WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 8, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
SECRET
(Information as of 1200 EST, 7 January 1965)
UNITED NATIONS Page
GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN RECESS AND UN MONEY PROBLEMS REMAIN 1
There is no sign of a break in the deadlock over the
USSR's refusal to pay its arrears, and the risk of
permanent damage to the UN is increasing. Indonesia's
decision to withdraw is contributing to the malaise.
WARSAW PACT MEETING TO CONVENE ON 19 JANUARY
This will probably be a meeting of the Political Con-
sultative Committee, a forum used in the past to issue
foreign policy announcements.
RUMANIA MAY BE REDUCING COMMITMENT TO WARSAW PACT
Rumanian officials have told US representatives that
Rumania would prefer not to belong to any military bloc.
One sign of diminishing cooperation with the Soviet
bloc may be Bucharest's recent substantial reduction
in the military conscript term.
SOVIET PARTY REORGANIZATION NEARING COMPLETION
In the process of reuniting party agricultural and in-
dustrial units to undo Khrushchev's two-year bifurcation
experiment, the new Soviet leaders have gotten rid of
another of his top farm officials. Neither the original
experiment nor the current reorganization has had much
effect on the political standing of local party bosses.
SOVIET KGB BORDER GUARDS INCREASE COMBAT CAPABILITY
The problems of protecting the Sino-Soviet border area
have apparently led Moscow to strengthen KGB Border Guard
Troops by assigning them additional aircraft, particular-
ly helicopters, and establishing their own tank units.
COMMUNIST CHINA TAKES STOCK
In speeches at the annual National People's Congress
which ended on 4 January, regime spokesmen boasted of
China's growing influence and power abroad, but conceded
that its economy has not recovered from the disaster
years of 1959-61 and that considerable popular opposi-
tion to domestic policies still exists.
SECRET
8 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
SECRET
THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page
HANG][-MOSCOW RELATIONS MAY BE CHANGING 8
Hanoi has withdrawn an anti-Soviet article from its
party journal, perhaps in response to some Soviet
offer of greater support for the Viet Cong.
ASIA-AFRICA
COMMUNISTS MAKE FURTHER GAINS IN INDONESIA 9
Drastic steps are being taken against those involved
in the abortive anti-Communist "Sukarnoist" movement
and Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN would further
remove Sukarno from moderating influences.
CIVILIAN-MILITARY COMPROMISE SOUGHT IN SOUTH VIETNAM 10
An arrangement that would accept the military's fait
accompli in disbanding the High National Council ap-
pears likely. At Binh Gia the Viet Cong have shown
more willingness than previously to engage government
forces for a sustained period.
LAOTIAN RIGHTISTS RESUME SQUABBLING 11
Factions led by Generals Siho and Kouprasith are eye-
ing each other with suspicion, and Deputy Premier Phoumi
Nosavan has tried to exploit their dispute to regain his
control of the rightist military command.
NEW DELHI CRACKS DOWN ON PRO-PEIPING INDIAN COMMUNISTS 13
The arrest of more than 700 members of the so-called
"Left" Communist Party of India will hobble that group's
efforts to compete for the allegiance of the country's
Communists and to operate as an overt party.
25X1
NEW POWER GROUP TAKES OVER SYRIAN MILITARY REGIME
Given the uncertain loyalties of key army units, how-
ever, this extreme leftist clique may soon face serious
problems in maintaining its position.
SECRET
8 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
SECRET
ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
IMPROVED SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS
The new Soviet leadership has moved to exploit US-
Egyptian policy differences and to assure Nasir that
its policies follow those of Khrushchev. Moscow,
however, has not made any new economic aid offers.
NIGERIA SHAKEN BY ELECTION CRISIS 16
The troubled Nigerian federation has apparently survived
a new clash between traditionally antagonistic ethnic
and regional forces, but further trouble could quickly
flare over the issues involved in the agreed compromise.
CONGO GOVERNMENT RETAINS MILITARY INITIATIVE
The rebels are better armed than earlier, thanks to
their foreign suppliers of weapons, but have not been
able to mount a concerted counteroffensive. Premier
Tshomb6 is seeking additional mercenaries in Belgium
and South Africa.
EUROPE
THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION
In the wake of last month's bitter presidential elec-
tion, the major problem facing the center-left govern-
ment is to work out an agreement among the coalition
parties on enactment of certain long-needed social and
economic reforms. The Socialists demand prompt action;
the Christian Democrats insist on further delays.
CASTRO INSISTS ON AUTONOMY IN COMMUNIST WORLD
The salient point of Castro's speech commemorating the
sixth anniversary of his regime was an emphatic decla-
ration of independence from Moscow, but he explicitly
rejected any thought of leaving the "socialist camp."
As for relations with the US, he said his regime was
strong enough to wait for Washington to meet his terms.
SECRET
8 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
SECRET
WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
PROSPECTS IN PANAMA ON ANNIVERSARY OF ANTI-US RIOTS
The Robles government is determined to avert violence
this week, but isolated terrorism may occur. Cuban-
backed revolutionaries, meanwhile, are trying to draw
Arnulfo Arias, Robles' opponent last May, into their
activities. There is also a threat of labor troubles.
NEW DISTURBANCES IN BOLIVIA
The ruling junta's move this week against what it de-
scribed as a widespread subversive movement organized
by followers of ex-President Paz may have been part of
its effort to eliminate the power of the national police.
SLOW PROGRAM: FOR RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALITY IN ECUADOR 22
Plans announced by the junta on New Year's Day will
delay elections for another year or more, but the
military rulers apparently feel they have enough sup-
port from the armed forces and the public at large to
enable them to cope with possible outraged reactions
of political leaders.
BRITISH GUIANA'S NEW PREMIER TRYING TO CONCILIATE OPPOSITION 23
Premier Burnham, however, has not yet succeeded in dispel-
ling the suspicion with which the large East Indian commu-
nity views his predominantly Negro government. Ex-Premier
Jagan is doing his best to exacerbate that suspicion.
SECRET
8 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iv
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
~ftw
SECRET
The UN General Assembly's
current: recess has provided one
more reprieve from a showdown over
the UN's money problems and the
voting rights of its financially
delinquent members. There is,
however, no sign of any break in
the deadlock, and the risk of per-
manent damage to the UN is stead-
ily increasing. Sukarno's threat
to take Indonesia out of the or-
ganization has also contributed
to the deepening malaise.
The crux of the money prob-
lem remains the USSR's unwilling-
ness to state how much of its ar-
rears it will pay,. and when. The So-
viets maintain they have already
made a major concession by agree-
ing in principle to some form of
voluntary donation beyond their
regular assessments. In return,
they demand that all claims
against them for the Congo and
Middle East operations be can-
celed and that the assembly re-
sume normal voting procedures.
The US insists, on the other hand,
that this position is in effect
a Soviet bid to have Article 19
of the UN Charter suspended. A
donation of about $17 million is
required if the USSR is to avoid
the loss of vote which that ar-
ticle specifies for financial
delinquents like the Soviets.
In refusing to go along with
Secretary General Thant's face-
saving plan to set up a "voluntary
rescue" fund to which the Soviets
and UN members generally would
contribute, the USSR may have been
playing for time in the knowledge
that France and several other
countries would fall more than two
years behind in their dues on 1 Jan-
uary. Although a French UN dele-
gate has said Paris is interested
in settling the debt issue, France
has not indicated what it would
consider a suitable solution.
The USSR stands to continue
benefiting from the impatience of
the Afro-Asians to resume normal
procedures in the General Assembly.
An Ethiopian official in New York
claims that a vast majority of Af-
ro-Asians are "disgusted" with the
long postponement. He added that
the US is consequently losing Af-
rican support since even its
friends fail to understand why "the
US appears determined to push the
USSR against a wall." A number of
Asians, however, appear to be sym-
pathetic to the US position.
Sukarno's decision to leave
the UN, imprecise as it is, has
been greeted with widespread dis-
approval and dismay by many UN mem-
bers, including some of the more
radical Africans. Most of them
find it difficult to see how with-
drawal would benefit Indonesia, and
there are no indications that any
one will follow Sukarno's lead. It
is possible, however, that if In-
donesia actually pulls out and
suffers no adverse consequences,
a precedent will have been set
for capricious withdrawals in
the future
SECRET
Page 1
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
VOW
SECRET
WARSAW PACT MEETING TO CONVENE ON 19 JANUARY
The Warsaw Pact meeting to
be held in the Polish capital
on 19 January is probably a ses-
sion of the Political Consulta-
tive Committee, consisting of
bloc party and government lead-
ers, which has not met since
July '1963. In the past, this
forum has been used to issue
foreign policy announcements
concerning alleged threats to
the national security interests
of the member nations.
The meeting follows a sharp
step-up in Soviet attacks
against continuing Western con-
sultations on the NATO multi-
lateral nuclear force, high-
lighted by Soviet Premier Kosy-
gin's 9 December call for War-
saw Pact consultations. It
seems probable that the sessions
will result in vague retaliatory
threats probably linked with
some new proposals dealing with
European security. For example,
there might be some elaboration
of Polish Foreign Minister
Rapacki's 14 December proposal
that representatives of the War-
saw and NATO blocs arrange a
conference of all European states,
including the Soviet Union and
adding the US, to discuss Euro-
pean security.
The gathering of the War-
saw Pact signatories will also
provide the first opportunity
since early November for bloc
leaders to review broad policy
questions such as the Sino-So-
viet problem. The role of the
East European forces within the
pact structure is likely to come
under discussion, particularly
in view of tentative signs that
Rumania desires to reduce its
commitment (see next article).
Moscow may appeal for intensive
planning and consultation against
the possibility of nuclear war-
fare in Europe in the hope that
this will act as a catalyst for
greater coordination among the
Warsaw Pact forces.
RUMAN]:A MAY BE REDUCING COMMITMENT TO WARSAW PACT
Rumania's independent posi-
tion in the Communist world is
now apparently being reflected
for the first time in military
matters, as it already has been
in economic and political af-
fairs. Rumanian officials have
even been hinting that-Bucharest
is no longer willing to cooper-
ate fully with the USSR in bloc
military activities.
The pivotal development
apparently was the Rumanian de-
cree of 19 December reducing the
military obligation of most cate-
gories of conscripts from 24 to
16 months. Although the Ruma-
nian action is consistent with
Moscow's own facade of military
economy, party first secretary
Gheorghiu-Dej's comments on it
gave US Ambassador Crawford the
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
SECRET
clear impression that opposition
to the cut came from foreign
sources--an implication that the
move was not approved by the
Warsaw Pact command. One ef-
fect of the cut may be a reduc-
tion in the Rumanian forces
available to the Warsaw Pact.
Dej's comment follows sev-
eral suggestions of friction in
Rumanian-Soviet military rela-
tions. Rumanian foreign liai-
son officials told US Embassy
officials that some Rumanian of-
ficers boycotted the 7 November
Soviet Embassy reception in re-
taliation for the rude behavior
of Soviet Marshal Grechko, Com-
mander in Chief of the Warsaw
Pact, during his October visit
to Rumania.
The Communist World DIA
25X1
that, if Rumania could have its
way, it would not subscribe to
any pact. Since then, public
Rumanian commentary has increas-
ingly denounced the need for
military blocs.
These developments may be
the harbingers of a slow and
cautious reduction by Rumania
of its participation in Warsaw
Pact activities. The first
open indication of Rumanian
independence vis-a-vis the pact
may occur at the Warsaw Pact
meeting scheduled for 19 Janu-
ary (see preceding article).
Premier Maurer says he plans to
go, but has not said whether
party first secretary Gheorghiu-
Dej will accompany him as would
normally be the case for such
a meeting.
The new Soviet leaders
have taken advantage of their
current reorganization of the
party to rid themselves of
another of Khrushchev's top
agricultural officials. Leonid
Yefremov, who had been Khru-
shchev's agricultural deputy
for the Russian Republic (RSFSR)
and a candidate member of the
ruling party presidium, was de-
moted to first secretary of the
Stavropol agricultura.lparty com-
mittee on 1 December. He stayed
on as provincial party boss when
the Stavropol industrial and
agricultural party organizations
were reunited later in the month.
The demotion occurred just two
weeks after Vasily Polyakov, the
central party secretary in
charge of agriculture, had been
fired.
The choice of Stavropol as
the first stop in Yefremov's
political decline is especially
ironic since the Stavropol prov-
ince had figured in the eclipse
of another agricultural official
appointed by Khrushchev--Nikolay
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
SECRET
Belyayev, demoted in 1960 from
party first secretary of Kazakh-
stan and expelled from the party
presidium. Belyayev stayed in
Stavropol only six months, then
disappeared from public view.
Fast-rising Aleksandr
Shelepin, who became a member
of the presidium in mid-Novem-
ber, supervised Yefremov's
transfer. Yefremov's predeces-
sor in Stavropol was recalled
to staff work in Moscow and ap-
parently suffered no demotion.
Veteran party secretary
Suslov supervised the only other
change of note when he helped
install Mikhail Solomentsev,
former second secretary in
Kazakhstan, as Rostov provin-
cial party boss. Solomentsev's
shift, unlike Yefremov's, ap-
pears to be a lateral transfer.
His predecessor was recalled to
Moscow for reassignment.
The demotion of Yefremov
also vacates the second of the
three top posts in the impor-
tant Bureau for the RSFSR. Khru-
shchev had been chairman and
Yefremnov his first deputy for
agriculture. Andrey Kirilenko,
the third top official, was
first deputy for industry. No
replacement has been identified
for either Khrushchev's or
Yefremov's post. Brezhnev
would undoubtedly like to as-
sume direct control of the
bureau and may already have
done so--changes in the bureau
are not normally publicly
announced--but the current em-
phasis on collective leadership
might throw the chairman's job
to someone else. Kirilenko,
his close friend, would be a
logical choice.
The merger of industrial
and agricultural party units
ordered by the central commit-
tee in November is virtually
complete. The record of elec-
tions to the newly unified party
bodies shows quite clearly that
Khrushchev's bifurcation experi-
ment had little effect on the
political standing of the 75
provincial party bosses whose
bailiwicks were divided two years
ago. Over two thirds have re-
mained as party chieftains in
the reunified regions. Most of
the newcomers had been promoted
to fill posts made vacant by
the death, promotion, or lateral
transfer of the earlier chief.
In the 1962 reorganization
the number of incumbent party
first secretaries assigned to
the rural half of the divided
regions was nearly three times
the number assigned to the in-
dustrial half. The same ratio
has prevailed in the reversal.
Clearly the nature of the eco-
nomic problems of the area
rather than political considera-
tions determined the emphasis
on industry or agriculture,
both in the original bifurcation
and in the reunification.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
SOVIET PRESS PHOTOGRAPHS OF BORDER GUARDS
Above: A combined tank
and infantry attack exer-
cise at the Alma Ata
Higher Border Guard
Command School.
At Left: A border guard
search group boards a
helicopter. 650106 3
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
SECRET
that the Soviet KGB Border
Guards have been given greater
air strength, particularly heli-
copters, and now have their own
tank units. These additions
would be in line with the Au-
gust 1960 "Decree on State Bor-
der Protection" which specifies
that border troops must "repel
armed incursions into Soviet
territory by military formations
and groups."
The Sino-Soviet border is
believed to be Moscow's chief
concern. In Eastern Europe the
Soviets appear to be using fewer
of their own border guards and
relying more on cooperation with
those of the satellites.
In October 1964 KGB Border
Guard personnel with Tank, Air
Force, and Motorized Rifle in-
signia were observed leaving the
Alma Ata Higher Border Guard
Command School, the only one
which trains line officers. This
school added a fourth year to
its curriculum in the fall of
1961, and showed signs of fur-
ther expansion in October 1964.
A photographic essay on the
school in a May 1963 Soviet mili-
tary magazine showed a combined
tank and infantry attack being
conducted.
Border Guard tank units
are believed to be attached to
certain detachments along the
lengthy southern border with
China and Outer Mongolia where
the terrain, the degree of
tension, and the absence of
nearby army units justify their
deployment.
SECRET
Page
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
SECRET
COMMUNIST CHINA TAKES STOCK
Speeches at the annual Chi-
nese Communist National People's
Congress, and the resolution is-
sued following the final session
of the rubber-stamp parliament
on 4 January, suggest that the
leaders in Peiping believe they
are on the right track in solv-
ing their basic problems.
Regime spokesmen boasted
about China's growing influence
and power abroad. In a major
report on the state of the na-
tion, however, Premier Chou En-
lai conceded that the economy
has not fully recovered from
the disaster years of 1959-61
and that considerable popular
opposition to domestic policies
still exists.
Foreign Policy Aspects
Chinese confidence was most
clearly displayed in Chou's re-
marks on foreign policy. He
claimed great victories in "se-
rious trials of strength" during
the past five years. Chou as-
serted that despite repeated at-
tacks by "imperialists, reaction-
aries, and modern revisionists"
Peiping's prestige has grown.
He noted that Communist China
now has diplomatic ties with 50
countries and maintains trade or
cultural relations with 120.
Chou declared that China's
chief enemy--the US--is being
"knocked about everywhere" and
faces more disastrous defeats
if it enlarges the war in Indo-
china. He repeated earlier warn-
ings that China would not "stand
idly by" if this should take
place.
Although he made a pro
forma reference to China's de-
sire for better relations with
the USSR, Chou's oblique attacks
on Moscow indicate unflagging
determination to press on with
the Sino-Soviet conflict. His
remarks concerning the "great
significance" of Mao Tse-tung's
pronouncements on international
questions are a new and sweeping
claim to Chinese leadership of
world revolutionary forces.
Peiping's growing chauvin-
ism was underscored by Chou's
declaration that China would
never depend on others for help.
He asserted proudly that Commu-
nist China will pay all its re-
maining debt to the Soviet Union
ahead of schedule, out of the
favorable balance in 1964 trade
with the USSR. Politburo mem-
ber Marshal Ho Lung took the
same chauvinistic line in a
speech on 3 January described
by New China News Agency as "im-
portant."
Ho bragged that Peiping
not only has developed powerful
armed forces but has exploded
its first atom bomb--entirely
designed and manufactured in
China. The creation of a new
7th Ministry of Machine Building
headed by an air force general
suggests an expansion of the
defense industry. This organi-
zation may be associated with
aircraft or missile production.
Chou En-lai's statement on
the economy reflected satisfac-
tion at improvements since the
SECRET
8 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
SECRET
disaster years of 1959-61, but in-
cluded no plans for speeding the
country's slow, steady recovery.
He admitted that many shortcomings,
mistakes, and diffficulties still
exist. Chou explained that read-
justment of the economy--a euphe-
mism for economic recovery--was
unfinished, and would have to con-
tinue in 1965. Preparations are
to be made this year for launching
a third five-year plan in 1966,
three years behind schedule.
Current planning remains on
an annual basis, with 1965 goals
surprisingly modest. The five-per-
cent increase in total value of agri-
cultural output scheduled for 1965
is quite cautious for Chinese plan-
ners, as is the 11-percent increase
for industrial output, which is a
drop from the claimed increase of
15 percent for the previous year.
Chou's claim that 1964 output of
grain, cotton, and other major
agricultural products all surpassed
1957 levels is not supported by
CIA analyses, which estimate that
grain and cotton output in 1964
were below that of 1957. Chou's
claims of a "better" harvest in
1964 are neither spelled out sta-
tistically nor reflected in the
generally restrained planning for
1965.
The Internal Scene
The Chinese leaders appear
even more concerned over domestic
political attitudes than over eco-
nomic problems. Chou claimed that
"sinister winds of capitalism" are
still blowing into China, where
hostile elements are being "cease-
lessly generated" in party and gov-
ernment organs. According to Chou,
these people join forces with former
landlords and capitalists--still
a powerful and dangerous group--
and oppose party programs.
It is clear that the regime
intends to meet what it regards
as a threat by adopting an even
harsher line. The inclusion of
four important party men--all re-
gional bureau chiefs--in the gov-
ernment emphasizes the party's
determination to tighten direct
supervision over the government
apparatus. Two of them, Ko Ching-
shih and Tao Chu, were appointed
vice premiers. Li Ching-chuan
and Li Hsueh-feng were named to
the NPC Standing Committee.
that increasingly repressive meas-
ures are already being used to
root out and to punish all those
who resist regime policies in
any way. The NPC resolution de-
clared that the foremost domestic
task for 1965 is to deepen the
"socialist education movement."
The intensified political indoc-
trination which is a part of this
campaign is being supported by
a "cultural revolution" designed
to harness every branch of art
in the service of "politics."
people.
Chou's statement that all
ethnic minorities will be forced
to carry the socialist revolution
"through to the end" may fore-
shadow tougher treatment for tra-
ditionally hostile groups such
as the Tibetans. He attacked the
Panchen Lama--Chinese puppet
leader in Lhasa who was removed
from his post by the NPC--for
having encouraged anti-regime ac-
tivities. Chou promised that the
Chinese would take "bolder steps"
to "remold" or to eliminate such
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
SECRET
HANOI-MOSCOW RELATIONS MAY BE CHANGING
North Vietnam has made a
limited move toward a resumption
of its fence-straddling position
in the Sino-Soviet dispute by with-
drawing an anti-Soviet article
from its party theoretical jour-
nal. After distributing early
copies of the November issue of
Hoc Tap, the publishers suddenly
called them back to delete an ar-
ticle by Hong Chuong, a frequent
contributor with a decided pro-
Chinese bias. The title was inked
out in the table of contents, and
a nonpolemic speech by moderate
politburo member Le Thanh Nghi
was added as a loose insert.
This sudden decision suggests
that a Soviet offer to increase
political and perhaps some mili-
tary aid may have been made to
Premier Pham Van Dong, who re-
turned to Hanoi from Moscow shortly
before the Hoc Tap change was made.
Since then Increased political
support has in fact been given
Hanoi. Soviet leaders, backed by
increased propaganda in the So-
viet press and radio have reiter-
ated Moscow's pledge of "neces-
sary assistance" to counter any
US "aggression" against North Viet-
nam. Moscow has also announced
that a permanent office of the Na-
tional Front for the Liberation
of South Vietnam will be opened
in the USSR in early 1965.
A comparison of the original
Hoc Tap article and its replace-
ment --oTfers a rare example of the
differing attitudes of the moder-
ate and militant elements within
the North Vietnamese party. Hong
Chuong's article contained a
strong attack on the errors of the
Khrushchev leadership. It lashed
out at those who call for "peaceful
coexistence with imperialism,"
praised Stalin by name several
times, and attacked the Soviet
party's view of the party and state
as instruments of all the people
rather than class weapons.
The article drew a clear dis-
tinction between the errant Commu-
nists who were responsible for these
mistakes and those "true Communists"
in the Soviet party who had adhered
faithfully to the party of Lenin.
While admitting cautiously that "to
a certain extent" the removal of
Khrushchev suggested that the "true
Communists" might have regained some
influence in Moscow, the article was
essentially so anti-Soviet as to have
been offensive to the new Soviet
leaders as well as to Khrushchev.
The replacement article, a
speech by Le Thanh Nghi commemorating
the October revolution, is charac-
teristic of the traditionally non-
polemic policy pursued before mid-
1963. A platitudinous account of
Soviet and North Vietnamese coopera-
tion and successes, the whole speech
was designed to stress the things
that Moscow and Hanoi have in com-
mon rather than what has divided
them.
As yet, there has been no open
Chinese reaction to the prospect of
improved Hanoi-Moscow relations.
Peiping is probably adopting a wait-
and-see attitude on the assumption
that Soviet aid will fall far short
of Vietnamese expectations and that 25X1
this gesture toward the new Soviet
leadership will not be followed up.
SECRET
8 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 8
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
%W %0
SECRET
Developments in Indonesia,
in both domestic and foreign
policy, continue to favor Com-
munist interests.
A major cabinet reshuffle
which will either dismiss or
downgrade the strongest mod-
erates now in the government
is reliably reported to be im-
minent. Those believed likely
to be affected are Chaerul Sa-
leh (third deputy prime minis-
ter and minister of develop-
ment), Adam Malik (trade), Gen-
eral Nasution (defense), and
Admiral Martadinata (navy).
President Sukarno apparently
has been persuaded that they
are responsible for current
economic difficulties and fail-
ures in his military actions
against Malaysia.
The prospective move ap-
pears to be the outgrowth of
an extensive Communist attack
on those connected with the re-
cently banned anti-Communist
"Sukarnoist" movement. Saleh
and Malik were its principal
leaders, and Nasution and Mar-
tadinata publicly supported it.
Malik is reported already under
arrest, and a relative of Nasu-
tion is said to have been ar-
rested several days ago. The
Murba or Proletarian Party,
with which both Saleh and Malik
are associated, was "temporar-
ily" banned on 6 January, os-
tensibly to prevent any split
in the "unity of national pro-
gressive and revolutionary
forces." Action against the
non-Communist press, which
strongly supported "Sukarnoism,"
also seems likely. First Deputy
Prime Minister Subandrio has
threatened to shut down "anarch-
istic!'newspapers and to permit
only those of political parties
and mass organizations to pub-
lish.
These developments enhance
the position of Subandrio who,
in effect, has largely allied
himself with the Indonesian Com-
munist Party (PKI). This, to-
gether with the further weaken-
ing of the anti-Communists, will
work considerably to the party's
advantage, even if it does not
achieve greater cabinet repre-
sentation. Two PKI members and
two pro-Communists besides Su-
bandrio already hold significant
places in the government.
The PKI has applauded Su-
karno's decision to withdraw
Indonesia from the United Na-
tions. Withdrawal would further
remove Sukarno from moderate in-
fluences and his inclination to
cooperate with Communist China
and the more radical African
governments will be strengthened.
The PKI has con-
sistently advocated a policy of
force against Malaysia. Under
the umbrella of escalated military
operations--should they occur--
the Communists could be expected
to press for an increased polit-
ical role at both national and
local levels, and probably would
achieve it.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 9
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
SECRET
The Huong government ap-
pears to be moving toward a
compromise with South Vietnam's
armed forces leaders. Premier
Huong has indicated that he is
willing to forgo establishment
of another advisory council to
replace the disbanded High
National Council and that he
will try to expedite elections
for a permanent national as-
sembly.
This formula, while per-
mitting both parties to pro-
ceed on the basis of the
military's fait accompli in
abolishing the council, may do
little more than paper over this
challenge to the civilian
government's power. A newly
created military "liaison"
committee, headed by air force
chief General Ky, seems likely
to be a vehicle for continued
military involvement in politics.
Ky says this committee's pur-
pose is to resolve differences
between the government and its
Buddhist, student, and political
opponents.
Buddhists and students re-
newed antigovernment activity
during the week, although seri-
ous disturbances so far have
been avoided. Buddhist leader
Tri Quang now is indicating that
his campaign to force Huong's
removal as premier may be broad-
ened to include Chief of State
Suu as well, and that he may
order more drastic tactics if
the government does not revoke
a decree legalizing a rival
Buddhist organization.
Last week's six-day battle
at Binh Gia, southeast of Saigon
in Phuoc Tuy Province, established
another benchmark in the in-
creased willingness of the Viet
Cong to engage in sustained
clashes with government forces.
Linh Gia--which involved Viet
Cong units of estimated regimental
strength against government
marine, ranger, and airborne
battalions--was the most extend-
ed Communist action to date, and
possibly the most costly to the
government. However, it does not
represent a sudden Viet Cong
departure from guerrilla tactics,
but rather another step in a
gradually developing capability
for broader and more complex
military actions.
The total number of incidents
initiated by the Communists last
week remained slightly above the
1964 weekly average of 550,
with intense pressure exerted on
the countryside, particularly
against objectives in the southern
delta. On the government side,
the effective prosecution of the
war effort continued to suffer
from the preoccupation with pol-
itics on the part of some senior
officers at the higher levels of
command. Major government-initi-
ated ground operations, including
those in contact with the enemy,
again decreased.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
T~aakhek,
p b Bai fiuc
Servo
%Savanrrakhet
Ban Nong0
Boua Lao
Mean P iine
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
SECRET
LAOTIAN RIGHTISTS RESUME SQUABBLING
.,Rightist leaders in
Vientiane are again squabbling
over control of the Laotian
capital. Police and military
factions, led respectively by
Generals Siho and Kouprasith,
have been in a state of alert
for two weeks, each fearing
moves by the other to take over
full control. The latest crisis
was prompted when Siho seized
an editor who was critical of
police corruption. It appears
to have simmered down, but the
underlying antagonisms remain
resolved and could result in
a serious flare-up with little
notice.
The continuing struggle
for power has been complicated
by the recent efforts of Deputy
Premier Phoumi Nosavan to ex-
ploit it for his own purposes.
On 31 December, he called upon
military leaders outside Vien-
tiane to support his efforts to
regain control of the rightist
military command. This appeal
fell on deaf ears, however, with
most of the military chiefs ap-
parently anxious to avoid being
embroiled in the infighting at
Vientiane. Although rebuffed
in this instance, Phoumi still
remains a force to be reckoned
with by virtue of his positions
as deputy premier and finance
minister.
Premier Souvanna, meanwhile,
has created a commission to con-
sider the questions of national
elections, which under the con-
stitution should be held this
spring. On 4 January the com-
mission unanimously recommended
that elections be postponed,
but deferred discussion of
necessary constitutional modi-
fications and the length of the
postponement. Although King
Savang reportedly favors elec-
tions this spring, he is unlike-
ly to oppose these recommenda-
tions.
The military situation re-
mains relatively quiet, although
there has been a major move of
Communist troops into southern
Laos since mid-December. Govern-
ment roadwatch teams have re-
ported the movement of up to
1,000 North Vietnamese troops
west along Route 12 toward the
Mahaxay-Nhommarath region east
of Thakhek. Other reports over
the past few weeks suggest the
deployment of as many as 5,000
Communist troops south along
Route 23 toward the Muong Phine
- Tchepone area.
While some of the troops
may be destined for southeastern
Laos--and some perhaps for South
Vietnam--it seems likely that
the bulk will be moved west
along Route 9 to the Ban Nong
Boua Lao region, where rightist
forces have recently been step-
ping up their pressure.
SECRET
8 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
SECRET
The Indian Government, in
a series of sweeping arrests
across the country last week,
has confined more than 700 mem-
bers of the radical "Left" Com-
munist. Party under what could be
indefinite jail terms.
The Home Ministry has ac-
cused them of treasonous actions
and intent, beginning even prior
to China's 1962 attack on India,
when they were but an extremist
faction within the Indian Commu-
nist Party, and continuing
through 1964 when that party
split into two groups of nearly
equal size. The "Left" Communist
Party (CPI/L) looks to Peiping
for ideological guidance and in-
spiration; the "Right" Party
(CPI/R) is oriented toward Moscow.
The arrests will effectively
hobble the CPI/L in its competi-
tion with the CPI/R for the ul-
timate allegiance of India's
155,000 Communists as well as in
its ability to function as an
overt political party. The re-
pression may, in fact, prompt
ultraradicals within the CPI/L
to carry out extralegal activi-
ties of sufficient scope to cause
New Delhi to ban the group for-
mally, as it has already threat-
ened to do.
The timing of the arrests
appears to be essentially polit-
ical. Adequate justification
for such a roundup has existed
for two years under emergency
powers assumed by New Delhi dur-
ing the Chinese attack, and
lesser crackdowns took place
in 1962 and last fall. India's
strongly anti-Communist, British-
molded police and intelligence
officials presumably have favored
stern action for some time, but
the ruling Congress Party's dire
prospect in the forthcoming
Kerala State elections is prob-
ably what persuaded its leaders
to support such a drastic move
now.
Of the many parties in the
field for the Kerala elections
at the beginning of March, only
the CPI/L had a chance of put-
ting together a winning coalition.
With more than 125 of the arrests
having occurred in Kerala alone,
the CPI/L seems to have been
stripped not only of its lead-
ers but also of many of its
best known potential candidates.
The likely effect, therefore,
will be the one preferred by
Congress Party leaders if they
cannot win themselves--i.e., a
standoff at the polls, with no
party or parties able to form
a government and a subsequent
continuation of direct rule over
the state from New Delhi.
SECRET
Page 13
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
-AMOV SECRET
After another extended pe-
riod of internal maneuvering in
Syria, a group of extreme left-
ist young officers led by army
Chief of Staff Salah Jadid has
emerged in control of the mili-
tary regime. The Jadid group re-
cently managed the ouster of the
regime's number-two man, Major
General Umran, and reportedly
now is pushing for various com-
mand shifts to consolidate its
position.
The military leaders who
have ruled Syria since the 1963
coup now have almost completely
sidelined their civilian asso-
ciates under the Baathist (so-
cialist) banner. The remaining
civilian cabinet members are
primarily technicians. The
Baathist prime minister, Major
General Hafiz, who has main-
tained his position by a series
of successful compromises, has
not yet been threatened.
The increased influence of
the regime's. extremist faction
is clearly demonstrated by cur-
rent steps to complete the na-
tionalization of industry. Sim-
ilar moves last spring provoked
violent demonstrations and forced
the government to draw back.
The current program could meet
similar resistance. Given the
present uncertain loyalties of
key army units, the new power
clique might soon face serious
problems in maintaining its own
position.
SECRET
8 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 14
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
SECRET
Moscow utilized Deputy
Premier Shelepin's 19-29 Decem-
ber visit to Egypt to exploit
areas of US-Egyptian disagree-
ment such as the Congo. Shele-
pin also reiterated Moscow's
commitment to maintain close
relations with Egypt and con-
trasted Soviet assistance with
Western aid, which he said is
used "to interfere in the af-
fairs of other states."
Moscow and Cairo continue
to pursue their own policies
in the Afro-Asian world, but
both have found it expedient in
recent months to give the im-
pression of a close identity
of views on a number of inter-
national issues. The release
of many Egyptian Communists
from prison in 1964 and the
favorable press treatment in
each country of the other's
policies reflect this improved
atmosphere of relations.
Probably to demonstrate
the continuity of the USSR's
policy of friendship with Cairo,
the new Soviet leaders gave
especially favorable treatment
to the Egyptian delegation to
the 7 :November celebrations in
Moscow. Also, in recent months
Arab Communists, presumably on
orders from Moscow, have sought
to cooperate with Nasirite and
other nationalist groups in a
number of Middle Eastern coun-
tries.
In his public statements
in Egypt, Shelepin emphasized
Soviet-Egyptian solidarity in
support of "revolutionary lib-
eration movements," particularly
in the Congo. He avoided any
reference to the potentially
divisive issue of how Arab unity
is to be achieved, and instead
praised Egypt for choosing the
"socialist" path of development.
For his part, Egyptian
President Nasir has been trying
to give the impression that
the USSR is prepared to give
Egypt "all the aid it needs."
Shelepin kept his assurances
of support vague, however, and
it is unlikely that he offered
any new economic aid programs
or indicated a willingness to
replace any US aid which might
be withdrawn.
Under its new leadership,
the USSR has already ratified
the $280-million agreement con-
cluded by Khrushchev last May
in support of Egypt's new five-
year plan which begins in March.
It also signed an agreement on
11 November with Defense Minis-
ter Amir. This will lead to
delivery of a wide range of new
military equipment compatible
with Egypt's position as leader
of the United Arab Command.
After these recent demonstra-
tions of economic and military
support, further offers of aid
programs seem unlikely.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
ic'erict
Kaduna
Baucr ,
N O R T H E R N
Jos*
8 JANUARY 1965
MILES
46607
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
SECRET
The troubled Nigerian federa-
tion has apparently survived a
major crisis brought on by a direct
clash between traditionally an-
tagonistic ethnic and regional
forces in connection with the 30
December parliamentary election.
However, the settlement of specif-
ic problems arising out of the
election will probably involve pro-
longed haggling, and a new crisis
could flare over any of many issues.
The crisis arose two weeks
ago when the United Progressive
Grand Alliance, one of the two
national coalitions into which
Nigerian political parties had po-
larized for the election, appar-
ently concluded that it could not
win, and demanded postponement of
the balloting. The UPGA, which
mainly represents relatively ad-
vanced tribes of the Christian and
pagan south, had hoped to wrest
control of the federal government
from incumbent conservative north-
ern Muslim elements. The UPGA
leaders based their effort to
block the voting on charges that
irregularities in the Northern
Region made "free and fair" elec-
tions there impossible.
The crisis came to a head on
28 December when figurehead Presi-
dent Azikiwe, a. southerner who is
Nigeria's foremost nationa.list
hero, openly sided with his erst-
while UPGA associates and tried
to force northerner Prime Minister
Ba.lewa to give way to a "provision-
al government." Failing in this
effort, Azikiwe ga.ve tacit sup-
port to the'UPGA's election boy-
cott.
After the northerners' Nige-
rian National Alliance (NNA) won
the election--as it probably
would have even without the boy-
cott--Azikiwe refused at first
to carry out his constitutional
role in the formation of a new
government. After several days
of frantic maneuvering, however,
he and Balewa. announced a "compro-
mise" which seems to be a, ca.pitu-
la.tion to the northerners. It
calls for early elections in the
UPGA-dominated constituencies
where none took place and for a.
"reexamination" of constituencies
where only a. "small" number voted.
Azikiwe agreed specifically that
the validity of the elections
could be questioned only by "due
process of law" and that redress
for alleged irregularities must
be sought in the courts.
On 7 January Balewa announced
an apparently temporary government.
All but four -members are from the NNA,
but he promised a reshuffle after
"outstanding" elections are held in
the Eastern and Midwestern Regions
and Lagos. Much depends on the ex-
tent to which key UPGA elements are
included in the permanent government
and on Balewa's success in softening
the attitudes of both northern and
southern extremists. The top NNA
leader, Northern Region Premier Bello,
seems bent on taking full advantage
of the NNA's strong position.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
%so, N10
SECRET
CONGO GOVERNMENT RETAINS MILITARY INITIATIVE
The Leopoldville govern-
ment retains the military initi-
ative despite substantial for-
eign shipments of arms to rebels
in the northeastern Congo.
Government forces continue
to move quite freely and to cap-
ture sizable quantities of these
weapons. The rebels, although
better armed and using more
sophisticated tactics than pre-
viously, have not yet been able
to mount a concerted counter-
offensive and are often inca-
pable of effectively employing
their weapons. The insurgents'
ineptness suggests that they
are not accompanied by foreign
combat "volunteers." Reports
of foreign cadavers being picked
up have all, so far proven
false. The rebels' apparently
faltering resistance and their
increasing weapons losses may
cause their radical African
suppliers either to stop the
deliveries or to send in sol-
diers to protect their invest-
ment.
The supply route through
the Sudan may soon be threat-
ened by southern Sudanese dis-
sidents. Some of their leaders
based in Uganda claim that,
given arms they could effective-
ly block the shipments to the
Congolese rebels. Leopoldville
has reportedly agreed to help
but does not yet control any
overland route by which any
substantial. quantity of arms
could be transferred to the
Sudanese. Although any opera-
tions by the Sudanese rebels
would be limited largely to
harassing actions, this might
be enough to dissuade Khartoum
from further commitments of
military equipment and personnel
to the Congolese rebel cause.
Meanwhile, efforts are now
being made to drastically in-
crease the number of mercenar-
ies. Resignations, casualties,
and illness have reduced the
400 mercenaries brought to the
Congo to only 220, with scarcely
half of these now effective.
However, Belgians are being
recruited in Europe with a view
to replacing in due course all
the South Africans and Rhode-
sians. Some of them are to be
committed in small groups in
widely scattered locations to
stiffen Congolese Army units.
For short-term needs, however,
new recruiting is being resumed
in South Africa.
On the political scene,
Premier Tshombd has postponed
the parliamentary elections
planned for February until the
last two weeks of March. This
ostensibly will permit elections
to be held in areas not yet
pacified, and will in fact
allow the government to con-
solidate its political position.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
SECRET
THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION
Italy's short-run political
outlook remains uncertain, as each
of the parties in the center-left
government coalition re-examines
its policies in the wake of the
bitter presidential election. The
major hurdle facing Premier Moro's
government is the question of work-
ing out a firm agreement among
these parties to enact certain of
the long-needed reforms provided
for in the government program. The
Socialists (PSI) are demanding
prompt action, while the present
Christian Democratic (CD) leader-
ship seems to be insisting on fur-
ther delays.
The Socialists made it clear
at the 29 December cabinet meeting
that unless the government gets
going on meeting its program com-
mitments on specific reforms by
the end of January, the PSI will
withdraw from the coalition. They
consider action now on three re-
forms to be essential: an urban
reform :Law, institution of a na-
tional economic plan, and reorgan-
ization of the old-age pension sys-
tem. The urban law has not yet
been approved even by the cabinet
and, as of mid-November, the most
optimistic prediction was that it
might get parliamentary approval
by early summer. Coalition agree-
ment is still pending on the eco-
nomic plan, which was supposed to
be presented to parliament last
month.
The current CD majority lead-
ership appears disposed to stall
SECRET
8 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
as long as possible on certain re-
forms. It is telling the other
coalition partners that the threat
of renewed inflation makes it "un-
timely" to institute reforms or to
initiate legislation that would
cost large sums.
The PSI and the CD are also
at odds over who should replace
President Saragat as foreign min-
ister. The Christian Democrats
are said to have initially pushed
Treasury Minister Colombo, a mem-
ber of the CD, for the job, while
offering the treasury post to So-
cialist Minister of the Budget
Pieraccini.
Meanwhile, the CD National
Council, meeting later this month
must come to grips with the prob-
lem of restoring some semblance
of party unity, an exceedingly
difficult task now complicated by
25X1
the disruptive effects of the pres-
idential election. Any meaningful
harmonization of factional differ-
ences in the CD over key issues--
particularly the coalition's pro-
gram and factional representation
on the Party Directorate--seems 25X1
remote at this time. A thin pa-
pering over is probably the most
that can be expecte.
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
%001 'Now
SECRET
CASTRO INSISTS ON AUTONOMY IN COMMUNIST WORLD
The salient point in Fidel
Castro's long, rambling speech
on 2 January was an emphatic dec-
laration that Cuba will never
submit to foreign dictation. Ad-
dressing a mass rally in Havana
commemorating the sixth anniver-
sary of his coming to power, Cas-
tro was more direct on this is-
sue than ever before in a public
speech.
Castro left no doubt that
he had the Soviets in mind when
he declared that any foreign Com-
munist party trying to tell
Cubans what to do "would be met
with a decisive and complete re-
jection." Arguing that Marxism-
Leninism cannot be indiscrimi-
nately applied everywhere, he as-
serted tnat each country's na-
tional traditions and idiosyncra-
cies must be taken into account.
These "subjective factors," he
said, "are abundant" in Cuba.
"We have no need," he declared,
"to borrow anybody's brain...any-
body's courage... anybody's in-
telligence."
Castro strongly chastised
Cubans who, in his view, had come
to feel too dependent on foreign
aid. He said that Cubans must
be prepared to go it alone "even
if absolutely no help could come
...from abroad." Although "it
is possible that this test may
never come," he said, only with
this attitude can Cubans consider
themselves truly secure and gen-
uinely revolutionary.
Western Hemisphere
rin his
speech as ro was explicit in
again rejecting any thought of
breaking with the "socialist
camp."
In his references to the
United States, Castro was
characteristically defiant and
uncompromising. He perfunc-
torily reasserted his interest
in living in peace with the US
and even in developing trade
relations. But he stressed
that this is no sign of weak-
ness and that his regime is
strong enough to wait indef-
initely for the US to meet his
terms.
the Congo."
On this score, Castro re-
peated his conviction that Cuba's
revolution will inevitably be
followed by similar movements
in Latin America and elsewhere
in the underdeveloped world. The
US, he declared,will eventually
have to come to terms with Cuba
when it has to deal also with
"several" other revolutionary
regimes. He also emphasized the
view that ultimately the US will
be forced to decide against a
course of intervention--not
only in Cuba, but also in "Viet-
nam, Venezuela, Guatemala, and
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 19
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
SECRET
PROSPECTS IN PANAMA ON ANNIVERSARY OF ANTI-US RIOTS
The Panamanian Government
is determined to avert violence
this week, the anniversary of
last year's bloody anti-US riots.
Although internal squabbling
among Communists is in the gov-
ernment's favor, isolated acts
of terrorism cannot be prevented.
Other unsettling developments
are the efforts of Cuban-backed
revolutionaries to involve for-
mer president Arnulfo Arias in
their antigovernment activities,
and the threat of labor troubles.
Arias received well over
one third of the vote in last
May's presidential elections--
most of it among the urban lower
classes--a.nd his party has the
largest single block of deputies
in the National Assembly. Al-
though Arias himself has a. long
anti-Communist record, the "hard-
line" Communists see his mass
following as a tempting, suscep-
tible group to incite to vio-
lence. They also regard his
henchmen as invaluable allies
for subversive activities.
Arias has kept a.loof from
politics since May, but re-en-
tered the arena on 4 January with
a, speech bitterly criticizing
the Robles government for the
death of one of his followers
involved in a, bombing incident.
It is unlikely, however, that
Arias will make common cause with
the Communists unless he becomes
convinced that such collabora-
tion would enable him to oust
President Robles.
A politically and economi-
cally disruptive strike could
occur this month in the chief
banana-producing area, Chiriqui
Province.
The Communists have the sup-
port of National Assemblymen
Carlos Ivan Zuniga. and Virgilio
Schuverer, pro-Communists who dom-
inate the union. These men de-
rive much of their political
power from control of union funds
collected through a. checkoff sys-
tem. The company wants to dis-
continue this system, as well
as to hold the line on wages.
SECRET
8 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
``r+
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
The Bolivian Army on 3 Jan-
uary broke up what the ruling
junta termed a widespread sub-
versive movement organized by
followers of ex-President Paz.
The junta's description may
have been exaggerated. Indeed
there is reason to believe that
the government was not only in-
terested in disrupting pro-Pa.z
plotting, but was trying also
to discredit the national po-
lice. Many police officials
were among those arrested.
Ex-Minister
of-Government Ciro Humboldt
suddenly returned to La. Paz
last month from exile in Peru
and was immediately arrested,
SECRET
as he may have intended. His
aim seems to have been to put
himself in a, position to coor-
dinate police opposition to the
regime within Bolivia from a,
prison cell.
Whatever the provocation,
traditional military distrust
and dislike of the police leave
little doubt that the army is
anxious to eliminate the police
power structure as it was con-
stituted under Pa.z. As a result
of the alleged plot the army has
taken command of police posts
throughout the country, and'the
junta has announced the reorga.n-
ization of the police into a.
National Guard for Public Secu-
rity under military control.
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
SECRET
W
Western Hemisphere
SLOW :PROGRAM FOR RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALITY IN ECUADOR
Ecuadorean junta president
Admiral Castro Jijon on New
Year's Day announced plans to
return the country to consti-
tutional government, but his
program fell short of the ex-
pectations that have been built
up during the past several
months. Under the junta's plan,
the changeover will probably
be delayed for at least a year
and a half.
The eight-point program
included a decree combining
identity and voter registra-
tion documents into one card.
Reportedly, the cards will also
serve as employment descriptions
and tax registrations. The
junta claims that this action,
along with a new electoral law
and voting procedures it-
pro-poses, will end electoral fraud.
The compilation and distribu-
tion of the cards will probably
require a year's time.
.A new constitutional com-
mission will soon be appointed,
probably to reform the existing
1946 basic law. This move ap-
parently reflects a decision to
abandon a draft constitution
the junta recently published.
The junta also announced
that new decrees controlling
local government will be issued,
and that those will be followed
by municipal and provincial
elections. Presidential and
congressional elections will
occur later.
The junta's announcement
revealed no timetable for any
of these events.
Although reaction to the
junta's plans has so far been
scant, political leaders will
probably be outraged by such a
slow and indefinite plan for re-
turning to constitutional rule.
The junta, however, apparently
feels confident that it enjoys
full support from the armed forces
and most of the population, and
can therefore cope with any ad-
verse reactions.
In other domestic develop-
ments, the junta closed the old
year by releasing the last of the
political prisoners it has been
holding, including Communist
Party secretary general Pedro
Saad. On the international front,
the Foreign Ministry is moving 25X1
toward denunciation of the fish-
ing modus vivendi negotiated
SECRET
8 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
SECRET
Forbes Burnham since taking salary as official leader of the
office last month as premier of I opposition, and says he will con-
British Guiana has been trying
to project the image of a mod-
erate, conciliatory leader. He
has not yet succeeded, however,
in dispelling the suspicion with
which the large East Indian com-
munity views his predominantly
Negro government. Opposition
leader Jagan, ex-premier and
still spokesman for the colony's
East Indians, is doing his ut-
most to exacerbate that suspi-
cion.
Burnham has made a special
effort to form a multiracial
cabinet. In a further attempt
to broaden his base, Burnham
gave in to demands of his coali-
tion partner, the United Force,
for three cabinet posts, rather
than sticking to his initial
offer of two.
In his relations with Ja-
gan's People's Progressive Party
Burnham is going out of his way
to be correct and considerate,
thereby hoping to place the onus
for any noncooperation on Jagan.
Burnham has announced he will
arrange for Jagan to receive a
sult Jagan on "certain national
issues." In addition, he is
claiming personal credit for the
release, just before Christmas,
of nine political detainees,
five of whom belong to the PPP.
Jagan so far has not re-
sponded in kind to these attempts
at conciliation. The PPP still
claims the election was a fraud,
and is trying to keep racial ani-
mosities alive by warning that
Burnham's gestures to non-Negroes
are hypocritical and that Indians
must expect to be treated "like
Jews in Germany." Jagan has an-
nounced a program of "nonviolent
noncooperation" apparently aimed
primarily at weakening the colo-
ny's economy.
The US consul in Georgetown
is impressed with Burnham's
statesmanlike performance to date,
but doubts that the new premier
has made much impression on In-
dians in the countryside. 25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700090001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700090001-3