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lease 21000108130: CIA-RDP79=00927A0 Copy No. 52 LATIN AMERICAN NATX NAI,r S11~ AATI, Tilt `CTUL N ?Q CE CONCEPT SECRET GROUP I Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04900120004-4 Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04900120004-4 Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004900120004-4 SECRET An entrenched brand of neonationalism devel- oped in Latin America since World War II ha.s char- acteristically manifested itself internationally in a quest for enhanced prestige through adoption of a foreign policy which features "independence" from the United States. Such nationalistic currents underlay the third-force overtures of the Quadros- Goulart administration in Brazil. A new approach, however, now is being made by Chile's Christian Democratic government to promote, shape, and direct a reappraisal of Latin America's posture relative to the world at large. This effort, although de- riving much of its strength from basic nationalism, differs fundamentally as a result of the addition of inspiration and dogma from the Christian Demo- cratic movement. This non-Communist, noncapita.list approach has appeal to Latin American neonation- alists and is reflected in Chilean President Frei's recent conversations with European leaders. The Emerging Nationalism The current brand of nation- alism in Latin America is asso- ciated with a complex milieu of accelerated development, revolu- tionary expansion of mass aware- ness, and the emergence of a meaningful middle class. This increasingly articulate and po- litically significant group, at- tempting to provide the leader- ship for masses whose wants are expanding, tends to deep frustra- tion with the inadequacies of traditional sociopolitical structures as well as with the distribution and ownership of wealth and means of production. One of the results has been the rise of popular nationalism--a nationalism which is political and economic, but also cultural and intellectual which has dis- placed an older "aristocratic" nationalism, and which has found political expression primarily in parties of the left such as the Christian Democrats. Popular nationalism emerged early in Mexico because of the Revolution of 1910, and involved "nativism," or glorification of the Indian cultural background and legacy. This attitude mani- fested itself in favorable legis- lation enacted for the Indian and mestizo masses by their mid- dle-class political leaders, including protectionist trade measures adopted on the assump- tion that domestic industry would be stimulated to the benefit of the workers. There followed antiforeign economic laws and increased state control of natural resources, many of which were foreign exploited. Before World War II, similar legislation was enacted in such other countries as Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, Bolivia, and Brazil. SECRET Page 1 SPECIAL REPORT 23 July 65 Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004900120004-4 Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004900120004-4 SECRET Nationalism has tended to be highly emotional as well as xenophobic. After World War II it took an aggressive turn, mani- festing itself for example in ef- forts of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru to assert territorial control over 200 miles of adjacent ocean; seizure of foreign fishing craft by these nations along with Mex- ico and Nicaragua; and anti- colonialism directed especially against British possessions in the Western Hemisphere. Latin American nationalists remain suspicious, if not actually hostile, toward foreign capital, toward the government and pro- grams of the United States, and toward industrialized, "devel- oped" nations. They demand a greater place in the sun. They are in a hurry to drive upward politically and economically in the world and therefore they are willing to accept radical ap- proaches that promise speedy re- sults. An aspect of this is an eager compulsion to adopt a pos- ture of "independence" in world affairs--attributable in part to the need for expanded markets for basic products and in part to a nationalistic urge to win greater international prestige. Latin American nations have an intense desire to participate in international decision making. The United Nations has provided encouragement for these wishes and strengthened the shib- boleths of "self-determina- tion," "sovereignty," and "in- dependence." Related to nationalism is what the Latin Americans call tercerismo, or the quest for a "third position"--a con- cept which cannot be equated with neutralism. It appears to be a reflection of the Latin American nations' desire to be accorded a greater world role both individually and as a bloc with a corresponding diminution of US ties. This may lead them to seek to reduce the US posi- tion in the hemisphere on the assumption that only thus can they attain national fulfill- ment. Chile's Leadership The current leadership of Latin American tercerismo has been actively sought by the Chilean Christian Democratic Party (PDC) which swept into power in the 1964-1965 presiden- tial and congressional elections. This pursuit has tended to bring Chilean foreign policy into con- flict with US objectives in East- West relations and the Organiza- tion of American States--espe- cially over the Dominican Republic affair. The principal causes of this have been Chilean popular nationalism, basic PDC doctrine, and a vision of Christian Democ- racy as the vanguard of an inter- American movement of the future. SECRET Page 2 SPECIAL REPORT 23 July 65 Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004900120004-4 Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004900120004-4 1"011 Nfttf SECRET The ITUC IS, by its own def- inition, an uncompromising party of the left, and its program re- flects this orientation. It is not anti-Communist but rather is non-Communist and maintains that it must contest the Communist Party at the grass roots in order to defeat it. Therefore, the PDC has attempted to penetrate ideolog- ically the labor unions, student groups, and other traditional Communist strongholds. Nation- alistic attitudes which the PDC shares with the Communists include steadfast opposition both to for- eign imperialism and domestic oligarchy. There is no doubt that most PDC policy makers are critical of capitalism and for- eign interests in Chile, but they favor legal nationalization of foreign investment. Christian Democrats, like Communists, see themselves as a world movement, but maintain that their goal is a "social revolution with liberty." In speaking of this social upheaval, President Frei has said, "we are in the presence of a vast revolution. Old formulas are dead and a new age has been born.... Today we are present at the birth of a new civilization based on work which will reach total development of the human being at all levels of society." Ideologically, therefore, Chilean Christian Democracy, in endeavoring to present an imagina- tive nationalistic program, is much farther to the left on the political spectrum than its Euro- pean counterparts. Frei dreams of a synthesis of justice and freedom in an economy that is based entirely on man's ability, not on inherited factors of money, class, or race. In order to achieve this goal he has pro- posed leftist, Christian, non- Marxist, noncapitalist solutions which have the twofold purpose of raising Chile's standard of living and undermining Communist popularity with the masses. Non-Communist, Noncapitalist One of the PDC's fundamental inconsistencies is apparent in its attitude toward Communism. Although the party has always ar- gued for the legality of the Com- munist Party and at various times has supported Communist candidates, it is ideologically in conflict with Communism over the applica- tion of Christian values to pol- itics and the concept of the "social revolution with liberty." Furthermore, the party is divided between a vociferous group of pseudo-Marxist extremists and a majority of moderates. As a re- sult, the party is unable to agree on the true character and significance of Communism in Latin America, and tends officially to ignore the dangers of Communist subversion. As nationalists, most PDC members nevertheless summarily reject Communism as a non-Chilean ideology directed by a foreign nation. Frei himself has de- nounced "as typical of their sys- tem" the Communist propagandists who attacked him during the presi- dential campaign. He has also said, "We reject Communist doc- trine and tactics. But before ,Communism we see that there is ;something worse: anti-Communism." SE CRE T Page 3 SPECIAL REPORT 23 July 65 Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004900120004-4 Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004900120004-4 ter SECRET Frei's statement sums up the somewhat more definite Chris- tian remocratic attitude toward capitalism. The PDC has his- torically been critical of the heavily protected, high-profit, restricted-market "capitalism" prevalent in Chile and most of Latin America. Therefore, the party rejects capitalism as a valid solution for Chile's eco- nomic and social problems. In a recent interview Frei said, "Capitalism, while successful in the United States, has not worked out in Latin America, nor does it represent the joint hu- man and ideological values of our concepts of life--capitalism as a social philosophy and Com- munism as its antidote are ob- solete." Independent Foreign Policy This rejection of both Com- munism and the Latin American type of capitalism, together with progress in the Christian lemocrats' attempt to capture and lead Chilean nationalism, has led toward an "independent foreign policy" posture. This position is personified by For- eign Minister Valdes, who has declared that the world is di- vided between north and south, i.e., between have and have-not nations. Latin America, he said, "must have a voice in and be a connecting bridge with the peoples of the unsatisfied na- tions which have come to call themselves the third world, the nonaligned, or the noncomprised." Latin America, he went on, "can- not exhaust itself only in the organization of a perfect inter- American system. The ancient nationalistic systems of other epochs have lost force and na- tionalisms must act solely in benefit of the people and not of mere small groups of privilege and monopoly." Valdes, who sees Latin Ameri- can economic underdevelopment, social misery, and disunity--as well as the United States--as foes, has always despised the paternalistic attitude of the "colossus of the north" toward the rest of the American nations. Earlier this year he provoked controversy by stating that the interests of the US and Latin America in the Organization of American States were divergent. He demanded--and later denied that he had demanded--economic compensation for support of US policies, implying that the Latin American nations could thereby increase their influence within the inter-American system and presumably satisfy their national- istic aspirations. The foreign minister, in contrast to President Frei, de- lighted in the success of their current European tour, saying that now Chile would enjoy greater respect "in certain quarters." Frei, on the other hand, continued to advance Chilean nationalism and tercerismo in a doctrinaire manner, albeit not at the expense of the United States. In Paris, Frei urged Europe to join Latin America in a new alliance for progress. He stated that Chile wanted to build politi- cal independence without forcing a showdown with the US. "We want a system linked with all people, SECRET Page 4 SPECIAL REPORT 23 July 65 Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004900120004-4 Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004900120004-4 SECRET especially Europe." The United States, he went on, "is a world power and it exerts hegemony in several parts of the world. Among the people of Latin America there is a desire for true political and economic independence. I want a system without hegemony," he said. Reporting these state- ments, the Manchester Guardian called Frei-tie-"fie Gaulle of Latin America." More sophisticated and wiser politically than Valdes, Frei has not allowed himself to be placed in a position of open opposition to the US. He has apparently gained limited French economic, cultural, and technical assistance for his country. This reflects his admiration of France and the similarity between Chilean tercerismo and re Gaulle's own Fiord world" pol- icy. From all of the evidence available, Frei has made a great impression on European ruling circles. His idealistic sin- cerity and nationalistic belief in his country have overshadowed his apparent naivete about Com- munism. Chilean tercerismo has de- veloped in conjunction-with the growth and popularity of the Christian Democratic Party, the emotionalism of Latin American nationalism, and the majority re- jection of Communism and capi- Frei: "Excuse me, Mr. Policeman. Where do I find the third road?" DeGaulle: "Wait just a moment. I' m also looking for it," esmzo -Bogota, El Tiempo, 7 July 1965 talism as a solution to Chilean problems. Chile's present "in- dependent foreign policy" seeks a cultural and economic entente with Europe; it calls for trade and diplomatic relations with all countries; it presses for more inter-American political and economic cooperation with- out US predominance; and, finally, it is an attempt to make Chile influential in the international field. Increased European eco- nomic assistance and moral sup- port might enhance the future prestige of Chilean tercerismo among other libera - SECRET Page 5 SPECIAL REPORT 23 July 65 Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004900120004-4 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04900120004-4 -/ SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04900120004-4