SPECIAL REPORT INDIA AND PAKISTAN REMAIN AT AN IMPASSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004800080002-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

INDIA AND, PAKISTAN REMAIN AT AN IMPASSE
GROUP, I Excluded "fr?om automatic
d ,Aingrading=and declassification
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*Wme
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 02 THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
'This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS,, If marked wick specific dissemination
controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7,
the document must be handled within the framework of
the limitation so imposed.
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2 April 1965
Relations between India and Pakistan, never
good and usually fluctuating between bad and
worse, are again deteriorating. In the past,tem-
pers have flared most often over the reopening of
some wound left over from the 1947 partition of
British India or new abrasions produced by dif-
fering policies toward powers outside the South
Asian area. In the present instance, however,
long-standing Indo-Pakistani frustrations have
been aggravated again by a number of frequently
unrelated pinpricks.
These pinpricks have related primarily to
India's policies toward both the international and
"domestic" aspects of the Kashmir question. They
have in recent weeks been aggravated by a series
of border incidents, not along the normally
troubled cease-fire line in Kashmir but rather
along India's international boundaries with both
East and West Pakistan. The countries now appear
further away than ever from a productive dialogue
which could mark the first step toward a durable
accommodation.
While Nehru lived, pros-
pects for a resolution of In-
dia's and Pakistan's conflict-
ing claims to the state of Jammu
and Kashmir rested almost ex-
clusively in his hands. He was
strong enough to have been able
to sell his own countrymen a
solution acceptable to Pakistan,
but neither his mind nor his
heart was willing. Not until
1958, when Ayub Khan came to
power in Karachi with the solid
backing of the army, was there
anyone in Pakistan strong enough
to carry off an equitable set-
tlement. Ayub did make several
efforts, but thay all foundered
on the rock of Nehruvian ob-
duracy.
During the last five
months of his life, Nehru
seemed to show some slight de-
gree of flexibility regarding
affairs inside Indian-ruled
:Kashmir. An easing of police
state measures there brought
,some guarded hope in Pakistan.
The principal result of Nehru's
actions, however, was a mutual
moratorium on invective for
some months after his death,
while Pakistan waited to see
whether the moderate Shastri
would pick up where Nehru seemed
to leave off, and while Shastri
offered conciliatory words but
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focused mainly on consolidating
his own position as Nehru's
heir.
Ten months have passed
since Nehru's death, however,
and there has been no movement
toward a settlement. Indeed,
Shastri's remarks during a
brief stopover in Karachi last
out 18 locally recruited bat-
talions manning the Pakistani
side of the cease-fire line.
Whereas Pakistani policy
toward Azad Kashmir has-played
no part in recent years in In-
dian attitudes and propaganda,
New Delhi's administrative pol-
icy toward that portion of Kash-
fall appear to have conveyed to mir under Indian jurisdiction
Pakistanis only that the new In- has been the subject of bitter
than leader was well motivated Pakistani recriminations. Paki-
but felt too weak politically stan holds that because Kashmir
to come to grips with the hard
decisions necessary to resolve
the dispute.
is a disputed territory, both
countries are bound to preserve
its separateness and to avoid
acts aimed at absorption. In-
All the while, the instances than policy from 1953 on, how-
of firing across the UN-super- ever, has been gradually to
vised cease-fire line in Kashmir
have continued, occasionally in-
volving hundreds on each side.
The rate of incidents for 1964
reached a new high.
Policies pursued by each
country within the portion of
Kashmir it rules bring reper-
cussions internationally inso-
far as they affirm or erode the
"disputed status" which Kashmir
enjoys under international law
and United Nations resolutions.
On the Pakistani side, the
fiction of a quasi-independent
state of Azad (free) Kashmir is
no longer as serious a factor
in Pakistani policy and propa-
ganda as it was in the early
1950s. Azad Kashmir is firmly
controlled by Pakistan. Its
continued existence serves to
support the "disputed" status
of the entire area, and it also
provides the manpower to fill
make over the area into a fully
integrated Indian state by pro-
gressive application of bits
and pieces of the Indian
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constitution and by bringing the
state's administrative and po-
litical practices into conform-
ity with those in the other
states in the Indian union.
Thus by now, most of the
Indian constitution applies to
the state, India's courts have
been given jurisdiction there,
the civil services have lost
their separate identity, and,
most recently, provision has
been made for the imposition of
direct rule from New Delhi should
the administration of the state
break down.
Even when New Delhi was ob-
serving a "special" status for
Kashmir in the Indian union, In-
dian control in the coveted Vale
of Kashmir rested on Kashmiri
puppets and Indian bayonets. Over
the years, however, Indian ad-
ministrative actions have sought
to improve on the legal and po-
litical basis for the power while
keeping a tight lid on the ex-
plosive potential of Kashmir's
predominantly Muslim population.
In a shift of policy early
in 1964, India began to relax
its police controls. Strong man
Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad was given
his walking papers after 10 years
of despotic but reliable rule.
Shastri, then an aide to Nehru,
put the more compliant Ghulam
Muhammad Sadiq into Bakshi's
vacated chair, and directed a
liberalization of controls. Even
the charismatic Sheikh Abdullah,
imprisoned for nearly 11 years,
was released and began to breathe
life into Kashmiri politics.
In many of these actions,
the Pakistani Government had
cause for rejoicing. Its offi-
cial attitude was hopeful as it
watched political life resume
in the Vale and take up the
causes of Muslims disenchanted
with and hateful of Hindu Indian
rule; it had everything to gain
in offering to meet Abdullah,
for though he had betrayed Mus-
liLm Pakistan once when he took
Kashmir into India, he now of-
fered only a marginal and long-
range threat to Pakistani in-
terest in ultimately ruling the
state. His advocacy of self-
determination reinforced Paki-
stan's immediate claims against
Indian rule.
But the luster soon dimmed.
By late 1964 it became apparent
that Abdullah was getting no-
where in his pressure for Kash-
miri self-determination. In
New Delhi, the new Congress lead-
ership seemed embarked on a cam-
paign to cut him down to size,
and thus to deny him the power
to apply pressure on New Delhi.
Emergency powers to run the
state from Delhi were put on
the books. The ruling National
Conference was converted into
a state branch of India's Con-
gress Party. New Delhi is re-
ported planning even to discard
the uniquely Kashmiri titles for
Kashmir's ceremonial chief of
state and its effective head of
government in favor of the titles
"governor" and "chief minister"
in use in the other Indian states.
In recent months the situa-
tion has become increasingly
tense. Abdullah was granted per-
mission to undertake a pilgrimage
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to Mecca in February and is still
traveling. In his absence, more
than 165 of his followers have
been jailed for their efforts to
organize Kashmiri dissidence and,
especially, to prevent Muslims
from joining the new Congress
Party unit in the state. Abdul-
lab's return could spark addi-
tional demonstrations and a re-
imposition of the even stiffer
police controls of the Bakshi
era. At some point, however,
Indian "hard" policy will face
the same bankruptcy which led
Shastri and Nehru to gamble on
a soft line just a year ago.
Pakistan's reaction to the
re-emergence of this hard line
has been predictably harsh, re-
flecting not only frustration
with India's imperious handling
of "internal" Kashmiri affairs
and with India's further erosion
of Kashmiri separateness, but
also a sense of letdown that the
tenuous signs of Indian flexi-
bility during Nehru's last days
and in Shastri's first months
have brought no visible change
to the situation. Ayub and his
foreign minister have both pub-
licly stressed sympathy with
their oppressed Muslim brethren
in Kashmir in recent weeks. They
may in time be moved to provide
direct and substantial assist-
ance to Kashmir's disaffected
population, with or without Abdul
lab's leadership or consent, as
the only way to arrest further
moves at integration and to bring
effective international pressure
New border incidents have
recently occurred in the swampy
Rann of Kutch, at the point
where the western Indian state
of Gujarat abuts the Sind bor-
der of Pakistan, and to the
east where Indian and Pakistani
enclaves in each other's ter-
ritories have long been a source
of friction and bloodshed.
In the Rann of Kutch, the
Pakistanis appear to be at
fault, having deliberately
moved across a portion of
poorly marked border to oc-
cupy an abandoned fort site
well inside Indian territory.
The terrain is difficult and
the Indian Army reckons it
would take more than two bat-
talions to dislodge the Paki-
stani force. Thus far the
situation has generated more
heat than fire.
More tension has been pro-
duced by recent events along
the Bengal border, where In-
dians have moved to curtail ac-
cess to a Pakistani enclave--
Dahagram--separated from East
Pakistan by less than 200 yards
of Indian territory. The re-
sult has been indiscriminate
firing
into and around the en-
clave
by armed police on both
sides,
coupled with
Indian
forays
and communal
violence
inside
it. Lesser
incidents
have occurred nearby.
on the Indians to seek a settle- Pakistan has blown up the
ment. bloodshed at Dahagram beyond all
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INDIA AND PAKISTAN
AND..
lsni'in is uCel
--- Cease-fire line
in Jammu and
Kashmir
LACCADIVE,
MINICOY,
AMINDIVI IS.
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
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relevance to the local situa-
tion or to the facts of the
situation as reported by its
own intelligence service. It
seems clear, however, that In-
dians did fire first, and that
is the point of departure in the
Pakistani propaganda campaign,
Moreover, Pakistan is using the
incident in its argument against
the West's provision of military
aid to India, claiming--erro-
neously--that the Indian forces
on the scene are equipped with
Western arms and seeking to
point up both the deviousness
of the Hindu and the alleged
hollowness of Western assurances
that India's Western equipment
will be used only against the
Chinese.
The worst now appears to
be over, and the enclave--one
of nearly 200 such anomalies
left over from prepartition
jurisdictions of petty princes
--will eventually be involved
in an exchange for which a gov-
ernment-to-government agreement
has existed for some years. Un-
til the exchange finally takes
place, however, each enclave
poses the potential for Daha-
gram-type incidents.
Yet another pinprick in
the northeast has been Pakistan's
efforts to capitalize on Indian
difficulties in bringing the
decade-long rebellion by Naga
tribesmen to an end.
In recent weeks, a band of
Naga insurgents--which, like
two smaller groups before it,
was supplied and trained in
Nast Pakistan--has made its way
back to Nagaland via Burma. The
Indians, now negotiating with
the Nagas under a tenuous truce,
are particularly sensitive to this
latest Pakistani provocation.
The mood in both capitals
is uncompromising. The Shastri
government, beset with abundant
domestic problems, acts as
though it wished that Pakistan
would just go away. Its poli-
cies on the international as-
pects of the Kashmir question
are essentially reactive, since
it has what it wants and thus
desires to prolong the status
quo. Moreover, it remains to
be seen to what extent Shastri
is master of his own house.
Whatever his private sentiments
on the desirability for Indo-
Pakistani amity--and it is
widely assumed that he would
make some move to achieve it
if he could--he seems unable
and unwilling to challenge those
in his own party who have made
a political career out of Indo-
Pakistani enmity. These forces
represent both the left and the
right in the Congress Party,
and most other parties, thus
transcending ideological bias
and reflecting the Hindu com-
munal outlook of most Indians.
In Pakistan, President
Ayub, the undisputed master of
his domain, now is charting new
foreign relationships aimed at
giving Pakistan a greater sense
of security vis-a-vis the In-
dian behemoth. He has been
quite adept and successful thus
far in improving his relationship
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with Afghanistan, in projecting
his ideas of regional coopera-
tion into the CENTO area, in
asserting his "independence"
from cold war alliances, and in
making the appropriate noises
and bows in Afro-Asian circles,
especially among militants like
Indonesia. Moreover, in his
bitter reaction to Western mil-
itary assistance to India, he
has fashioned a new variant of
nonalignment, virtually as se-
lective and as mixed as India's
has become. He has thus been
able to reduce the scope of his
ties with the United States to
some basic essentials while at
the same time courting favor
with Peiping and the militant
Afro-Asians as a counter to In-
dia's exploitation of its re-
lationship with the USSR and
with the West.
But his major foreign pol-
icy problem remains India, and
the key element in that relation-
ship is spelled Kashmir. Here
he has little more than a string
of frustrations to show for his
efforts.
Neither country is disposed
toward full-fledged military
conflict to resolve its big
problems with the other, or the
parade of pinpricks in their
day-to-day dealings. The weight
of military power rests with
India and both sides know this,
despite the bellicose threats
that periodically fill the air.
Rather, the prevailing sentiment
in the two capitals is one of
despair for any relief from In-
dian inflexibility and Pakistani
harping.
Strong leaders come and go;
weak leaders come and go; yet
the impasse remains, and the
passage of time seems to have
had no effect. In fact, the
younger generation, born after
-the advent of independence and
the horrors of partition, seem
just as fixed as their forebears
have been for the simple yet
complex reason that people on
both sides of the border still
regard nationals on the other
side first as Muslims or Hindus,
and only then as Pakistanis or
]Indians. The national entities
of Pakistan and India still carry
the communal connotation which
gave them their birth, and
neither the Muslims nor the Hin-
dus have ever given the other
sufficient reason to develop
an atmosphere conducive to
trust and good faith in which
rational issues can be dis-
cussed--and dealt with--purely
as national issues. (SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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