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December 21, 2016
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June 10, 2008
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February 12, 1965
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Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~, .3~:. ~; ~~ ~ .%~ - Copy .No d '''iI \i\ ~f\ 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLlGEIVGE 25x~ ; `State Dept. review completed ~ s ar/r ...,SECRET C~RC?UP I Excluded from a+1~`omot dgwngrading pnd q'Qelassifica i-n Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 SEC'RET' (Information as of 1200 EST, 11 February 1965) Page THE VIETNAM SITUATION Hanoi apparently remains determined to continue the war in South Vietnam at an intensive pace despite the US and South Vietnamese air strikes. Heavy Communist pressure persists in the South, and this week appears likely to prove the most violent of the war to date, The politi- cal response of Hanai and its Liberation Front has also been defiant. Peiping, while moving cautiously, is issu- ing increasingly bellicose propaganda. However, no sig- nificant military deployment in China, the USSR, or North Vietnam that can be considered direct reaction to the air strikes has been detected thus far. PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST PREPARATORY MEETING Although before recent hostilities in Vietnam, Moscow appeared determined to proceed with the March prepara- tory meeting, the Soviets. now may find their plans com- plicated by the Vietnamese crisis. THE DOWNFALL OF LYSENKO Biologist Lysenko"s ouster from :his institute in the Academy of Sciences climaxes a tern-year campaign by Soviet scientists to free resear~:h from the stifling ideological dogmas of the Stalin era. His removal will encourage restive intellectuals in other fields. SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASES CONTINUE The USSR has bought considerable amounts of grain this season, both for its own use and to meet export commit- ments, and free world brokers ex]aect additional orders. SOVIET MILITARY MEN OPPOSE "SUBJECTI'J'ISM" IN DOCTRINE Recent statements by two high-ra~lking Soviet staff off i- cers suggest that the military l~aadership of the USSR is pressing for a greater role in the determination of mil- itary doctrine and other matters relating to national military policy. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 ~` SECRF; T ASIA-AFR];CA THE SITUATION IN LAOS 9 General Kouprasith Abhay, commander of the forces in the Vientiane area, has emerged as a dominant figure in the military establishment following last week's showdown with Phaumi and Siho, who have fled to Thailand. There appears to be no prospect at present of any effective, opposition to Kouprasith. SYRIAN REGIME MOVES LEFTWARD ~ The Baathists have successfully beaten down conserva- tive opposition to their nationalization program, and seem somewhat more willing to permit local Communists to collaborate with them. ISRAEL AND ARABS APPEAR EDGING CLOS~~R TO CONFLICT 10 The latest Israeli warnings havE; been aimed at intim- idating Lebanon from participating in Arab plans to divert the Jordan River headwatE~rs, but the Lebanese claim they have no alternative. Sentiment seems to be growing in Israel for some kind of preventive mil- itary strike against the Arabs. PRESSURES FOR RHODESIAN INDEPENDENCE CONTINUE Prime Minister Smith is being pressed by extremists within his party to tighten white rule, despite the international difficulties which are likely to ensue. GAMBIA BECOMES INDEPENDENT This small West African country, hitherto under British control, is expected to federate eventually with neigh- boring Senegal, although the movE~ment in this direction may be slow. SECRE ~' 12 Feb 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 SE CRE'T ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page COMMON MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 16 The six EEC countries are showing renewed determination to hasten their economic integration, but the difficult problems involved may be resolved only in another all- inclusive "package deal" this summer. ASSESSMENT OF DE GAULLE'S 4 FEBRUARY PRESS CONFERENCE 17 De Gaulle reasserted both his world power aspirations for France and. his insistence that Europe be independ- ent of US tutelege. He set no target dates for reform of the international monetary system or for German re- unification, but he may soon follow up on his proposal to reorganize the UN. STUDENT UNREST IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN' lg Portuguese students declare that the aim of recent anti- regime demonstrations in both gauntries is to free student organizations from government c~antrol, but they deny any connection between the two prat~est movements. The unrest has embarrassed bath regimes, which are trying to improve their image abroad. WESTERN HEMIS]?HERE CUBAN TACTICAL MISSILE DEPLOYMENT Continuing relocation of Cuban ,surface-ta-air and cruise missile units apparently is intended to shift emphasis from area and coastal defense to point defense of spe- cific military installations. SEC'RET' CURRENT INTELLIGENCE YIEEKLY SUMMARY Page Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 WESTERN I3EMISPHERE I;continued) Page TURMOIL OVER PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY OF BOLIVIAN JUNTA CHIEF 21 Although Bolivian law would appear to require Barrientos to resign from the junta in order to seek the presidency, he fears his probable successor would impose a military dictatorship. His refusal to resign has incurred both military and civilian opposition. BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT MAY POSTPONE GIJ.6ERNATORIAL ELECTIONS 22 President Castello Branco apparently feels that major political campaigns this year would have unsettling effects on the administration's ;austerity and reform programs, which are planned to have their major impact by early 1966. SECRET 12 Feb 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iv Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 CHINA 7, ~, a~~d 11 February 1965 Chop Le Borracks ~.~ grid 11 February ~..- ~ , r LAC35 r NORTH VIETNAM . J _` _-Doug Hoi Barracks ~,/ 7 February REPR45AL TARGETS ~1, ~~ ~ -. ,, . -~ , .~ a Target strucf~ vn ~ i ..,,~ r HAra r ~ '~ ~ ~?~'~~ Cbonh Hoa Borracks --~.~?"''~ :'`-~ I1 February ~ {`'t ~YIETNAM~~ Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 ? SECRET `'~ Hanoi apparently remains determined to continue the war in South Vietnam at an inten- si_ve pace despite the US and South Vietnamese air strikes on North Vietnam. Since the first strikes the Communists in South Vietnam have maintained the of- fensive they launched at the end of their unilateral lunar new year cease-fire, beginning with two simultaneous attacks on 7 February on US installa- tions at Pleiku. During the next several days there were other large- and small-scale attacks throughout the country. Heavy pressure persists, and this week appears likely to prove the most violent of the war to date. No significant North Viet- namese, Chinese Communist, or Soviet military deployments that can be considered a direct re- action to the air strikes have been detected thus far. In response to the stepped- up Communist offensive, which included the largest direct at- tacks on A~.~~ricans in the war, US and South Vietnamese air units on 7, 8, and 1.1 February struck targets in North Viet- nam associated with the infil- tration into South Vietnam. On 7 February US planes attacked North Vietnamese Army barracks at Dong Hoi, headquarters of the 325th Division, destroying a total of 12 buildings and damaging several more. One US plane was lost and its pilot is hissing. Or, 8 February, the South Vietnamese Air Force struck at the Chap Le Barracks, home of the North Vietnamese 270th Inde- pendent Regiment, just north of the Demilitarized Zone. Initial paststrike photography indicates that damage to the buildings in the area was light. On 11 February US carrier- based aircraft struck the Chanh Hoa army barracks just north of Dong Hoi, believed to house ele- ments of the 325th Infantry Di- vision, and pilot reports indi- cate the target was severely damaged. Three US planes and two pilots are still missing, and the North Vietnamese claim to have captured one. At the same time, on the 11th, the South Vietnamese Air Force at- tacked the Chap Le barracks area again. No information on the success of this strike is yet available. The sustained intensity of mil= itary action in South Vietnam since the end of the Tet cease-fire SECRET 12 Feb 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 ~ S.~ ~;RLT ~ has resulted in an impressive demonstration of Viet Cong mili- tary strength. Although Viet Cong forces have suffered heavy losses in some of the fighting, they have inflicted severe casualties on the government. In coastal Binh Dinh Province, two battalion-size Communist attacks may have wiped out nearly two companies of gov- ernment regulars and part of another battalion, although the fate of the government forces is still not fully known. US per- sonnel have also suffered their worst week of the .war, with heavy losses in the Pleiku attacks, the subsequent terrorist bombing on 10 February of an enlisted men's billet in Qui Nhon, the capital of Binh Dinh Province, and in scattered fighting throughout the country. Many of the Viet Cong attacks undoubtedly were in preparation before and during the cease-fire. Some, however, appear to have been launched in response to exhorta- tions by the Viet Cong's Libera- tion Front to step up military and political activity following the retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam on 7 and 8 February. In particular, a pattern of in- creased violence against Americans is indicated, not only by the severity of the Qui Nhon bombing, but by the mutilation of three American advisers whose bodies were found when government troops on 10 February retook a district town which had been briefly over- run by the Viet Cong north of Saigon. The political response of both Hanoi and the Liberation Front to the air strikes has also been one of defiance. The Lib- eration Forces Command urged all troops to "strike strongly, and really lastingly, in order to pro- tect the North and liberate the South." In propaganda statements and official protests to the In- ternational Control Commission, Hanoi adopted essentially the same posture used after the Tankin Gulf crisis last August--an expression of injured innocence, determination to pursue objectives in South Viet- nam, and willingness and readiness to meet future US military action. North Vietnam described the air strikes as unwarranted US aggression and portrayed the re- sults--it now claims the destruc- tion of 12 US aircraft--as a vic- tory for its air defense units. The first in a series of nation- wide mass protest demonstrations in Hanoi rallied 70,000 people. Peiping is moving cautiously while at the same time attempting, with increasingly bellicose prop- aganda, to encourage Hanoi and to deter the US from moves to enlarge the conflict. There has been a steady escalation in the Chinese war of words since 8 February, and massive anti-US rallies are being staged all over China. The editorial blast in Peo- ple's Daily on 10 February is very ~I".-I~warns ominously that if the US is bent on spreading the war to China, Peiping will "have no ~'E C.~ET Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 ,~'E CET alternative but to go along with it to the very end," and that in such an event "the whole of South- east Asia, the whole of Asia would be aflame w~.th the revolu- tionary fire." The editorial notes that America's "meager force" in Asia is spread thinly over a "long arc from South Korea to Indochina," and that if the conflict were expanded, the "time, place, and scale of the war" would be beyond US control. This ,. latest outburst con- tains Peiping's most specific pub- lic commitment thus far to action in response to new US moves. It is very carefully ~Shrased, however, to give the Chinese wide freedom of choice in their reaction. Speaking of a US decision to en- large the struggle, Peiping as- serts that "an invasion of the DRV is also an invasion of China" which the Chinese would be duty- bound to oppose with "concrete action," This is much more precise than the formulation used in the official statement about the Viet- nam situation issued by Peiping on 8 February--and last August fol- lowing the Tonkin Gulf incident --which used the broader term "ag- gression," Thus refined, the Chi- nese promise to help Hanoi defend itself is firmest in regard to the contingency Peiping probably re- gards as most remote, a major ground offensive against North Vietnam, In other more likely situations the Chinese leave them- selves room for maneuver. Peiping's latest statement implies that it expects more air strikes against North Vietnam but makes no promise of an immediate Chinese response. Instead, it claims that such attacks will never frighten the "South Vietnamese people" and that whatever the US does they will "certainly redouble their efforts to deal one heavy blow after another on the US aggressors." The events in Vietnam have al- ~most certainly made it more diffi- cult for the USSR to choose between .increased support for the DRV--with .its consequent implications for So- ~viet-US relations--and a disengage- ment which could be exploited by ]?eiping. -The initial decision to :send the Kosygin mission to Hanoi `vas probably based an the premise i~hat a commitment of Soviet military -rt Sa"r~nse?ttx?airrrissile site . -'d . Sarface to-air' missile assembly area . `1~ ..Cruise missi('e site T?'~ Crrrisa mr's,s91e facility??; ; - i~Q7,'~ . Ae~ s~mba~s rleaote.vacated itrsial tatio CUBAN TACTICAL MISSf LE DEPLOYMENT Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 SECR.~~' Western Hemisphere Relocation of Cuban sur- face-to-air and cruise-missile units apparently is continuing. High-altitude photography revealed that the M sites at Caibarien and have been moved from the Santiago de Cuba cruise-missile storage site and the Ma.ya.ri Arriba. cruise- missile facility., The new loca- tion of most of the cruise mis- siles and equipment is unknown, although the high-altitude recon- naissance mission 25X1 Nuevita,s have recently been abandoned. The new location of the Ca.iba.rien site has not been found, but high -altitude phatogra.phy indicates that the Neuvitas unit may be moving to Altagracia. near Camaguey. This change would be consistent with the continuing Cuban program of shifting SAM deployment from area defense to point defense. Cruise-missile equipment has also been transferred re- cently. a con- voy of cru se-m?ss a equipment was photographed moving out of the Banes coastal defense site. The same photography re- vealed that numerous cruise- missile vehicles and crates showed that some cruise-missile gear was a.t the port of Banes. The other actions ma,y well have been taken in order to establish additional coastal defense launch sites along the coast, or to de- ploy the ground forces version of the missile to selected mili- tary camps. Nearly 150 cruise missiles were delivered to Cuba during the Soviet military .build-up in 1962, but only four coastal de- fense Launch sites--with about ten missiles each--were set up. The rest of the missiles have been kept in storage areas. SECRET 12 Feb 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 20 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 SE CR~;T Western Hemisphere TURMOIL OVER PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY OF BOLIVIAN JUNTA CHIEF Rene Barrientos is deter- mined to stay on as president of the Bolivian junta in spite of his presidential candidacy in the national elections now scheduled for 26 September.. Bar- rientos fears that should he resign from the junta, his prob- able successor, commander of the armed forces General Ovando, would annul the elections and impose a. military dictatorship. Barrientos' resignation was requested in a. cabinet meet- ing last month, probably on the basis of a constitutional re- quirement that candidates for election resign from public of- fice 180 days before the elec- tion date. It is likely that this legal issue masked the feeling of certain officers that the military should stay out of politics. Barrientos refused to resign, a.nd his stand has since been given a. legal and public blessing in a press ar- ticle by a prominent constitu- tional lawyer. The relationship between lBarrientos and General Ovando :remains cordial on the surface. On the other hand both men are ,ambitious for the presidency, a.nd their cooperation is based ~aa.inly on the respect of each :l=or the other's assets, namely Barrientos' popularity with the ~:ivilia,n population and Ovando's f~ta,nding with the armed forces :~s a respected commander. Division within the armed j"orces over the two leaders does not exist a.s yet, but there i'.s little doubt that opinion groups have developed over cer- i;a.in issues. In general, the debate is over the role of the a~,rmed forces in the life of the nation. Ovando is believed to k-e aiming at a condition where the military will be the final a~.rbiter in Bolivian a.ffa.irs. A. Barrientos government would p~roba,bly depend more upon civil- ians in the decision-making process. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 21 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 SECRET Western Hemisphere A p~oposa.l by President Strong opposit3n n to the Castello Branco to postpone all postponement proposal has gubernatorial elections scheduled come from such widely di- for this year has become a vergent sources as the Labor major political issue in Brazil, Party and the far right. The A presidential adviser has governors themselves appear confirmed press reports that divided on the matter according Castello Branco is preparing to to the political advantage they ask Congress either to extend see in the alternatives. The the terms of the governors con- powerful Magalhaes Pinto of cerned for one year or to allow Minas Gerais has strongly en- indirect elections by the state dorsed the postponement. How- legislatures. ever, Guanabara Governor Carlos La.cerda, whose attitude will heavily influence the final Voting now is scheduled outcome, has yet to make his far October in 11 of the 22 views known. Lacerda is a top states. The President a.p- presidential contender and patently feels, however, that probably would make a.n all- political campaigns at this out effort to block post- juncture would have unsettling ponement if he concluded that effects on the government's gubernatorial elections would stabilization and reform policies. help his candidacy. At the This year is considered de- moment it appears likely that cisive in the effort to have the administration could gain the austerity program dem- sufficient congressional support onstra.te success by early 1966. for some form of postponement. Castello Branco seems deter- mined to leave office next yeax when his term expires. He realizes that he would come under increasing pressure from hard-liners to defer the 1966 presidential a.nd congressional elections and to remain in power indefinitely if the country's urgent economic problems a.re not alleviated. SECR~~'T Page 22 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0 Q Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0