioned only the role of U1-
bricht.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND USSR ISSUE CAUTIOUS COMMUNIQUE
A modus vivendi governing
future Czechoslovak-Soviet re-
lations seems to have been
worked out during Antonin No-
votny 'svisit to Moscow last week.
A cautiously worded communi-
que signed on 3 December reflects
continuing close relations as
the basis of policy. The Czech
delegation endorsed all major as-
pects of Soviet foreign policy,
while the USSR took cognizance
of Czechoslovak needs and de-
sires. Interparty relations
were characterized by the phrase
"full unity of views," but the
next sentence emphasized the
"great importance of reciprocal
exchange of experience." The
USSR promised that its future
actions would be guided by rec-
ognition of "complete equality
of rights, strengthening of na-
tional sovereignty... and com-
bining the interests of the com-
monwealth with the interests of
the peoples of each country....
The communique stated that
the new Soviet leaders are bas-
ing their policies on the 21st,
as well as the 20th and 22nd So-
viet party congresses. The
Czechs subtly disassociated them-
selves from this reference to
the 21st congress, which attacked
"revisionism," probably because
they feared that full endorse-
ment might detract from their
newly closer relations with Yugo-
slavia.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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creased supply of Soviet raw
materials. Forty percent of
Czech trade is with the USSR,
which supplies a large part of
The Czechoslovaks appar-
ently sought and received So-
viet agreement to new economic
arrangements affecting indus-
trial cooperation and an in-
necessary raw materials.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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The Communist World
PEIPING SEEKS CLOSER TIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Foreign Minister Chen Yi's
recent meetings with government
leaders in Cambodia, Indonesia,
and Burma are part of a Chinese
Communist campaign to gain in-
fluence through more frequent
high-level political contacts
abroad.
Chen arrived in Phnom Penh
on 8 November to take part in
Cambodian National Day festivi-
ties. Public statements during
the five-day visit reaffirmed
Peiping's previous vague prom-
ises of support in the event of
US "aggression," reflecting ef-
forts to encourage Sihanouk in
his anti-Western stand. Pri-
vate talks probably included the
recognition of the present Cam-
bodian--Vietnamese frontier by
the Vietnamese Communists, a sub-
ject over which Sihanouk has be-
come increasingly concerned.
It seems likely that Chen
sought to smooth over the bor-
der issue. His visit, however,
failed to forestall further Cam-
bodian demands, and the Chinese
now appear to be playing a media-
tory role. Preparatory talks on
the border question started in
Peiping about 4 December.
Chen traveled to Indonesia
just two weeks after his return
from Phnom Penh. He spent seven
days in Djakarta discussing ques-
tions of joint strategy with Su-
karno and other leaders.
Chen apparently won a com-
mitment for more active Indone-
sian help in efforts to exclude
the Soviet Union from the Afro-
Asian conference scheduled to
be held in Algiers next March
and a promise that Djakarta would
urge other Afro-Asian states to
back Peiping's claim to the Chi-
nese seat in the UN. The Chi-
nese may have offered to help
Djakarta establish additional
diplomatic posts in Africa. The
US Embassy in Indonesia reports
signs of a major effort to set
On his way home, Chen stopped
in Rangoon on 3 December for a
three-day visit.
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CHINESE COMMUNIST 1964 ECONOMIC
AID PROGRAM
Amount Extended
in million U S dollars
AFGHANISTAN
CAMBODIA
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
CEYLON
CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)
GHANA
KENYA
MALI
PAKI STAN
TANZANIA
YEMEN
28
Unknown
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COMMUNIST CHINA'S 1964 FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS
Communist China has made
commitments for a record $244
million in economic aid to free
world countries so far this
year (see chart on facing page).
Most of these have gone to
Africa and the Middle East,
where aid has been part of Pei-
ping's diplomatic offensive.
The actual use of these credits
--like those provided earlier--
is likely to be very slow.
China has just offered a
long-term $28-million credit to
Afghanistan and $10 million in
credit: and grant to Mali for
economic development projects.
Earlier this year, China gave
a $28--million credit to Yemen
and about $115 million worth
of aid to a number of African
countries. In,addition, Chi-
nese economic aid has been ru-
mored in the works for the UAR,
Burundi, Dahomey, and the Su-
dan. Last year, all of Pei-
ping's $90 million in economic
aid to non-Communist countries
was given in Africa and the
Middle East.
In past years, Peiping
had focused its attention--and
its economic aid--on the Far
East; the recent shift reflects
in part its backlog of aid com-
mitments in Asia as well as its
wider diplomatic interests.
Thus far in 1964, Chinese eco-
nomic aid offers outside Africa
and the Middle East total $65
to $70 million. A Pakistani
mission is currently in Peiping
discussing a $60-million credit
extended in July. China has
also offered a small credit to
Cambodia for imports of textile
and cement-making equipment, and
$4 million to Ceylon to finance
imports of Chinese machinery and
equipment. Prior to this year,
the most recent offers to non-
Communist Asian nations were in
1962 when Peiping extended a
total of $15 million in credits
to Laos and Ceylon.
China has also slowed down
its economic aid to other Commu-
nist countries. Even though
past assistance to North Korea,
North Vietnam, Mongolia, Albania,
Hungary, and Cuba accounts for
about two thirds of China's $2
billion in aid extended since
1953, Peiping has given only
$150 million in aid to other
Communist countries--Albania
and Cuba--since 1961. Peiping
is not known to have extended
any additional aid to other Com-
munist countries this year.
Chinese economic aid proj-
ects in other Communist countries
generally appear to be imple-
mented according to schedule,
but drawings by free world coun-
tries have been slow, primarily
because of delays originating
in the recipient countries. Over
60 percent of China's aid to
other Communist countries is es-
timated to have been utilized,
compared with only about 15 per-
cent of that to the free world.
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The tempo of the fighting
in South Vietnam picked up this
week as the Viet Cong undertook
several battalion- or company-
size attacks against various
targets, including two district
headquarters. A somewhat inten-
sified Communist military effort
between now and the year's end
would be consistent with the
past seasonal pattern.
Government forces have
scored several tactical victo-
ries over the Viet Cong. These
engagements, such as a combined
ground/airborne attack last wee&
end against a Communist concen-
tration south of Saigon, have
inflicted heavy losses on the
insurgents.
On the political front
Premier Huong's position appears
to have been momentarily strength-
ened by the absence of new agi-
tation in Saigon, relative cau-
tion on the part of Buddhist
leaders, and a new pledge of
support from armed forces com-
manders. Huong is reportedly
being urged by some members of
the High National Council to
consider making some cabinet
changes before a concerted Bud-
dhist antigovernment campaign
develops, but he appears disin-
clined to make concessions under
pressure.
Amid reported preparations
by Buddhist elements in central
Vietnam to stage demonstrations,
influential monk Tri Quang re-
turned from Hue to Saigon to
plan his strategy with other
leaders of the hierarchy. Quang
declares himself firmly opposed
to Huong's continuing as premier.
He reportedly envisages that
the clergy will initially apply
pressure to depose Huong by legal
means, holding in reserve the
threat of mass popular action.
The hierarchy's hesitation to
launch a public campaign could
indicate internal weaknesses or
fear of a harsh military response.
Despite the pledge of mili-
tary support for the government,
however, signs of dissatisfac-
tion with armed forces chief Gen-
eral Khanh persist among some
of the "young Turk" generals.
They suspect Khanh of still har-
boring political ambitions.
Their reported moves to force
him into a strong pro-Huong com-
mitment, to curb his authority
for independent military deci-
sions, and to retire some top
staff officers may precipitate
a new military shake-up.
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Prime Minister Bandaranaike
of Ceylon has ordered the dissolu-
tion of Parliament and has sched-
uled parliamentary elections for
next March :following her govern-
ment's defeat in last week's
confidence vote.
The government fell when 13
members of Mrs. Bandaranaike's Sri
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) joined
the opposition in voting for the
no-confidence motion. The defec-
tion climaxed a period of mounting
dissatisfaction over the inclusion
in the cabinet of three leaders of
the island's largest Marxist party.
The government has also been under
heavy fire over its ineffectual
economic policies and its efforts
to introduce press control measures.
Mrs. Bandaranaike now faces
the monumental task of patching up
her dilapidated party and prodding
it through an election campaign.
Leopoldville now holds the
military initiative in the Congo-
lese rebellion, and resistance
around Stan:leyville has crumbled.
Rebels are still fighting strongly
in many areas, however, and have
retaken several lightly garrisoned
towns. They now have received some
large-scale arms shipments from
radical African states, backed by
the Soviets. These states may also
be sending in some military per-
sonnel, which could restore the
advantage to the rebels.
SLFP strength has been sapped by
defections and its organization
is in apparent decay in many parts
of the country. The prime minister
probably will negotiate a no-con-
test agreement with her coalition
partners and with the pro-Moscow
Communist Party similar to the pact
under which the three parties con-
tested the 1960 elections. Even
with their support, her chances of
winning a parliamentary majority
now appear slim.
Formidable opposition is
likely to come from the more con-
servative United National Party
(UNP), which has recorded signifi-
cant gains in local elections over
the past two years--largely at the
expense of the SLFP. The UNP prob-
ably will be aided by the SLFP
defectors, by the non-Marxist press,
and by a growing number of Buddhist
leaders who feel that the principles
isters .
of Ceylon's Buddhist majority have
been cast aside by the Marxist min-
In the first five days of
December, at least 16 planeloads of
supplies, most of them apparently
from Egypt and Algeria, were flown
to Khartoum, and thence to Juba in
southern Sudan to be loaded into
Sudanese trucks for transit into
the Congo. Most of the aircraft
almost certainly were Egyptian,
although Cairo attempted to dis-
guise them by using Algerian and
Ghanaian markings.
Moscow apparently agreed to
back Egypt and other radical African
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corgi to press repor s, the
USSR will also pay part of the
costs of the airlift. Moscow
will probably avoid any direct
military commitment to the reb-
els, however,
It is doubtful that weapons
alone can bail out the insurgents,
who have always been fairly well
armed. In the early stages of
the rebellion they are estimated
to have captured at least 10,000
rifles. Their ammunition supply,
mostly seized from the govern-
ment, has been adequate.
However, foreign "volun-
teers," who could tip the mili-
tary balance to the rebels'
favor, may be on their way to
the Congo. A German Embassy of-
ficial in the Sudan says that
early this month he saw 40 sol-
dier-like Algerians in civilian
clothes at the Xhartoum airport.
Ghanaians--probably less effec-
tive than Algerians--may go as
As African excitement over
the Stanleyville-Paulis rescue
operation subsided following
the withdrawal of the Belgian
paratroops, differences over the
proper role of the Organization
for African Unity (OAU) in the
Congo re-emerged. This split is
likely to be intensified by the
radicals' stepped-up pro grain of
assistance to the Congolese
rebels.
Haile Selassie's call for
a special heads-of-state meet-
ing--proposed for 18 recember in
Addis Ababa--has evoked little
enthusiasm. Several moderate
countries, including Nigeria
and Senegal, have flatly opposed
the idea as constituting undue
intervention in the Congo's in-
ternal affairs, while Ghana evi-
dently views such a meeting as
a possible hindrance to supplying
direct aid to the rebels. Any
general OAU meeting convened on
the Congo in the near future now
appears more likely to be held
by the foreign ministers than
by heads of government.
Meanwhile, a financial dis-
pute between Premier Tshomb6 and
Brussels could affect the future
of Belgium's assistance program
to Leopoldville. A Congolese de-
cree of 29 November in effect re-
voked Belgian mining concessions
and demanded the surrender of
colonial Congo government finan-
cial holdings still held by Bel-
gium. Brussels claims that the
decree repudiates an agreement
made last March by then Premier
Adoula and Foreign Minister Spaak.
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Dissidence by Negroid peo-
ples in southern Sudan, which
led indirectly to the overthrow
of President Abboud's military
regime in late October, has be-
come a major issue for the
delicately balanced civilian
government that took over.
The first serious outbreak
of racial violence in the Arab
north occurred this week as
riots broke out in Khartoum be-
tween southerners and Arabs.
A demonstration by southerners--
who number about 30,000 in the
capital area--urging autonomy
for the southern provinces took
a, violent turn and provoked
Arab counterattacks. At least
40 people were killed and hun-
dreds wounded.
The rioting has obviously
frightened the month-old govern-
ment. All demonstrations and
political rallies have been
banned, and a, committee of
Negroes was dispatched to the
southern provinces in an at-
tempt to head off similar dis-
turbances there. Official
statements now attribute the
riots to "imperialist designs."
Although the new regime
came into office pledging im-
Government is under considerable
political pressure to keep down
the costs of its Congo opera-
tions.
mediate steps to solve the
long-standing question of south-
ern constitutional status, no
talks have yet been held. The
southern leadership is divided
between a "Southern Intellec-
tua.l Front" in Khartoum and
the leaders of the Sudan Afri-
can National Union who directed
the year-long terrorist cam-
paign against the military re-
gime. This latter group has
not yet returned to the Sudan
from exile, mainly in Uganda..
Southern spokesmen have
refused to pledge any support
to the Congolese rebels. Never-
theless the government's fear
that the Congolese and Sudanese
rebel movements might cooperate
was probably a. factor in its
own decision to aid the Congo-
lese rebel regime.
The Communists are likely
to inflame Sudanese racial ten-
sions further in the hope of
delaying the elections now sched-
uled for April. Despite their
foothold in the cabinet, they
do not yet have the nationwide
strength to compete successfully
in elections with the moderate
and conservative brotherhoods.
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RADICAL BRAZZAVILLE REGIME STIFLING DOMESTIC OPPOSITION
The regime in the Brazza.-
ville Congo is encouraging a
campaign of violence against
domestic elements opposed to
its rapid swing to the left.
There are also signs that the
few remaining nonextremists
may soon be purged from the
cabinet.
Last month extremists,
probably under the direction
of politburo member Julien Bu-
kambou, launched an all-out at-
tack against various Catholic
elements which by virtue of
numbers and organization prob-
ably constitute the most influ-
ential single grouping in the
country. For some time Catholic
spokesmen had a.tta.cked the left-
ward trend through two important
newspapers and through the Cath-
olic la.bor federation (CATC)
and youth movement, both of
which have resisted incorpora-
tion into monolithic national
organizations subordinated to
the Congo's single political
party.
Since late November, the
leader of the CATC has been ar-
rested, his weekly news organ
silenced, and at least two CATC
local headquarters sacked by
bands of the regime's unruly
youth orga.niza.tion. The editor
of another influential Catholic
weekly has also been arrested
and reportedly tortured. The
crackdown has included the re-
cent expulsion of two French
to oust the regime.
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priests and three French Catho-
lic lay workers--the first sig-
nificant.reprisals against
French nationals.
Within the government it-
self the regime recently beat
down criticism in the National
Assembly simply by removing the
parlia.menta.ry immunity of the
deputies in question. The ex-
tremists now reportedly pla.n to
weed out remaining moderate and
underzealous ministers. Some
reports indicate that even Prime
Minister Lissouba., a Marxist,
will be ousted because he now
is considered "too moderate."
The shift to the left may
soon have significant repercus-
sions in the economic sphere.
The economic impa.ct of the with-
dra.wa.l of French troops--sched-
uled to be completed by 31 De-
cember--will begin to be felt
early next year. The regime
will proba.bly then turn to radi-
cal solutions--such as estab-
lishing an independent currency
--having the effect of disrupt-
ing basic ties to the West.
Despite their apparent grip
on the country, the extremists
still seem to lack both cohesive-
ness and self-confidence. Their
feeling of insecurity was evi-
denced recently when a. planned
public protest a.ga.inst the Stan-
leyville paradrop was postponed,
reportedly because they feared
an attempt by the CATC to turn
the demonstrations into a. move
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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YEMENI ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS FOUNDERING
The cease-fire declared in
Yemen on 8 November is nearing
a breakdown, and the scheduled
armistice talks have been post-
poned indefinitely. Deep-seated
disagreement between the two
sponsors of the proposea peace
conference, Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, and misunderstandings
over details have caused the
present impasse.
The meeting between Egyp-
tian President Nasir and Saudi
King Faysal in September brought
only a cautious announcement
that agreement had been reached
on ending the two-year-old con-
flict. From the start, Nasir
was adamant on retaining the
name and form of the present
Yemeni republican government,
while allowing that the composi-
tion might be changed. Saudi.
Arabia has demanded only that
the new government be accept-
able to a conference of repub-
lican and royalist Yemenis.
In late October the Yemenis
agreed that a cease-fire would
go into effect and that a na-
tionalarmistice conference
would be held on 23 November.
This proposed meeting was to
"lay the foundation for solv-
ing present differences by peace-
ful means." Egypt and Saudi
Arabia acted with unusual alac-
rity to set up joint observer
teams and attempted to enforce
the cease-fire. Delegations were
appointed on both sides and
were ready to leave for the
site, when the sponsoring par-
ties stalled over the composi-
tion of the delegations, as
well as over the future of the
Imamate and the Yemeni royal
family. The conference was in-
itially postponed to 1 December
and then indefinitely.
The delay has given time
for factions within both camps
to maneuver and intrigue. At
least one royalist group never
stopped fighting during the
cease-fire and has regained much
territory in the north. The
republican government has dis-
missed and arrested several
cabinet ministers. In addition,
the religious sect dominant in
the south has been edging away
from loyalty to the republican
regime.
Both Nasir and Faysal still
want to end the war. However,
their controls over the Yemenis
have been loosened to the point
where it may no longer be possi-
ble to bring enough Yemenis to-
gether to settle anything.
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Several proposals for steps
toward European political union
are now under consideration in
the EEC countries in preparation
for further talks which could
begin early next year. Although
the plans strongly endorse eco-
nomic integration within the
Common Market, they only hint
at the goal of a federated Eu-
rope. By making major conces-
sions to De Gaulle's views on
political cooperation, they seem
to mark further movement toward
a consensus on a "feasible" Eu-
ropean organization. It never-
theless remains doubtful that
early agreement is in sight,
principally because of the un-
resolved question of what role
a European organization would
plan in Atlantic defense.
By emphasizing "consulta-
tive" procedures and loose or-
ganizational ties, all of the
plans come very close to Gaul-
list positions expressed in the
1961-62 talks on political union.
The most obvious element of su-
pranationalism remaining is in
Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak's
idea for a three-man commission
of independent "wise men" who
would propose union plans. In
the plan advanced by Bonn in
November, the commission con-
cept is even more vague, and
the recently announced Italian
proposal explicitly refers to
the members of the "political
commission" as "government rep-
resentatives." While this trim-
ming away at federalism is evi-
dently finding some favor with
Paris, the vestigial suprana-
tionalism in these proposals
could still provide De Gaulle
with an excuse to be negative.
With regard to the British
role, there has been a marked
evolution in the attitudes of
the Six, with only the Dutch
now holding out for UK inclusion
in any talks from the beginning.
Nevertheless, there have been
no indications from London that
the Labor government intends to
abandon British pursuit of that
objective.
Although the plans all fore-
see including defense as a mat-
ter of discussion, there is a
general feeling of caution be-
cause of the use which France
might try to make of such an op-
portunity. French Premier Pom-
pidou noted recently that the
"prior existence of a political
Europe" was necessary before any
"European" defense force solu-
tions could be considered. West
German Foreign Minister Schroeder,
possibly with this hint in mind,
has expressed concern that meet-
ings of foreign ministers to
discuss political union could,
in fact, serve to undermine the
MLF.
Despite Schroeder's caution,
Chancellor Erhard's prestige is
already committed to pressing
Bonn's own initiative on polit-
ical union. In a talk last week
Erhard stated that it now would
be possible to get on with the
discussions about a European
union in light of the "friendlier
tones" being heard from France
because of the agreement in
principle on unified grain prices.
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PARTY COMPOSITION OF THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT
SOCIALISTS
(PSI)
SOCIAL
DEMOCRATS
(PSDI)
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS
(CD)
LIBERALS
19 (PLO
JEO-FASCISTS
(MSI)
MONARCHISTS
(PDIUM)
NEO-FASCISTS
(MSI)
2 MONARCHISTS
(PDIUM)
'The Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) was created on 12 January 1964 as a result of a
split in the PSI. PSIUP parliamentarians, before the split, represented much of the pro-Communist left wing
of the PSI. In some respects, PSIUP's positions on political issues would place it to the left of the PCI.
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The election of a. succes-
sor to Italian President Antonio
Segni, who resigned on 6 Decem-
ber, appears certain to increase
strains within and among the
center--left coalition parties.
The coalition seems unable to
agree on a. candidate and, as a
result, the race is wide open.
The two houses of Parlia-
ment, along with 13 represent-
atives from the five semiauton-
omous regions, will meet in
joint session on 16 December.
A two-thirds majority is re-
quired on the first three bal-
lots and an absolute majority
thereafter.
On paper, the four center-
left coalition parties have
enough votes to elect a new
president after the third bal-
lot, but party discipline is
ineffective in a. secret ballot.
The Christian Democrats will
insist that the president come
from among their members, but
they apparently have not been
able to agree on who it should
be. The other coalition part-
ners will probably initially
support; Foreign Minister Giuseppe
Saraga.t, leader of the Social
Democratic Party (PSDI), whose
prospects do not appear bright.
As in the past, the opposi-
tion parties, and particularly
the disciplined Communists, will
try to break up the coalition
by their voting tactics. Their
efforts may be particularly dis-
ruptive in this instance, when
the coalition is rent by differ-
ences over the lack of progress
on its reform program.
There are five leading con-
tenders besides Sa.raga.t, four
of whom are Christian Democrats.
The current front-runner appears
to be ex-Premier Amintore Fan-
fani (56). He is a principal
founder of the center-left pol-
icy but in recent months has
alienated many of his former
admirers in the political left
as a. result of tactical moves
aimed at gaining support from
both the Communists and from the
conservative right. Fanfa.ni is
also still opposed by many in
his own party because of past
political moves.
Other CD candidates are
Interior Minister Paolo Tavia.ni
(52), Giovanni Leone (55), a.
former premier and long-time
president of the Chamber of
Deputies, and Senator Attilio
Piccioni (72), president of the
CD National Council. Either
Leone or Piccioni, as the least
controversial personalities,
might be designated by the CD
as its "official" candidate or
be offered a.s a compromise can-
didate if a. deadlock develops.
Also in the running is act-
ing President Cesare Merza.gora.
(66), who although technically
an "independent," was elected
to the Senate on the CD ticket
and was that party's official
choice for president in 1955.
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Western Hemisphere
OUSTER OF CUBAN LABOR MINISTER
The ouster of Labor Min-
ister Augusto Martinez Sanchez,
which apparently led him to
attempt suicide on 8 December,
occurred at a time of rumored
high political tensions among
elements of the Cuban leader-
ship. Nevertheless, his ouster
may have been only indirectly
a. result of such tensions.
The immediate cause may well
have been, as the regime an-
nounced, his "grave a.dminis-
trative errors" in managing
the ministry. One of the most
basic of the economic problems
now plaguing the regime is low
labor productivity, to which
Castro himself has recently been
devoting considerable attention
in his public speeches.
It has not been uncommon
in recent months for high regime
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11'Dec 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
officials to be dismissed for
incompetence or inefficiency.
The ministers of economy and
foreign trade suffered this
fate last summer when the regime
came to recognize the severe
foreign exchange problems it
faces. Martinez Sanchez, who
had been labor minister since
1959, is the logical whipping
boy in the labor sphere. His
dismissal probably presages a.
new effort to increase produc-
tivity.
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Western Hemisphere
The Bolivian junta, has set
30 May 1965 as election day and
6 August for the new govern-
ment's assumption of office.
A new electoral statute will be
drawn up.
Political activity, now
confined primarily to smoke-
filled rooms, will soon move
into the open, and electoral
alliances currently under dis-
cussion will take form rapidly.
The early election date would
appear to favor ex - Vice Presi-
dent Juan Lechin and the far
left.
In many areas of the coun-
try lawlessness still prevails.
For example, military units were
forced to intervene in an armed
battle between rival peasant
leaders near Cocha.ba.mba. recently,
and the junta, has no more author-
ity in the mining region than
did the Paz regime. FSB extrem-
ists reportedly wa.nt to wrest
political control of Santa Cruz
Department from Luis Sandoval
Moron, whose private militia,
however, stands in the way. The
murder of a. Falangist by Moron
henchmen has raised tensions
there to the brink of open war-
fare.
REACTION TO PERON'S ATTEMPTED RETURN TO ARGENTINA
Reaction among Juan Peron's
followers to his abortive at-
tempt to return to Argentina
has thus far been mixed. Some
Peronists claim that by making
the attempt, he has fulfilled
his pledge to return before the
end of the year. Others have
expressed consternation and dis-
appointment at Peron's perform-
ance. Peron himself may have
wished to fail.
There will probably be some
shifts in Peronist leadership
as a, result of the incident.
The prestige of leaders who
waged a campaign over the past
yea.r to force the government to
grant legal recognition to a.
Peron-directed party and to
create conditions suitable for
Peron's return may be consider-
ably reduced. More of these,
with or without instructions
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from Peron, now may seek to
rely entirely on subversive
methods to accomplish their
objectives.
Those leaders most strongly
supporting Peron's return have
expressed the unanimous opinion
that Peron now will reactivate
his "hard line,"
dicted a "revolutionary" veer
to the left but were uncertain
whether it would be so in name
as well as in purpose.
The neo-Peronists who did
not support Peron's return will
probably find both the govern-
ment and the electorate more
sympathetic to their efforts
to achieve political participa-
tion by legal means.
The apparent absence of
forewarning of Peron's trip and
the Brazilian Government's swift
action forcing his return to
Spain reduced the threat of any
major clash between Peronists
and security forces. Minor
demonstrations occurred in Buenos
Aires and a few provincial cities,
but police were able to control
them without serious violence.
Peronist labor leaders were
reportedly vexed at the govern-
ment's failure to act forcibly
against the Peronists and thus
to provide them with an excuse
for militant action. Security
measures put in force on 2 De-
cember continue in effect.
Sharp differences are re-
ported to exist in the Spanish
cabinet regarding a renewal of
Peron's stay in Spain, but a
decision is expected at a meet- 25X1
ing set for 11 December. Span-
ish authorities reportedly in-
tend to make any new exile privi-
leges contingent upon the termi-
nation of Peron's political ac-
tivity, including receiving
visitors from Argentina.
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