SPECIAL REPORT SOVIET POLICY AND TACTICS IN THE CYPRUS DISPUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 12, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

12 February 195
OCI No, 0276,/65A
Copy K6.-
SOVIET POLICY AND TACTICS IN THE CYPI US DISPUTE
O F I = I C E OF C U R R E N T I N J' L L,( N F.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE: -AGE-NCY
State Dept. review completed
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12 February 1965
The USSR has skillfully exploited the Cyprus
crisis to further a number of its policy objectives
in the eastern Mediterranean at the expense of the
West. It has been able to pursue its major goal of
weakening the NATO alliance by playing upon the am-
bitions and animosities of Greek and Turk without,
thus far at least, committing itself to any specific
course of action. In recent months Moscow has taken
a position more favorable to that of Turkey as the
new Soviet leadership has vigorously pursued a policy
of rapprochement with Ankara.
Soviet Objectives
Soviet policy in the east-
ern Mediterranean area has been
aimed primarily at reducing the
cohesion and effectiveness of
the southern flank of NATO.
Since the Cyprus crisis began,
the USSR has consistently pur-
sued this goal by exploiting
tensions among NATO allies and
by seeking to complicate efforts
to achieve a settlement of the
dispute. Thus, Moscow's policy
during the prolonged crisis and
Soviet gestures toward the Greek
Cypriots and the Turks have re-
sulted from strategic considera-
tions which transcended the pa-
rochial issues of contention on
the island.
Moscow's most immediate
goal in Cyprus has been the ter-
mination of Western base rights.
Soviet propaganda has encouraged
Greek Cypriot opposition to the
continuation of British sovereign
base areas on the island. The
USSR has also sought to discredit
those political elements in Cy-
prus favorable to the West and
to strengthen the already impres-
sive position of the Communist
Party of Cyprus.(AKEL). The
influence of AKEL grew consid-
erably during 1964 as the Ma-
karios government consistently
sought to give the impression
of a closeness of views between
the Greek Cypriot and Soviet
:positions.
The USSR has portrayed it-
~self as the champion of the in-
dependence and integrity of the
island. The Soviet Union has
consistently opposed enosis
(union with Greece). Soviet
statements in public forums of-
fering the Makarios' government
an alternate source of support
have encouraged it to maintain
its independence of Athens.
Soviet support for the
Makarios government, however,
was not dictated by any inher-
ent sympathy for the Greek Cyp-
riots, but by the political and
strategic considerations already
outlined. In recent months, So-
viet officials have expressed
doubts about the long-term pos-
sibilities for Cypriot independ-
ence and have shown a full ap-
preciation for Makarios' capa-
city for duplicity. Even when
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it was attacking Turkey most
vigorously, the USSR managed
to keep open its lines of con-
tact with Ankara and to preserve
its freedom of maneuver for a
move toward rapprochement if
this were expedient. In fact,
it appears that both before and
during the crisis Moscow has
calculated that its objectives
in the area were more likely to
be achieved through closer re-
lations with Turkey.
In recent years the USSR
has made intermittent efforts
to improve relations with Tur-
key. These moves have been
prompted primarily by a desire
to reduce and ultimately elimi-
nate the extensive NATO presence
on the Soviet borders. As a
part of this program, the USSR
has slowly expanded its diplo-
matic, cultural, and economic
contacts with Ankara and has
tried to promote neutralism in
Turkey.
The most recent Soviet ef-
forts, begun in early or mid-
1962, were moderately success-
ful, and in June 1963 a Turkish
parliamentary delegation visited
the USSR. A Soviet delegation
was to have returned the visit
in January 1964, but the Cyprus
crisis led to the postponement
of this good-will gesture until
January 1965.
Initial Reaction--
Limited Support for Makarios
Moscow's initial reaction
to the outbreak of communal
fighting on Cyprus in December
1963 was to give full support
to Makarios' renunciation of
the London and Zurich agreements
of 1960 which established Cyp-
riot independence. Soviet
propaganda emphasized the need
to respect the national inde-
pendence and territorial integ-
rity of the Cypriots and al-
leged that NATO was exploiting
communal tensions to justify
interference in the internal
affairs of the island.
Soviet support for Makar-
ios' efforts to block US-UK
plans for a NATO peacekeeping
force on the island was moti-
vated in part by a concern that
the West would succeed in using
the crisis to strengthen its
military position in Cyprus--
thus jeopardizing Soviet se-
curity interests in the eastern
Mediterranean. These same stra-
tegic calculations led the USSR
to encourage Cypriot opposition
to British base rights.
At the same time, this
militant vocal support enabled
Moscow to undercut Chinese
charges that it was indifferent
to anti-Western movements among
oppressed nationalities. Fi-
nally, by encouraging the Greek
Cypriots, who were trying to
reduce the political role of
the Turkish community, Moscow
sought to aggravate relations
between Ankara and Athens, thus
further weakening the southern
sector of NATO.
Despite its interest in
encouraging Makarios to termi-
nate the London and Zurich
agreements, the USSR carefully
avoided any commitment to sup-
port the Cypriot Government
militarily.
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Tentative Gestures
Toward Ankara
SE CRS; T
A new phase opened up last
spring and summer as Moscow ap-
parently calculated that the
danger of Turkish intervention
had diminished. During this
period, Moscow began to spell
out its opposition to enosis
more clearly and at the same
time sought to draw the anti-
Turkish sting out of earlier
statements. This tactic was re-
flected in a 4 May Khrushchev.
statement in Izvestia and a
Pravda article the same day.
Both commentaries sought to lay
the blame for the crisis on "the
imperialists and reactionaries
that have their own special plans
for Cyprus."
On
2 June, Turkish Foreign Minister
Erkin told the press that the
USSR had given assurances that
it would not supply weapons and
war material to Cyprus.
Opposition to
Turkis ntervention
By the end of July, however,
tensions in Cyprus had again
raised the danger of Turkish
intervention. On 26 July Pravda
published a highly inflammatory
interview with Archbishop Ma-
karios in which he expressed his
"appreciation" for remarks made.
earlier in the month by Khru-
shchev concerning Cyprus. Ma-
karios interpreted these remarks
as a "serious warning" to Tur-
key against invasion; Khrushchev's
statement fell far short of this,
but Pravda allowed Makarios to
give i a bellicose ring.
At the same time, however,
Moscow may have become concerned 25X1
that the Greek Cypriots had be-
gun to believe their own propa-
ganda.
Subsequent Soviet conduct
during and after the 9 August
Turkish air strikes on Cyprus
bore out this warning. Cyprus
asked the Soviet Union "to in-
tervene" on its behalf, accord-
ing to the Cypriot foreign min-
aster. Khrushchev responded im-
mediately with noncommittal notes
to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu
and to Makarios. Only on 15
August, after the danger of fur-
ther Turkish attack had subsided,
did a Soviet Government state-
nent promise "help" in the event
of foreign invasion.
Moscow apparently issued.
some private warnings to Turkey,
but it is unclear how specific
these were. Erkin told the US
ambassador that on 15 August
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
stated that in case of further
Turkish military activity in
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Cyprus, the USSR "will help Cy-
prus militarily." Erkin told
the British ambassador that Gro-
myko said the USSR would "in-
tervene militarily." Following
up these conversations, Erkin
approached the US ambassador on
more than one occasion for US
assurances of support in the
event of Soviet retaliation
against further Turkish military
action in Cyprus. Erkin may
have elaborated on Gromyko's
warning simply to obtain assur-
ances from the US before Turkey
undertook any further action in
Cyprus.
The Soviet Government state-
ment of 15 August offered to
open negotiations with Cyprus
concerning the "help" to be
rendered in case of an invasion.
As a result of this offer, a
Greek Cypriot delegation traveled
to Moscow and on 30 September
signed an agreement with the
USSR. The full details of this
agreement have not yet been re-
ported, but there is speculation
that it covered a wide range of
military material.
Deliveries under the pact
began in January 1965 and are
likely to be finished by mid-
February.
Recent Moves Toward Turkey
By the time of the Cypriot
visit to Moscow it was already
becoming clear that the USSR
was determined to resume its
efforts to improve relations
with Ankara, and it is unlikely
that the Greek Cypriots received
many specific promises from the
Soviet authorities. Moscow may
have calculated that Turkey had
abandoned further plans for an
attack on Cyprus and that Arch-
bishop Makarios was moving to-
ward accepting enosis. Under
these circumstances, it was not
only possible but necessary to
seek an improvement of relations
with Turkey and to base this
effort in part on a common op-
position to enosis.
Moscow's efforts have been
facilitated by Ankara's convic-
tion that the West had not given
it adequate support over Cyprus.
In the latter half of 1964, this
disillusionment led to a feeling
in Turkey that it was necessary
to improve relations with the
USSR. The first step in this
effort was Erkin's 30 October -
6 November visit to Moscow.
This visit, first proposed
by the USSR in mid-1963, was
used by both governments to dem-
onstrate a renewed warmth in re-
lations. This took the form of
a Soviet recognition of the
"lawful rights" of the Turkish
community on the island--a tac-
tical gain from the Turkish
point of view--and an agreement
on cultural and scientific ex-
changes. Subsequently, a Turkish
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technical delegation visited
the USSR in December for two
weeks and concluded an agreement
to expand trade.
The USSR quickly responded
to the Erkin visit by sending
to Turkey the ldng-delayed par-
liamentary delegation, led by
presidium member Podgorny, from
4 to 13 January 1965. During
the visit Podgorny made routine
reference to such issues as Turk-
ish adherence to NATO and sought
support for the Soviet position
on UN Article 19, but directed
most of his efforts toward im-
proving the atmosphere of rela-
tions. He offered economic aid
to Turkey and invited both Pres-
ident Gursel and Prime Minister
Inonu to visit the USSR.
Despite a Turkish show of
optimism that the USSR is moving
to endorse Ankara's position on
Cyprus, Podgorny specifically
refused to recognize the validity
of the London and Zurich agree-
ments--which give Turkey the
right to intervene militarily.
Moreover, on 13 January TASS an-
nounced a visit to Moscow of an
AKEL delegation to discuss the
Cyprus situation. This announce-
ment reiterated the standard So-
viet line that the independence
and integrity of Cyprus must be
respected, that foreign inter-
ference must be avoided, and that
the Cypriots must be free to de-
cide their own affairs.
Podgorny promised a statement en-
dorsing the principle of federa-
tion as a possible means of set-
tling the dispute on the island.
This promise was partially ful-
filled by an equivocal statement
in Izvestia by Gromyko on 21
January. Gromyko.suggested that
federation might be chosen by
the Cypriot people, but immedi-
ately qualified this statement
by indicating that such a "sys-
tem presupposes the existence of
a single centralized government."
Although Gromyko's refer-
ence to federation excited the
most comment among the princi-
pals to the dispute, it was al-
m.ost certainly intended to be
read as part of a larger scheme
which would contain elements
pleasing to both the Greek Cyp-
riots and to Ankara. Moscow
probably was aware of the opposi-
tion in Athens and Nicosia to
federation, but it appears to
have miscalculated the intensity
of the emotional impact of the
term "federal solution." This
suggests that Soviet efforts to
pursue a consistent policy, while
giving the appearance of being
all things to all men, may have
finally broken down. Moscow's
recent stand, for instance, has
already begun to erode the once-
strong position of AKEL on the
island and appears to have se-
verely reduced its chances of
coming to power by electoral
means.
Behind the balancing act
attempted by Gromyko, however,
was a clear statement of basic
Soviet interests in the affair:
opposition to enosis and to the
presence of foreign troops on
the island. Gromyko declared
that "the main thing now is to
ensure Cyprus' independence and
territorial integrity" and that
"the withdrawal of all foreign
troops" is necessary.
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Outlook: Limitations on
Soviet Action
Soviet goals have not
shifted since the downfall of
Khrushchev, but the new leaders
appear to be moving with greater
vigor to improve relations with
Ankara. Erkin's visit was the
first by a high-level foreign
non-Communist official after
the fall of Khrushchev. The
dispatch of a figure with the
stature of Podgorny and the
propaganda treatment of his
visit reflect considerable So-
viet interest in impressing Tur-
key with the potential gains of-
fered.by closer relations.
Despite Moscow's quick rec-
ognition and exploitation of
Turkish disillusionment with
the West, Soviet policy is to
a degree limited by past Soviet
initiatives. The logic of the
situation following the Turkish
air strikes in August demanded
at least the offer to "help"
the Cypriots. This help is
probably not of such a magnitude
as to have a serious effect on
the military situation on the
island, but its psychological
impact could damage the Soviet
position in Turkey. Moscow,
moreover, would face a genuine
dilemma if Turkey should take
a threatening stand against Ma-
karios' recent steps to promul-
gate an electoral law which dis-
regards the terms of the London
and Zurich agreements.
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Finally, Soviet leaders
are probably aware of the fra-
gile nature of the recent improve-
ment in relations with Turkey.
The rapprochement of the past
few months has been undertaken
over the opposition of the Jus-
tice Party, which now appears
likely to win the forthcoming
elections in Turkey. Despite
growing trends of independence
and opportunism in Ankara's for-
eign policy, there remains a
strong current of anti-Russian
feeling in Turkey and it is un-
likely that there will be any
significant change in attitudes
in the next few years.
Despite these limitations
on its freedom of action, the
USSR will continue to seek to
expand its role in the eastern
Mediterranean at the expense of
the West. It is unlikely to
assist in seeking a solution of
the Cyprus problem, since it has
most to gain by a continuation
of tensions between Greek and
Turk. The USSR might actively
oppose any solution which par-
titioned the island, as was pro-
posed by Turkey last summer.
Moscow is likely, however, to
pursue its rapprochement with
Ankara as far as possible, with-
out compromising its position
elsewhere in the Afro-Asian world
in the event of renewed Turkish
threats of intervention. F
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