WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004800070001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 26, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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(Information as of 1200 EST, 25 March 1965)
Page
VIETNAM
Despite last week's step-up in air strikes against the
North, Communist reaction remained confined to relative-
ly pro forma denunciations. More heated was the reaction
to US activity against the Viet gong in the South, and
the bloc is acting in unison in condemning use of non-
lethal gas there. Peiping gave prompt propaganda support
to the Viet Cong call for foreign assistance, but hedged
somewhat over sending troops by tying such a move to a
bid from the "South Vietnamese." Peiping continues to
take a hard line on negotiations. The current lull in
Viet Cong activity is reminiscent of those noted before
the battles of An Lao and Binh Gia and the raid on US
forces at Pleiku.
PROGRESS ON ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE USSR
Continuing public discussion shows that many fundamen-
tal disagreements remain and suggests that reforms will
be made gradually and with considerable opposition and
revision.
RUMANIAN LEADERSHIP CHANGES
Following the death of party first secretary and State
Council president Gheorghiu-Dej, key posts were quickly
filled--apparently Moscow was not consulted--by men gen-
erally considered to have been among the architects of
Rumania's independent course in the Communist world.
26 Mar 65 CURRENT INTEf Gc#&~EEKLY SUMMARY Page i
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THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page
EFFECTS OF MOSCOW CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE 8
East European leaders now believe more strongly that the
determination of future policies affecting their countries
rests primarily with themselves, rather than with some new
international Communist organizational mechanism.
CHINESE COMMUNISTS STEP UP WAR OF WORDS WITH MOSCOW
Their vituperative attack in the 23 March issues of
People's Daily and Red Flag--their first extensive
commenf-o the recent "'consultative"" conference in
Moscow--makes it clear they intend to press forward
with a no-holds-barred polemical assault on the new
Soviet leadership.
AS IA-AFRICA
ANTI-AMERICAN CAMPAIGN CONTINUES IN INDONESIA
In addition to taking control of American-owned oil
companies, the Indonesian Government has permitted in-
creasing harassment of the local American colony.
MODERATES WIN ELECTIONS IN CEYLON
Prime Minister Bandaranaike's leftist coalition was
defeated in the voting on 22 March,, and moderate for-
mer prime minister Dudley Senanayake will form a new
government.
NEW THREAT OF TURKISH MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS
Ankara's armed forces remain in a high state of readi-
ness, and Cypriot President Makarios has refused to
stop importing heavy military equipment. Athens has
rejected the idea of negotiations until after the UN
mediator issues his report, probably next week.
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONGO
Leopoldville's military operations are meeting little
resistance at the moment, although trouble may be build-
ing up in the eastern Congo near Lake Tanganyika. Mean-
while, national provincial elections, scheduled to last
until 30 April, have begun.
SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN HOSTILITY FLARES AGAIN
Although the Somali Government charges that Ethiopia is
moving troops and creating incidents in disputed areas,
the Somalis themselves seem to be stirring up most of
the trouble, partly for domestic reasons.
EUROPE
FRENCH ELECTIONS CONFIRM LOCAL APATHY TOWARD GAULLIST PARTY 16
Even on the Paris city council, where they scored rela-
tively well, the Gaullists just barely outnumber the
Communists and will have to work with an anti-Gaullist
"center" group in order to elect a council president
and administer the city.
ATLANTIC NUCLEAR FORCE DISCUSSIONS
In response to British efforts to get ANF talks started
again in a multilateral forum, Bonn, Rome, and The Hague
have agreed such talks could be held in the existing
Paris MLF Working Group--probably not before May.
EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNITY TALKS IN PROSPECT
EEC members generally welcome Italy's invitation to
hold foreign ministers' discussions in Venice this
spring on European political unity, but there is some
concern over possible French tactics.
SPANISH GOVERNMENT RISKS FURTHER STUDENT UNREST
Student demonstrations are likely to resume following
a virtual turndown by the Council of Ministers of de-
mands for democratic reforms in the Spanish University
Syndicate.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
ECUADOR ATTEMPTING TO REVIVE BORDER DISPUTE WITH PERU 19
Ecuador has been preparing diplomatically to try to
bring before the Extraordinary Inter-American Confer-
ence scheduled to open on 20 May its claim that the
Rio Protocol is void. This 19,62 protocol established
boundaries between Ecuador and Peru, disputed since 1822.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
HONDURAN ASSEMBLY MAKES LOPEZ "CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT" 20
Even moderate factions of the Liberal Party, whose del-
egates had boycotted the first several sessions of the
government-rigged assembly, may now feel compelled to
join Communists and opposition labor elements in at-
tempts to overthrow the Lopez regime.
TRINIDADIAN GOVERNMENT MOVES AGAINST LABOR AGITATORS 20
It has introduced a bill--which seems certain of early
passage--designed to reduce the power of leftist union
leaders who have plunged Trinidad into a lengthy period
of labor unrest.
SAO PAULO MAYORALTY ELECTION ENCOURAGES BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT 21
The Castello Branco administration, confident that the
mayoralty outcome reflects public acquiescence in its
basic programs, will apparently resist further hard-
line pressure to postpone all state elections.
BOLIVIAN POWER STRUGGLE THREATENS NEW VIOLENCE 22
The clandestine rivalry between junta president Barri-
entos and armed forces commander Ovando burst into the
open this week and is threatening to resolve itself by
violence. Barrientos? position seems to be the strong-
er at the moment.
SE CRE T
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Swo, *0
CHIN:A
HANOI
A O S
Phu Van upply
i and`ammodepot
,V.inh..Son radar.....
NORTH VIETNAM
RECENT US AND SOUTH
VIETNAMESE STRIKE TARGETS
,Dong Hoi radar
Vinh Linh radar
Vu Con ba,r ckks , DEMARCATION LINE
r5 BOOTH
26 MARCH 1965
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The pace of the air war
against North Vietnam quickened
this week as five strikes against
DRV military targets were con-
ducted by US and South Vietnam-
ese planes.
The large ammunition and
supply depot at Phu Van was hit
first on 19 March with excel-
lent results. Nearly half the
75 buildings in the target areas
were destroyed, and many more
heavily damaged. The next strike
was conducted against the Vu Con
barracks on the 21st. This tar-
get is believed to be a staging
site for the Viet Cong infiltra-
tion network.
Following the Vu Con at-
tack, US and South Vietnamese
strike aircraft were directed
against DRV radar stations.
Three sites were hit
Poststrike photo-
graphs show that considerable
damage was done to the radar in-
stallations at Vinh Son and Vinh
Linh, although both radar towers
remain intact. Results of the
strike against the Dong Hai radar
site are not yet available. Af-
ter the Vinh Linh and Dong Hoi
attacks, the strike aircraft
ranged north along Route 1, us-
ing their remaining ordnance on
targets of opportunity.
Despite the step-up in the
air strikes, Communist politi-
cal reaction continued to be con-
fined to relatively proforma de-
nunciations. Hanoi propaganda
in part stressed the theme that
normal economic effort in the
DRV should be disrupted as lit-
tle as possible by civil defense
preparations in connection with
the strikes.
Much more heated was the
Communist political reaction to
US activity against the Viet
Cong in South Vietnam. In a ma-
jor pronouncement on 22 March,
the president of the Viet Cong's
Liberation Front denounced the
US bombing of insurgent concentra-
tions and the landing of US com-
bat forces in South Vietnam.
The expanded US role in the war,
according to the pronouncement,
justified a Viet Cong call for
foreign assistance in the form
of weapons and other war ma-
terials. The front spokesman
also warned that the Viet Cong
will ask for "troops and youths"
from abroad if the US continues
to send forces to South Vietnam
and further expands the war.
Peiping gave prompt propa-
ganda support to the Viet Cong's
open call for foreign assist-
ance. The People's Daily edi-
torial on march 1she most
explicit warning thus far con-
cerning possible Chinese mili-
tary intervention.
People's Daily declared
that a inese people" will
jo:Ln in sending "all necessary
material aid, including arms and
all other war material, to the
Viet Cong." The editorial took
a more cautious line on the
question of sending Chinese
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troops, however, by asserting
that Peiping was ready for this
step "whenever the South Viet-
namese people want them." The
most recent Viet Cong statement
implied that such a call for as-
sistance would come only if the
US continues to send its own
forces to Vietnam and "expands"
the war further.
The Chinese editorial quoted
the Liberation Front statement
that "all negotiations with the
US imperialists at this moment
are utterly useless if they still
refuse to withdraw from South
Vietnam all their troops and all
kinds of war material and means
and those of their satellite
countries ...11 and endorsed, it
as a "clear and definite answer"
to US "war blackmail." Although
this still leaves Peiping room
for maneuver on the conference
question, it moves the Chinese
closer to a public commitment
on preconditions for talks.
According to press reports
from Peiping on 24 March, a sen-
ior Chinese official told Japa-
nese correspondents that negotia-
tions were impossible as long
as the US bombing attacks against
the DRV continued and US troops
remained in South Vietnam. This
statement, if correctly quoted,
goes beyond the more ambiguous
Chinese position in earlier com-
ments that "peace" in Vietnam
is out of the question prior to
a US withdrawal.
26 Mar 65
Hanoi has rebroadcast the
Viet Cong appeal, but has of-
fered no substantive response
of its own as yet. Earlier in
the week the North Koreans had
reiterated their willingness to
send "all types of material aid."
Pyongyang has not hinted, how-
ever, that it plans to send
men to fight in Vietnam.
For the first time, a So-
viet leader has hinted at the
possibility of Soviet "volun-
teers." In a 23 March speech,
one of the USSR's toughest on
Vietnam, party leader Brezhnev
also attacked US "acts of ag-
gression" against the DRV and
again intimated that Soviet-US
relations will suffer a further
deterioration if the US main-
tains its present policy in
Vietnam. He maintained that al-
though the USSR is not against
"good relations" with the US,
it will not tolerate any en-
croachment on its legitimate
interests or on the security
of its friends and allies. In
an oblique reaction to recent
Chinese charges of a Soviet
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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sellout on Vietnam, Brezhnev
concluded that "we shall never
make these interests the sub-
ject of a deal with anyone."
The bloc states are acting
in unison on the use of non-
lethal gas against the Viet Cong.
Editorials and commentaries from
Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow have
depicted the gas as "poisonous,"
and have assailed its use as
"inhuman" and a "monstrous crime"
against all the Vietnamese
people. Their goal is appar-
ently to generate as much anti-
US sentiment as was sparked by
Communist "germ-warfare" charges
during the Korean war.
Communist Military Developments
There is as yet no evidence
to confirm an assertion by So-
viet leader Brezhnev on 23 March
that the USSR is "already" as-
sisting the DRV in building its
defense potential.
E2evelopments in South Vietnam
The political situation
remains outwardly quiet in
Saigon. However, friction and
rivalries persist among top
military and civilian officials
and Buddhists and Catholics
continue to view each other
with distrust. Premier Quat,
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now on his first major provin-
cial tour in the northern prov-
inces,,continues to have at
least the current support of
the Buddhists as well as the
cooperation of the military.
Some generals are grumbling
quietly, however, over the lack
of dynamic action by the govern-
ment so far.
Concern among the military
over an early challenge to the
position of General "Little"
Minh as armed forces commander
appears to have diminished fol-
lowing confirmation of his
status by a meeting of the Armed
Forces Council on 20 March. The
meeting may have the effect of
exacerbating religious frictions
in view of the fact that the
three top military positions
now are held by Catholics, while
an allegedly pro-Buddhist gen-
eral has been put in charge of
personnel on the Joint General
Staff. Buddhist leaders, how-
ever, continue to give the im-
pression that they intend to
avoid any major political in-
volvement unless their organiza-
tion is threatened
Viet Cong armed attacks,
terrorism, and sabotage declined
considerably during the past
week, as Communist forces
throughout South Vietnam appeared
to be avoiding contact with
major government units. Similar
lulls have been noted periodi-
cally in the past. The Viet
Cong may be holding their forces
in check to consolidate recent
gains, to resupply and replace
combat losses, to assess re-
cently increased American and
Vietnamese air operations di-
rected against concentrations
of their forces, and to plan
new attacks. The current rela-
tive inactivity is reminiscent
of the lulls noted before the
battles of An Lao and Binh Gia
and the raid on US forces at
P:leiku.
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The Communist World
PROGRESS ON ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE
Since the change of Soviet
leadership last fall there has
been an acceleration in discus-
sions that may lead to signifi-
cant changes in the economic
management of the USSR. As
many fundamental disagreements
remain, however, whatever
changes take place will prob-
ably be introduced only grad-
ually, and with considerable
opposition and revision.
As of mid-February, Pravda
claimed to have received a ou
600 responses to a proposal
made last August that an enter-
prise's performance should be
judged by profit, not output.
Pravda's account of these re-
plies indicated that the major-
ity of the correspondents be-
lieved that production could
improve if managers were given
more autonomy and were judged
by the profits they earned.
The opponents--those who fa-
vored continued central direc-
tion and retention of volume
of production as the major suc-
cess indicator--were clearly
in the minority.
The strength of this op-
position, however, is apparent
in the recently published rec-
ommendations of a commission
appointed by the Academy of
Sciences. This commission
specifically noted that profit
is only one of the important
success indicators which must
be used along with other cri-
teria to measure the total value
of production. The report omit-
ted any reference to wider use
of volume of sales, which has
been; paired with profitability
as the basis for judging the
success of a current experi-
ment in the textile industry.
Regime support for this experi-
ment is indicated by plans to
extend it to more than 500
light industrial plants this
year.
In calling for additional
studies and experimentation as
we'Ll as for research on the pri-
ority ranking of performance in-
dicators, the recommendations
of the commission reveal an in-
ability to reach agreement on
how to implement the various
suggestions that have been made
in recent months. Consequently,
any decisions to go beyond the
innovations of the textile ex-
periment would be premature until
these questions have been more
fully resolved.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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I I VICE MAURER FIRST VICE
FIRST SECRETARY: CEAUSESCU PRESIDENTS: BUNACIL PRESIDENT: APOSTOL PRESIDENT: VOITEC
NINE VOITEC
SECRETARIES: MEMBERS EIGHT TWO VICE PRESIDENTS
CHIVU STOICA SECRETARY: GEAMANU VICE PRESIDENTS
DALEA FOUR 465 DEPUTIES
RAUTU ALTERNATE EIGHTEEN
NICULESCU-MIZIL MEMBERS MINISTERS
VERDET
Names in red indica-e changes resulting from death of Gheorghiu-Dej
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RUMANIAN LEADERSHIP CHANGES
The new Rumanian regime will
probably continue the independent
policies inaugurated under the late
party first secretary and State Coun-
cil president, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-
Dej. Following his death, the key
posts were quickly filled, appar-
ently without consultation with Mos-
cow, by men generally considered to
have been among the architects of
Rumania's new course.
The new party first secretary,
Nicolae Ceausescu, who was probably
hand picked by Dej, is a 47-year-old
former central committee secretary.
He reportedly exercised considerable
control in the party as Dej's chief
of personnel and organization. He
is a totally committed and national-
istic Communist, but it is question-
able whether he has Dej's political
ability to concentrate power in his
hands and gain the unconditional sup-
port of the party hierarchy.
In internal affairs, Ceausescu
apparently will support the current
thaw in regime control over the in-
tellectuals.
All indications are that the
first secretary, along with the new
State Council president, 56-year-old
Chivu Stoica, will pursue Rumania's
independent line in foreign affairs.
Stoica, like Ceausescu, is a central
committee secretary. Both are
veterans of international Communist
gatherings, and both went to Pei-
ping last March with Council of Min-
isters President Ion Gheorghe
Maurer for talks with top Chinese
Communists on the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute. With his appointment to what
Is largely a ceremonial job, Stoica,
whose importance has been waning
in recent years. may suffer a fur-
ther diminution of his power.
Maurer, 63, is considered to
have been the regime spokesman dur-
i.ng the past two years. An able
administrator, he was re-elected
premier last week and will retain
his responsibilities-as head of gov-
ernment. Listings of party lead-
ers during Dej's funeral rites place
him second behind Ceausescu in or-
der of importance.
The party also elevated Alex-
andru Birladeanu to full politburo
status and chose three new central
committee secretaries. Birladeanu,
an economist in whom Dej placed a
great deal of trust, represented Ru-
mania at meetings of the bloc's
Council for Mutual Economic Assist-
ance (CEMA) where Bucharest's in-
dependent policies were first mani-
fested. The net effect of these
changes appears to be to emphasize
the technical-administrative
character of the party secretariat25X1
The strength of the Rumanian
:Leadership during the past decade--
and in particular as it has estab-
7Lished its independence from Moscow
---has stemmed from its unusual unity
and relative stability. The new
:Leadership appears to reflect a ju-
dicious effort to continue in power
those elements that have contributed
to the evolution of the Rumanian
position in the bloc. In speeches
during the 24 March funeral pro- 25X1
ceedings, both Ceausescu and Maurer
emphasized "collective leadership."
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The Communist World
Eastern European leaders
apparently have concluded that
a break with the past took
place at the 1-5 March "con-
sultative meeting" of 19 Commu-
nist parties in Moscow. They
now believe more strongly that
they themselves rather than
some new international Commu-
nist organizational mechanism,
must determine future policies
affecting their countries.
Marked by dissension and
lacking any meaningful com-
mon ground, the meeting pro-
duced a communiqud pointedly
designed to be broadly inter-
preted by the Ea.stern European
parties. The differences in
interpretation already apparent
suggest that the document it-
self contains the seeds of fur-
ther discord.
The diverse reactions of
the East Europea.n leaders to
the conference reflect their
na.tiona.l interests. Polish
politburo member Zenon Kliszko
made the most explicit state-
ment on the meeting. He told
a plenary session of the party
central committee on 17 March
that "uniform interna.tiona.l
organization of the Communist
movement, with an international
center of lea.dership, does not
exist, and...its existence is
out of the question."
Kliszko made clear that
the future "unity" of the Com-
munist parties could not be won
with "oinding resolutions"
drawn up at international meet-
ings. In effect, he urged a
new style of relations among
Communists based on a. voluntary
association of parties. They
could hold international meet-
ings, but only to set the
broadest common policies such
as "coordinating strategy (not
ta.ctics)in the struggle against
imperialism."
By implication at least,
a.Lthough for different reasons,
the East German regime has a
similar view to that of the
Poles which, in turn, approaches
that of the uninvited Yugoslavs.
Czechoslovak reaction to the
meeting heavily stressed its
negative a.spects, suggesting
that the Prague regime agrees
with these positions. Rumania's
party--which along with Albania's
declined to attend--barely men-
tioned that the meeting was held.
The Hungarian regime has
reacted cautiously so far and
issued no original commentary.
Failure to do so suggests that
Budapest is examining again the
import for itself of the evolv-
ing state of relations within
the Soviet bloc.
In contrast to other East
Europeans, the Bulgarians chose
to re-emphasize their "undying
loyalty" to_the Soviet party
and a world-wide need to strug-
gle for "purity," that is, uni-
formity, in ideology. This
probably reflects the belief
of the Bulgarian leadership--
deeply dependent on Soviet sup-
port--that this line is what
Moscow still wants to hear.
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CHINESE COMMUNISTS STEP UP WAR OF WORDS WITH MOSCOW
Neither Kosygin's Consulta-
tions in Peiping last month nor
the confrontation between US and
Communist forces in Vietnam has
brought Communist China and the
USSR any closer together. The vi-
tuperative anti-Soviet attack in
the People's Daily and Red Flag
issues of -a-rrch makes_1t-cTear
that Peiping has every intention
of pressing forward with a.no-holds-
barred polemical assault on the
new Soviet leadership--a.n assault
which the Chinese now claim could
last "10,000 years."
In its first extensive commen-
ta.ry on the recent "consultative"
conference in Moscow, Peiping
flatly rejects the Soviet plea for
an end to polemics. The Chinese
claim that by the very act of con-
vening the Moscow meeting the So-
viets have made it necessary for
Peiping to "openly" criticize the
"'more cunning" revisionism of Mos-
cow's new leaders. They contend
that preparations for "a success-
ful meeting for unity," which at
one time might have required four
or five years, now will require
"twice as long, or even longer."
The latest Chinese blast de-
mands that the Soviets capitulate
on all major issues in dispute
and publicly admit that the recent
Moscow meeting was "wrong and il-
legal." It rings all the changes
on the theme "Khrushchevism with-
out Khrushchev," alleging that Mos-
cow's leaders have taken over Khru-
shchev's revisionism "lock, stock,
and barrel" and that the "consulta-
tive" gathering was in fact the
"self-same illegal and schismatic
meeting ordered by Khrushchev."
The Chinese clearly view the
new Soviet leaders' efforts at
bloc unity and the decision to
hold the March meeting as oblique
thrusts at Peiping itself and im-
plicit challenges to China's pre-
tensions as the leader of mili-
tant revolution in the Communist
world.
The Chinese also appear seri-
ously concerned over the possibil-
ity of Soviet-US collusion in
reaching a. Vietnamese settlement
which not only might save face for
Washington but avert the major po-
litical and military defeat which
Chinese leaders contend is inevi-
table in the long run. The Peo-
ple's Daily - Red Flag commentary
bitterly attacks'-"fraudulent" So-
viet policy, castigating Moscow
for "sham" support on Vietnam and
for "plotting peace talks." It
belittles the statement on Vietnam
issued during the Moscow meeting
and again berates the USSR for al-
leged brutality against Chinese
students who participated in the
4 March anti-American demonstra-
tion in Moscow.
The harshness of Peiping's
tone suggests that even if Sino-
US relations deteriorate sharply
in the months ahead because of
Vietnam, there is little likeli-
hood of any real Sino-Soviet rap-
prochement. China's leaders are
probably now convinced that the
basic attitudes of Khrushchev's
heirs have not and will not change
and that any hardening in Moscow's
relations with Washington as a 25X1
result of the crisis in Vietnam
will be only a. temporary tactic.
SECRET
26 Mar 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
ANTI-AMERICAN CAMPAIGN CONTINUES IN
Largely as the result of Com-
munist pressures, the Indonesian
Government on 19 March placed all
foreign-owned oil companies under
its control. These include the
three American-owned companies--
Caltex, Stanvac, and Pan-American
--and a Dutch subsidiary of Shell.
The government has appointed cus-
tody-control teams for each com-
pany, and has stated that manage-
ment is obliged to "assist" these
teams. The actual role of manage-
ment, however, has yet to be de-
termined.
The government ministers im-
mediately concerned in the take-
overs appear anxious to continue
operations with as little inter-
ruption as possible, because oil
is a major source of foreign ex-
change. The Communists, on the
other hand, are pushing for a
complete take-over and expulsion
of all non-Indonesians from the
companies' administrations.
Other harassment of Americans
also continues. Gas and electric-
ity were cut off at selected Amer-
ican homes and offices on 18 March;
electricity has been restored, but
not the gas. The teletype service
between the US Consulate in Sura-
baya and the US Embassy in Dja-
karta was discontinued for a time,
and the telecommunications center
in Djakarta refused to handle dis-
patches for American news corre-
spondents. A small American-owned
rubber factory in Java, which had
been placed under government super-
vision in February with minimum
obstruction to its activities, now
has been seized by Communist-led
workers, and the American manager
has been barred from his office.
The Communists continue to de-
mand action against remaining do-
mestic anti-Communist newspapers
and organizations. On 2 March, the
government banned six weeklies and
two dailies that had supported the
anti-Communist "Sukarnoist" move-
ment last fall. These are in ad-
dition to 21 non-Communist news-
papers banned in mid-February.
Sukarno has ordered that no further
demonstrations be held from now
until the end of April. This may
be an effort to muzzle both the
Communists and the Moslems, but
it looks more like a device to
dampen the Moslems' current anti-
Communist campaign without requir-
ing actual repressive action. The
agitation among the Moslems appears
to have been largely channeled into
the press during the past week.
MODERATES WIN ELECTIONS IN CEYLON
As a result of the defeat of
Prime Minister Bandaranaike's party
in Ceylon's 22 March general elec-
tions, her leftist regime has been
replaced with a government headed
by Dudley Senanayake, a former
prime minister and head of the
conservative United National
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
Party (UNP). Senanayake's govern-
ment will be more sympathetic to-
ward Western interests, but will
maintain Ceylon's nonaligned pos-
ture.
Senanayake has emerged with
enough parliamentary strength to
win a confidence vote when Parlia-
ment convenes early next month.
The UNP itself won 66 seats in the
157-member House of Representatives,
and Senanayake, as prime minister -
designate, is entitled to fill six
appointive seats. In addition, at
least ten independents and members
of minor parties will vote with the
UNP government. These include sev-
eral whose defection from Mrs.
Bandaranaike's party last December
helped topple her government. The 14
legislators belonging to the Feder-
al Party, which represents Cey-
lon's Hindu Tamil minority, have
also agreed to support Senaua-
ya ke.
Senanayake's victory augurs
well for an early settlement with
US oil companies whose properties
were seized three years ago. This
resulted in the suspension of US
aid to Ceylon.
Senanayake will fall heir to
serious economic troubles--nearly
exhausted foreign reserves, wide-
spread unemployment, industrial
stagnation, and probably leftist
labor unrest--that will severely
test the administrative compe-
tence of a party that has not held
office for nine years. The new
government probably will seek 25X1
emergency Western financial assist-
ance to help it past the critical
SECRET
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h } xx
I" RN?~L
rasa ,~ o
PT
CYPRUS
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N"001 V-0w
S$ CRET
Asia-Africa 25X1
,NEW THREAT OF TURKISH MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS
There was less military activ-
ity on Cyprus during the past week
and diplomatic efforts continued in
an effort to prevent a new collision
between Ankara and Athens.
The
Turkish press states that Premier
Urguplu will present an ultimatum
to Athens before Turkey moves. Pres-
ent Turkish intransigence over Cy-
prus may have been strengthened by
a growing belief in Ankara that the
USSR will not interfere if the Turks
decide on military intervention.
The Turks are maintaining their
armed forces in a high state of
readiness and are currently engaged
in large-scale amphibious "training
The Greek Government is fully
aware of the danger of Greek-Turkish
hostilities growing out of the pres-
ent C rus situation.
Greek attempts to secure a
promise from the Greek Cypriots to
avoid further provocations to the.
Turks for the next six months appear
to have failed. Makarios, at Greek
and UN urging, has agreed, however,
not to oppose the rotation of the
Turkish Army contingent on 28-29
March. He has refused to end the im-
portation of heavy military equip-
ment or permit the UN troops to re-
assume their positions between Greek
and Turkish Cypriot forces in tense
areas such as the one near Lefka. Re-
ports from US and UN officials in
Nicosia tend to discount Turkish
claims that the Turkish Cypriots are
starving and suffering "inhuman"
treatment.
Informal Turkish suggestions
that Athens agree to begin immediate
bilateral negotiations have been re-
jected by the Greeks. There is some
hope, however, that the new Turkish
ambassador in Athens and a proposed
change of Greek ambassadors in Ankara
will permit easier relations to de-
velop. Much will depend on the pro-
posals contained in the UN mediator's
report, scheduled to be presented to
U Thant this week. The Greeks have
indicated a willingness to begin ne-
gottiations with Ankara after the re-
port is issued, apparently on the as-
sumption that it will support Greek
demands. Greek Cypriot leaders have
indicated that if the mediator re- 25X1
commends negotiations, they too will
be willing to enter into direct con-
versations.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 13
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DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
International boundary
Province boundary
0 National capital
* Province capital
Areas outside
government control
GABON
Banzyvil le
Gemena
Lisala Bumb
* - ..ems
4unia/
Coqullhatville
?
Boende
r1 ;*Inongo
?
Bolobo
BRAZZAVILLE
LEOPOLDVILLE
Ken-ge
-- Boma= ?1
Pow nqui
Kindu~
1Ct4XItA~!
(j) KIGALI
i RtJND!)
BUJUMBURA
(U61, NI )A
i Fort Portal
? . KAMPALA"
I. ~~a eale?,'Con
1 Kongolo
Bakwanga 1~ F y>__ *1
* *Kabittda Albertville
,~ms
A
Baudoul~Ile
Kabongo.
... _ _ri ManOpo,g
Kernina ?
ANGOLA
(Port.)
ties bane bccn anterpoiazcd from earning
'flee reports, and are not definitive
Kolwezi*t
Jadotvilie
'
Elisabetvhvilte
ZAMBIA
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vkw~ SECRET Vapi
DEVL,,OPMENTS IN THE CONGO
The Congolese Government's
offensive to seal the northeast
borders has so far met little
resistance, but rebel activity
is increasing north of Albert-
ville. Meanwhile national and
provincial elections have begun.
A government force of 250
mercenaries and 500 Congolese
is moving rapidly along the
Ugandan border. At last report,
the column had captured Aru, the
principal point of entry from
Uganda. The rebels are said to
be fleeing to the north.
In other sections of the
northeast, government forces
patrolling from Paulis are meet-
ing little resistance and are
generally well received by local
tribes. Government patrols from
Stanleyville have also been ac-
tive and have penetrated rebel-
controlled areas on several oc-
casions recently.
In the eastern Congo south
of Bukavu, the rebel build-up
continues around Fizi, near Lake
Tanganyika. Several thousand
insurgents equipped with arms
smuggled across the lake from
Kigoma, in Tanzania, are re-
ported to be in the area, threat-
ening to move south into north-
ern Katanga. In this region,
there are few effective merce-
naries, and government units are
reported to be unreliable. A
Congolese lake patrol appears
to have been mounted, however,
and should reduce considerably
the arms smuggling across the lake.
The Congolese national and
provincial elections began on
:L8 March. The three Katangan
provinces are leading off. The
elections--to select the 166-
member Chamber of Deputies--
will continue province by prov-
ince until 30 April. Provin-
cial assemblies are also being
chosen, and the national Senate
will be chosen by the provincial
:assemblies when they meet. The
president will be chosen later
this year.
The elections in Katanga
have thus far progressed smoothly
and with little violence, al-
though there is considerable
evidence of irregularities. The
results will not be known for
several days, but these three
provinces will probably rally to
Tshombd, no matter which parties
or individuals actually win the
provincial or national positions.
Tshomb4's recently formed
national political cartel, CONACO
(Convention Nationale Congolaise),
is having a slow start, but it 25X1
is currently the largest politi-
cal combination in the Congo.
SECRET
26 Mar 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 14
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 40 i0
l\ lei;') SAUDI ARABIA
S U D``A N ~^- 'F'~ ~F (''',?
4
staua
^ a
KHARTOUM Agordat
SAN'A
Kass a '
ma
As
ia
1
ERnT R
~^
YEMEN R
A:osab
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r
ADEN
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m \/F \
Gondar L
k
a
e FRENCH '
4i I- , / 'DJIBOUTI'
Er Roseires 1T?rzn- SOMALILAND,
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NO ~~ ass4er
}
Berbera
w
10
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Dir?da
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Hargeisa BenderEell~ -
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ADDIS
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T H I 0 P LA
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uke Baia 08
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TANZANIA Arusha
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BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
{
1
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE I
50
THE HORN OF AFRICA
Area inhabited by Somali people
International boundary 1 11 Selected railroad
National or colonial capital
0 200 400
47092 Miles
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SECRET
Friction between Ethiopia
and Somalia has increased again
following persistent charges by
Somali radio of Ethiopian viola-
tions of the agreement they
reached after last year's seri-
ous border clashes. The Somalis
say Ethiopian forces have killed
Somali nomads and moved troops
into the demilitarized zone
along their disputed border. The
Ethiopians counter that the So-
malis themselves, by their false
allegations, are violating a
provision in the agreement call-
ing for cessation of hostile
propaganda. The Somalis insist
they are merely reporting the
facts.
The level of dissident ac-
tivity in the chronically dis-
turbed Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia
border areas generally has re-
mained at a low level during the
past year, although in recent
weeks unusually severe drought
and famine conditions have in-
tensified frictions. At this
time of year, Somali nomads are
deep in Ethiopian and Kenyan ter-
ritory, and it is not unusual
for them to clash with bandits
or Ethiopian troops, often with
human casualties as well as
losses of cattle or goods.
L___J Somali radio early this
week was silent on the
subject of clashes in the bor-
der area.
Last week the Ethiopian am-
bassador to Mogadiscio was re-
called "for consultations as a.
result of deteriorating relations.`"
Before leaving Somalia he told
a US Embassy official that he
would return within a week and
urge the Ethiopian Government
to set an April date for the bi-
lateral foreign ministers' meet-
ing sought by Somalia's Prime
Minister Abdirazak.
If, as seems likely, the
Somalis are exaggerating the
seriousness of recent border
area clashes, they probably have
a variety of objectives. They
hope first of all to persuade
the Ethiopians to negotiate.
Also, the Somali Government
needs to divert attention from
the drought and famine and is
seeking a means of sidestepping
political difficulties when
parliament convenes in April.
Moreover, Mogadiscio's anger is
currently stirred by what it re-
gards as inequities in Western
aid policies toward Ethiopia and
Somalia.
Ethiopian fears, meanwhile,
have been magnified by Somali-
Sudanese-Egyptian collusion in
support of dissidence in Ethio-
pia's northern province of Eri-
trea and by Somalia's interest
in pan-Islamic movements, as
well as by continuing Soviet
arms deliveries to Somalia
SECRET
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SECRET
FRENCH ELECTIONS CONFIRM LOCAL APATHY TOWARD GAULLIST PARTY
The 21 March runoff ballot in
France's nationwide municipal elec-
tions confirms the failure of the
Gaullist Union for the New Repub-
lic (UNR) to make headway against
the firmly entrenched traditional
parties. The UNR remains in a rel-
atively weak position, having won
only 25 of the larger cities--a
net increase of 1. Only the Commu-
nists have clearly gained, winning
control of 34 of the larger cities
--9 more than in the last municipal
elections in 1959. The Socialists
won 32--a net loss of 9, princi-
pally to the Communists.
In Paris, where the Gaullists
had expected to obtain a majority
of the 90-member municipal council,
they won only 39 seats. Anti-Gaull-
ATLANTIC NUCLEAR FORCE DISCUSSIONS
Bonn, Rome, and The Hague, in
response to British efforts to get
ANF discussions started again in a
multilateral forum, have agreed
such talks could be held in the ex-
isting Paris MLF Working Group.
London has accepted this and is
pushing for the talks to begin next
month, but they will probably not
start until after Prime Minister
Wilson's visit to Rome from 27 to
29 April.
The UK, which has been seek-
ing as broad a forum as possible
among the NATO members for the ANF
talks, is proposing expanding the
group from its seven present mem-
bers and adding an observer cate-
gory. To get around a possible
French veto and avoid pre-emptive
ist "center" lists would not with-
draw in favor of the better placed
UNR, thus throwing several dis-
tricts to the "popular front."
Nevertheless the UNR did increase
its strength in the capital, where
in 1959 it had won only 23 seats.
The remainder of the council now
consists of 38 Communists and 13
"center" members, obliging the
UNR to work with the "center" in
order to elect a council president
and administer the city.
In Marseille, Socialist Mayor
Gaston Defferre, in alliance with
the "center" elements, scored a
resounding victory over both the
Communists and the UNR, thus re- 25X1
inforcing his base to challenge
the Gaullists in the presidential
elections in December.
idebate in the North Atlantic Coun-
cil, the British Foreign Office
proposes that a simple announce-
group sessions are being resumed.
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26 Mar 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNITY TALKS IN PROSPECT
The EEC foreign ministers
have apparently accepted Italy's
invitation to hold discussions
in Venice this spring on Euro-
pean political unity. Italy's
move is welcomed as affording
the first opportunity in three
years for even a modest degree
of progress. At the same time,
however, officials are con-
cerned over possible French
tactics in a new round of talks.
Prior to Italian Foreign
Minister Fanfani's invitation
last week, nothing specific had
come of De Gaulle's and Erhard's
agreement in January at Ram-
bouillet to try to relaunch
political unity talks. In
superseding the lower key bi-
lateral approaches made in re-
cent weeks by Rome Foreign Min-
istry Secretary General Cattani,
Fanfani now has taken the more
direct--but substantively vague
--approach favored by the French,
who object to the proposals in
both the Italian and German po-
litical unity plans of last
year for a "first step" in-
volving the setting up of an
independent study commission.
The French, although favor-
able to Italy's intiatives, have
been reluctant to push the matter
publicly for fear of raising
suspicions of their intentions.
German Foreign Minister Schroeder,
for example, probably suspects
--and fears--that talks on po-
litical unity could force a
discussion of Germany's defense
commitments. This may explain
Europe
Bonn's earlier expressed pref-
erence for starting the unity
talks at the working-group
level. Erhard himself admitted
this week that defense ques-
tions would "ultimately" have
to be part of any political
union, but added they did not
have to be discussed, initially.
Similarly Belgian Foreign Min-
ister Spaak, who reportedly
understands that Fanfani wishes
to introduce the MLF/ANF issue
into the talks, believes the
injection of nuclear defense
matters would be "most unfor-
tunate." If the Venice meeting
takes place on 10 May, as
originally proposed by Fanfani,
it would immediately precede
a scheduled NATO ministerial
council meeting in London.
Despite German reserva-
tions on procedure, Erhard is
anxious to have something con-
crete to show before the fall
German elections as a result of
his unity proposals. In Feb-
ruary he reportedly appealed to
:Dutch Foreign Minister Luns to
help him "in the pre-electoral
period with some kind of for-
ward movement in the European
political field." There has
been speculation, as well,
that the French are not in-
different to Erhard's electoral
concerns. Spaak's hesita-
tion about a formal meeting--
riow apparently overcome at
Erhard's urging--also derived
less from a lack of desire for
movement than from concern over
the adverse feeling which could
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SECRET
Europe
result from a "failure." France's
desires at least to commit its
EEC partners to regular political
discussions are probably increased
now by its suspicions of recent
British diplomatic maneuvers in
Bonn and The Hague which the
Quai probably views as partially
intended to obstruct progress on
European unity.
The intensive bilateral
contacts which can be expected
before the Venice meeting and the
extraordinary nature of the meet-
ing itself will probably make the
discussions a major focus of
European attention during the
coming weeks.
Student demonstrations are
likely to resume following a vir-
tual turndown by the Council of
Ministers of demands for democratic
reforms in the Spanish University
Syndicate (SEU). Following a cab-
inet meeting on 18 March it was
officially announced that a study
of reforms must await a "normal
situation" and be carried on within
the existing syndicate structure.
Students will consider this a
disavowal of the commitment which
they felt they received from
Herrero Tejedor, under secretary
of the movement (the parent body
of the syndicates), on 7 March.
A further hint of some uncertainty
within the regime over the ques-
tion was the tone of editorial
comments in the controlled press.
The support it evidenced for re-
forms in the university syndicate
had suggested that some accommoda-
tion of student demands would be
forthcoming.
Police action against demon-
strators was mild when the current
round of student demonstrations
against the SEU first began in
Madrid on 29 January. A protest
march on 24 February was roughly
broken up, however, and the
faculties of medicine and of
philosophy in Madrid were closed
for several days and five profes-
sors who participated in a student
meeting were suspended. Herrero
Tejedor met with student leaders
and quieted the situation with
promises of reform. Students in-
dicated that a lull in demonstra-
tions would depend on the way the
government acted on Herrero's
promises and on the treatment ac-
corded to the five suspended pro-
fessors. Demonstrations at Bar-
celona and Bilbao led to closings
of faculties there.
The reversal of Herrero
Tejedor's commitment is not sur-
prising. While some elements
within the regime are sympathetic
to the students' demands, they
are much more responsive to the
dangers inherent in any liberal-
ization in the monolithic syndi-
cate organization. Any reforms
granted to students would quickly
bring new demands by workers for
reform of their syndicates. This
would undermine the government's
rigid control of labor, with at-
tendant political repercussions.
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ECUADOR
dSan~?.
Loren.,'
O Esmeraldas
OIbairra
Bahia de ~
Caraquez
?Papallacta
OO
Guaranda _ O
Babahoyo Riobamba
9Daule
Guayaquil 1 Alfaro
Santa Elena OP
Salinas -- 0
ISI.A
PUNAj
1y
Santo ?
Domingo
Azogue (9
Cuenca O
Machala
o LAST 2 MARKERS*-,.
Pasale
'iedraos
O I I
Lola Zamora [ ?
ECUADOR ASPIRES TO
AN OUTLET TO
AMAZON SYSTEM=..I
Rocafuerte?Fs...
r1. :aCl-
FR. GUIANA
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Nwo~ 1140
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
Ecuador has been preparing
diplomatically to try to bring be-
fore the Extraordinary Inter-Amer-
ican Conference scheduled to open
on 20 May its claim that the Rio
Protocol is void.
The Rio Protocol of 29 Janu-
ary 1942 established in detail the
boundaries between Ecuador and
Peru, disputed since 1822. These
reflected Peru's de facto control
of most of the upper Amazon basin,
its victory in a 1941 border war,
and its strong colonial titles.
Ecuadorean public opinion has been
so intensely committed for genera-
tions to unattainable aspirations
for territory on the Amazon-Mara-
non river system that the protocol
has been exploited by the politi-
cal opposition to embarrass suc-
cessive Ecuadorean governments.
frontier remaining open between
the last two border markers em-
placed, but President Belaunde
opposes this.
The agenda of the OAS meet-
ing was approved before the Ecua-
dorean junta was driven to action.
Should it belatedly raise the mat-
ter there as it has promised, Peru
would leave the meeting. Further-
more, the quarantors of the execu-
tion of the 1942 protocol--Chile,
Brazil, Argentina, and the US--
have no wish to permit the open-
ing of a Pandora's box of demands
for boundary revisions. Most gov-
ernments are unwilling to touch
this hot potato, and consequently
Ecuador has little hope of obtain-
ing the necessary two-thirds vote
to introduce its pleas at the OAS
meeting.
Impotent to loosen the rul-
ing military junta's grip on power
or to speed up its plans for tran-
sition to civilian rule, Ecuador's
political parties demanded in Feb-
ruary that the government use the
forthcoming OAS meeting to present
"just grievances." Ecuador has
claimed since 1960 that the jurid-
ical background of the protocol,
and a minor flaw in geographical
terms of reference of the stipu-
lated boundary, nullify the in-
strument.
Peru adamantly maintains that
the protocol is a valid, freely
ratified, unalterable instrument
whose execution should be com-
pleted. The Peruvian opposition,
which controls congress, has re-
peatedly demanded unilateral de-
marcation of the 78 kilometers of
If the junta and Belaunde
are able to resist political and
public pressures, this episode in
the long dispute will probably
pass without diplomatic or fron-
tier incidents. The basically
friendly relations between the
two governments favor gradual dis-
sipation of the current storm.
Nevertheless, Ecuador reportedly
has added 90 days to draftees'
military service, and if nation-
alistic pressures in either na-
tion force strong actions, a
critical situation could develop
rapidly. The affair carries the
potential for wrecking the OAS
conference and, if the Ecuadorean
junta does not do enough to placa125X1
its people, conceivably could be
the issue to bring about its fall.
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w
Nicaragua
MANAGU* J,
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HONDURAN ASSEMBLY MAKES LOPEZ "CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT"
25X1
The Honduran political situ- opposition labor elements in st-
ation was aggravated on 23 March tempts to overthrow the regime.
by the Constituent Assembly's
"election" of Chief of Government guerrilla bands are
Lopez as "constitutional presi- already active in the departments
dent." On 22 March a majority of Atlantida, Yoro, Olancho, and
of Liberal deputies attended the El Paraiso. In fact, the moder-
assembly which they had boycotted ate Liberals too may feel com-
since its opening session on 16 pelled to join an antiregime
March, but walked out prior to movement, in which case, with
Lopez' "election." They sub- its factions united, the Liberal
sequently charged that the Na- Party might replace Communists
tionalists broke a tacit under- as the pacer of the revolution-
standing to draft a constitution ary movement.
before taking up the presidential
question. At this time, there In the coming weeks, the
seems to be little chance that purely Nationalist assembly plans 25X1
the Liberals will participate in to draft a new constitution and
further assembly sessions or in then set the length of Lo ez'
the formation of any new govern- presidential term.
ment.
The Liberal Party's radical
faction, which has been more ag-
gressive than the moderate wing
in its attitude toward the gov-
ernment, has opposed party par-
ticipation in the assembly. It
now may join with Communists and
TRINIDADIAN GOVERNMENT MOVES AGAINST LABOR AGITATORS
The Trinidadian Government
has introduced legislation de-
signed to reduce the power of
leftist union leaders who have
plunged Trinidad into a lengthy
period of labor unrest. Strong
criticism from the opposition
party is not expected to halt
early passage of the bill, which
appears to have wide popular sup-
port. It would establish an
industrial court with sweeping
powers and no appeal, provide
stiff penalties for lockouts
and wildcat strikes, and re-
strict the right to strike of
civil servants and workers in
"essential" services.
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Western Hemisphere
George Weekes, pro-Commu-
nist president of the Trades
Union Congress (TUC)--one of
the island's two major labor
confederations--had encouraged
sugar workers affiliated with
the other confederation--the
progovernment National Federa-
tion of Labor--to rebel against
their union leadership. Wild-
cat strikes in the island's
sugar-growing belt closed several
large mills and forced the gov-
ernment to declare a state of
emergency on 9 March. The strong
government action has weakened
the TUC, from which several un-
ions have withdrawn to protest
Weekes' leftist policies and
his unauthorized interference
in the sugar unions.
An announced strike of
Weekes' important Oilfield
Workers' Trade Union failed
dismally, and a protest demon-
stration against the labor bill
gained no significant support.
The government presently seems
to have the upper hand, and an
uneasy peace has been restored
to the sugar centers. Weekes
still controls nearly half of
Trinidad's organized labor, how-
ever, and may be merely waiting
for action on the labor bill be-
fore making another move.
brazil's leaders are encour- I The only openly prorevolution
aged by results of the 21 March
Sao Paulo mayoralty election,
the first major election in
Brazil since President Castello
Branco took office nearly a year
ago. Although the revolution
was not a, key campaign issue,
the winner, air force Brigadier
Jose Fa.ria. Lima., is likely to
support the government's basic
programs and provide the coun-
try's largest city with respon-
sible leadership. Faria Lima.
ran well ahead of the other
seven candidates with approxi-
mately 40 percent of the valid
votes.
As the personal choice of
ex-President Ja.nio Quadros,
whose political rights have been
canceled for 10 years, Faria
Lima is not politically popular
among the backers of the April
1964 revolution, but he has a
reputation for honesty and ef-
ficiency even among hard-liners.
candidate, political unknown
Egydio Martins, failed to place
among the top runners in heavy
balloting which saw 85 percent
of Sao Paulo's 1.5 million voters
go to the polls. The results
are a decided defeat for Sao
Paulo State Governor Adhemar de
Ba.rros, a. presidential hopeful,
whose candidate ran a weak third.
With added confidence from
the Sao Paulo election, Presi-
dent Castello Branco has announced
that the administration now be-
lieves that gubernatorial elec-
tions should be held in half of
Brazil's 22 states in October
according to schedule. As with
the Sao Paulo mayoralty, mili-
tary and civilian hard-liners
have been pressing to postpone
all state elections on grounds
that the revolution "is not
ready for them."
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Western Hemisphere
BOLIVIAN POWER STRUGGLE THREATENS NEW VIOLENCE
The clandestine rivalry
between Bolivian junta presi-
dent Barrientos and the commander
of the armed forces, General
Ovando, has burst into the open
this week and is threatening to
resolve itself by violence.
Barrientos' position seems to
be the stronger at the moment
as recent events have worked
to his advantage, while Ovando
has apparently made some seri-
ous miscalculations.
Until the assassination
attempt against him on 21 March,
Barrientos was losing support,
and his efforts to force polit-
ical parties into a coalition
behind him had foundered.
Furthermore, the prevailing
opinion within the cabinet and
the military was that Barrien-
tos had to resign from the junta
if he wished to campaign for the
presidency. News of the shooting
however, immediately rallied
civilian and military sympathy
for him.
Ovando's attempt to dis-
place Barrientos as junta presi-
dent on 22 March, plus his
flirtation with the offer of
a presidential nomination by
center and rightist political
parties, has revealed his hos-
tility to Barrientos, and is
forcing all political parties
to define their positions.
Barrientos' peasant supporters
in Cochabamba and the Nationalist
Revolutionary Movement (MNR) are
calling for Ovand
MNR leader H
Zuazo has propose
tion plan which i
tions that electi
the cabinet be pu
supporters, and
high command be r
Siles has also re
Barrientos resign
at a later date a
government to a t
o's dismiss
ernan Siles
d a pacific
ncludes sug
ons be post
rged of Ova
the armed f
eorganized.
commended t
from the j
nd entrust
riumvirate
al.
a-
ges-
poned
ndo
orces
hat
unta 2
the
of
solid Barrientos
supporters.
The MNR has
called out
its
armed militants to demonstrate
on behalf of Barrientos when
he returns to La Paz from
Cochabamba. The demonstrations
are aimed at pressuring Barrien-
tos into accepting the peace-
keeping formula and at securing
a promise of substantial MNR
:representation in a future gov-
ernment. The US Embassy con-
siders violence in La Paz likely
as a result of the demonstra-
tions.
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