WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004900090001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 2, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/08/27 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900090001-1
DIA review completed.
State Dept. review completed ~ `~ {ARMY Review Completed
~ENTR~L 11`~ITELLIENE> ~~E~~~
.OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLI~ENC~
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~E~F~ET
.~RC~I~R{ ~XClud~d From fliifamatc
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"' SECRET '~
(Information as of noon EDT, 1 July 1965)
VIETNAM
The Viet Cong summer offensive regained its momentum
last week. The weekly incident rate was the highest
this year. Battalion-size or larger attacks were re-
sumed on a countrywide basis, and guerrillas attacked
Da Nang ~1ir Base. Both Hanoi and Peiping continued to
reject all m a v e s for negotiations, such as the Com-
monwealth Peace Mission proposals and President John-
son's UN speech.
Page
United Nations
CHARTER AMENDMENTS MAY LEAD TO EMERGENCY ASSEMBLY SESSION 5
If, as expected, amendments enlarging the Security Coun-
cil and Economic and Social Council become effective in
the next few weeks, any UN member anxious to complicate
the US-Soviet dispute over Article 19 could demand an
emergency session of the General Assembly to elect the
additional members.
The Communist World
AGRICULTURAL PROSPECTS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
At mid-June, prospects for the winter grain crop were
generally good in the USSR, China, and North Vietnam,
and uncertain in Eastern Europe. All will continue to
be net importers of grain in 1965.
SOVIETS MAKE INTENSIVE EFFORT AT PARIS AIR SHOW
As a result, some sales of Soviet helicopters may de-
velop, but most Western manufacturers probably will not
encounter serious Soviet competition in the commercial
aircraft field before the 197 Us.
SECRET
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 July 65
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~"'~ SECRET
UNRESOLVED ECONOMIC ISSUES MAY HAVE DELAYED SOVIET PLENUM
Earlier rumors that the long-awaited central committee
plenum expected to deal with industrial organization
and management was scheduled for June or July have been
succeeded by rumors suggesting it will not be held until
some time in August dr September.
EAST GERMANY PRESSES CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY
The apparent aim of current Soviet and East German moves
affecting land and air communications is to draw the
West Germans into piecemeal concessions without posing a
direct challenge to basic Allied rights in Germany.
Asia-Africa
ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS SCHEDULED IN LAOS
The Souvanna government hopes to farm a new assembly
with a minimum of open opposition. Minor military
operations meanwhile continue in both the northwestern
and southern sections of the country.
NEW SOVIET ECONOMIC AID FOR INDIA
The increased Soviet aid widely anticipated as a result
of Prime Minister Shastri's recent negotiations may to-
tal as much as $1.2 billion during India's fourth five-
year plan (1966-?0)--an amount which would approximate
all Soviet economic aid to India since 1955.
SECRET
Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 July 65
Page
10
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SECRET ~"
STRUGGLE BETWEEN CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT LEADERS CONTINUES
President Kasavubu appears to be slowly increasing the
political pressure on Premier Tshombe in their wrestle
over the powerful office of the presidency.
Page
15
INCREASING HUTU-TUTSI TRIBAL TENSIONS IN BURUNDI
The Hutus, who won the May election, are trying to organ-
ize themselves outside existing party lines in arde
control the ~avernment i'rP.P_ of Tnt~ci 9 of 1 nPnr!a _
NEW ALGERIAN REGIME STILL ORGANIZING
Colonel Boumedienne may be having some difficulty rec-
onciling differences among the various opponents of the
old Ben Bella government, but at least the much-publi-
cized demonstrations against his coup have slackened.
Europe
US RELATIONS WITH EURATOM AND ITS MEMBERS
Some progress may have been made toward substituting a
single US EURATOM agreement for the bilateral accords
the US now has with five EURATOM members, but several
of the five continue to have reservations and France is
opposed to any move like this that would enhance the
supranational status of the European communities.
SECRET
Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 July 65
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'`'"' SECRET `"~
Western Hemisphere
Page
SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Extremists dissatisfied with rebel leader Caamano's will-
ingness to negotiate a political solution have attached
loyalist positions in the interior. These incidents have
heightened the Imbert regimets demands for a military so-
lution. Ymbert is resisting suggestions that he step
down, but several military chiefs say they will withdraw
their support from him if an acceptable interim govern-
ment can be formed.
SECOND INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE IN JEOPARDY
A number of OAS members, opposed to the role of the US
and the Organization of American States in the Dominican
crisis, are against holding the conference as scheduled
on 4 August in Rio de Janeiro.
POSSIBLE SPLIT IN JAGAN'S PARTY IN BRITISH GUIANA
Jaganfs apparent decision to direct violent opposition
to independence under the Burnham government may have
come too late to prevent extremists from leaving his
pro-Communist People's Progressive Party.
COLOMBIA'S FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS REMAIN UNSOLVED 25
President Valencia now proposes to send to Washington
a "high commission" of several ex-presidents, party and
union leaders, and technical advisers, but many of its
members are pessimistic about accomplishing anything.
SECRET
Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 July 65
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i`'' SECRET
The Viet Cong summer offen-
sive regained its momentum last
week, with an incident rate (678)
which was the highest this year.
Battalion-size or larger attacks
were resumed on a countrywide
basis, and guerrillas attacked
Da Nang Air Base. Both Hanoi
and Peiping continued to reject
all moves for negotiations, such
as the Commonwealth Peace Mis-
sion proposals and President
Johnson's UN speech.
Viet Cong Offensive
The Da Nang attack by Viet
Cong demolition and recoilless
rifle teams, supported ~y 81-mm.
mortar fire, occurred on the
night of 30 June - 1 July. One
F-102 jet fighter and two C-130
transport aircraft were destroyed,
and two F-102s and one C-120 were
severely damaged. One US service-
man was killed and two wounded.
On 25 June, a force of two
to three Communist battalions
overran Tou Morong, a district
capital in the northeastern part
of Kontum Province, bordering
southern Laos. Most of the town's
population, the district chief,
and some 75 defending troops
escaped to a nearby district town
on the road to the provincial
capital. The government appears
to have decided not to try to
reoccupy Tou. Morong, which air
reconnaissance suggests now is
deserted.
It is too early to tell
whether the Communists are making
a full-scale effort to seize
Kontum Province, but two other
isolated district towns, Dak
To and Dak Sut, have been mor-
tared since the attack on Tou
Morong.
In the highland province
of Phu Bon, the Viet Cong on 30
June overran Thuan Man, a dis-
trict capital just south of
Cheo Reo, the provincial capital.
Two relieving airborne battalions
moving to evacuate the Thuan Man
garrison engaged in heavy fight-
ing with farces of possible reg-
imental size. Late reports in-
dicate the airborne battalions
fought their way to the belea-
guered garrison. The strong
Communist force still in the
area may comprise other elements
of the North Vietnamese 325th
Division or elements of the 3rd
Viet Cong Regiment, or both.
Sabotage against land lanes
of communication continued at a
high level during the week, with
all major routes into II Corps
reported closed. US military
authorities in Saigon state
that continued interdiction of
roads to the high plateau region
will soon make it necessary to
rely exclusively on air delivery
of military and civilian supplies.
The north-south coastal railway
is operational only between Phan
Rang in Ninh Thuan Province and
Nha Trang in Khanh Hoa.
The government forces' most
successful action last week was a
large-scale search-and destroy
operation against a suspected Viet
Cong regiment in the delta province
SECRET
Page 1
WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 July 65
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~' SL' G1tL 1 ' '~
of Dinh Tuong. Vietnamese mili-
tary sources claim that 255 Viet
Cong were killed, as against
friendly losses of 6 killed (1
US) and 33 wounded (1 US). A
large-scale US-Vietnamese airborne
operation into the southern
fringes of Viet Cong War Zone
"D" resulted in the destruction
of sizable quantities of food-
stuffs and other supplies but
only minor contact with the enemy.
ing within the ruling military
group behind the facade of unity
and dedication to reform.
Saigon Political Developments
Saigon's new military gov-
ernment in its second week con-
tinued to emphasize austerity,
war mobilization, and national
self-discipline. On 24 June it
suspended diplomatic relations
with France, which have been
conducted at the chargd level
since early 1964. This was
Premier Ky's major political
move of the week, apparently
motivated by a desire to launch
his regime with a dramatic action
calculated to win popular sup-
port. Saigon intends to retain
consular ties with France, how-
ever, and has indicated no in-
tention of moving against the
considerable French economic and
other interests still in South
Vietnam.
There are already signs that
internal rivalries may be develop-
The Viet Cong have stepped
up terrorism in an effort to add
to the new government's problems
and to inhibit US action. Ter-
rorists on 25 June bombed a
floating restaurant on the Saigon
River, killing 44, including 13
Americans, and wounding 81, of
whom 16 were US citizens. The
Communists next day announced
they had executed.an American
military prisoner in retaliation
for Saigon's recent execution of
a Viet Cong terrorist. They
threatened that "tomorrow will
be the turn of all the wicked
devils, headed by Taylor, John-
son, Westmoreland, Thieu, Ky,
and so forth."
Military Developments in DRV
US and South Vietnamese air-
craft last week maintained the
steady pace of air attacks on
targets in southern and north-
western North Vietnam. Two US
aircraft were lost to ground
fire .
SE CRE T
Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY
2 July 65
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JL' (.~ ~c r, l
Hanoi and Peiping
The Vietnamese Communists
continued their propaganda at-
tacks on the Commonwealth Peace
Mission this week, focusing their
objections on the participation
of prime Minister Wilson. A Lon-,
don Da~.ly Worker interview quoted
Ho i'n on 6 June as saying
that Wilson "cannot engage%in
peace negotiations since he him-
self has supported US aggressive
policies its uietnam."
Hanoi has not yet rejected
the Commonwealth proposals out-
right. In Peiping, however, the
Foreign Ministry handed a note
to the British charge on 25 June
formally rejecting the idea of
a mission to Peiping and charg-
ing that the British Government
had appropriated the name of the
Commonwealth to launch a new
"peace talks plot" designed to
help the US.
Peiping responded to Presi-
dent Johnson's 25 June UN speech
in a People's Daily article on
29 June asserting what the US
was attempting to use the UN in
a "peace hoax" while at the same
time escalating the war b send-
in lanes near Hanoi.
SECRET
Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY
2 July 65
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~ SECRET ~
,United Nations
CHARTER AMENDMENTS MAY LEAD TO EMERGENCY ASSEMBLY SESSION
The Charter amendments en-
larging the UN's Security Coun-
cil and Economic and Social Coun-
cil could further complicate the
problems associated witH Article
19. If, as expected, the amend-
ments become effective in-the
next few weeks,-the legality of
the two councils is subject to
challenge, and an emergency ses-
sion of the General Assembly
could be demanded to elect the
additional members. Such a
tactic might appeal, for example,
to the Albanians, who succgeded
earlier this year in forcing the
General Assembly to break its
moratorium on-voting and would
complicate efforts now under way
to resolve the US-Soviet stale-
mat~~ over Article i9 before the
20th General Assembly convenes
this winter.
A UN Secretariat official
had suggested earlier that this
danger would be 'averted if Na-
tionalist China or the. US were
tQ delay deposit of the ratifica-
tion required to bring the amend-
ments into effect.. Taiwan, how-
ever, has refused to take a
course which would incur the
wrath of Afro-Asians and be
likely to jeopardize its seat
on the Security Council. The
US also would be vulnerable to
criticism should it withhold
its deposit or take an active
role in urging that new members
not take office until next year.
In response to a US sug-
gestion.?Secretary General Thant
now is trying to convince mem-
bers that the amendments should
be "interpreted" to permit the
Security Council to continua
with its present membership un-
til additional members elected
during the 20th General Assembly
take office on 1 January 1966.
Even if he obtains a consensus
to this effect, however, it may
not hold up until next year if
some member has imperative po-
litical reasons for wishing to
hamstrin any Securit Council
action.
At mld-June, prospects for
the winter grain crop were gen-
erally good in the USSR, China,
and North Vietnam, and uncertain
in Eastern Europe. All will con-
tinue.to be net importers of
-grain in 1965. Total grain im-
ports from the free world are
projected at 15 to~16 million
tons.
SE ~'RE T
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Crop prospects in the USSR
appear favorable, but less prom-
ising than a year ago when con-
ditions were excellent.' Soil
moisture levels at the end of
May were generally above normal
but lower than at this time last
year. The total yield of winter
grains in the USSR will probably
be somewhat better than in 1964
2 July 65
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PRODUCTION OF GRAIN IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, SELECTED YEARS
(Million Metric Tons)
USSR ??
GRAN
E1kSTERN EUROPE
(irzcluding~Ibania
rand Yugraslavia)
GRAIN: Breadgrains
Annual Average 1457-61 19b3
COMMUNIST CHINA
GRAIN
Harvestedl;
early
summer **
NORTH VIETNAM
RICE
Spring rite.
a.
Including tubers on a grain equivalent basis of 4 metric tons to 1 metric ton of grain .
k* Excluding tubers.
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,.. SECRET `'`
beca uee of the good condition
of winter wheat. Acreage sown
to spring wheat was in excess of
-plan and greater than in 1964.
Planting of, some other crops was
continuing as of mid=June, prob-
ably delayed somewhat by weft
weather in the, northern and west-
ern European USSR. Livestock
production for marketing should
be greater than in recent years,
and overfulfillment of some semi-
annual meat,and milk delivery
plans was 'reported in early June.
In Easterm Europe, the ab-
normally cold and ,rainy spring
has made prospects, uncertain, The
condition of winter grains is
generally good, liut final yields
and quality now depend upon.
weather during the next month.
Production prospects for same im-
portant crops are currently not
as good as they were a year ago.
In addition.to its over-all ad-
verse effects~on crops in Eastern
Europe, the unusual precipitation
in late May and June is causing
extensive flood damage in agri-
cultural areas in Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
Prospects for the early
grain harvest in Communist China
are relatively favorable. Pro-
duction of winter wheat is ex-
pected to be lower than in 1964
because of reduced acreage. In
North China, soil moisture levelsi,
which are well below those last
year, delayed the sowing of some
spring crops, In South and South-
west China, which produce more
than half the early rice crop,
weather conditions are very fa-
vorable.
In North Vietnam, the spring
rice crop, which accounts for
about one third of the annual
rice harvest, looks promising,
and may equal last year's bumper
crop. Acreage sown is the hi h-
est ever claimed.
SE CRE T
Page 7 WEEKLS( SU~dMARY
2 July 65
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AN-Z~ TRANSPORT
MODEL O:F TU-'t44 SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
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`"' SECR.~T `~
Despite Moscow's intensive
effort at the recent Paris Air
Show, early and appreciable So-
viet inroads in the world com-
mercial aircraft market are un-
likely. Some sales of Soviet
helicopters may develop, but
most Western manufacturers prob-
ably will not encounter serious
Soviet competition in the com-
mercial field before the 1970s.
The USSR has to convince
prospective customers that its
newer aircraft a.re economically
competitive in operation. Those
available for export are com-
para.ble in range, speed, and
capacity to Western types, and
are being offered at lower prices,
but the USSR has a poor reputa-
tion for servicing exported a.ir-
cra.ft, and operating costs have
proven excessive.
the new IL-62 faur-jet 186 pas-
senger transport, have nothing to .
recommend them--other than price--
Other Soviet aircraft dis-
played at the air show, including
viets will keep the TU-144
program one step ahead of the
Concorde, in order to'be able
At Paris, the USSR also dis-
closed some details and displayed
a scale model of the TU-144 super-
isonic transport, which is very
!similar to the Anglo-French Con-
corde. Under the present devel-
opment schedule--which closely
~iparallels that. of the Goncorde--
the TU-144 is to make its first
flight in 1968 and enter service
in 1970 or 1971. It seems highly
probable, however, that the So-
to claim a "first . "
SE CRE T
g WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 J,uly,65
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~"~ SECRET
UNRESOLVED ECONOMIC ISSUES MAY HAVE DELAYED SOVIET PLENUM
It appears there may be some
delay in convening the long-
awaited Soviet central committee
,plenum expected to deal with in-
dustrial organization and manage-
ment. Earlier rumors in Moscow
that the plenum was scheduled for
June or July have been succeeded
by later ones suggesting that it
will not be held until some time
in August or even September. The
apparent delay in convoking the
plenum is mare apt to reflect the
complexity of economic problems
facing the regime than differences
in the leadership over the need
for economic reform.
Premier Kosygin in March
and party secretary Podgorny in
late May stressed that the cen-
tral committee was preparing a
reorganization of industrial man-
agement. They may have been re-
ferring to the activity of an ad
hoc commission of prominent econ-
omists who were at the time re-
portedly working on the matter.
Late in June, after several
months' lull in public discussion
of the management problem, Pravda
published an account of a Moscow
economic conference generally
favorable to greater decentrali-
zation.
During the second half of
this year selected retail stores,
restaurants, and food-processing
plants will-switch to a more lib-
eral system of management that
grants considerable autonomy to
enterprise directors. These en-
terprises will be in: addition to
the 400 factories in the cloth-
ing, textile, shoe, and leather
industries already scheduled to
convert to such a system during
1965. Several installations in
heavy industry began experiment-
ing with variants of these rela-
tively liberal methods earlier
this year.
The limited scope of this
experimentation suggests that
decision on a nationwide reform
will be slow in coming. The
plenum is unlikely to do more
in this sphere than approve the
broad principles and possibly
outline the next steps.
Differences within the
leadership over economic priori-
ties may be hindering a decision
on the extent and pace of future
reform. Although there is no
indication of uncertainty over
the high priority attached to
agriculture by the plenum last
March, there continues to be in-
decision on the relative weight
to be given other economic sec-
tors. In late May Nikolay Pod-
gorny asserted that consumer-
goods production would no longer
suffer because of heavy industry
and defense needs, but on 2 June
Mikhail Suslov warned that de-
fense requirements still impose
"material sacrifices" on Soviet
citizens. Since these statements,
which may have been influenced
by differing assessments of the
international situation,.have not
been repeated by other members
of the policy-making party pre-
sidium, the extent of current
disagreement on the issue is un-
certain.
SECRET
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`~ SECRET
The East Germans and Soviets
have begun what may prove to be
a protracted series of moves
affecting West Germany's land
and air communications with
East Germany and West Berlin in
order to advance East German
claims of sovereign equality
with the Federal Republic. Their
apparent object is not to pro-
voke a major crisis but to draw
the West Germans into piecemeal
concessions without posing a
direct challenge to basic Allied
rights in Germany.
Recent East German pro-
nouncements have insisted that
the postwar four-power agree-
ments governing communications
across East Germany (GDR) and
air traffic in the Berlin Con-
trol Zone are obsolete or invalid,
and have emphasized the "rights"
of the GDR as a sovereign state.
These pronouncements--like the
intermittent East German heli-
copter flights in the Berlin
area between 23 March and 21
June--are aimed at asserting
East German air sovereignty
over East Berlin, and at eroding
the authority of the four-power
Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC).
authorize BASC to reach flight
safety agreements with the GDR
transportation ministry. A
formal East German initiative
to the four powers along this
line may be forthcoming. This
would give the Soviets an oppor-
tunity to indicate an intention
in the future to exercise their
BASC functions in concert with
the East Germans, thus opening
the way far gradual efforts to
inject them into BASC.
The East Germans' promotion
of their claim to sovereignty
is similarly evident in the
Berlin pass agreement talks,
and is also the reason for their
recent denunciation of inter-
zonal agreements on rail tariffs
and barge traffic, which were
based on four-power agreement.
With the apparent aim of
undercutting West German charges
of Soviet=East German .collusion
and Bonn's appeals to the three
Western powers for joint action
to counter Communist "provoca-
tions," Soviet propaganda so far
has ignored the East German har-
assments.
It is unlikely that the
Soviets and East Germans intend
to carry their current pressure
campaign to the paint of chal-
lenging existing Allied air ac-
cess to West Berlin. However,
the new GDR foreign minister has
suggested that the four powers
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SECRET `~
Preparations are under way
for Laotian National Assembly
elections scheduled for 18 July.
By limiting the suffrage to
senior military, police, and
civilian officials and by the
judicious designation of "fa-
vored" candidates, the Souvanna
government hopes to form a new
and acceptable assembly with a
minimum of open opposition.
The Pathet Lao have charged
that the elections are illegal,
but do not appear prepared to
mount a major move to prevent
them. Some Kang Le neutralists
also appear dissatisfied, not
so much on the grounds that the
elections will be rigged, as
that they will favor rightists
at the expense of the neutral=
ists.
Skirmishing between govern-
ment and Communist forces mean-
while is continuing in widely
scattered areas of the country.
In the northwest, the Pathet Lao
have deployed substantial forces
to the hill regions southwest of
Nam Tha in an effort to curb pro-
government guerrilla activities
there. Recent activity has cen-
tered near Vieng Phu Kha, where
several key positions have changed
hands in recurrent fighting. The
Communists have also been pressing
clearing operations in the Muong
'La area,. to the east of Nam
Tha .
In southern Laos, on the
other hand, government forces
have mounted a clearing opera-
tion against Communist positions
along the northern flanks of
Route 9 east of Seno. The reg-
ular troops involved in this
action met their first stiff re-
sistance last week when they
probed sensitive Communist posi-
tions located about 20 miles
north of Dong Hene.
Troop movement as
been reported along the tradi-
tional infiltration route lead-
ing from the North Vietnamese
border just north of the De-
militarized Zone toward the
Ban Dong area on Route 9. Truck
traffic along Route 23 north
of Muong Phine apparently has
been brought to a halt because
of heavy rains; no truck move-
ment has been reported since
late. May. Some local traf-
fic, however,. appears to be
moving south from Ban Dong
along Route 92 toward the South
Vietnamese border. ~
SECRET
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...- ...
Muong Houn {
"1 C
~Sayahouryf
1 ~ Mrro~orvg Kassy
~.
Samneua
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c, ` ~~ m ~
J Mii a Ha
Muong Hiem ~ fr
/~ Na Khang
Luang Prabang
Lao Y~_
-
~
~,
f 7I PLAINE
[ti.- `-,~
Xieng Khouang\,
Ban Ta Viang~Tha Thom
~/
I\\
Pak Sane> f,":
I ' Vang VrengC,
11
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::?
f
T H A I L A N D
--?- Road
--- Track or trail
-~-~- Railroad
VIETNAM
Dong
naMnc!
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~ SECRET `'~
The increased Soviet aid
to India which has been widely
anticipated as a result .of Prime
Minister Shastri's recent ne-
goti~tions may total as much as
$1.2 billion during India's
fourth five-year plan (1966-70).
According to the Indian press,
most of this aid will be used
for large-scale industrial proj-
ects, but the USSR is also re-
ported to be considering substan-
tial assistance for existing proj-
ects in the form of maintenance
and spare parts.
Two thirds of the ,total aid
figure--an amount approximating
all Soviet economic aid to India
since 1955--will reportedly be
used for ten new projects and
expansion of a number of exist-
ing Soviet-aided operations. The
largest Soviet aid project for
India's upcoming plan is the
Bokaro steel plant, the first
stage of which is to be in opera-
tion by 1970, with an annual
capacity of about 2 million tons.
Soviet aid is also expected to
finance a second stage designed
to boost production to about 4
million tons.
The Soviets are also to ex-
pand the Bhilai steel plant to
a capacity of about 3.5 million
tons, and construct an oil re-
finery. The deputy chairman of
India's Planning Commission has
said that the USSR has also ten-
tatively agreed to provide as-
sistance for the construction
of a number of power stations,
smelters, and a large fertilizer
plant.
From 1955 to 1964, the USSR
extended about $1 billion in
economic aid to .India, the
largest Soviet economic aid pro-
gram in the free world. This
assistance has been directed
primarily to large-scale proj-
ects in the steel, heavy machin-
ery, petroleum, and power in-
dustries. Three of these, the
Bhilai steel mill and two heavy
machine-building plants, accounted
for almost 40 percent of Soviet
aid during India's second and
third five-year plans.
Soviet economic assistance
amounted to only about 10 per-
cent of the total given India
by foreign governments dur-
ing the 1955-64 period. How-
ever, the Soviets supplied around
40 percent of foreign aid for
India's government-owned indus-
tries, and roughly 25 percent of
its steelmaking capacity
Congolese President Kasavubu
appears to be slowly increasing
the political pressure on Pre-
mier Tshomb~ in their wrestle
over the powerful office of the
presidency.
Following a court nullifi-
cation of election results in
three provinces--in which Tshomb~
and his allies had won--Kasavubu
postponed the scheduled 30 June
convocation of parliament and set
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S~CR.~T
no new date. This action permits
him to continue to govern by de'-
tree and deprives Tshomb~ of the
backing of a parliament in which
his Conoco party cartel would
control a majority.
Kasavubu also has publicly
suggested that the composition
of the Tshombd government be
modified, and has reminded
Tshomb~ that it is the presi-
dent who presents governments
to parliament for approval.
Tshomb~, however, has repeatedly
rejected suggestions that he
modify his "transition"' gov-
ernment before presidential
elections, which are to be held
six months after the parliament
convenes. Tshombd's political
and military assets seem the
stronger, but Kasavubu has the
better legal. position.
The government's over-all
military situation remains
favorable, although another
small flurry of rebel activity
has appeared in the eastern
Congo.
INCREASING HUTU-TUTSI,TRIBAL TENSIONS IN BURUNDI
Tribal tensions between the
Hutus and Tutsis--the majority
and minority peoples in Burundi
--have continued to build up since
ttie Hutu election victory in May.
Last week end, there were rumors
that a Tutsi-instigated coup was
imminent, and the excitement led
the- Belgian commander of the Bu=
rundi Army to declare an alert.
The troubles center on the
Hutus' efforts to organize them-
selves outside existing party
lines in order to control the Na-
tional Assembly and the future
cabinet. The Tutsis, who hold
only 10 of the 33 assembly seats,
are, trying to convince Hutu mem-
bers to stay within the previously
governing UPRONA party, where the
Tutsis can maintain influence.
SE CRS T
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SECRET ~.
Both opponents and support-
ers of the new Algerian regime
seem to be marking time, await-
ing the formal composition of the
National Revolutionary Council
and the reorganization of the
government.
Colonel Houari Boumedienne
may be experiencing some diffi-
culty in reconciling differences
among his closest supporters and
in meeting conditions which Ben
Bella's chief opponents are like-
ly to have posed as the price for
adhering to or collaborating with
the regime. Ferhat Abbas, the
respected former president of the
pre-independence provisional AZ=
gerian government, reportedly is
insisting on free elections and
civilian control over the mili-
tary. Boumedienne probably would
resist the latter demand.
Almost total paralysis grips
the administration. Government
employees are preoccupied with
their worries about the nature of
the new regime and the intentions
of Boumedienne and of the army.
There have been few declarations
of support, and even those were
.couched in noncommittal terms.
"The only labor group which has
unequivocally supported the new
regime is the farm workers,
which took this stand shortly
after the coup.
The pro.-...:Ben Bblla demonstra-
tions, largely the work of left-
ist-oriented student groups,
apparently have petered out.
Demonstration organizers may
believe that police and mili-
tary forces will be less in-
clined to deal gently with dem-
onstrators, now that the Afro-
Asian conf erence has been post-
poned and the press spotlight
is off Algeria.
The regime presumably is
somewhat concerned by the de-
tached and even antagonistic
attitude of other African gov-
ernments and by the unfavorable
publicity the coup has generated
in the foreign press. Algerian
spokesmen have made it clear
that they will not tolerate for-
eign meddling; they seem partic-
ularly to be harassing Egyptian
technicians and teachers em-
ployed in Algeria.
Reacting to Fidel Castro's
characterization of the Alge-
~ian coup as "antirevolutionary,
treacherous, and inglorious,"
the Boumedienne regime closed
down the Cuban news agency,
Prensa Latina, for "distribution
of material harmful to the rev-
olutionar overnment." /
SECRET
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SECRET
US RELATIONS WITH EURATOM AND ITS MEMBERS
Some progress may have been
made toward substituting a single
US-EURATOM agreement for the bi-
lateral. accords the US now has
with five EURATOM members for the
exchange of nuclear fuel and in-
formation. At a recent meeting,
all of the countries concerned
except France indicated a gen-
eral willingness to permit their
bilaterals with the US to ex-
pire and, in particular, to ac-
cept EURATOM as their inter-
mediary in the acquisition of
special nuclear materials from
the US. Their continuing res-
ervations, however, could still
delay-their assent or deprive
it of some of the expected ad-
vantages.
Between 1955 and the estab-
lishment of EURATOM in 1958, the
US negotiated individual agree-
ments to assist France, Italy,
West Germany, Belgium, and the
Netherlands in their peaceful
atomic programs. Much of the
purpose of these accords disap-
peared, however, when direct US-
EURATOM relations were set up.
Moreover, the EURATOM treaty it-
self had contemplated that the
community would ultimately assume
responsibility for arrangements
connected with the procurement
of special nuclear materials from
nonmembers, and that the rights
and obligations which member
states had acquired under pre-
existing agreements with non-
members would be transferred to
the community.
Full implementation of these
provisions, however, has been re-
peatedly delayed by French re-
luctance to accept the supremacy
of EURATOM and by suspicion among
all members that termination of
their bilateral cooperation agree-
ments with the US might cost
them certain advantages. The
French, whose accord ends in 1966,
recently restated their strong
desire to retain a bilateral
relationship with the US, in-
cluding in the area of fuel sup-
ply. Italy--whose treaty would
not expire until 1978--says it
favors a switch to the EURATOM
channel, but only if all its
partners--including France--
agree. The Dutch and Germans,
whose accords are up in 1966 and
1967, say they are willing to
let them lapse, and the Germans
have even offered to cancel
theirs beforehand "if others
would too."
Belgium, whose bilateral
expires on 31 July 1965, is in
the uncomfortable position of
having to take the lead and has
been insisting that it could re-
linquish its bilateral only if
assured that the others would not
be extended. While recent state-
ments by the Germans, Italians,
and Dutch had seemed to provide
such assurances, new doubts have
apparently arisen in Brussels
in the last few days.
It is unlikely that any over-
all agreement can be reached to
cancel all the bilaterals at this
time. Aside from the French
attitude, the Italians--still
miffed by their recent defeat
over EURATOM's research program--
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~" SECRET '~
may seek to cling for some
time to their bilateral.
Should Belgium willingly agree
to let its treaty expire in
July, however, this would
make it easier far the US to
decline to renew the others
as they expire. There has
been some indication that Paris
is resigned to this, even
though it would mean a further
strengthening of the Eurppean
communities.
Western Hemisphere
SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Dissension among the Do-
minican rebels became more evi-
dent this week as hard-line
extremists took exception to
rebel president Caamano's will-
ingness to negotiate a political
solution to the two-month-old
crisis. Both the orthodox
Dominican Popular Socialist
(Communist) Party (FSPD) and
one element of the pro-Castro
Fourteenth of June Political
Group (APCJ) generally approve
negotiations, on the grounds
that only a political solution
offers any hope for the rebel
cause. Opposition to polit-
ical compromise is centered in
the hard-line Communist Domin-
ican Popular Movement (MPD) and
some militant members of the
APCJ.
Underscoring their dis-
satisfaction, the extremists
attacked several loyalist
positions in the north-central
region of the country. On 25
June, loyalist police and army
forces repulsed an 80-man at=
tack, led by Communists and pro-
Castro extremists, in San Fran-
Cisco de Macoris. The next day,
a small rebel band unsuccess-
fully stormed a police post in
the nearby town of Pimentel.
Press and rebel reports of other
outbreaks have not been con-
firmed. Police and army units
are on alert and vigilante
groups have been formed in sev-
eral interior towns.
As violence broke out in
the interior, the Imbert govern-
ment increased its demands. for
a military solution in the capi-
tal. These new incidents have
heightened Imbert's criticism
of the US and the Organization
of American States for not al-
lowing him to "clean up" the
rebel zone in Santo Domingo.
Loyalist authorities have re-
fused to cooperate with the
Inter-American Human Rights Com-
mission in its investigation of
conditions in the interior and
alleged atrocities.
Imbert continues adamant in
his resistance to the OAS sug-
gestions that he step down in
favor of a new provisional
SE C'RE T
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"' SECRET
government, but loyalist mili-
tary chiefs have told US at-
tachds~ that they would with-
draw their support from him
once an 'acceptable interim gov-
ernment had been formed. Some
key military officers, partic-
ularly air force Generals Wessin
y Wessin and de los Santos,
have previously voiced discon-
tent with Imbert's rule. They
specifically were concerned
that the mounting evidence of
atrocities, for which they
blame police units personally
controlled by Imbert, would
further discredit the armed
forces.
The OAS committee has se-
cured the tentative agreement
of a number of capable Domin=
icans to serve in a provisional
government that would, with the
support of the OAS, rule until
general elections are held at
a still undetermined date. The
leading candidate to head the
provisional government is Hector
Garcia Godoy, a career diplomat
without strong political ties.
In an effort to maintain the
economy of the country, the OAS
will provide $8 million to pay
the June salaries of all govern-
ment employees. It has also ap-
propriated $9 million far recov-
ery programs.
Meanwhile, former president
Joaquin Balaguer returned to Santa
Domingo on Monday to visit his
dying mother, and his supporters
are attempting to capitalize on
his presence. Balaguer, a widely
known political figure, has
considerable support from a broad.
spectrum of ..Dominican society, in-
cluding the military. He has an-
nounced his support of the OAS
proposals and offered his assis#-
2~nce tb,the provisional government.
He is unwilling, however, to ac-
cept a position in a provisional
government because he hopes to run
for president when elections are
held.
SECOND INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE IN JEOPARDY
Opposition to the role of
the US and the Organization of
American States in the Dominican
crisis is jeopardizing the Sec-
ond Inter-American Conference
scheduled to begin in Rio de Ja-
neiro'.on 4 August. Foreign min-
istry officials of a number of
OAS members--notably Chile, Mex-
ico, Uruguay, and Peru--are
against holdin the meeting as
25X1 scheduled.
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~. w
yBAwI M~
Is~nra os
~y
`>
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f'iovnicia boundary
ib rvac~o~ai caNnai
Provin~ia ~apilal
ead.oaa
Hnad
?ar, r
~? San Francisco
?
--..de Macotis`:
~ i
Yimcnrel `-~
~_as
rv Dunn
M~y~c,.
ioP~?NG
ru Enro
Rlco
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A moderate-extremist split that he could remain the effec-
within the pro-Communist People's) tive party leader only by fol-
Progressive Party (PPP) in Brit- lowing an extremist course.
fish Guiana has been aggravated
by Cheddi Jagan's indecision over
whether to lead the PPP into vio-
lent opposition to the Burnham
government. The dissension is
further complicated by dissatis-
faction with Jagan's authoritar-
ianism and by the personal.. am-
bitions of second-ranking party
leaders.
The ambitious Brindley Benn,
a Negro and leader of the extrem-
fists, apparently is restrained
from breaking with the PPP and
forming the "Communist Party of
:British Guiana" only by lack of
political support among Jagan's
fellow East Indians.
Too late, perhaps, to stem
the tide of ill feeling within
the PPP, Jagan appears to have
come to a decision. He recently
declared that independence under
the Negro-dominated Burnham
government would place East In-
dians in a dangerous position
and should be prevented by sabo-
tage which he would direct. Ja-
gan's decision may be based on
fear that the militants' posi-
tion was becoming too attractive
to the PPP rank and file and
SECR.~T
In early June,-Jagan com-
plained that most if not all
of the sabotage conducted in
British Guiana was being carried
out by individual PPP units act-
ing independently of the central.
leadership. The bombing of the
US Consulate in Georgetown on 24
June seemed to follow the pat-
tern of these earlier sabotage
efforts. Premier Burnham has
arrested three top Jagan henchmen
as a result of the bombing, but
it is quite possible that Jagan
did not order it and that he has
not yet been able to bring all
terrorists within the party under
his personal control.
A split in the PPP, however,
will not improve the security
situation because, with Jagan
and PPP extremists both opting
for violence, the outlook for
a tranquil march to independence
day looks bleak.
Although Premier Burnham in-
tends to deal forcefully with
peace breakers, he will also have
a difficult time keeping extrem=
fists in his own party from re-
taliating in kind should violence
appear to be increasing. On the
day after the consulate bombing,
Burnham told the US consul gen-
eral that "the boys'' in his
party wanted to know if it were
not time for them to "operate
directly."
SE iC'R~ T
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.rte
SECRET
Public confidence in Colom-
bia's National Front government
remains low because nothing has
been done to solve the country's
critical financial and econamic
problems following President
Valencia's refusal to counte-
nance a de facto exchange devalu-
ation. Business and labor are
restless, prices have edged up
somewhat, and the free foreign
exchange rate is the highest it
has ever been. Congress has
been in special session since
2? April but has still not acted
on economic reform measures pro-
posed by a special study group
after an earlier crisis.
In a letter explaining his
recent resignation, ex-finance
minister Hernando Duran Dussan
stated that exchange reform is
inevitable and .that the reform
measures being considered by the
special session of Congress will
not realize enough revenue to
cover the government's deficit.
He said that the President lacks
a fixed policy, the cabinet
ministers dispute among them-
selves,and the entire government
lacks cohesion. He pointed out
that in this environment neither
technical instruments nor ex-
perience have any value. Duran
was replaced by the minister of
agriculture, but this appointment
was apparently temporary, and the
position now has been offered to
Ignacio Copete Lizarralde, an
officer of the Inter-American'
Development Bank.
Hoping to find other solu-
tions to the country's financial
problems, Valencia has set up a
"high commission" composed of
several ex-presidents, party
leaders, labor union leaders,
and technical advisers, which he
proposes to send to Washington.
Many of the members were reluc -
tantto accept the assignment
because of pessimism that the
commission will be able to ac-
complish much. At the installa-
tion session of the commission,
a representative of one of Colom-
bia's two largest labor unions'
endorsed Valencia's stand against
devaluation and set forth the
union's proposals. If a majority
of the members oppose these pro-
posals,the unions may withdraw
from the commission.
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