WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004900040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 28, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

DIA review
completed.
OC Z No. 0291/65
/Copy Noe h
a
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
{^(` Z 7 ROUP I Excluded from automatic'
downgrading and declassification
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For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04900040001-6 - 1965
'State Dept. review completed
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%Wf SECRET :
(Information as of noon EDT, 27 May 1965)
VIETNAM
Soviet military aid to North Vietnam is growing rapidly
and now includes an increased number of jet fighters.
A third surface-to-air missile site has been detected
under construction near Hanoi, although no missiles have
yet been identified in the DRV. In the South, the Viet
Cong are applying increased pressure, using ambushes,
sabotage, and terrorism, while still avoiding the commit-
ment of large main-force units.
USSR TAKES HARDER LINE TOWARD THE US
This policy reflects the increasing Soviet commitment
to North Vietnam, which practically precludes any im-
Orovement in relations with the US, especially while
bombing of the DRV continues.
Page
RUMANIAN-CZECHOSLOVAK RELATIONS
A recent series of visits to Czechoslovakia by high-
level Rumanian officials may be the initial steps toward
closer ties between the two countries, whose relations
up to now have been marked by distrust and animosity.
SECRET
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w ~,.rW
SECRET
PEIPING ABOLISHES MILITARY RANKS
The decision appears to have been adopted primarily for
internal political reasons and is unlikely to have a
significant effect on Chinese military capabilities.
AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS
The Chinese Communists are making a major effort to
dominate the "Bandung II" meetings scheduled to open
in Algiers on 29 June. Local arrangements are confused
and tardy.
FURTHER GAINS FOR COMMUNISTS IN INDONESIA
Sukarno has publicly praised their revolutionary fervor
and added two pro-Communists to his cabinet. His cam-
paign against Malaysia continues.
SHASTRI'S MOSCOW VISIT STRENGTHENS INDO-SOVIET TIES
The Soviet leaders made a major effort to establish
close personal relations with Shastri and to enlist
Indian support against US policy in Vietnam.
NEW CLASHES BETWEEN INDIAN AND PAKISTANI TROOPS
Neither side seems disposed to make much of last week's
encounters in the Rann of Kutch and Kashmir, but the
latest shooting complicates British peacemaking efforts.
SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO TURKEY
Gromyko's trip seems to have been directed more at im-
proving the diplomatic atmosphere than at seeking agree-
ment on substantive matters. Next, the Turkish premier
will visit the USSR.
BURUNDI'S HUTU MAJORITY WINS FIRST ELECTION VICTORY
The radically inclined and politically more sophisticat-
ed Tutsi minority is not likely to surrender its former
dominance readily, however, and may attempt a coup.
SECRET
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DAHOMEY REMA INS UNSTABLE
An influential group is agitating against premier Aho-
madegbe's regime but seems reluctant to stage a coup.
Europe
Page
14
BELGIAN ELECTION UPSET
The losses by the governing Social Christian and Social-
ist parties in the 23 May elections represent a setback
for their efforts to resolve Belgium's bitter language
controversy and foreshadow a period of instability in
the country's political life.
Western Hemisphere
SE CRE T
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SECRET `00
SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
There is no sign of a solution to the stalemate in the
Dominican Republic, although the Imbert regime contin-
ues to gain momentum both politically and militarily.
An unofficial and uneasy cease-fire is being maintained,
partly through pressure from the Organization of Ameri-
can States and the United Nations.
THREATS TO BARRIENTOS REGIME IN BOLIVIA
A turbulent week opened with a drive by the government
to assert its authority over the Communist-dominated
tin miners and ended with junta chief Barrientos acting
to save his regime from threats posed by the personal
ambitions of his principal rival, armed forces commander
General Ovando.
Page
19
COLOMBIA UNDER STATE OF SIEGE 24
Agitation by Communist-front student groups precipitated
a declaration of a state of siege on 21 May. President
Valencia, now empowered to govern by decree, is said to
favor an attempt to force Congress into accepting his
SECRET
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The Soviet commitment to
North Vietnam, measured in
terms of military deliveries,
is growing rapidly.
25X1 The number of jet fighters
in North Vietnam has grown to
between 63 and 67
A third surface-to-air mis-
sile site has been detected in
the Hanoi area.
site is being built about 13
nautical miles east southeast
of Hanoi. Four launch revet-
ments appear to be well along
in construction, the fifth is
in the early stages, and work
was apparently just be inning
on the sixth position
Construction is continuing
on the other two SAM sites. The
second site, which has five of
the revetments now almost com-
pleted, still has no missile-as-
sociated equipment. Such equip-
ment has appeared at the first
site, but no missiles have yet
been detected.
Hanoi continues to make
I other civil defense re ara-
tions.
the massive defense efforts 25X1
observed appear to be prep-
aration for an extended siege
rather than an effort to main-
tain domestic morale, which re-
mains at outwardly healthy.
Hanoi
ider- 25X1
cons
is prepare to ea.r
able punishment short of total
war, and only "if the Viet Cong
is turned" will negotiations be
possible.
DRV Political Developments
ag nda
DRV intent to weather the
air strikes for the time being
has also been widely reflected
in its propaganda this week.
Several major commentaries and
editorials have emphasized that
Hanoi will not quit under the
pressure of the attacks. Hanoi
also took pains in its propa-
reiterate its requirements for 25X1
a settlement.
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%QW SE CRE T
Viet Cong Actions
The Viet Cong are applying
increased pressure in the coun-
tryside while still carefully
avoiding commitment of large
main force units against regular
government forces, except in
situations overwhelmingly in
their favor. Recent highly suc-
cessful ambushes--in Binh Dinh,
Phuoc Long, An Xuyen, Binh Dinh,
and Thua Thien provinces--illus-
trate current Viet Cong tactics.
Sabotage of government com-
munication lines and terrorism
against the rural. populace remain
widespread. Intensified Viet
Cong interdiction has closed
roads leading from Saigon to
Binh Duong, Tay Ninh, and Hau
Nghia provinces, and large sec-
tions of Route I from Quang Ngai
to Binh Thuan Province. Route
20 between Saigon and Da Lat
has just been reopened after
being cut for two weeks. Traf-
fic on the coastal railway has
been seriously disrupted with
large stretches of track inop-
erable between Da Nang and Phan
Thiet.
While the present focus
of Viet Cong activity is in the
delta. and in the provinces north
and northeast of Saigon, in-
creased action may occur in the
highland region of I and II
Corps as the monsoon season in-
tensifies. The pattern of re-
cent sabotage efforts may rep-
resent a coordinated effort to
isolate the central coastal area
and the highlands while summer
rains inhibit government use
of aircraft.
Political Developments in South
Premier Quat's measured
efforts to maintain a political
balance while strengthening
his own authority have been
jolted by two events of the
past week. On 20 May, a new
coup attempt by Colonel Thao,
fugitive ringleader of the
abortive February coup, was
reportedly thwarted by the ar-
rest of some 40 conspirators.
Thao himself again escaped, but
government sources claim to
have evidence that he was acting
in collusion with the Viet Cong,
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MW
SECRET
as well as with sundry malcon-
tents. Whatever the facts,
Premier Quat and his military
supporters are apparently using
the incident to purge some ele-
ments unacceptable to the Bud-
dhists, while seeking to reas-
sure the Catholic community by
blaming the Communists for in-
stigating the coup plot.
Quat's long-delayed cabinet
reshuffle was finally announced
on 25 May, but Chief of State
Suu refused to approve at least
two of the changes on technical
grounds. Suu was evidently in-
fluenced by the incumbent min-
isters' threats of political
repercussions if they were re-
moved. Regardless of Suu's
ability to hold out against Quat
and the military on this issue,
the incident suggests that his
preoccupation with constitu-
tional legalities can be exploit-
ed by Quat's opponents to chal-
lenge the premier's authority.
US Air Strikes
Last week, sustained US air
attacks caused the greatest
damage to North Vietnamese naval
vessels recorded to date. At
least eight patrol-type ships,
including several Swatow gun-
boats, were either destroyed or
heavily damaged.
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SECRET
The Communist World
USSR TAKES HARDER LINE TOWARD THE US
The USSR's harsher line to-
ward the US reflects the increas-
ing Soviet commitment to North
Vietnam, which practically pre-
cludes any improvement in rela-
tions with the US, especially
while bombing of the DRV con-
tinues.
A 20 May TASS statement on
President Johnson's V-E Day ad-
dress of 7 May was one of Mos-
cow's strongest attacks on him
to date. It coincided with the
arrival of Soviet military equip-
ment in the DRV and the resump-
tion of US air strikes. It seems
intended to impress US policy-
makers with the USSR's determina-
tion to proceed with its program
of military assistance to Hanoi.
The 20 May TASS statement
is considerably stronger in tone
and comes from a more authorita-
tive medium than Moscow's ini-
tial criticism of the President's
State of the Union message last
January. It reiterated the
claim that US statements on im-
proving relations with the USSR
are incompatible with the US
"aggression" against "socialist"
countries. Underscoring Mos-
cow's anti-US mood at this time
was Shelepin's 9 May comment to
the Israeli ambassador that
President Johnson's recent re-
marks on the international situa-
tion "represented a serious turn
in American policy." He bluntly
warned that "the Soviet Union
could not accept this."
Recently, high-ranking So-
viet officials have made unusual
efforts to convince Western rep-
resentatives of the extent of
the Soviet Union's commitment to
support Hanoi in whatever course
the DRV leaders decide upon. So-
viet leaders apparently feel that
the Vietnam conflict will become
more dangerous before any pros-
pect for negotiations emerges.
They now seem primarily intent
on discouraging the US from ex-
panding military pressures. So-
viet presidium member Shelepin
told the US Army attache on 7 May
that although the USSR has no
desire to get involved in the
conflict, the US is mistaken if
it believes the bombings will
force an end to the war. He
asserted that the air strikes
"will become only the beginning
of something bigger."
Another reflection of Mos-
cow's willingness to accept a
further deterioration of US-So-
viet relations is a 19 May Pravda
article signed "Observer"--_a__cTe-
vice used to indicate high-
level concurrence--which at-
tacked US actions in the Domini-
can Republic. The article was
in marked contrast to Moscow's
earlier low-key and relatively
meager commentary on events
there.
Moscow, however, is being
careful to avoid provocative in-
cidents. In early May, for ex-
ample, Soviet authorities re-
fused to allow a "peaceful demon-
stration" by Latin American stu-
dents outside the US Embassy. Such
a decision could have been taken
in part to avoid a repetition
,of the 4 March Asian student
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protest which got out of hand
and was subsequently exploited
by Communist China.
The prevailing hostile So-
viet attitude toward the US has
also crept into cultural rela-
tions. A number of planned
trips by various Soviet delega-
tions to the US have been can-
celed due to the "present politi-
cal climate." Official exchanges
and diplomatic social contacts
continue, however, and Moscow
can be expected to hold the door
open for eventual talks on Viet-
nam in order to be in a position
to take full advantage of unfore-
seen developments and opportuni-
ties.
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SE CARET ,
WEEKLY SUMMARY
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RUMANIAN-CZECHOSLOVAK RELATIONS
Following a period of ani-
mosity and mistrust, Czechoslo-
vakia and Rumania have re-estab-
lished contacts at a high level
and may be moving into a period
of improved relations. Encour-
aged by Prague's efforts toward
greater independence, Rumania
may view Czechoslovakia as a po-
tential ally in bloc affairs.
In honor of Rumanian par-
ticipation in the 1945 libera-
tion of Czechoslovakia--given
wide publicity by both countries
this year for the first time--
Rumanian Defense Minister Sala-
jan led a military delegation to
Czechoslovakia in late April.
His well-publicized trip was
followed by a short stopover for
talks in Prague by Foreign Minis-
ter Manescu en route to Egypt.
Rumania then sent Premier Maurer
to Prague for V-E Day celebra-
tions--the highest level repre-
sentation Bucharest sent anywhere
for the occasion and among the
highest in Prague.
The current spate of high-
level visits to Czechoslovakia
contrasts sharply with Rumania's
policy over the past two years
of curtailing trips by ranking
delegations to other Soviet
bloc countries. It is consist-
ent, however, with the Bucha-
rest regime's campaign to em-
phasize Rumania's contribution
to the Allied victory--before
the Communists came to power--
thereby identifying the regime
with traditional Rumanian na-
tionalism.
In what appears to be an
attempt to correlate Czecho-
slovak statements with Rumanian
independent foreign policy po-
sitions, Bucharest quoted Czech
leader Novotny's recent call
for better relations with the
Chinese and Albanians. The TASS
summary ignored this part of
Novotny's address.
Czechoslovakia apparently
has changed its former policy
of purely pro forma relations
with Rumania and is willing to
explore the possibility of
warmer ties--just as it did with
Yugoslavia last year. Any such
improvement in relations could
only encourage the "liberal"
forces in Czechoslovakia which
have brought Novotny to increas-
ingly Independent, enlightened
policies.
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SECRET
The Chinese Communist de-
cision to abolish all formal
military ranks appears to have
been adopted primarily for in-
ternal political reasons. This
unexpected move, publicized in
a broadcast on 24 May, marks a
reversion to a system of "posi-
tional" ranks under which au-
thority and responsibility are
derived from the place of the
individual in the command struc-
ture. It is unlikely, however,
to have a significant effect on
Chinese military capabilities.
The shift probably reflects
a desire to emphasize the supe-
riority of distinctively Chinese
military organizational forms
developed by Mao and employed by
the Chinese Communists during
their successful revolution. It
also serves to underscore Chi-
nese rejection of foreign, and
particularly "revisionist" So-
viet patterns.
The Chinese armed forces
operated effectively without
formal rank designations until
1955 when Peiping switched to a
system similar to that employed
by the Soviets. The changeover
at the time was explained as a
necessary part of the armed
forces modernization effort and
signaled the beginning of a
period of professionalism in the
military services which lasted
until the dismissal of Defense
Minister Peng Te-huai in 1959.
Peng was disgraced, apparently
chiefly because he had been
stressing professional qualifi-
cation at the expense of party
control and had also opposed
Mao's decision to pursue the
ideological quarrel with Moscow
at the risk of a cutoff in So-
viet military assistance.
The present reversion to
a system without formal ranks
probably reflects the growing
obsession among top leaders in
Peiping with the problem of in-
stilling the proper revolution-
ary zeal in the rising genera-
tion. In this context, they
are no doubt especially con-
cerned with the armed forces as
the basic instrument of control.
An editorial in the Liberation
Army Daily on 25 May declared
explicitly that political con-
siderations were of first im-
portance in making the change.
It asserted that the decision
was correct and necessary in
order to make the army "still
more proletarian and militant"
and to promote "revolutioniza-
tion of the ideology of com-
manders and fighters."
The Chinese Communists are
apparently concerned that the
move might be interpreted out-
side China, and perhaps within
the military establishment it-
self, as a blunder which would
lead to weakness or disorganiza-
tion. They are clearly anxious
to avoid giving the impression
that their latest move would re-
duce their ability to intervene
in Southeast Asia. The editorial
in the army paper noted specifi-
cally that in Korea the absence
of formal ranks had not adversely
affected either the operations of
volunteers or the "united com-
mand in a combined military ac-
tion taken together with the
armies of fraternal countries."
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With only a month remain-
ing before the scheduled con-
vening of the Second Afro-
Asian Conference in Algiers on
29. June, preparations remain
highly confused. The Chinese
Communists are making a major
effort to advance their inter-
ests there.
The Algerians, fearing a
debacle, are trying hard to
put on a reasonable show.
Nearly 5,000 laborers are work-
ing around the clock to ready
facilities, but at best only
the main conference hall will
be finished on time. Housing
and transportation will be
makeshift and inadequate. En-
tertainment being virtually
nonexistent in Algiers, offi-
cials are considering charter-
ing a Caravelle to fly inter-
ested delegates on nightly
trips to Paris.
After considerable confu-
sion stemming from numerous
imprecise communications on
the conference, President Ben
Bella finally issued formal
invitations in mid-May. It is
still not known how many of a
possible 67 governments (in-
cluding Holden Roberto's An-
golan government in exile)
were invited.
Even the agenda is not
yet set. Among the issues
some participants wish to dis-
cuss are Palestine, Cyprus, UN
reorganization or removal to
Geneva, US policy in Vietnam and
the Caribbean, disarmament,
decolonization, human rights,
economic development and coopera-
tion, and establishment of a
permanent Afro-Asian secretariat.
Chinese preparations con-
tinue at a brisk pace. Premier
Chou En-lai, scheduled to visit
Tanzania early in June, probably
will make other stops in Africa
and the Middle East en route to
Algiers to line up support for
Chinese positions. Vice Foreign
Minister Chi Peng-fei is tour-
ing North Africa, probably for
the same purpose. The Chinese
have not let up in their cam-
paign to exclude the USSR, claim-
ing that a Soviet presence would
only serve to divide the confer-
ence, and are still trying to
weaken India's position by ac-
cusing it of serving "imperial-
istic purposes."
These tactics are causing
concern among moderates and
even some radical countries.
At the early May preparatory
meeting in Algiers the Ghanaian
and Guinean delegates are said
to have vehemently disassoci-
ated themselves from the Chi-
nese attack on the Indian ambas-
sador. The moderates have done
some consulting on tactics, but
do not yet appear well enough
organized to counter Peiping
and its allies.
the conference's aims.
The USSR is likely to make
further efforts to counter Chinese
opposition to its attendance. A
TASS summary of a recent article
in the Russian weekly New Times,
obviously alluding to Peiping,
decried attempts to split the
Afro-Asian movement. It claimed
many Afro-Asian countries favor
Soviet participation, which
"cannot but be useful" to attain
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Developments in Indonesia
continue to favor the Communists,
while President Sukarno pursues
his campaign against Malaysia on
both diplomatic and military
fronts.
Sukarno's most recent praise
for the Communist Party came in a
speech at its 45th anniversary
celebration on 23 May. He termed
it the "most revolutionary pro-
gressive group" in the nation and
called party chairman Aidit a'"for-
tress" of Indonesia. He told
photographers to take a picture
of him embracing Aidit, and con-
cluded by telling the Communists
to "go ahead, go ahead, go ahead."
Two days later Sukarno added
to his cabinet two more pro-Com-
munists who may be secret party
members. They fill newly created
portfolios--for basic irrigation
and for electricity and energy.
Both positions seem susceptible
to significant Communist exploita-
tion, particularly the former in
view of the major activity in
which the Communists are already
engaged among the peasants in
densely populated Java.
At the plenary session of
the Communist Party's central
committee earlier this month,
Aidit called for extending gov-
ernment supervision of "imperial-
ist" enterprises to actual owner-
ship. He reiterated that ac-
tivity among the peasantry--at
least 70 percent of the popula-
tion--is the party's primary task
and must be both broadened and
intensified. Probably as the re-
sult of the strong antagonism
Moslem peasants in East Java dis-
played toward the Communists
early this year, Aidit urged
intensified mass education in
Marxism in rural areas and care-
ful planning of all activity
directed against the peasants.
On the international level,
Sukarno seems primarily engaged
in tactics to prevent Malaysia's
participation in the Afro-Asian
conference in late June. He
sent Foreign Minister Subandrio
to Canton on 27 May to confer
with Chinese Premier Chou En-
lai, presumably to coordinate
strategy for the Algiers gather-
ing. Sukarno apparently hopes
to utilize the preconference
meeting of foreign ministers as
the forum in which to cancel
Malaysia's chances by persuading
other delegates that all issues
be settled unanimously. Mili-
tary measures against Malaysia
continue to be planned, but no
successful infiltration of pen-
insular Malaysia has occurred
for six weeks. On the Borneo
border, Indonesians have inten-
sified patrolling and reconnais-
sance and an increase in attacks
is expected.
Sukarno is also looking
ahead to his Conference of New
Emerging Forces (CONEFO). Com-
munist China has agreed to
August 1966 as the tentative
date for the first CONEFO, and
is assisting in the construc-
tion of a complex of office
buildings in Djakarta for the
projected organization. Of-
ficials of both nations have
hinted that they view CONEFO as
a framework for the creation of
a rival UN.
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SHASTRI'S MOSCOW VISIT STRENGTHENS INDO-SOVIET TIES
Indian Prime Minister
Shastri's recent trip to the
Soviet Union probably has sub-
stantially strengthened Indo-
Soviet ties within the frame-
work of India's basically non-
aligned foreign policy. Shas-
tri's irritation at the United
States over a variety of mat-
ters, his desire to prove his
ability to get along with the
Russians, and his eagerness to
appear appropriately anticolo-
nialist for the upcoming Asia-
Africa Conference make the In-
dians highly receptive to So-
viet pressure.
Soviet leaders made a ma-
jor effort to re-establish the
close personal relations that
characterized the Khrushchev-
Nehru era. Premier Kosygin re-
portedly attended Shastri con-
stantly for four days and, at
the end of the visit, their
wives embraced in a tearful
good-by.
Moscow sought to exploit
current US-Indian frictions to
enlist Indian support in mobil-
izing the Afro-Asian world
against US policy in Vietnam.
Kosygin hinted that Shastri's
proposed trip to the US had
been postponed because of Wash-
ington's irritation with New
Delhi's Vietnam policies. The
Soviets also gave an anti-US
content to their re-endorsement
of Indian nonalignment; in a
major speech in Shastri's pres-
ence, Kosygin argued that "non-
alignment" in its true sense re-
quires action against injustice,
and that the "Vietnamese people"
are fighting against the re-
surgence of US imperialism to
the benefit of all "freedom-
loving" people.
As a measure of Soviet suc-
cess, the 19 May communiqud
called for an immediate halt to
the bombing of North Vietnam,
but did not repeat earlier In-
dian demands that all outside
interference in Vietnam cease.
Both Shastri and his foreign
minister claim that they were un-
aware of the suspension of US
raids at the time of the visit
and might have modified the
communiqud had they known. The
remainder of the communiqud did
not significantly depart from
previous Indian positions, but
gave them a somewhat more rad-
ical tone.
There was no mention of
India's most pressing foreign
policy problems, its disputes
with Pakistan and Communist
China. Because of Moscow's cur-
rent efforts to improve its re-
lations with Karachi and to play
down its differences with Peiping,
New Delhi had to be satisfied
with private Soviet expressions
of sympathy and support.
The Soviets, however, ap-
parently offered substantial nea
aid for India's third five-year
plan.
also be raised.
The modest
level of Indo-Soviet trade will
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The continuing volatility
of relations between India and
Pakistan was freshly illustrated
during the past week. A high
rate of incidents occurred along
the 17-year-old Kashmir cease-
fire line, patrols clashed in
the Rann of Kutch, more than
250,000 troops remained deployed
at close proximity along the
borders, and indications of
heightened Hindu-Muslim communal
unrest appeared in northern In-
dia.
Neither side seems disposed
to make much of the small clash
in Kutch which broke the month-
long cease-fire there, and the
UN is on the scene in Kashmir
patiently trying to keep each
encounter localized. The gun-
fire nonetheless complicated
British efforts to get both
sides to agree on a mode for set-
tling the Kutch dispute and for
withdrawal of troop concentra-
tions.elsewhere along the bor-
Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko's visit to Turkey last
week appears to have been di-
rected more at improving the
diplomatic atmosphere than at
seeking agreement on substantive
matters. Although Turkey sought
a more explicit endorsement of
its position on Cyprus, Gromyko
merely reiterated Moscow's rec-
ognition of the rights of the
Turkish minority on the island
and its opposition to Cypriot
union with Greece. He evaded
the issue of Soviet arms aid
to the Greek Cypriots.
Gromyko's major interest
in Ankara reportedly was to dis-
cuss means of increasing Soviet-
Turkish trade under the recently
expanded trade protocol. He
also indicated Moscow's general
willingness to provide aid but
apparent.y made no specific of-
fers. Despite the lack of move-
ment on substantive matters,
both sides appear anxious to
continue to improve relations,
and Turkish Premier Urguplu ac-
cepted Gromyko's invitation to
visit the USSR.
Burundi's generally pro-
Western Hutus are organizing
to exploit their first electoral
victory over the country's other
ethnic group, the Tutsis. In
the mid-May voting, the Hutus
won a sizable majority in the
new assembly.
Some of the Hutus were
elected under the banner of the
UPRONA party, through which they
had previously shared rule with
the more politically sophisti-
cated Tutsi minority. These
Hutus have reportedly now agreed
with fellow tribesmen to form
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a new strictly Hutu party--Un-
ion Populaire du Burundi--and
through it to organize the as-
sembly and government. A popu-
lar and militant figure now in
exile, Paul Mirereka.no, may be
called to lead it.
The radically inclined
Tutsis are not likely to sur-
render their former dominance
readily. They apparently be-
lieve they can continue to manip-
ulate the Hutus, although it
appears they face more formi-
dable opposition than in the
past. They may decide on more
drastic measures, possibly in-
cluding a coup attemyt.~
The tenuous political situa-
tion in Dahomey continues fol-
lowing the arrest of a small
group of civil servants accused
of plotting against premier
Ahoma.degbe's regime.
Dahomey's politics have
long been dominated by a competi-
tion among three personalities
--Ahomadegbe, Apithy, and former
president Ma.ga--all of whom have
led the country at one time or
another. 'Each is backed by cer-
tain regional, tribal and eco-
nomic interest groups and cham-
pioned by various opportunists.
Although Apithy tends to be
somewhat more leftist than the
others, ideological or program-
matic differences play virtually
no part in the contenders' quest
for power.
The army and the labor un-
ions, whose joint action upset
the Maga regime in October 1963,
appear tempted to rebel against
Ahomadegbe's proposed austerity
program. However, the unions
now lack leadership, and Soglo
is reluctant to have the army
take the initiative.
In any case, a successor
regime will face the same prob-
lems which have proved insoluble
in the past. Dahomey is a poor
country, unable to pay ~... own
way even on a, modest scale, and
is burdened with an unusually
large group of semieducated
young men who are unemployed and
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BELGIAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
DEMOCRATIC FRONT 3
(French - speaking)
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The losses suffered by the
governing Social Christian and
Socialist parties in Belgium's
23 May national elections is a
setback for their efforts to
resolve the country's bitter
language controversy and fore-
shadows a period of instability
in its political life.
The parties' failure to
win two thirds of the seats in
Parliament will prevent consti-
tutional ratification of a legis-
lative compromise both permit-
ting increased representation
for the more rapidly growing
Dutch-speaking population and
providing certain guarantees
for French-speaking Belgians.
The business-oriented Liberals
were the principal winners in
the elections, apparently largely
as a result of their opposition
to the language compromise.
Strongly nationalist parties
from both French- and Dutch-
speaking areas of the country
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also made parliamentary gains.
The Communists picked up one new
seat.
Protracted negotiations will
probably be necessary to form a
new government, which will per-
haps include the Social Chris-
tian Party of caretaker Prime
Minister Lefevre but be headed
by someone else, possibly party
chairman Paul Vanden Boeynants.
Paul Henri Spaak would probably
continue as foreign minister if
his Socialist Party is in the
government.
Western Hemisphere
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SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
There is no sign of a solu-
tion to the stalemate in the
Dominican Republic, although An-
tonio Imbert's loyalist regime
continues to gain momentum both
politically and militarily. An
unofficial and uneasy cease-fire
is being maintained, partly
through pressure from the Or-
ganization of American States
and the United Nations.
The Loyalists
The loyalist military of-
fensive cleared rebels from the
area north of the US-patrolled
line of communications in Santo
Domingo before a 24-hour cease-
fire went into effect at noon
on 21 May. Imbert's troops met
only light resistance and cap-
tured more than 1,000 prisoners
and numerous weapons. The cease-
fire was not officially extended
but each side has stated that
it will not resume fighting
unless provoked.
The loyalist regime con-
tinues to gain confidence and
Imbert appears to be rallying
middle- and upper-class support.
These classes evidently fear
that a compromise government in-
fluenced by ex-President Bosch
--such as one headed by Antonio
Guzman--inevitably would be
based on liberal policies that
would damage their interests.
The regime also enjoys strong
support from the loyalist of-
ficer-corps which opposes a
political solution that would
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give influential positions to
Bosch supporters.
In an attempt to broaden
its base and gain a semblance
of legitimacy, the Imbert gov-
ernment announced on 24 May that
it would form a "consultative
council" of business, profes-
sional, labor, and political
groups to which it would dele-
gate "full legislative powers."
Among the political groups that
apparently will be represented
on the council are five "politi-
cal parties" that support Im-
bert. Three of these are small
personalistic factions; the other
two are larger but lack wide-
spread support.
The loyalist government
has also tried to mobilize mass
support. In a recent nation-
wide radio address, Imbert at-
tempted to refute the idea that
he would impose authoritarianism,
stating that his "provisional
and transitory" government would
ensure that the "era of privi-
lege and irritating social in-
equality" had ended. His gov-
ernment has also held rallies
in outlying towns in an effort
to develop popular backing, ap-
parently with some success.
There now is reason to believe
that much of the populace--
including some elements who
dislike Imbert personally--
would accept him if he could
provide an effective govern-
ment that would furnish jobs
as well as security.
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650523 2
47552
Gulf of Mexico
M~klCo#
Mt of Nati
Atlantic Ocean
~~A H AMA
ANDS
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PORTAUPR INCE
SANTO DOMINGO
Principal Rebel-Held Area
Rebel-In Filtrated Area
h
j Ca brera
Mppon~teea
Azue ~L Lax{Sen II. 5
,
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/7 ''RRrr~~See liaggl
( A ryw r'eluz Santlag
\. ODRIGUEZ
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-??- Internal anaI boundary
Prouinca boundary
? National capital
OO Provincie capital
Railroad
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0 20 40 Miles
0 20 40 Kilometers
-0Higuey
LA ROMANA
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Buoyed by such indications
of support and by his military
successes, Imbert continues in-
transigent about political com-
promise. His line is one of
strong anti-Communism and un-
conditional surrender. There
has been growing resentment in
the Imbert camp over the US
role in preventing any new at-
tack against the rebels. In
public statements Imbert's re-
gime has declared that foreign
attempts to arrange a settlement
constitute unjustified inter-
vention in internal Dominican
affairs. Despite the presence
of the Inter-American Armed
Force (IAAF) between the con-
tending forces, the loyalist
government has spoken of "clean-
ing up the rebels" by possibly
launching an attack from the
National Palace--the only place
where the IAAF is not interposed.
Aristy has called "an enemy of
the people" who would be sub-
jected to their "just vengeance."
The rebels' attitude to-
ward the military is a major
point that any negotiated set-
tlement must consider. Antonio
Martinez Francisco, Bosch's hand-
picked secretary general of the
Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PRD), has maintained that the
armed forces need to be reduced
in size. Another PRD leader
has said that the party will de-
mand that its members who have
served with rebel units be in-
corporated into the Dominican
military establishment.
Extremists continue to
play an important part in the
rebel camp.
The rebels appear to have
taken a more conciliatory public
attitude toward negotiations,
possibly because they believe
that a political settlement would
favor them. They have publicly
indicated their willingness to
negotiate with the US or inter-
national organizations. Rebel
leader Francisco Caamano has
stated his cabinet would resign
if it would "serve the revolu-
tion." The rebels, however, re-
main firm on two points: their
demand that the 1963 constitution
--a symbol of the revolution--
not be sacrificed; and their op-
position to the military and to
Imbert, whom rebel minister
extremist ranks seems to have
decreased somewhat. Some have
spoken--somewhat wistfully--
of hoped-for arms and advice
from Cuba. Within the rebel
camp there is an increasing
shortage of arms and ammuni-
tion; this may in part explain
the 25 May attack on the Na-
tional Palace, which is the
only remaining ammunition store-
house in the rebel area. As
their military prospects have
dwindled, the number of rebels
willing to fight also has re-
portedly decreased.
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There have been at least
two small rebel attacks against
police posts in the interior
during the past week, but at
present calm conditions prevail.
The important Santiago area
has been tranquil and loyalist
police and military forces are
in control, but the people are
reportedly confused by the pro-
longed political machinations
in the capital. Some people in
the interior seem to be increas-
ingly annoyed by what they con-
sider US political manipulations
in. Santo Domingo.
Secretary General Jose Mora
of. the Organization of American
States, that body's appointed
mediator in the Dominican Repub-
lic, has taken the initiative
in trying to bring both fac-
tions to the conference table
and has worked hard--thus far
unsuccessfully--to get them to
accept a compromise.
The act formally establish-
ing the Inter-American Armed
Force was signed on 23 May in
Santo Domingo by the commanders
of military contingents from
the United States, Brazil, Costa
Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua,
as well as by Mora. This is
the first peacekeeping force
to be established in the hemi-
sphere. The Brazilian Govern-
ment, at OAS behest, named 64-
year-old General Hugo Panasco
Alvim, to command the force.
General Alvim, a veteran of the
Italian campaign in World War
II, is considered a forceful
and experienced commander.
Meanwhile, the Brazilian
contingent of some 1,200 troops
has begun to arrive in Santo
Domingo. As Latin American
troops land, comparable numbers
of US forces are being removed.
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THREATS TO BARRIENTOS REGIME IN BOLIVIA
A turbulent week in Bolivia
opened-with a drive by the govern-
ment to assert its authority over
the Communist-dominated tin miners
and ended with junta chief Barrien-
tos acting to save his regime from
threats posed by the personal am-
bitions of his principal rival,
armed forces commander General
Ova nd o .
The military campaign got off
to a good start on Monday. Before
the day was over, miner resistance
had been reduced to a number of
strongholds. Desperate mine labor
leaders attempted to avert mili-
tary occupation of the mines and
preserve their personal power by
asking the sympathetic student
organization to obtain a truce.
General Ovando,for reasons not yet
clear, unilaterally concluded an
agreement which provided both for
a cease-fire and an end to the
miners' strike. The agreement
cost the government the initiative
in that it also provided that, by
29 May, government forces would be
withdrawn from the mines they had
occupied. Sporadic street fight-
ing, however, continued in La Paz
as late as Thursday.
Ovando may have lost his
nerve as a result of a reported
defection of 200 soldiers in the
fighting near La Paz. It is more
probable, however, that he acted
to undermine Barrientos and thus
advance his own ambitions. A de-
cisive victory over the unruly
miners, who for years have been
the core of Bolivia's economic
and political problems, would
have greatly enhanced Barrientos'
power position.
Skillful political maneuver-
ing by Barrientos averted a coup
attempt this week. He arranged
the appointment of Ovando as junta
co-president and then had himself
appointed co-commander of the armed
forces. His aim is to neutralize
Ovando by binding him more closely
to the government and forcing him
to share authority over the mili-
tary. The reconciliation is hypo-
critical and probably impermanent
but has eased tensions in military
and civilian sectors. A final
showdown seems inevitable, however,
and may only have been postponed
for a short time.
The overthrow of pro-US Bar-
rientos by Ovando would seem to
facilitate an eventual leftist
take-over of Bolivia, to say noth-
ing of the encouragement it would
give the Communists everywhere in
Latin America. Successful or not,
an Ovando move against Barrientos
could provoke a civil war from
which the Communists would prob-
ably emerge as the chief benefici-
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Antigovernment agitation
by Communist-front student groups
precipitated a declaration of a
state of siege in Colombia on
21 May. Although rioting contin-
ued through Tuesday, army and po-
lice vigilance prevented any se-
rious damage. The outlook for
restoration of order has been
improved by the disappearance
into hiding of the adult insti-
gators behind the student unrest.
Moreover, the military courts
which now have jurisdiction over
"crimes against internal secu-
rity" are not inclined to be le-
nient.
President Valencia, now
empowered to govern by decree,
may attempt to force his eco-
nomic reform program on the Con-
gress. Some of his ministers
have apparently urged him to dic-
tate into law certain measures
recommended by a commission set
up in January to study social
and economic problems. The rec-
ommendations were presented to
a special session of Congress
convened on 27 April, but by 20
May it was evident that the leg-
islature was in no mood to act.
ists, unless they are ratified
by congress or issued to correct
the conditions which precipitated
the state of siege. Valencia's
advisers believe they can use the
latter loophole to give perma-
nence to any measures he might
promulgate in dealing with the
present situation. The proposed
reforms are generally popular
and, with elections less than a
year away, Congress may not at-
tempt to repeal reforms if they
become law.
Military leaders, who prob-
ably pressured Valencia into de-
claring the state of siege, con-
tinue to profess their loyalty,
but an undercurrent of discontent
pervades the military establish-
ment. Minister of War Gabriel
Rebeiz has found it necessary to
have meetings of his field offi-
cers from time to time to rein-
force their personal loyalty and
to assess the morale of their
troops. At these meetings, it
has become customary to warn jun-
ior officers against "association"
with retired General Ruiz Novoa,
who was forced to resign as minis- 25X1
ter of war in Janua
d h
ry an
as
been unofficially campaigning for
As a rule, presidential de-
crees during a state of siege
have the force of law only as
long as the state of siege ex-
president ever since.
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