EUROPE, THE US, AND THE ALLIANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004700130002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 5, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/07/28
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OCI No. 0275/658
-Copy No.,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE Q F C U R R E N T I N T E- L I E ,,N _C
State Dept. review completed
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EUROPE, THE US, AND THE ALLIANCE
5 February 1965
The deep differences among the NATO members
over the organization of allied nuclear forces
and the way they should be used are probably now
more exposed than ever before. The reaction of
most European powers to the US decision not to
press ahead with the Multilateral Nuclear Force
(MLF) project has been one of relief mixed with
concern over what should be done next. In the
present hiatus Britain has failed to obtain a
broader European consensus on its own plan and
indeed has not tried very hard to do so.
De Gaulle is hopeful the death blow has been
given both projects, but continues to brandish
the threat of French withdrawal from the NATO
structure unless the whole NATO organization is
adjusted to satisfy his specifications by 1969.
A NATO without France remains inconceivable to
many, however, and this prospect puts into
sharper focus the question of the proper place
and role in the Alliance of a Europe attempting
to organize itself on a more self-reliant foot-
ing.
At work in this process are two dynamic
forces. One is De Gaulle's effort to organize the
Continent according to his own lights as a pre-
lude to a challenge to US dominance in Europe.
The other is the continued evolution of the Com-
mon Market into a politico-economic union in which
France, although still the predominant influence,
is progressively less an independent agent.
Nuclear Reform Blunted
After his visit to Washing-
ton in early December, Prime
Minister Wilson undertook to ob-
tain European support for the
British "Atlantic Nuclear Force"
(ANF) as a framework for, if not
an alternative to, the MLF. As
expected, the reaction in France
to the idea of turning various
national nuclear forces over to
NATO command was entirely neg-
ative. Among those sympathetic
to the MLF--West Germany, Italy,
and the Netherlands--the re-
sponse was open-minded but crit-
ical. Both Italy and West Ger-
many oppose the severe reduction
in the size and role of the sur-
face fleet proposed by London,
and both are eager for a British
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A Fleet of approximately 25 high-speed, merchant-type
surface ships, each armed with some eight Polaris A-3 stra-
tegic missiles--a total of some 200 missiles.
The Fleet to be owned, controlled, and manned multi-
laterally by a group of as many NATO nations as may want
to participate.
The Fleet would be mixed-manned throughoutby person-
nel from the participating nations. Each ship would be man-
ned by personnel from at least three nations, with no nation
providing more than 40 percent of the personnel in any ship.
No member's share of costs, obligations, and responsi-
bilities could exceed 40 percent.
The Fleet would be under the political direction of a
Council or Commission composed of representatives of the
participating nations.
The Fleet would be assigned to NATO and placed under
the operational control of the Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe (SACEUR), who would target it and work it into
NATO plans and strategy.
US concurrence would be essential for any decision to
fire the Fleet's missile weapons. The concurrence of the
other members--i,e~, a European veto--would be by vote
of the major participants, or a majority, or otherwise as
ultimately decided by them,
Total cost for constructing the Fleet, equipping and
arming it, building the, necessary bases, and operating it
for the first five years is estimated at $2.3 billion. Annual
operating expense thereafter would average about $156 mil-
lion.
The Fleet is rated comparable "in effective delivery
power" to the British national nuclear force, and for greater
than the French force de frappe as it is presently constituted.
BRITISH-PROPOSED ATLANTIC NUCLEAR FORCE (ANF)
A Force composed of seaborne, airborne, and land-based
nuclear weapons systems, comprising existing national nu-
clear forces of NATO countries--such as the British and
French forces--and a sharply reduced MIS of no more than
ten to twelve ships.
The British ,accept "some" mixed-manning for bombers
and land-based missiles and complete mixed-nianningfor the
MLF component, but they do not want to participate in the
MLF component with either personnel or futrds.
The Force would be under the polTticol control of a
Council of the participating nations. It would beintegrated
with NATO forces and coordinated with the US Strategic
Air Command.
The Force would not be placed under the operational
control of SACEUR, but under another commander respon-
sible to the political Council. (The British da not accept a
strategic mission for SACEUR, and they foresee a French
veto of any formal proposal to turn the Force over to NATO
command because of the practice of "unanimous agreement"
on voting in the North Atlantic Council.)
Nonnuclear powers (i.e., other than the US, the UK,
and conceivably France) would have political control rights
over the Force equal to those of the nuclear powers, but the
nuclear weapons, and the latter neverto disseminate s
relinquish its veto over use of the Force unless it had British
consent (this would prevent eventual Europeanization of the
the Nassau agreement to withdraw them in time:
national crisis.
Force except on British terms).
The UK would commit its notional farces "for the
tion of the Alliance," relinquishing the right it retai
would consist of existing systems essentially, its cost in com-
parison with the US surface-fleet plan would be much.smaf-
ler. In particular, its cost could be much more easily
managed by the UK at the present time.
British national forces committed to the Force would
consist of 64 V-bombers and three to five Polaris submarines.
The British have proposed that the US match the British
contribution of Polaris submarines with units from its own
strategic submarine flotilla, and commit "some" of its US-
based Minuteman missiles to NATO-agreed targets.
The possibility would be kept open for the French to
commit their force de frappe--presumably after De Gaulle's
departure.
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commitment to participate in the
surface component. The two also
agree that any nuclear force
should be placed under the com-
mand of the Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Europe, (SACEUR) , in
order to assure the availability
of all its components to the de-
fense of Europe. They further
favor keeping open the possibil-
ity of reorganizing the nuclear
force to give the European mem-
bers greater powers of control
if and when Europe has attained
a high degree of political unity.
Given France's adamant op-
position to the MLF, and the in-
ability of the others to coalesce
around Britain's alternative,
there was no disposition to raise
the MLF question formally in the
mid-December NATO ministerial
meeting in Paris. But the all-
pervading interest in the problem
of a nuclear force dominated the
bilateral talks which took place
before and during the ministerial
sessions between Secretary Rusk
and the foreign ministers of the
UK, France, West Germany, Italy,
and the Netherlands. These talks,
however, merely confirmed the
lack of any real consensus. At a
five-power meeting on 15 December
it was decided only to issue a
statement calling for another
meeting in late January or early
February to work out a compro-
mise which hopefully would meld
the ANF, MLF, and any other pro-
posals that might be advanced.
forces needed for its imple-
mentation.
In keeping with the con-
cept of "flexible response,"
Secretary McNamara argued that
greater attention is needed in
planning for the contingency of
unpremeditated, limited, con-
flict, arising from political
crises or confrontations. In
the ensuing discussion most of
the other defense ministers
agreed that NATO does, in fact,
need such a new and flexible
strategy. France's Messmer,how-
ever, stuck to the Alliance's
existing strategic doctrine which
calls for immediate and massive
nuclear response to a Soviet at-
tack. To give emphasis to his
conviction, Messmer flatly stated
that France will make no further
commitment of forces to NATO,
regardless of what force goals
the Alliance members might agree
to establish.
There was nothing in his
talks with Secretary Rusk which
would suggest that De Gaulle has
softened any of his demands for
sweeping readjustments in the
NATO structure before present
treaty commitments expire in
1969.
EXCERPT FROM THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY,
signed"inWashington, 4:C.,?on4April1949
The Gaullist eminence gris
was also evident during the De-
cember meetings in the discus-
sion of NATO strategy and the
After the Treaty hos beers in'force fop twenty years, any
Party, may cease to be'a Party, arse year after, its notice of
denunciation has been given "ta the Government of the United
States oft America, which will inform the Governments of the
other Parties of?the deposit of each notice of `denunciation,
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De Gaulle did express an
interest in "coordination" among
the Alliance's nuclear forces
after the French atomic bomb is
ready, and some observers have
interpreted this as a French
concession signaling a "thaw"
in France's hostility to NATO
as it is presently organized.
But is appears more likely a
reflection of the French lead-
er's determination to achieve
recognition of his force de
frappe as a logical--s-Fe-p in his
campaign to restructure NATO on
a "two-pillar" basis in which
European power would have parity
with that of the US at the de-
cision-making level.
Had the nuclear question
been brought to a head in the
atmosphere which prevailed at
the year's end, it is quite pos-
sible that the future of the Al-
liance would have been irrepara-
bly compromised. An almost cer-
tain collision of interest was
avoided largely because the US
decided not to insist on an
early deadline for the creation
of a nuclear force and let it be
known it would approve no plan
not acceptable to both the UK
and West Germany and not dis-
cussed in advance and in detail
with Franch.
With some reservations,
most of the interested NATO
countries accepted the US shift
as in the best interests of the
Alliance. The West German Gov-
ernment, which was more deeply
committed to the MLF than any of
the other European members, had
itself already retreated from its
previous eagerness for a quick
agreement, at least in part be-
cause of a reluctance to see the
MLF question become an issue in
next September's national elec-
tions. In addition, elements in
Chancellor Erhard's Christian
Democratic Party (CDU) did not
relish the government's being
placed in a position of having
to choose between Washington
and Paris.
While it is difficult to
judge the precise impact of the
US move on the UK, the Wilson
government has since seemed much
less disposed to carry out its
mandate to find an acceptable
nuclear compromise. No longer
pressed to hold off an agreement
on the MLF, the British appeared
not to savor being "out in front"
on the nuclear question and La-
bor's search for a way of fulfill-
ing campaign promises to divest
Britain of its independent deter-
rent seemed to lose urgency. In-
deed, there have been reports of
British irritation that the US
appeared to be giving increased
recognition to the French nuclear
force at just the moment Britain
was being encouraged to give up
its own.
In retrospect it seems un-
likely that the Europeans were
prepared at this time to take
the decisions needed to bring
the MLF into effect and to ac-
cept the consequences thereof.
They are openly or secretly re-
lieved that pressures on them to
do so have been eased. Neverthe-
less, they have been quick to
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claim that there is no leader
in Europe capable of bringing
about an agreement on the MLF
--and equally quick to warn that
De Gaulle can be expected to
take advantage of the psycho-
logical vacuum produced by "US.
inactivity" and that he might
succeed in turning the nonnu-
clear powers to France for nu-
clear leadership.
The Uncaught Ball
There is, moreover, only
small prospect at best that the
countries to which the US tossed
the nuclear force ball will be
prepared in the short term to
run with it. The stunning set-
back the Wilson government suf-
fered in the by-election re-
verses of 21 January would seem
to constitute a further obstacle
to a British initiative during
the coming months. Moreover,
London's belaboring of the al-
leged demise of the MLF and of
its basic interest in getting on
with disarmament have fed Bonn's
suspicions of Britain's real in-
tentions. The public statements
of Wilson and Defense Minister
Healey in and out of Parliament
have been viewed in Bonn as
marked by consistent anti-German
overtones.
The Erhard government--faced
with unremitting French opposi-
tion to German participation in
either the MLF or ANF, with a
vigilant pro-French wing in the
CDU and with a Socialist opposi-
tion that is probably stronger
than ever before--is hardly in
a position to act before the
September elections. Even if
Bonn did not want to sidestep the
issue until then, there now is
hardly sufficient time left to
get any nuclear force agreement
through the legislative processes
in the Bundestag before it ad-
journs in July, a prerequisite
to West German approval of such a
treaty this year.
While Rome is hopeful it has
solved some of its internal polit-
ical difficulties for the time be-
ing, it has not in the past been
able or willing to take the lead
in negotiations on an Allied nu-
clear force. Italian Foreign
Ministry officials now are saying
that Italy is presently taking no
initiative with the West Germans
to concert a position on the Brit-
ish proposals. There is little,
if any, prospect that the Moro
government will do so later in
the year in the absence of a push
from one of the other interested
powers.
Restive Europe: The EEC
Although prospects are there-
fore poor for an early agreement
on any kind of joint nuclear force,
it is nevertheless doubtful the
present stalemate is a stable one
in the long run. For an impor-
tant element in the evolving situ-
ation is the considerable movement
on the question of Europe's organ-
ization--one of the basic politi-
cal issues involved from the be-
ginning in the MLF dispute.
Even while the NATO ministers
grappled with the nuclear question
in Paris, the EEC ministers in
Brussels were concluding the crit-
ical agreement to unify grain
prices in the Common Market. With-
out this agreement, the EEC would
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have remained--if indeed it had
survived at all--as primarily an
industrial customs union. With
it, the community now has
achieved something close to a
federal system in the field of
agriculture. It has sharply in-
creased the need for currency
stability and monetary harmoniza-
tion, brought to the fore the
question of the community's fi-
nancial independence, and paved
the way for the substantial
achievement of the EEC's goals
by 1967. In the view of Ambas-
sador Tuthill, chief of the US
Mission to the EEC, the community
is now--much more even than a
year ago--"a major economic
power with strong political over-
tones even in the absence of
overt political union."
Europe: Which Direction?
The grain price decision
would thus appear to imply that
Europe has taken a giant stride
in the direction of the kind of
European organization which the
US has long sought to promote.
The politics of Europe's unifica-
tion are so complex, however,
that one cannot be sure the ad-
vance is so clear-cut as it
seems.
Even the manner in which
the grain price agreement was
reached advises some caution.
It was the EEC Commission which
moved boldly to devise and cham-
pion the terms of a compromise
that proved acceptable to both
the French and Germans. It is
doubtful, however, that the ques-
tion would have come to a head
had De Gaulle not decided, after
months of temporizing, to make
it a test of Bonn's European
faith. Just as he subsequently
warned that German participa-
tion in the MIFF risked French
withdrawal from NATO and the
end of hopes for European po-
litical unification, so De
Gaulle declared that failure
to agree to price unification
would end the Common Market and
the Kennedy Round tariff ne-
gotiations in Geneva.
In both cases, De Gaulle
probably saw in the German
position--belatedly perhaps--
a serious if not fatal threat
to his hopes for Europe.
Whether in forcing Bonn to ac-
cept price unification he ac-
tually advanced those hopes,
however, is another question.
It is true, of course, that
De Gaulle once more success-
fully assumed the mantle of
European leadership, that com-
pletion of the Common Market's
common agricultural policy will
benefit France economically
the most, and that for its po-
litical and economic sacrifices,
Bonn received little in return.
On the other hand, it is
also true that henceforth all
important decisions on agricul-
ture will be taken in Brussels
and that none of the Six may
again act independently on
farm questions. As the US Mis-
sion has observed: "...Future
threats by De Gaulle to wreck
the community, while always
unsettling to some, will be
less credible than heretofore
given the vested interests of
French industry, labor, and
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farmers...De Gaulle has done
much to build up the Common
Market. . .which over a broad range
of national policy... is tying
France into an integrated Euro-
pean system...." In that system,
France "will increasingly feel
restraints on its national free-
dom of action in commercial
policy, financial policy, and
other vital areas." However,
"by his will and determination,
De Gaulle can within limits use
the Common Market for French na-
tional purposes," and it is
likely that the contribution he
is making to its progress is
still conditioned on his belief
that the community serves to
promote his over-all aim of
building a "European Europe."
.Rambouillet: Europe
The relevance of all this
to the future of the Alliance
has perhaps become more evident
from Erhard's meeting with De
Gaulle at Rambouillet on 19 and
20 January. This meeting linked
the questions of economic in-
tegration, political unity, and
defense as perhaps never before.
Erhard went to the meeting
anxious, to obtain at least a
nod of support from De Gaulle
for the German proposals of last
fall for a new start toward de-
veloping a European political
organization. Bonn's proposals,
which envisage on the one hand a
further acceleration of the
EEC's program of economic in-
tegration, also sketch out a
trial approach to political co-
operation in a so-called "pre-
treaty period" of several years
in which there would be pe-
riodic meetings of heads of
government and of foreign,de-
fense, and cultural ministers
to coordinate national policies.
During this time a commission
would facilitate discussions
and, drawing on what transpires,
draft a political union treaty.
From all accounts, De
Gaulle responded favorably to
Erhard's overtures. He re-
minded Erhard that there was
still much to be achieved on
agriculture in the EEC, and he
sniffed suspiciously at the com-
mission idea for any odor of
supranationality. He agreed
nevertheless that the grain
price agreement had cleared the
air for further examination of
the political unity question.
As a result, a timetable of
sorts has been devised. Sub-
ject to the concurrence of the
other EEC members, a committee
of experts of the Six will be
convened early this spring to
prepare for a later meeting of
foreign ministers. If enough
progress is achieved at that
level, a summit meeting would
be in order, perhaps as early
as July.
Talks on defense were also
inconclusive, but appear to
have been more pointed than such
exchanges in the past. This
may be due in part to the fact
that Bonn, at the height of De
Gaulle's campaign against the
MLF last fall, formally requested
Paris to spell out what De
Gaulle meant by his frequent
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references to the possibility discourse by De Gaulle on strat-
of a more truly "European" de- egy, in which he reportedly as-
fense organization, presumably sured Erhard that in the event
as an alternative to the MLF of nuclear conflict Germany
and defense integration in NATO. would be defended. This was
It was evidently Erhard's objec- presumably a reference to De
tive to pursue this question Gaulle's thesis that his force
further at Rambouillet. de frappe would be immediately
According to various ac-
counts of the discussions, De
Gaulle reminded Erhard that
France was still opposed to the
MLF or any variation thereof.
With apparent reference to the
prospects for European union,
De Gaulle reportedly said that
"it would be very regrettable
and unfortunate if the effort
we hoped to make together coin-
cided with pushing the MLF." He
further suggested that German
participation in the MLF or any
other joint atomic defense ar-
rangement would end all hopes of
German reunification by arousing
fears that "German nuclear ambi-
tions were being fulfilled."
In response, however, to
Erhard's questioning on how Eu-
rope was to be defended against
Soviet MRBMs targeted on it, De
Gaulle took a conciliatory line.
He allowed that West Germany, as
the most exposed European ally,
had a "natural right" to partici-
pate in strategic consultations
and nuclear planning for its de-
fense.
This acknowledgment appar-
ently came in the context of a
committed in the event of a So-
viet attack. Thus the French
force would assure the ultimate
availability of the US deterrent
for the defense of Europe even
if the US, under its present
strategic concepts, would pre-
fer a "pause."
The Unity Outlook
It will be some time be-
fore the full significance of
the events leading to Rambouil-
let and of the meeting itself
can be fully assessed.
In the opinion of the US
Mission in Brussels, even if
the grain price agreement paved
the way for modest steps toward
political union, these are
likely to come slowly. It may
in fact, turn out that the forth-
coming negotiations on a "pre-
treaty" arrangement will come
to nothing at all--as has hap-
pened to similar talks so often
in the past. There is no evi-
dent weakening in De Gaulle's
philosophical disdain for
supranationalism, and he may
at any time exercise his pre-
rogative of citing a lack of
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sufficient progress in the Com-
mon Market or the unresolved
questions of nuclear defense as
excuses to bring the exercise to
a halt. Moreover, while the
other European countries have now
largely despaired of "keeping the
door open" to a Britain which
seems to have no real desire to
enter, there are those like the
Dutch who may still feel that
without Britain a European union
is certain to be dominated by
Paris or Bonn or by both.
Nevertheless, the circum-
stances now are not the same as
they were in 1962 when the last
political discussions collapsed.
The EEC is not in the throes of
the divisive negotiations with
Britain or still hamstrung by the
bitterness of their collapse. In-
stead it has scored a notable ad-
vance, the stake of every member
in its continuation is far greater
than before, and the need to con-
tinue the integration process is
more imperative. Moreover, while
the doctrinal question was a
large one in 1962, there are at
most only vestiges of suprana-
tionali_sm left in the West Ger-
man, Belgian, and Italian plans
up for consideration--plans which
are specifically calculated to
satisfy De Gaulle.
crats" in Brussels--not the
Europe of Fatherlands. They
are stronger every day, and
with the coming extension next
year of majority voting rules,
even more power will accrue to
them. Hence, to De Gaulle--and
not only to him---a "political"
balance to such de facto strength
is all the more necessary.
There is a similar range of
baffling uncertainties respect-
ing the defense question. Erhard
has said he offered De Gaulle no
assurances regarding the MLF, but
indicated that the forthcoming
German elections had relegated
the project to the background.
Despite speculative reports,
there is as yet no convincing
evidence that De Gaulle or Erhard
either sought or offered direct
German assistance or participa-
tion in the force de frappe. It
is unlikely as well-t at any con-
crete French-German plan exists
for giving West Germany meaning-
ful participation in nuclear tar-
geting and strategy, and unclear
in what organizational framework
it is thought such participation
might occur.
Finally, in addition to the
positive attractions to De Gaulle
of these concessions, he now has
a more imperative negative reason
for interest in progress toward
political cooperation. He can
hardly be unaware that, since
1962, the advances toward Eu-
ropean unity have meant a further
coalescence around the "techno-
On the other hand, either
Erhard's assurances regarding the
MLF or De Gaulle's hopes that the
project is dead were sufficient
to permit De Gaulle to agree that
political unity talks might pro-
ceed. Should they in fact do so,
Erhard--having initiated them--
has a large political stake in
their fruition. An integral fea-
ture of even Erhard's European
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unity plan is periodic consulta-
tions on and coordination of de-
fense policies. In the short
run, this could provide France
another forum to deal with spe-
cific issues--to undercut any
new moves to create an MLF, for
example. In the long run, it
might prove the first of many
short steps toward a European
defense organization built along
Gaullist lines.
Much, of course, will de-;
pend on Bonn, and it is diffi-`
cult to conceive that the pres-
ent German Government would
involve itself with France in
any defense arrangement which
would jeopardize its ties with
the US, on which its security
depends. In Ambassador McGhee's
opinion, it is possible that
once Erhard is successfully
through the elections he will
consider himself "free from De
Gaulle and able to proceed along
the lines of a more independent
policy." If that is the case,
Bonn's interest in joining some
version of an MLF within the
Atlantic framework is merely
dormant and not dead.
McGhee, however, also notes
the other possibility--namely,
that Erhard may have concluded
from his recent experiences that
it is impossible for Bonn to con-
duct a foreign policy in direct
conflict with that of France. In
this case, Bonn would have to
follow a policy of "detours"--
particularly in the question of
defense. This might mean Bonn's
abandonment for the immediate
future of any hope of direct par-
ticipation in any kind of joint
nuclear force in favor of some
kind of closer nuclear" associa-
tion with both France and the US.
One such possibility which has
been mentioned to the Bonn em-
bassy would be a Nest German
cohsultative role in the target-
ing of both the US deterrent and
the force de frappe.
The other great imponderable
is-the future of Britain in Eu-
rope. So far at least, there is
little or nothing to suggest that
the anti-European bias of the
Labor Party has been modified by
the responsibilities of power.
Nevertheless, Labor is probably
far more aware of Britain's Eu-
ropean- involvement than it was
before it attempted to persuade
Bonn and Rome to accept the ANF,
'before its dispute with France
over the Concord project, before
it incurred the ire of its part-
ners in the European Free Trade
Association with its import sur-
charge, and before it found how
much the future of the pound de-
pends on the Continental bankers.
The Continent, although not
hopeful, will continue to watch
this "education process" with in-
terest. And who could say that
even De Gaulle's exclusion of
Britain from the Common Market is
graven in stone--especially if
the-need for another ally in op-
position to a federal system in
Europe should seem more pressing
to-Paris or if Bonn should become
a less compliant partner than it
now is?
Outlook for the Alliance
In short, the future course
of_the'Alliance now is more deeply
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embedded than ever before in
the future course of Europe.
After two years of relative
stagnation, European unity is
on the move. In which direc-
tion it is moving and what its
eventual shape will be is far
from clear. The motive forces
are clearly De Gaulle and the
Common Market. The two have
different objectives, but they
are often allied in practice,
and are more evenly matched
than many would assume.
If the MLF has in fact
failed, it may have done so
for the same reasons that
blocked Britain's bid for Com-
mon Market membership: because
both implied the continuation
of a US-European relationship
which France could effectively
charge was not in keeping with
Europe's present or future poten-
tial. Whether the US will again
have so great an opportunity to
determine the shape of the re-
lationship between the US and Eu-
rope remains to be seen. In any
case any new approach would have
to take into account the extent
to which "tomorrow's Europe"
already exists. In that Europe,
as Ambassador Tuthill has ob-
served, the "European Community
probably represents the most
vital insitutional element."
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