WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004900100001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 9, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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~"`; 9 July 1965
ARMY review(s)
~
completed. ~= . ~
State Dept. review
~'~completed . .`
-.Navy review
completed.
'QCI. No: 0297`65
copy zoo , 7i
ENTC~,L., ~I~:"C'EL1.IGENCE ~ ~~E~NC~(
pFF1CE. ?F. CURRENT 1NTELLIGEN.C
Approved
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GR?L)P?}.:Excluded fram,outQi
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`"" SECRET
C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EDT, 8 July 1965)
VIETNAM
The Viet Cong are pressing their campaign in the cen-
tral highlands, and fighting has intensified in the
northern part of South Vietnam. The main action has
shifted to Kontum Province, where there are an esti-
mated six Communist battalions, including three from
North Vietnam. In the DRV, efforts to improve air de-
fenses continue, and a fifth surface-to-air missile site
have been identified under construction near Ranoi
The Communist World
SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS CONTINUE TO IMPROVE
Brezhnev and Kosygin have used the occasion of Tito's
first visit to Moscow since Khruschev's ouster to demon-
strate that they are as eager as their predecessor was
to cultivate good relations with Yugoslavia.
SECRET
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SHIFTS IN POLAND'S INTERNAL SECURITY APPARATUS
The transfer of uniformed internal-security units from
Interior to Defense Ministry control puts all the mili-
tary-security apparatus under a military hierarchy which
assumed a more pro-Soviet cast in a shake -up~in February.
The shift undercuts the growing-power of the interior
minister's nationalistic "partisan" faction in the party,
YEMENI PRESIDENT.SALLAL REGAINS POLITICAL POWER.
His apparent victory in a showdown with Premier Numan
has-,torpedoed any prospect for an early agreement,be-.;
tween:Nasir .and Saudi. King Faysal on ending the:.Ye.men
civil war.
IRAQI POLITICAL CRISIS UNRESOLVED
The dispute between the pro- and anti-Nasirists has
finally come to a head, highlighted by the pro-Nasir
ministers' mass resignations from President Arif's....
government-.,
NEW ALGERIAN 'E~EGIME MAKES LITTLE PROGRESS
Colonel Boumedienne'assumed the leadership of the ri'ew
National.Revolutionary Council when others refused. He
still lacks broad popular suppora and~is being critic-'
cized b~,t'he Arab, African, and Eastern European press.
KASAVUBU-TSHOMBE STRUGGLE SHARPENS IN .CONGO 11
Kasavubu has dismissed one
of Tshombe's closest allies from the cabinet.
Europe
CRISIS IN THE COMMON MARKET
France is engaged in'a test of strength with its~f3.ve
EEC partners and the EEC Commission, The-question at
hand is 'how to finance the community's common agricul-
tural'Policy;?but the"underlying issue is De Gaulle 's
opposition to a federal organization of Europe..-
SECRET
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`""' SECRET
POLITICAL CRISIS EMBROILS GREEK MONARCHY
Involvement of the army in politics and factionalism
within the governing Center Union are leading to a
confrontation between Premier Papandreou and King
Constantine.
Western Hemisphere
NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD DOMINICAN POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
Imbert's ,junta forces as well as the more moderate rebel
elements now appear resigned to a political solution, al-
though rebel extremists continue efforts to thwart such a
seirtlement. The peacemakers of the Organization of Amer-
ican States are concentrating on gai-Wing acceptance of
a leader for a provisional government.
COLOMBIA'S FINANCIAL CRISIS CONTINUES
The public remains uncertain that the National Front
government will be able to solve the country's critical
financial and economic problems, and demands for
President Valencia's resignation have been revived.
PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT MOVES AGAINST GUERRILLA ACTIVITY
It has ordered a 30-day suspension of constitutional
guarantees and a police roundup of leftist extremists,
and has put the army in command of counterinsurgency
operations.
SE CRE T
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SE ~`RE T
Fighting intensified this
week in the northern part of
South Vietnam as the Viet Cong
continued to press their campaign
in the central highlands. Fol-
lowing last week's major engage-
ment in Phu Bon Province involy-
ing three government battalions,
the main action shifted to Kontum
Province, where the Communists
put new pressure on remote dis-
trict towns and paramilitary
camps.
The Viet Cong .overran the
district town of Dak To on 7
July, strengthening their hold
in the area. Government forces
have abandoned the nearby dis-
trict town of Tou Morong since
it was overrun on 25 June. The
other district town in northern
Kontum, Dak Sut, has been re-
peatedly mortared and mast gov-
ernment troops withdrawn. Vir-
tually the entire province now
is in enemy hands except for
the provincial capital (Kontum),
which is also under increased
harassment.
US military authorities
have estimated that there are
six Communist battalions in
Kontum Province, including the
three from the 101st Regiment of
the North Vietnamese 325th Divi-
sion. The US and South Vietnam-
ese commands have confirmed the
presence of the 101st, and con-
sider that the other two regi-
ments of the 325th are probably
in the South Vietnamese highland $,
although this is still uncon-
firmed.
In the neighboring coastal
province of Quang Ngai, a govern-
ment outpost at Ba Gia, about
12 miles west of the provincial
capital, was overrun briefly on
5 July, and then subjected to
heavy harassing fire.
Although acts of sabotage
declined somewhat last week,
major roads leading north from
Saigon and to the central high-
lands and the coast remained cut
or closed. Coastal highway No.
1 is impassable over long stretches,
and the coastal railroad is open
only between Hud and Da Nang in
the north, and between Nha Trang
and Phan Rang and along the spur
line inland to Dalat. Apparently
in an effort to complicate air
supply and rescue, the Viet Cong
continued a series of harassing
mortar attacks on several pro -
viascial airfields.
Government military opera-
tions declined slightly last
week, but successful operations
were reported in the far north
and in the delta. US military
activity in South Vietnam was
highlighted by B-52 bomber at-
tacks on 5 and ? July on War Zone
D, northeast of Saigon, and by
another major search-and-destroy
ground operation into that Commu-
nist stronghold..
Saigon Politics
Saigon's military leaders
continue to emphasize austerity,
anticorruption, and mobilization
of resources for the war effort.
The government's major administra-
tive action of the week was to
abandon its announced plan to
close down most of Saigon's vernac-
ular press during July, a policy
which had been the source of some
friction within the government.
SE ~'RE T
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This pa'rtia'l retreat,
coupled with reported moves by
Premier Ky to enlist the support
of the Catholic community, seems
to have diminished the initial
opposition of more militant
Catholics. However, there a.re
signs of greater apprehension on
the part of influential Buddhist
leaders, particularly over the
role of Catholic General Thieu
e new chief of. state .
Military Situation in.DRV
Although the pace of US'
air strikes against North Viet-
nam was slowed this week by
poor weather, numerous armed re-
connaissance sorties were flown.
US aircraft a'tta'cked the Dien
Bien Phu military complex for
the first .time. They also de-
stroyed the Nam Dinh POL stor-
age area about 40 miles south
of Hanoi.,. the nearest target to
the capital thus far.
The North Vietnamese con-
tinue efforts to improve their
a.ir defenses. A fifth surface -
to-air missile (SAM) site, a.p-
paxently in the middle stages
of construction, wa.s identified
about 10 miles northeast of Hanoi
25X1 on 4 Jul .
pi of training for
DRV persanne is still being con-
25X1 ducted in the USSR and Czecho-
slovakia..
Political Developments in DRV
The latest evidence of the
DRV's civil defense mobiliza,tian
efforts was Premier Pham Van
Dong's a'nnoun'cement on ? July
of the formation of the "Bri-
gade of Young Volunteers to
Fight US Aggression for National
Sa.lvativn."
The US a.ir raids on the Na.m
Dinh petroleum storage depot
drew a particularly strong pro-
test from Hanoi. Its radio
propaga'nda' depicted the bombings
a.s an indiscriminate a'tta'ck on
civilians--Nam Dinh is the
country's third largest city.
Claiming high civilian casual-
ties, the broa'dca'st asserted
that such "wanton" a'tta'cks
showed that US offers to nego-
tiate the wa.r a.re a. "hoax. "
Hanoi described the Nam
Dinh bombings as a "da.ngerous
step forward in the.esca.lation
of the war and a challenge to
the socialist countries," but
did not threaten reta'li'atory
countermeasures. The propaganda
on these strikes seemed partly
aimed at encouraging additional
bloc defense assistance . Hanoi's
ambassadors in Peiping and
Prague, for example, held special
press conferences to dexlounce
the Nam Dinh raids.
In a. sharp editorial on 5
July, Peiping, like Hanoi, as-
serted that the Nam Dinh strikes
moved the US "one step further"
in escalating the war. The ed-
itoria'l's main :si;ress, however, was
on the futility of intensi-
fied bombing, which the Chinese
declare will only strengthen
Vietnamese determination to
"deal haxder blows':' at the US.
SECRET
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`'"` SECRET
The Chinese apparently see
no need to increase their public
commitment to Hanoi at this time
and are holding to their course
of opposing any move toward ne-
gotiaton While providing moral
and material backing for the DRV.
Soviet Political Developments
Moscow apparently sees lit-
tle opportunity for early initia-
tives to break the Vietnam im-
passe. Its current public posi-
tion was summarized in an au-
thoritative "Observer" arti-
cle in Pravda on 7 July which
once again endorsed the DRV
"four point" basis for settle-
ment and pledged that the USSR
would provide Hanoi all the as-
sistance needed. There have
been recent private expressions
of Soviet interest in finding
a basis for talks, but these
approaches seem primarily de-
signed to deter the US from fur-
ther escalating the war in reac-
' tion to the current Viet Cong
offensive.
SECRET
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,~
SECRET
Yugoslav President Tito's
two-week visit to Moscow in late
June was his first since Khru~-
shchev's ouster last October.
Brezhnev and Kosygin used the oc-
casion to demonstrate that they
are as eager to cultivate and
improve Soviet-Yugoslav relations
Tito, but will be taken as an
encouraging sign by those states
in Eastern Europe which have
been increasingly asserting their
independence. Moscow, for its
part, finds this line useful in
refuting Chinese charges that
the USSR is still bent on "wield-
as was Khrushchev. Althougn some 'ing the baton" in Eastern Europe
differences in tactics remain, and elsewhere in the international
the final communiq ud stressed the Communist movement.
two regimes' "closeness and iden-
tity" of views on important inter-
national issues; both expressed
satisfaction with the visit.
The Soviet leaders put par-
ticular stress on efforts taken
to remove "the things which once
cast a shadow on Soviet-Yugoslav
relations." In the joint com-
muniqu~=; Moscow's new leaders
endorsed the 1955 Belgrade dec-
laration.. by Tito and Khru-
shchev which first officially
sanctioned national Communism,
and Russian pronouncements in
connection with the visit have
played heavily on the theme of
Moscow tried to profit from
Tito's influence among "nonaligned"
nations. Attempts were made to
identify Soviet-Yugoslav posi-
tions--especiallq. condemnation
of US policy in Vietnam--with
those of the "third world," and
the visit itself may have been
deliberately'timed to coincide
with the oft-postponed Second
Afro-Asian Conference, which was,
at the time, scheduled for late
June in Algiers.
Tito's welcome in the USSR
clearly reinforces other indica-
tions that Moscow has no inten-
tion of yielding one iota on
substantive matters in dispute
~~with Peiping. The visit itself
was, in part, a calculated of -
'front to China, but although
jsome of Tito's public remarks
'were pointedly anti-Chinese,
;there was no indication that
the Soviets are about to aban-
':don their policy of relative
respect for sovereignty and non- public restraint toward Peiping.
interference in intrabloc affairs.',
This is not only reassuring to
.,S'E CR.~ T
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SHIFTS IN POLAND'S INTERNAL SECURITY APPARATUS
Poland's uniformed internal
security troops were resubordi-
nated on 1 July from the Minis-
tary of .Interior to the Ministry
of Defense. This move brings
the country's entire military-
security apparatus under the con-
trol of party boss Gomulka's
politburo confidant, Defense
Minister Marian Spychalski, and
under the influence of a mili-
tary hierarchy which assumed a
more pro-Soviet cast in a mayor
shake-up last February.
The change involved both
the elite military units of the
Internal Security Corps (KBW),
totaling 25,000 men, and the
20,000-man .Border Guard (WOP).
Despite government claims that
there was no longer a need for
internal-security units, both
the KBW and the WOP will prob-
ably retain their former func-
tions under Defense Ministry con-
trol. Within the KBW, however,
there may be some resentment,
particularly if the troops lose
certain special privileges they
have long en,~oyed.
The new subordination--
which reflects Gomulka's policy
of closer alliance with the USSR
--is in part motivated by Soviet
desires for stronger command
control of Warsaw Pact forces.
In domestic politics, the shift
undercuts the influence of the
party's nationalistic "partisan"
faction and of, its most prominent
member, Interior Minister Moczar,
and significantly weakens the
power base of potentially the
most powerful faction in the
party. The group's growing
power since 1959 had been based
on infiltrAtng its supporters
into positions of influence in
the military-security apparatus.
Gomulka has kept this process
under control through a series
of countervailing personnel ap-
pointments.
The organizational change
will enhance the political ins
fluence of the rising generation
of pro-Soviet generals and tech-
nocrats who are closer to Gomul-
ka's geopolitical thinking than
any other party faction. Such
a realignment of the delicate
balance of power among party fac-
tions will probably lead to fur-
ther personnel and organizational
changes,
These changes might affect
the Interior Ministry's secret
police (UB). There has long
been friction between the UB--
responsible for nonmilitary for-
eign intelligence and covert in-
ternal security operations--and
the Defense Ministry's military
intelligence organization (Z-II).
To overcome these differences
there may be a partial merger,
or at least closer coordination,
of the two organizations. However,
because the Interior Ministry
still retains control of a potent
political weapon--the personnel
dossiers of all regime officials
--it is unlikely that it will
lose complete direction over the
UB.
SE CRE T
WEEKLY SUMMARY. 9 July 65
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President Sallal has appar-
ently succeeded in regaining
political power in Yemen with
Egypt's blessing.
The two-month-old government
of Premier Numan, which was
pledged to secure-the withdrawal
of Egyptian troops, had been try-
ing to avoid loss of Egypt's fi-
nancial and military support
while retaining the allegiance of
the anti-Egyptian republican
tribes. Nasir's;"suspicions of
Numan 's independent line were re-
inforced by his conviction that
six of Numan's cabinet ministers
were Baathists--Nasir 's archriv-
als in the Middle East. Numan
had consequently been faced with
pressure to replace the suspected
ministers, under threat of loss
of financial subsidies. The un-
announced withdrawal of Egyptian
forces from outlying areas to
main population centers in June
led to republican setbacks at the
hands of the royalist forces and
dramatized republican dependence
on Egyptian troops, now numbering
between 53,000 and 58,000.
The present governmental
crisis was sparked by Sallal's
creation of a sppreme armed
forces council in late June with-
out consulting Numan's cabinet.
Numan immediately tendered his
resignation and flew to Cairo,
hoping to press Nasir into back-
ing him in the showdown with
Sallal. Nasir, however, has re-
f used to see him.
Sallal took advantage of
the absence of nearly all major
political leaders in Cairo to
order widespread arrest s, using
as pretext a 4 July attempt on
his life. .The 60 or more indi-
viduals rounded up to date in-
clude two of the cabinet minis-
ters Nasir wanted removed.
The latest moves have tor-
pedoed any prospect for an early
agreement with Saudi King Faysal
to end the Yemeni civil war.
Postponement of.the Afro-Asian
conference in Algiers had already
removed the occasion for sched-
uled''talks between Faysal and
Nasir. Even if;-Nasir does not
completely back Sallal because of
his lack of popular support, no
oth?r Yemeni Government could
avoid being considered merely an
instrument of Egyptian policy.
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SECRET
IRAQI pOLLTICAL CRISIS UNRESOLVED
The Iraqi Government has
been paralyzed by a major polit-
ical crisis for more than a
week as the long-standing dis-
pute between pro- and anti-
Nasirists finally came to a
head.
President Arif, who has
aligned himself with the anti-
Nasirists, apparently precipi-
tated the crisis by demanding
changes within the Arab Social-
ist Union, the government-spon-
sored political party that has
been dominated by the pro-
Nasirists. As a result Guidance
Minister Farhan, the most dy-
namic of the pr.o-Nasirists,re-
signecl from the government and
flew to Cairo--evidently just
a step ahead of Arif 's police
--in an effort to drum up ad-
ditional support far himself
and his friends from Nasir.
Other pro-Egyptians in the
government, including some
ten ministers, then submitted
their resignations also.
The pro-Egyptians evidently
hoped that this tactic of mass
resignation would have a sober-
ing effect on Arif and his anti-
Nasirist allies. They probably
calculated that such an~open
.signal of dissatisfaction might
stir up latent pro-Nasirist
sentiment in the army or lead
Nasir, whose prestige is .clearly
at stake, to throw himself open-
ly into the struggle. Although
the pro-Egyptians are signifi-
cantly weaker than in previous
crises of this sort, Arif has
had great difficulty in re-
constituting a government, since
most Iraqi political figures
believe that a new one-would
not last very long. In these
circumstances, some sort of
face-saving compromise with
the pro-Egyptians is increasing-
ly likely.
NE~Y ALGERIAN REGIME MAKES LITTLE PROGRESS
Colonel Houari Boumedienne
apparently- is having some dif-
ficulty in getting Algeria's
revolutionary government in
motion. Unable to obtain any-
one with political stature and
popular appeal to chair the
policymaking National Council
of the Revolution, whose com-
position was announced on 5
July, he has assumed leadership
himself .
The 26-man council is
heavily weighted with-military
leaders, including the command-
ers of at least three military
regions, the national gendarm-
erie, and the state security
organization. Mast of its
civilian minority have long
been considered Boumedienne
henchmen, whose presence in the
Ben Bella government reflected
Boumedienne's influence.
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`'~ SE ~'RE T `"~
Formation of a council of minis-
ters is not yet completed.
The principal task of the
new regime will be to obtain
support of the public, whose
enthusiasm for Ben Bella faded
into lethargy when no economic
gains appeared. Boumedienne
has promised a reorganization
of the country's sole party, the
National Liberation Front, con-
stitutional revision, and ulti-
mately elections.
Such changes
as may emerge are more likely
to be found in the general eco-
nomic climate rather than in
formal pronouncements. In his
major speech on 5 July, the
third anniversary of Algerian
independence, Boumedienne prof-
fered no new policies, while
calling for austQrity and the
mobilization of domestic re-
sources. He retained the Ben
Bella regime's emphasis on
socialism, self-management,
and agrarian reform.
Despite Boumedienne's prot-
estations to the contrary, A1-
geria's ties with the nonaligned
"third world" and with Communist
states may be weakening. 'f he
African, Arab, and Eastern Euro-
pean press continue to publish 25X1
criticism of the 19 June coup
and eulogies for Ben Bella,
Foreign Minister Bouteflika has
privately indicated that Algeria's
foreign policy will be consider-
ably more circumspect in pursu-
ing an "anti-imperialist" line
than in the past.
KASAVUBU-TSHOMBE STRUGGLE SHARPENS IN CONGO
Positions in the Congolese
political struggle between Pres-
ident Kasavubu and Premier
Tshombe seem to be hardening,
and the two may be close to a
showdown.
fighting alongside the rebels.
Earlier this week, Kasavubu
summarily dismissed minister of
interior Munongo, a close ally of
TshombC and a prime target of the
premier's enemies. Kasavubu was
provoked when Munongo, who last
month was elected governor of East
Katanga, failed to appear at a
swearing-in ceremony of provincial
governors.
Rebel bands continue active
in the Lake Tanganyika region of
the eastern Congo, especially
around Bendera just north of Al-
bertville, and around Uvira at
the head of the lake. For the
first time, Cubans, presumably
from a group of 40 recently ar-
rived in Tanzania, have been found
SE ~'R~ T
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A test of strength between
France on the one hand and the
other five EEC countries and
the EEC Commission on the other
has evolved from the failure of
negotiations last week on how
to finance the community's com-
mon agricultural policy (CAP).
Although the immediate questions
are technical and economic, the
underlying issue is De Gaulle's
commitment to a "Europe of
states" and his opposition to
a federal organization of Eu-
rope with a strong European
Parliament.
The crisis was perhaps in-
evitable at some stage in the
Common Market's development.
It has arisen now because of
De Gaulle's decision to force
a confrontation over the Gommis-
sion's CAP financing proposals.
These proposals would have re-
placed the present transitional
financing arrangements with a
permanent system to become ef-
fective when both the integra-
tion of agricultural markets and
industrial customs union had
taken place.
The Commission had hoped
to exploit French interest in
getting the CAP completed at an
early date--by mid-196?--to win
concessions from the French.
Specifically it hoped to get
Paris' consent to giving the
community "independent" revenues
and strengthening the powers of
the European Parliament in su-
pervising the funds which would
no longer be under the control
of the national parliaments.
This Paris effectively
undercut in mid-June by abandon-
ing its insistence on early com-
pletion of the CAF. It said it
wanted instead to go ahead as
rapidly as possible in bringing
individual products under unified
prices, but to finance the costs
until 1970 by national contri-
butions to a central fund rather
than by import levies collected
by the community. By renouncing
reliance on automatic and in-
dependent community funds, the
French obviated the need for
European parliamentary super-
vision.
Paris has attempted to
portray the breakup of the 30
June meeting of the EEC Council
of Ministers as a failure of
its partners to meet a deadline
for extending the present finan-
cial arrangements. In fact,
the cause was the partners'
reluctance to throw away their
leverage on France by agreeing
now to a five-year extension
of the transitional financing
phase. The Dutch, Italians,
and to some extent the Germans
--under strong pressure from
their national parliaments--
were therefore insistent on get -
t_ing a quid pro quo from the
French regarding the European
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Parliament and the completion
of the industrial part of the
EEC.
Paris now has begun to im-
plement its threats to "put the
community in a deep freeze" and
has announced there is still
"no question for the moment"
of French participation in any
new community meetings. By
such a boycott the French are
trying to force the other mem-
bers to deal directly with Paris
even in effecting a compromise.
The US Mission to the EEC has
noted that the effect of this
is to cut the Commission in
particular out of the decision-
making circuit in favor of a
return to "classical bilateral
diplomacy." French press com-
mentators have claimed that,
as a result, De Gaulle's "Eu-
rope of states" concept is al-
ready taking over.
The other five members and
the Commission seem still uncer-
tain what to do. The Commis-
sion has developed new proposals,
but it is not yet known how
far they go--if at all--toward
meeting French demands. Dutch
officials claim The Hague will
stand firm,. but the mood in
Brussels and Luxembourg is one
of compromise. Although Belgian
Foreign Minister Spaak is eager
to play the role of "honest
broker," one Belgian official
stated that Brussels has also
considered the possibility of
the five's forming a "solid
front" to call De Gaulle's
"bluff" or even to consider a
new grouping with countries of
the European Free Trade Associa-
tion. One press report claims
the Italians and Germans have
agreed to go ahead with a sched-
uled 26 July EEC Council meeting
even if the French do not attend.
Should the five knuckle
under to the French, the poten-
tial damage to the community
would be great. French interests
in the community are for the
moment predominantly agricultural,
and, having secured those, Paris
would be under no pressure to
satisfy the interests of others
--for example, in successful
completion of the Kennedy Round.
The institutional consequences
would be even more serious.
Paris is clearly out to "get"
the Commission, which has heavily
committed its prestige to the
financial proposals. French
success would jeopardize the
Commission's role of catalyst
--along with the whole system
of dialogue among the Commission,
Council, and Parliament under
which the community was slowly
evolving toward a federal state.
These are-the known costs which
the five are weighing against
the unknown costs ?f "standin
u to De Gaulle." ~
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A political crisis which
could alter the future role of
the Greek monarchy has arisen
as a result of involvement of
the army in politics and fac-
tionalism within the governing
Center Union party.
Premier Papandreou, embold-
ened by a parliamentar~- vote
of confidence and popular ac-
claim in his recent public ap-
pearances, seems determined to
remove both right-wing Army
Chief of Staff Gennimatas and
Minister of Defense Garoufalias.
They have long been targets of
major progovernment newspapers
in Athens, partially on the
grounds that they are "men of
the palace"--more loyal to
King Constantine than to Papan-
dreou.
Garoufalias has refused
Papandreou's request to resign.
Dismissal of the defense minis-
ter normally requires the con-
sent of the King as commander
in chief of the armed forces.
The premier presumably will not
confront Constantine with his
plans until he sees him follow -
ing the expected imminent birth
of an heir to the royal family.
The King,. intent on retaining
the army's primary loyalty to
the crown and encouraged by
some of his more extreme right-
wing advisers, may refuse to ap-
prove these changes.
Papandreou has warned that
in that event he would resign
and ask the King to call
new elections. The King could
attempt to create a new govern-
ment from among the members of
the present parliament. As
there is apparently no viable
alternative to Papandreou, how-
ever, early elections, with the
powers of the King a major
issue, would be likely. A
Center Union victory, which.
also seems probable in such
circumstances, could result in
significant curtailment of the
King's political influence.
Efforts are presently under
way by proponents of both men
to find a compromise solution.
Within the Center Union,
meanwhile, pressure continues
to mount for th? removal of
Andreas Papandreou, the premier's
son, from the cabinet. Despite
efforts by the elder Papandreou
to protect his son from adverse
publicity in connection with
the current investigation of
ASPIDA--a covert group of left-
of-center army officers--it
appears that Andreas has become
such a liability that he will
be forced to resig~q his posi-
tion as alternate minister of
coordination. One of the lead-
ers in the drive to force. him
out is Minister of Finance
Mitsotakis, potentially the .chief
rival of the younger Papandreou for
party leadership should the premier
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Western Hemisphere
NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD DOMINICAN POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
The committee of the Organ-
ization of American States
charged with bringing peace to
the Dominican Republic is con-
centrating on gaining acceptance
of a leader for a provisional
government. Hector Garcia Godoy,
a professional diplomat without
strong political ties, remains
the leading candidate.
The committee has also
drafted a brief document which
would serve as a basic charter
for a provisional government
and has submitted it to leaders
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of both sides. It envisions a
single executive and general
elections early next year, but
carefully avoids issues--such
as the future status of rebel
military elements and safeguards
against Communist subversion--
which would snag current negotia-
tions. Committee members feel
these more controversial matters
should be worked out by the in-
terim government.
The loyalist forces of
junta leader .Antonio Imbert now
appear resigned to a negotiated
political settlement. Imbert
himself, under considerable pres-
sure, now has said that, under
certain conditions, he is will-
ing to step dawn in favor of a
new provisional government, and
loyalist military leaders have
indicated they would accept
Garcia Gadoy as its president.
They insist, however, that they
retain control of the armed
forces until after an elected
government is installed.
Rebel reaction to the OAS
proposals has clearly demon-
strated the internal divisions
among Colonel Caamano's forces.
The more moderate elements,
aware that the military phase
of the rebellion is over, have
entered into negotiations to
gain the most favorable politi-
cal terms possible. This tac-
tic has also been adopted by
the orthodox Communist Dominican
Popular Socialist Party (PSPD).
Mindf ul, however, of their long-
range political future, these
groups are unwilling to become
associated with the provisional
government and are prepared to
claim it was forced upon them.
The hard-line rebel extrem-
ists, on the other hand, fear
that a political settlement
would cost. them their present
prominent position. To thwart
a settlement, the extremists--
led by the unsophisticated Com-
munist-oriented Dominican Popu-
lar Movement (MPD) and a faction
of the pro-Castro 14th of June
Political Group (APCJ)--have
tried unsuccessfully to start
a popular uprising in the in-
terior by attacking loyalist
security forces. The extremists
are also probably responsible
for many of the cease-fire vio-
lations in Santo Domingo.
The situation in the inte-
rior continues tense. Loyalist
military and police officers
are chafing at the impasse in
Santo Domingo and the apparent
ease with which extremists bring
arms out of the capital and at-
tack outlying police patrols
and installations.
Preventive security meas-
ures, such as curfews and arbi-
trary arrests, along with the
growing evidence of atrocities,
have caused resentment toward
Imbert's government. For exam-
ple, the arrest of extremist
labor union officials triggered
a strike which has completely
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shut down the large US-owned
sugar complex at La Romana.
The country's economy, de-
nied its commercial center
(Santo Domingo), continues to
stagnate. Unemployment is wide-
spread, and food and fuel short-
ages add to the hardships of a
people who at best live a mar-
ginal existence.
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COLOMBIA'S FINANCIAL CRISIS CONTINUES
The financial crisis trig-
gered by a worsening of Colom-
bia's foreign exchange position
was temporarily alleviated by
an emergency exchange measure
which somewhat reduced the
pressure on the free exchange
rate, but the situation showed
signs of further deterioration
after 6 July.
The public remains uncer-
tain that the National Front gov-
ernment will ever be able to
solve the country's critical fi-
nancial and economic problems.
This uncertainty is fed by the
government's slow action on
necessary reforms. President
Valencia's "High Commission,"
composed of several ex-presi-
~entS,party and union leaders, and
technical advisers continues to
put politics before its real
business of preparing to dis-
cuss the country's problems
in Washington. There is lit-
tle evidence that the special
session of Congress is any
nearer to passing needed eco-
nomic reform measures.
Demands for President
Valencia !s resignation have
been revived, and a recent poll
of political leaders indicates
that the parties making up the
National Front will have to work
hard to offset opposition gains
if the front is to be able to
function after next year's con-
gressfon~l elections.
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PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT MOVES AGAINST GUERRILLA ACTIVITY
The guerrilla ambush and
decimation of a police unit in
central Peru last week and two
terrorist bombings in Lima have
heightened official alarm over
the insurgent threat. On 4
July, the government ordered a
30-day suspension of constitu-
tional guarantees and a police
roundup of leftist extremists.
The army has assumed com-
mand of counterinsurgency op-
erations against the guerrillas.
A command .post is being estab-
lished in Huancayo, capital of
Junin Departments where the
guerrillas are based. No army
units are in action as yet, but
one hundred rangers have been
sent to the area for eventual
commitment against the guer-
rillas.
Guerrilla activities, di-
rected by the pro-Cuban Move-
went of the Revolutionary Left
(MIR), have thus far been lim-
ited to two departments in cen-
tral Peru. In this area, the
guerrillas have succeeded in at-
tracting considerable support
from the peasants. MIR guer-
rilla units also exist in the
northern and southern zones.
In the past, extreme frag-
mentation of the Peruvian far
left has severely handicapped
its capabilities. A general
police crackdown on leftists,
along with the leadership newly
demonstrated by the MIR, could
now draw them closer together.
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