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December 21, 2016
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June 19, 2008
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January 29, 1965
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OROI P 1 Excluded from au+omatic'' dt v ~roding,eQnd declassification Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 Nele %wool SECRET C O N T E N T S (Information as of 1200 EST, 28 January 1965) THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page ALLIED TRAVEL POLICY FOR EAST GERMANS CHALLENGED I East Germany is gaining at least tacit support from some NATO members in its latest challenge to the system of regulating East German travel to the West. NEW SOVIET LEADERS ENCOURAGE LOCAL AND PRIVATE INITIATIVE 2 Funds are being made available for private housing and for purchase of private livestock, and an experiment last year allowing textile plant managers to control production and marketing is to be greatly expanded during 1965. HANOI COMPLAINS OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS Its modest claims for 1964 have been overshadowed by expressions of concern that the "heavy tasks" of 1965 will not be accomplished. MILITARY TAKE OVER AGAIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM General Khanh's bloodless coup has damped down growing Buddhist street agitation, but he still faces a host of problems as he tries to revamp the government. SECRET 29 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 11404 %Doi SECRET ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page COMMUNIST MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN LAOS 7 The Communists have launched what appear to be clearing operations in northern Laos at a time when the govern- ment's defense capability is hampered by the accidental destruction of a number of its combat aircraft. Commu- nist supply and reinforcement movements continue in south- central Laos and around the Plaine des Jarres. ETHIOPIA AGAIN FACES DISSIDENCE IN ERITREA Long-standing Eritrean opposition to Ethiopian rule may soon receive a boost in the form of aid from Muslim countries, including the Sudan and Somalia. PROSPECTS FADING FOR MARCH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN SUDAN 9 The non-Communist parties, anxious to dissolve the left- ist-influenced transitional government, are pushing hard for elections, but the Communists and other leftists could delay an electoral law indefinitely. TSHOMBE TO NEGOTIATE IN BRUSSELS The Congolese premier's oft-delayed trip to Belgium is scheduled to take place this week end, at the same time that another meeting of the Organization of African Unity's Congo Commission convenes in Nairobi. OAU PRESSURES AGAINST HOLDEN ROBERTO'S ANGOLAN EXILES Moves are under way within the Organization of African Unity to reduce support for the inept Roberto's Congo- based Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile. SECRET 29 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 SECRET Nw~ EUROPE (continued) MEETING OF DE GAULLE AND ERHARD The principal result of the 19 January conference of the two leaders was a renewal of Franco-German amity which may have set the stage for early resumption of negotiations on a European political organization. ITALIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS The badly divided Christian Democrats have convened their national council in an effort to reach agreement to enact certain of the coalition's reform measures. Unless they are able to do so, their coalition partners will probably feel obligated to leave the government. Meanwhile, new demands from factions in both the Chris- tian Democratic and Socialist parties may portend a fairly extensive cabinet shakeup. 25X1 SECRET 29 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 SECRET WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page POLITICAL TENSIONS RISING IN HONDURAS 19 The majority Liberal Party, believing Chief of Govern- ment Lopez intends to rig elections for a constituent assembly next month in order to remain in office, may resort to violent protest. 25X1 COLOMBIAN MINISTER OF WAR REPLACED President Valencia, taking advantage of an upsurge of public confidence in the government after the collapse of a threatened general strike, has replaced the polit- ically ambitious and outspoken General Ruiz Novoa. SECRET 29 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iv Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 SECRET The Communist World ALLIED TRAVEL POLICY FOR EAST GERMANS CHALLENGED East Germany is gaining at least tacit support from some NATO members in its latest chal- lenge to the system of regulat- ing East German travel to the West. This system operates through the Allied Travel Office (ATO), which was set up as a four-power group after the de- feat of Germany and now is ad- ministered by the three Western powers with the support of NATO. ATO adopted a highly re- strictive policy after the Ber- lin Wall went up, when it be- came more apparent that East Ger- many would permit trips abroad only if they served its politi- cal interests. To counter this, ATO began granting Temporary Travel. Documents (TTDs) only for compassionate reasons, emigra- tion, or trade of interest to the West. Some relaxation occurred in mid-1963: TTDs were granted to athletic teams and scientific or cultural delegations if they joined with similar groups from the Federal Republic to repre- sent all of Germany. Regula- tions were further relaxed on a trial basis in April 1964 to per- mit freer travel by individuals and by teams and delegations representing a locality, a sports club, or a regional scientific SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1 group. At no time, however, were travel documents granted to government or party offi- cials. (See table on reverse of this page.) The regime currently is making use of selected travel- ers to NATO states in an ef- fort to undercut the ATO reg- ulations. It has encouraged emi- nent clergymen, scientists,. and athletes to apply for TTDs to attend church meetings, sym- posia, and sports events which draw public attention. If these are not granted, it accuses ATO of being arbitrary and unreason- able. More recently East Ger- man offers of increased trade have had some success in gain- ing access to NATO countries for officials without proper documentation. In October, for example, Trade Minister Julius Balkow visited the Salonika Trade;Fair and reportedly met with government officials in Athens. He went to Belgium in December after Brussels and Ant- werp businessmen, fearful of losing shipbuilding and other contracts, persuaded Foreign Minister Spaak to waive the TTD requirement. Twice the East Germans have also caused strain and embarrass- ment in NATO by sending Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 MR-M 0% ALLIED TRAVEL OFFICE CATEGORIES FOR EAST GERMAN TRAVEL IN THE WEST 1. Trade 2. Transport and Communications 3. Professional 4. Cultural 5. Political 6. Press 7. Religion 8. Official East German Delegations and Teams 9 . All - G erman D e l egation s and Teams 10. Private Visits 11. Tourism 12. Emigration 13. Wives with Husbands 1. Trade 2. Transport and Communications 3. Agriculture Banned 4. Medical and Scientists Banned Banned 5. Professional Banned Banned 6. Political Banned 7. Cultural. Banned Banned 8. Sport Banned 10. Religion 11. Visits to Relatives 12. Visits to Friends 13. Wives with Husbands.. Banned 14. Tourism Banned 15. Health 16. Emigration 17. Compassionate 18. Private Contractual Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 V %NO SECRET high-ranking party leaders to Western capitals. An SED dele- gation, led by candidate polit- buro member Axen, attended the funeral of Maurice Thorez in Paris last July. The French later explained with some cha- grin that harried customs offi- cials at Orly had overlooked the East Germans' lack of documenta- tion. In late August, another SED delegation, led by polit- buro member Warnke, attended the funeral of Palmiro Togliatti in Rome. The Italian Government claimed that pressure from the local Communists had caused it to grant the East Germans 48-hour transit visas. Reflecting the greater in- terest of some NATO members in trade with East Germany, as well as general dissatisfaction over the way current regulations are enforced, the Netherlands dele- gation to the North Atlantic Council meeting on 13 January proposed liberalizing ATO regula- tions to permit more travel by sports teams and other "unobjec- tionable individuals." It also 25X1 argued that trade officials should be allowed to travel on business. NEW SOVIET LEADERS ENCOURAGE LOCAL AND PRIVATE INITIATIVE The new rulers of the USSR are encouraging local and pri- vate initiative in housing con- struction, agriculture, and in- dustry. The Construction Bank is once again offering credits to private individuals to build their own homes and encouraging them to do so. These seven-year cred- its--up to 700 rubles for work- ers and 1,000 rubles for teachers and doctors--will cover about 25 percent of the total costs of a private house. In the late 1950s private housing construction, which was supported by government loans, accounted for about a third of all urban housing built. When Khrushchev withdrew his support SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 2 of this program in 1960, how- ever, only a limited program of loans was sanctioned, and by the end of 1964 only 19 per- cent of total urban housing was privately built. The new government apparently recognizes that the 1965 goal of building over 10 million square meters more living space than in 1964 cannot be reached without a large increase in private homes. Another incentive to stim- ulate private housing construc- tion is offered to families who settle in state and collective farms on irrigated land. The 10-year credits previously granted have been increased from 1,700 rubles to a maximum of 3,500 rubles for building Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 SECRET The Communist World dustry. The successful produc- tion-marketing experiment con- ducted at two clothing plants last year is to be expanded in July 1965 to some 400 factories which account for one fourth of total Soviet output of clothing and shoes. In the second quarter of 1965 the same system will be applied to 76 textile and 20 leather enterprises which supply these factories. Plant directors will have authority to buy the raw materials and hire the workers needed to fill orders received, and to set wages. Any reduc- tion in profits caused by changes in consumer demand will be covered at least temporarily by reserves of the regional economic councils. houses with small sheds for animals. The USSR is also helping individuals acquire livestock. The state will extend five-year credits of 300 rubles for pur- chase of a milk cow, and 150 rubles to buy a calf. Grain now can be bought from state supplies for privately owned livestock, and fodder now is being sold to collective and state farms and other govern- ment enterprises at wholesale prices and without the turnover tax. A recent article in Pravda has suggested increased reliance on local initiative to raise agricultural production. Stat- ing that profit may be the best indicator for evaluating the op- eration of agricultural enter- prises, the article implied that the government should pay more for agricultural products be- cause some current procurement prices keep production rates be- low plan. The newspaper also suggested that the farms help draft the plan so that the state can determine which products they want to produce and can then adjust procurement prices to meet the needs of the whole country. This encouragement of pri- vate and local initiative in agriculture follows the announce- ment of plans to expand a rela- tively liberal production sys- tem now being tried in light in- In line with Premier Kosy- gin's statement in his 1965 plan speech that this system will eventually spread to other branches of industry, an ex- periment is under way in five enterprises in the Lvov area including a lift-truck plant and a coal mine. The results of this trial will be watched closely because some of the strongest supporters of the textile experiment believe it cannot be successfully applied to heavy industry. Proponents of its expansion, however, argue that central control over the "commanding heights" of the economy can be maintained through less direct means.25X1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 VMW SECRET ``'4 HANOI COMPLAINS OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS Hanoi's year-end statements have been unusually brief, with modest claims for 1964 over- shadowed by concern for 1965. The official announcements on 1964 are thus far limited to claims of a five-percent increase in the value of agricultural output over 1963's very poor crop and a ten-percent increase in industrial production. The early rice crop was excellent, but autumn typhoons left con- siderable damage from waterlog- ging. The fact that Hanoi has made no mention of total rice output suggests poor results in this vital area of the econ- omy. In spelling out the prob- lems, a recent.editorial in Nhan Dan reiterated the usual compli~int that "various short- comings in leadership and eco- nomic management" have limited progress and have created con- cern about accomplishing the "very heavy" tasks of 1965. Al- though this is the last year of North Vietnam's first five-year plan (1961-65), Hanoi's per- functory references to the plan indicate that even the reduced goals are not expected to be met. Goals for 1965 are stated in extremely broad terms with the only persistent stress be- ing on the need to fulfill food targets. A recent communiqud called for better distribution of food and noted that require- ments were growing faster than production. Hanoi found it necessary to import food in 1964 and may have to again in 1965. While food shortages have not been serious, the need to import food and the inability to ex- port significant amounts of agricultural products are re- stricting economic growth and making Hanoi's goal of self- sufficiency all the more unat- tainable. With limited exports to earn foreign exchange, Hanoi will remain dependent on aid from the Communist world for most of the manufactured goods it needs. Although North Vietnam's economy is clearly capable of supporting its present level of aid to dissident forces in Laos and South Vietnam, Hanoi re- mains dependent on the rest of the Communist world for all but the simplest military equipment. In his 1 January statement, Vice Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh said that the 1965 state plan would have to link the economy closely with national defense in order to increase the economic poten- tial for supporting the mili- tary and "to heighten combat readiness." Considering the negligible military potential in the predominantly agricul- tural economy, Nguyen's state- ment appears designed to stimu- late the people to greater eco- nomic efforts by citing external threats to the security of North Vietnam. SECRET Page Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 1"01 -now" SECRET MILITARY TAKE OVER AGAIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM The military's bloodless coup on 27 January against the Huong regime in South Vietnam has damped down what was becoming increas- ingly violent Buddhist-inspired agitation, but General Khanh is likely to encounter a host of problems in his attempt to revamp the government. Khanh and the military say that Buddhist leaders promised to give the military time to stabil- ize the situation and agreed to exile some of the more militant monks. The Buddhists, however, having once again demonstrated their political power, are already showing signs of reneging. They are insisting, as they have in the past, that all persons arrested in their recent demonstrations, in- cluding identified Viet Cong, be freed. The projected council, which will include religious elements, may become the new focus for the exertion of Buddhist pressure, as well as for the interplay of those other contending political forces which have thus far prevented es- tablishment of a viable regime. Agreement on a new government com- bination may thus be difficult to achieve. An alliance between Khanh and 25X1 the Buddhists appears to have been a prime factor behind Huong's overthrow. Continued divisions within the military can be expected to limit the degree to which Khanh can enhance his per- sonal power position. The military have entrusted to Khanh responsibility for estab- lishing a joint civilian-military council., which will in turn name a new chief of state. The new chief of state is to name a new premier. The council will act as the legis- lative body pending election of a national assembly, still scheduled for mid-March. Phan Khac Suu will remain as acting chief of state. Third Dep- uty Premier Nguyen Xuan Oanh has been appointed acting premier pending designation of a successor to Huong. Khanh professes an in- tent to leave the rest of the cabinet largely unchanged for the present, but Buddhist pressures are likely to force the removal of some civilian ministers who had pre- viously excited Buddhist attacks. Viet Cong military activity was relatively light last week, possibly reflecting a tapering off as the Tet (lunar new year) holi- days approach. As in previous years, the Communists have uni- laterally declared a cease-fire from 31 January to 6 February in observance of this major Vietnam- ese holiday. A sharp upsurge of activity can be expected thereafter. On the government side, six large-scale operations last week resulted in substantial Viet Cong losses. The most notable govern- ment success was against the 261st Viet Cong Battalion, famous for 25X1 its defeat of government forces in the battle of Ap Bac in 1963. SECRET 29 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 6 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 LAOS honp Saly Kam ho nmara-h L, ~y rnau_:~ At1opeu Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 Luang Praban BaA Ken Bridge Kh?" ,e Bridge N?m Pla,n Pho~ ` s h~eng I ^oun erred Khouang Muong Ta Viang~ Kassy aTna fiiiom Vang Vieng SOUTH V1ET\M Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 NW SECRET 1we Communist forces last week launched a strong clearing opera- tion against government military pockets in Sam Neua. Province in northern Laos. Similar opera- tions conducted sporadically over the past few years have re- sulted in only temporary gains aga.inst the strongly entrenched government troops, mostly Meo tribesmen. In the present instance, the Pathet La.o, probably rein- forced with additional North Vietnamese elements and new anti- aircraft artillery, are believed to outnumber the government forces by about six battalions to three. Some minor government positions west and southwest of Sam Neua town have been taken by the Communists, whose main objective appears to be a. base area. about 30 miles southwest of the provincial capital. Gov- ernment defensive actions have been hampered by the loss of air support resulting from the destruction of nine Lao Air Force T-28s in a series of ac- cidental explosions at Vientiane Airfield on 23 Ja.nua.ry. The military situation is relatively quiet in other areas of La.os, although there are re- ports that the Communists may be preparing for another push in the Tha Thom area, southeast of the Plaine des Jarres. Farther south, the recent capture of a. North Vietnamese soldier along Route 9 in the panhandle lends support to previous reports that North Vietnamese forces have reinforced Pa.thet La.o troops in this area. The Com- munists may be preparing to launch a. counterattack to re- gain territory lost during the recent government offensive ea.st of Sa.vannakhet. Meanwhile the Communists continue to supply advanced positions in the pa.nha.ndle area along routes 12 and 23. In the 11-26 January period a total of approximately 70 trucks moved west on Route 12 toward the Nhomma.ra.th-Mahaxa.y area, an average of about 5 per day. In the same period, a.bout 100 trucks moved south on Route 23. This latter movement wa.s high- lighted by a. 60-truck convoy on 25 Ja.nua.ry, the largest south- bound convoy on Route 23 since mid-December. Most of the trucks carried unidentified cargo, al- though in some instances small numbers of Communist troops apparently were transported. A recently received road- watch report, the first since late December, indicates that Communist traffic continues to move into the Plaine des Ja.rres via Route 7. photography 25X1 tends to confirm earlier reports that a. ford just north of the destroyed Ban Ken bridge is in SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 ,'3=Y4F ~i w w.t7-u.ss-tc>i L$4- tfri- lM s~-w. .~~~~~ :=' 'ItFf is-}%1~?141 -414-' ! IZZ J O Spv~ S U bP A Nr >ab ., # 14w-t- It ;j / ADEN Kassal KH~RTOUM A L I A O 100 200 300 K E N Y A /? STATUTE MILES 46748 FRENCH l? SOM ALILAND * DJIBOUTI ..~ Dase `/?? -7 ~- 'Berbera Diredawa I r ? ' Hargeisa ADDIS ABABA n Harar ..~i~ ?.~??~S O M E T H I 0 P I A ~-?? ...,~ / Jima ?~ O G A D E N/? ?~ Nagele, ? ~? ,, / Q(?? ??~? M 29 JANUARY 1965 Rudr,If Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 NW SECRET *ft/ ETHIOPIA AGAIN FACES DISSIDENCE IN ERITREA Ethiopian officials are in- creasingly concerned about chronic armed dissidence in Eritrea Province. The latest incident was a successful at- tack on a police unit at Mas- saua in mid-January. Addis Ababa is particularly worried over the support the new Suda- nese Government is giving the Eritrean liberation movement, whose leaders have been in exile, first in Egypt and now in Iraq, since Eritrea was feder- ated with Ethiopia in 1952 un- der a UN resolution. It became an integrated province of Ethiopia in-1962. This month Ethiopia's act- ing foreign minister, angered by an anti-Ethiopian demonstr~- tion in Khartoum as well as Suda- nese press and radio propaganda favoring the Eritrean cause, publicly deplored the new Suda- nese sympathy for Eritreans in exile. Ethiopian officials also believe that in recent months the USSR has been giving more encouragement to the Eritreans in exile. Banditry, tribal warfare, and Christian-versus-Muslim an- tagonisms as well as political dissidence have been endemic in Eritrea, but poor organization and factional rivalries have kept unrest at a level control- lable by police and army units responsible for internal security. During the past ten years, the exile leaders have obtained mili- tary training for displaced Eri- treans, recruited from Sudan and elsewhere, while a few personnel and small quantities of arms have been smuggled in and out of Eri- trea with minor help from Egypt, Somalia, and other Mus- lim countries. The impact of this activity has been minimal. The collaboration that evidently has been developing between the new Sudanese Government and So- malia, however, lends some sub- stance to Ethiopia's historic fears of Muslim encirclement. The Somali Government, which has its own long-standing feud with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region, is surprised and delighted by the Sudanese sup= port for the Eritreans. A marked step-up in dissi- dence in Eritrea would severely tax the Ethiopian Army, whose best units are already tied down watch- ing the Somalis in the Ogaden. Any sign of weakness in dealing with the Eritreans, moreover, could en- courage elements in: Ethiopia hos- tile to the Emperor's regime. Con- tinued Sudanese toleration of the Eritreans thus could eventually provoke the Emperor to retaliate, possibly by supporting the south- ern Sudanese rebels. SECRET 29 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 8 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 r/ SECRET PROSPECTS FADING FOR MARCH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN SUDAN Prospects for March parlia- mentary elections in the Sudan are fading. While the non-Com- munist parties are anxious to dissolve the leftist-influenced transitional government as soon as possible and are pushing hard for cabinet assurances that elections will be held as prom- ised, the Communists still pre- fer a postponement. The Commu- nists and other leftists can probably secure ample cabinet votes to put off final approval of an electoral law indefinitely. The growing conflict be- tween the non-Communist Front of Political Parties--led by the Ansar religious brotherhood --and the Communist-backed Pro- fessional Front has thus far been limited to an exchange of public accusations and demands. Both groups, however, may soon turn to demonstrations and vio- lence. The Professional Front has already called on the govern- ment to lift the present ban on demonstrations. The inflexibility of the strongly anti-Communist leaders of SANU, the southern dissident organization, is playing into the hands of the leftists. The Communists and most other north- ern Sudanese insist that any elections held must be nation- wide, and SANU refuses to par- ticipate in elections until the government meets its presently unrealistic demands for self- rule in the southern provinces. SANU leaders in exile are said to have agreed to return to the Sudan for constitutional negotiations. Southern dissi- dent activity, however, is con- tinuing. While both northerners and southerners still claim to be anxious to settle the southern problem, both sides are taking an increasingly hard line, and there is no indication that any compromise is possible at this time. SECRET Page 9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 ft SECRET TSHOMBE TO NEGOTIATE IN BRUSSELS Moise Tshombd plans to make his oft-postponed trip to Brus- sels this week end, while the OAU's Congo Committee is sched- uled to meet in Nairobi. The Congolese premier's object is to try to resolve out- standing critical problems with Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak. Tshombd is interested primarily in obtaining possession of the important portfolio of shares in Belgian companies operating in the Congo which was to have been handed over at independence, four and a half years ago. Spaak, worried by radical African sup- port of the rebels, is pressing Tshombd hard to seek wide Afri- can support by broadening his government, holding general elections, proclaiming a, sweep- ing amnesty, and replacing South African mercenaries with Euro- peans. As a pressure tactic the Belgian Government has recently stalled on further military and technical assistance to the Congo. Some of the most effec- tive Belgian military advisers recently returned to Belgium at the expiration of their tours, SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO ???- Internctivree boundary Province ec.indary N strove cap tal * Prince capital Approximate area of uprising GABON_. Inongo CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC L l/ B A N G I i`? ""?+j ?,` Banzyville r-f *.- -?Bumba Lisala -~ Basoko Buma*' r