NIGERIA'S NATIONAL ELECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004700060003-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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IS December 1964
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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Federal parliamentary elections to be held in
Nigeria on 30 December will mark the beginning of
a critical period for Africa's most populous coun-
try. At stake in the balloting, and even more in
the political maneuvering certain to follow, is the
relatively broad-based governing coalition of ma-
jor regional forces which has been the foundation
of Nigeria's stability since it gained independence
in 1960.
That coalition, which has combined the con-
servative Muslim leaders of the politically domi-
nant north with the largest and most dynamic party
of the more progressive south, is threatened by a
recent realignment of political forces. For the
election, the two coalition partners are arrayed
against each other as leaders of rival national al-
liances which both reflect and further aggravate
the federation's basic north-south cleavage.
Should the realignment hold up after the elec-
tion--as the leader of the favored northern-based
alliance insists it will--Nigeria's new government
will be appreciably more narrowly uased than its
predecessor. Such a development would greatly im-
pair its capacity to cope with new strains and ten-
sions looming on the economic front as well as the
inevitable periodic crises which arise from Nigeria's
tremendous regional and tribal diversity.
The Structure of Politics
Nigerian politics are still
overwhelmingly regional, and each
major political disagreement
threatens to develop into a cri-
sis which could split the coun-
try back into the basic tribal
components from which the British
colonial administrators put it
together some fifty years ago.
Even the government's census
figures are the subject of bit-
ter controversy, since they are
used as the basis for assignment
of parliamentary seats and
thereby weight the political
balance toward one tribal group
or another.
Thus the country's major
political parties essentially
express the fears and ambitions
of and concern themselves al-
most exclusively with the in-
terests of Nigeria's three
largest tribal groupings--the
Fulani-Hausa, the Ibo, and the
Yoruba. The situation is
further complicated by the fact
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Kaduna
Bauchi,
N O R T fns, H E R N
Minna (167) Tafawa Balewa
ALLOCATION OF THE 312 SEATS
IN FEDERAL PARLIAMENT
ON BASIS OF 1963 CENSUS
(157 seats needed for majority)
Major tribal groups shown in green. The
intermingling of the Fulani with other
tribes precludes their delineation as a
separate culture area.
that the Fulani-Hausa are Mus-
lim, with a relatively rigid,
strongly traditionalist social
structure. The Ibo and Yoruba,
despite considerable differences
have in common a relatively
early contact with European edu-
cation and commerce. The Fu-
lani-Hausa dominate northern Ni-
geria, the Ibo the eastern part
of the south, and the Yoruba the
western section of the south.
These areas became the three
original regions of Nigeria,
and a fourth, the midwestern,
was carved out of the Western
Region in 1963 mainly because
its creation served the politi-
cal ends of the Northern and
Eastern regions. Each of the
four regions is alloted a spe-
cific nu"iber of seats in the
federal Parliament on the basis
of its population; Lagos, the
federal capital, elects four ad-
ditional representatives (see
map).
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The Muslim north has been
and remains the most populous
section of the country; this
situation was confirmed by the
census of 1963, the results of
which have been grudgingly ac-
cepted after an intense legal
and political struggle. The
Fulani--Hausa party, the Northern
People's Congress (NPC), has
thus been the largest in Parlia-
ment, and the Northern Region
alone has more than half the
seats. The next most important
party is the National Conven-
tion of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC),
which represents the Ibo, al-
though it originated as an at-
tempt to form a national Nige-
rian party and its leaders still
espouse the ideal of a nation-
wide political organization. The
NCNC has much more the flavor
of a "progressive" African na-
tionalist party than does the
NPC, which is controlled by Mus-
lim aristocrats who have oper-
ated more or less openly through
the traditional devices of so-
cial and, if necessary, physical
compulsion.
For the past five years,
the NPC and the NCNC have main-
tained an uneasy alliance to
divide the positions in the fed-
eral government between them
and to govern the country.
Nnamdi Azikiwe, a founder of
the NCNC, has been president,
a largely ceremonial position
but one with significant psy-
chological influence, while Sir
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa--repre-
senting NPC "boss" Sir Ahmadu
Bello, Sardauna (traditional
ruler) of Sokoto and the North-
ern Region's premier--has been
Nigeria's prime minister. This
arrangment has frozen out the
third major party, the Action
Group (AG) of the Yoruba tribe.
The effect of this on turbulent
Yoruba politicians led to a
party split two years ago. A
basically traditionalist ele-
ment, now called the Nigerian
National Democratic Party
(NNDP) broke off; it controls
the Western Region government.
The parent AG now is almost
exclusively modernist and vehe-
mently anti-North.
Only three minor parties
have any electoral significance.
The Northern. Elements Progres-
sive Union is composed of Mus-
lims who advocate reform and
democratization of Northern po-
litical institutions; it has
long been allied with the NCNC.
The United Middle Belt Congress,
another Northern group, rep-
resents an enclave of about
a million non-Muslims called
the Tiv and is allied with the
AG. In the Midwestern Region,
a Midwest Democratic Front, un-
der the control of the NPC, op-
poses the NCNC's administration
there. Communists and pro-Com-
munists are largely attached to
two minute southern nuclei, the
Socialist Workers and Farmers
Party of Nigeria and the Nige-
rian Labor Party. The former is
reported to have received funds
from the USSR at one time, and
plans to contest some seats.
The 1959 general election,
held just before independence,
gave no party an absolute ma-
jority of the 312 seats in the
federal legislature. The NPC's
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dominant position, however, has
enabled it to attract defectors
and it has come to control a
sizable majority without its
NCNC coalition partner. Never-
theless, the NPC has not tried
to dissolve the coalition, and
the NCNC has continued to oc-
cupy almost half of the cabi-
net posts, including those of
finance and foreign affairs.
Practical administrative con-
siderations have played a role
in this, since southerners, with
their longer exposure to Euro-
pean ways, fill about 90 per-
cent of the Nigerian federal
civil service.
Realignment
A realignment among the al-
lies, however, began to take
shape early this year. Although
the NCNC remained in the govern-
ment, its national leaders, as
well as those of the AG, had be-
come increasingly frustrated
over "domination" by the North.
Southern progressives had looked
to the recent new federal cen-
sus to break the Northern Re-
gion's hold. When the results,
which were clearly exaggerated
by all regions, showed the North
as still having over half the
population, the southern pro-
gressives were intensely dis-
appointed. Court action up-
holding the announced results
finally ended the crisis, but
by that time the government co-
alition partners had become so
estranged that they were ne-
gotiating in earnest for new al-
lies.
Last June, the Ibo NCNC
and Yoruba AG announced the
formation of the United Progres-
sive Grand Alliance (UPGA), in-
cluding their respective satel-
lite parties. In August, the
Northern leaders countered by
forming the Nigerian National
Alliance (NNA). This combines
the NPC with the NNDP in the
West, with the Midwest Demo-
cratic Front, and with several
very small anti-NCNC parties
in the Eastern Region. A month
later, Prime Minister Balewa
somewhat irregularly added two
NNDP politicians to the federal
cabinet.
The NNA appears to be a
reasonably happy marriage of
traditionalist elements, whereas
considerable friction exists
between working-level elements
of the UPGA. The antagonism
between Ibo and Yoruba is ex-
ceeded only by their distaste
for the Fulani-Hausa of the
North. Initially, the leaders
of the AG and NCNC agreed that
neither party would contest a
constituency already held by
the other. However, personal
rivalries have made application
of this agreement difficult in
some localities. There has
also been haggling over other
constituencies, especially
those affected by redistricting.
The possibility thus still
exists that NCNC and AG candi-
dates will oppose each other
in some areas.
Although the outcome of
the census controversy ended
southerners' hopes that they
would make major gains through
the reallotment of parliamentary
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seats, the UPGA is waging an
extensive campaign. It has is-
sued a manifesto complete with
a "dynamic program for the first
hundred days," promises of a
"socialist society," and a strong
indictment of the present gov-
ernment's "reactionary" foreign
and domestic policies. Michael
Okpara, UPGA leader and Eastern
Region premier, is advocating
radical constitutional revisions
which would place more power at
the center, make the now largely
ceremonial Senate equal in power
to the lower house, and break up
the four regions into 25 states.
He has also implied that Nigeria
presently inclines too much to-
ward the West.
Not to be outdone, the NNA
has also issued a manifesto. Its
terms are much less positive,
but probably more realistic than
the UPGA's. It is somewhat more
reserved in its social welfare
commitments and generally ap-
peals to the interests of the
regions, promising to safeguard
their considerable "states
rights." In foreign policy the
NNA comes out in favor of "non-
alignment" but says nothing con-
trary to Nigeria's present pro-
Western policies.
Both alliances have made
their real appeal on the bread
and butter issues of tribal and
regional prejudices. The NNA
has endeavored to capitalize on
the anti-Ibo feeling of minor-
ity tribes in the east, and to
split the UPGA by charging that
its NCNC component is really
trying to build an "Ibo em-
pire." The UPGA has countered
by attacking the antidemocratic,
parochially oriented policies
of the "feudal North" in an at-
tempt to win support from the
minority northern tribes.
Despite an extended cam-
paign trip in the North by UPGA
leaders, it appears as of now
that the NPC will probably not
lose more than 10 of the 167
northern seats. This would
be sufficient to give the N?C
a bare majority. UPGA victo-
ries in the North will probably
come mainly in the dissident
Tiv area. Since last July,
serious rioting has occurred
intermittently among the Tiv,
who have long resented NPC
domination. The disturbances
became so extensive last month
that the federal government
moved an army battalion into
the area.
In the Eastern and Mid-
western regions, however, the
UPGA will probably garner some
74 of the 84 seats. It should
also sweep the four consituen-
cies in Lagos. The big ques-
tion mark is the Western Region,
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where the modernist Pction
Group leaders, out of power
since the 1962 party split,
seem to have kept their hold
on the mass of the Yoruba elec-
torate. The NNDP government is
resorting freely to intimida-
tion, bribes, and coercion, and
is rallying the Yoruba Obas
(kings) who retain considerable
influence, particularly among
the semiliterates in certain
rural areas. Five of these
traditional rulers hold cabi-
net posts in the Western Re-
gion government, Nevertheless,
assuming that the ballot boxes
are turned over to the federal
authorities reasonably intact
--not at all a certainty inas-
much as the NNDP controls the
government machinery--US ob-
servers do not expect the NNDP
to win more than 5 to 15 of the
West's 57 seats.
If these forecasts are
reasonably accurate, the North-
erners and their allies in the
NNA would come away from the
balloting with between 172 and
182 of the 312 seats, a not un-
comfortable majority.
The ballot count seems
certain to be only the begin-
ning, however, even if the
NNA wins such a majority. Each
group evidently intends to
buy over and cajole as many of
its victorious opponents as it
COALITIONS CONTESTING NIGERIA'S NATIONAL ELECTIONS
30 DECEMBER 1964
PRESENT STATUS IN
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
ELECTION PROSPECTS
(157 Seats Needed for Majority in Parliament)
Will probably win 157 of Northern Region's
167 seats
i'lorthern People's Fulani-Hausa Ahmadu Bello, Senior partner of governing
Congress (NPC) Sardauno of Sokoto coalition; controls at least
179 of 312 seats in Parliament
Nigerian National Yoruba Samuel Akintola Holds less than 10% of seal-
Democratic Party (NNDP) in Parliament
The following small southern groupings have for various local reasons joined
NNA: Midwest Democratic Front, Niger Delta Congress, Calabar Emancipation
Party; Dynamic Party, and Eastern People's Congress
Action Group (AG) Yoruba Obofemi Awolowo (im-
prisoned); acting leader
is U.S, Adegbenro
United Middle Belt Congress Tiv and other Joseph Tarka
(UMBC) minority tribes
in the North
Nigerian Elements Fulani-Hausa and Aminu Kano
Progressive Union (NEPU) minority tribes in
the North
coalition; controls about 25"',,
.d seats in Parliament
Holds less than 10% of seats
in Parliament
Holds less than 3% of seats
in Parliament
Holds less than 1% of seats
in Parliament
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Uncertain, but appears likely to win only a
small number of seats--all in the Western
Region--- in a reasonably honest ballot
tabulation
May win up to 10 of Midwestern and Eastern
Regions' seats
The NCNC and AG will probably win 74
of 84 seats allotted to Easternand Mid-
western Regions and appearlikelyto win a
large majority of Western Region's 57 seats,
assuming an honest vote count there; the
UP GA wi l l probably wi n the 4 seats in Lagos
Will probably win 7 to 9 seats in Northern
Region
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can. The NCNC reportedly has
already set aside a sizable
amount of money for this pur-
pose. However, a victorious
NNA, with the prospect of gov-
ernment jobs and contracts
available, would seem likely
to profit most from this game.
The question of whether
the present broad north-south
governing coalition will carry
on will not be decided until
the lines are actually drawn
in the legislature. On several
occasions, Ahmadu Bello has
publicly indicated that he in-
tends to form an exclusive NNA
government after the election.
A communiqud issued by the NNA
in September stated flatly that
no members of the opposition
would participate in the next
government. However, federal
Prime Minister Balewa, who is
deputy NPC leader under Bello,
has consistently advocated a
"national" government including
all major parties. In November,
Balewa appeared to be consider-
ing retiring from the political
scene, but has since affirmed
his intention to stay on. Bello
may have assured the prime min-
ister that the dominant voices
of other regions need not be
excluded totally from the next
government.
Bello's proposal to ex-
clude the UPGA, or drastically
reduce its role in the govern-
ment would not, as one might
expect, push the opposition
into tighter unity. Indeed,
it could well precipitate a
split within the NCNC, because
several of the present NCNC min-
isters are more devoted to the
perquisites of office than to
party loyalty. They would prob-
ably bolt the party rather than
become ex-ministers if that
choice is offered. Finance Min-
ister Okotie-iboh, the top NCNC
leader in the Midwestern Region,
has been particuarly careful not
to do or say anything throughout
the campaign that would antago-
nize the Northern leaders. The
ultimate danger here is that
Okotie-Eboh and most of the other
NCNC members who now are in the
federal cabinet generally rep-
resent the conservative wing of
their party, and their defec-
tion would greatly increase the
influence of more radical ele-
ments in the NCNC and in the
UPGA as a whole.
Another threat to national
unity could come from President
Azikiwe, the country's number-
one nationalist hero, who re-
signed from active leadership of
the NCNC and from active politics
to become the head of state. On
10 December, Azikiwe made a
speech which amounted to a parti-
san attack on the electoral prac-
tices of the NNA. Azikiwe's
speech will undoubtedly serve to
encourage UPGA leaders, who that
same day warned that they could
not accept the results of any
election which is not "free and
fair." Azikiwe also has publicly
vowed to return to active politics
if the NCNC is excluded from the
government. Such a move by a
man whose presence symbolically
associates the south with the
federal government would give
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the federal structure a seri-
ous psychological jolt.
one major casualty of the
situation, regardless of the
election outcome, is likely to
be External Affairs Minister
Wachuku. He managed to obtain
renomination from the NCNC, but
he will probably not be con-
tinued in the new cabinet. He
has antagonized important NCNC
elements by making outspokenly
pro-Western pronouncements and
by staying aloof from the north-
south struggle, while he has
alienated NPC leader Bello, es-
pecially by criticizing Bello's
freewheeling initiatives to de-
velop closer ties among Islamic
nations.
more radical posture and was
finally convicted of plotting
the violent overthrow of the
government.
These domestic political un-
certainties can only serve to ag-
gravate Nigeria's already seri-
ous economic problems. In addi-
tion to struggling with the coun-
try's faltering six-year develop-
ment plan, the next government
will almost certainly have to
contend with new initiatives
from the labor movement. Since
winning a significant strike vic-
tory last summer, Nigeria's trade
unionists are gradually emerging
as an important force and one
which the Northerners, including
the prime minister, have shown
a distinct inability to under-
stand or to deal with.
Longer Term Outlook
Although the formation of
a more narrowly based government
under the Northerners would
probably not be followed imme-
diately by radical or extra-
legal southern countermoves,
it will almost certainly in-
crease southern frustration and
could eventually provoke extreme
measures to break the North's
hold. Disgruntled NCNC and AG
members might well be tempted
to follow in the footsteps of
the popular AG leader Obafemi
Awolowo, who, following
party's exclusion from
his
the
na-
tional government after
the
1959
In foreign affairs, the de-
parture of Wachuku would deprive
the West of a strategically
placed friend, as almost any re-
placement is unlikely to he willing
to buck emotional African tides to
the extent Wachuku has. If his
successor is a Northerner, and
thus more directly responsive to
Bello's "Islamic League" vi-
sion, Nigeria may fall even fur-
ther out of step with the gov-
ernments of other African states
--even the moderate ones--and
suffer a further loss of influ-
ence despite its size and popula-
tion. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DIS-
SEM)
election, assumed a progressively
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