WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005000050001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 10, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

2067,10W, chA- DPis=Qo927a o d
ember 1965
OCI No . 0306/65
Dopy No.
CEIIT'FAL INTELLIGENCE .AGENCY.
OFFICE OCURRENT INTELI. IG,ENC
,;State Qep. review cgrnpleted
prove , ;,, cf- Release 200'7103109
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(Information as of noon EDT, 9 September 1965)
VIETNAM
The Communists are still infiltrating arms and per-
sonnel into South Vietnam in quantity, and North Viet-
namese propaganda continues to express confidence in
a Communist victory. Hanoi still shows no interest in
peace talks, but it seems to have been sobered somewhat
by recent military developments in the South and by
the continuing air war against the North. Chinese Com-
munist diatribes against negotiations have increased
in intensity. The Soviet- and Vietnamese-manned DRV
missile defenses continue to engage US aircraft. The
Viet Cong during the past week were still following
recent patterns, generally avoiding major contact with
large US-Vietnamese units. The student antigovernment
movement in South Vietnam has subsided.
The Communist World
Page
BILATERAL MEETINGS BETWEEN SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS 4
These meetings over the next several weeks probably
are concerned primarily with questions of purely bi-
lateral interest but designed also to keep the Eastern
European leaders informed of Soviet plans and to foster
an appearance of bloc solidarity on the Vietnam issue.
IMPASSE NEAR IN GERMAN INTERZONAL TRADE TALKS
For political reasons Bonn insists that trade negotiators
continue to sign agreements as representatives of their
respective currency areas, an arrangement that automati-
cally includes West Berlin as part of West Germany. The
East Germans may abrogate the current agreement as a
bargaining tactic, but trade is not likely to be inter-
rupted.
INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN OPEN WARFARE
Pakistan's commitment of regular forces in Kashmir led
to India's attack across the international boundary.
The combatants' attitudes give little opening for UN
Secretary General Thant's peace mission. Moscow is show-
ing frustration over the conflict, and Peking, although
cautious, probably sees an opportunity to inflict further
damage on India and the West.
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SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN DISPUTE WARMS
Emperor Haile Selassie fears Somali subversion and has
fostered virulent propaganda attacks to counter it.
Both countries have redeployed troops in border areas.
NASIR'S VISIT TO MOSCOW
Each side will find useful the political support voiced
by the other, and Moscow presumably hopes that the Egyp-
tian leader's trip will boost its efforts to enhance So-
viet prestige and influence in Africa and Asia.
CONGO POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN NEW PHASE
President Kasavubu's decision to convene Parliament on
20 September brings to a head differences over whether
Tshombe now is obliged to resign as premier.
GREEK POLITICAL CRISIS REMAINS ON DEAD CENTER
Last week's Crown Council failed to find a solution,
and party leaders were unable to agree on a proposal
to have the right-of-center National Radical Union
form an interim government to supervise early elections.
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KENNEDY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS TO RESUME
The trade talks are to resume on 16 September, when the
major participants are to present lists of agricultural
products on which they are willing to lower trade bar-
riers. It is questionable how substantial these will be
in the Absence of parallel offers from the EEC, still
paralyzed by the French boycott.
ITALIAN PRESIDENT TO VISIT LATIN AMERICA
The 10-23 September visit of President Saragat and For-
eign Minister Fanfani to Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina,
Chile, Peru, and Venezuela is unlikely to produce any
major agreements, but increased economic, cultural, and
perhaps political contacts will be discussed.
Western Hemisphere
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC INSTALLS PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Garcia Godoy regime is already beset by a number
of major problems stemming largely from nervousness of
the military over their position and continued efforts
of the "Constitutionalists" to maneuver for a final
victory.
JAMAICAN
RIOTS REFLECT UNREST IN CARIBBEAN
21
The
pute
not
rioting apparently was sparked by a personal dis-
between a local Chinese and a Jamaican and was
politically directed. It is symptomatic of an at-
mosphere of unrest fostered by widespread unemployment,
poverty, burgeoning population, and racial tension.
LACK OF EVIDENT PROGRESS ON CANAL THREATENS PANAMA REGIME
22
Dissatisfaction over lack of evident progress in the
canal negotiations is increasing in Panama and could
cause serious problems for the Robles government.
GUATEMALAN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY SETS MARCH ELECTION DATE
22
The Peralta regime's continuing concern over internal
security, however, may lead it to delay the elections.
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COMMUNIST BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA 23
Negotiations on trade and economic aid now in progress
between Communist bloc and Latin American countries may
result in some new economic relationships, but their
impact on the over-all level of economic exchanges will
be delayed.
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The Communists continue to
infiltrate both armaments and
personnel into South Vietnam in
quantity. The first good photog-
raphy' of actual military hard-
ware destined for the Vietnamese
Communists was obtained
at the Pinghsiang ra
transshipment point near the
Chinese/DRV border. Over 160
light and medium antiaircraft
artillery weapons along with
mortars, howitzers, fire control
radars, and some 265 trucks were
seen.
Substantial numbers of Com-
munist troops continue to walk
south past roadwatch teams in
the Laotian panhandle. A team
located some 25 miles north of
Muong Phine has counted a total
of about 3,500 southbound and
150 northbound enemy troops
since 1 June. The majority of
these have been identified as
Pathet Lao rather than North
Vietnamese, but their origin
and destination remain unclear.
Farther north, in the Mu Gia
Pass area, 150 Pathet Lao troops
have been counted walking south
since 3 September, bringing the
total southbound in this area
to some 2,100 troops (and north-
bound 335 troops) since 1 June.
Communist Propaganda
North Vietnamese speeches
and propaganda continue to ex-
press confidence in a Communist
victory, but there is a growing
emphasis on the probable long
duration of the conflict and on
the necessity for greater per-
Page 1
sonal effort by Vietnamese both
North and South. There is no
indication of any softening in
the DRV position on negotiations,
although Hanoi's propaganda
continues to suggest that the
regime will not hold out for a
withdrawal of US forces from
the South before the start of
talks. At present, however, the
North Vietnamese apparently are
not interested in any type of
discussions.
Although the DRV propaganda
suggests that Hanoi has been
sobered by the recent military
developments in South Vietnam
and by the attrition of the air
war against the North, it is
apparently not yet convinced
that the Viet Cong cannot hold
their own against the non-Com-
munist forces. DRV propaganda
has been putting special em-
phasis on assertions that the
US is not prepared to conduct
a prolonged war in Vietnam, but
that the Vietnamese insurgents
are prepared to do so and have
the necessary resources.
Chinese Communist propaganda
blasts against negotiations have
picked up in intensity. Several
have suggested that Peking doubts
Hanoi's staying power in the con-
flict and is trying to encourage
the Vietnamese. A 3 September
broadcast on the US "peace smoke-
screen" denounced as "fraudulent"
alleged US desires to "discuss
the four-point proposal" of the
DRV Government, and warned that
"nobody should allow himself to
be taken in" by this "vicious
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Sept 65
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ISE
Peking used the 20th anni-
versary of Japan's surrender in
World War II as the peg for a
new flood of propaganda urging
a bitter-end struggle against
"imperialism" and promising even-
tual victory. The key state-
ment was a 30,000-character ar-
ticle by Defense Minister Lin
Piao in Red Flag and People's
Daily onSeember, wh c as-
serted that the Viet Cong and
"revolutionary elements" else-
where in the world can defeat
the "imperialists" if they faith-
fully follow the theory of "peo-
ple's war" which Mao used in de-
feating the Japanese. Lin de-
clared that Mao's strategy was
especially applicable today in
Latin America, Asia, and Africa
and emphasized that the current
struggle in Vietnam was part of
a grand strategic plan to "sur-
round" the US and Western Europe.
The article reiterated Pe-
king's standard line that the US
is "clamoring" for war with China
and warned once again that, if
the US attacked, Peking would be
free to decide where and how the
war would be fought, implying
that hostilities might involve
all of Asia.
North Vietnamese Defenses
The Soviet- and Vietnamese-
manned DRV surface-to-air missile
defenses continue to engage US
aircraft. Since 4 September
four, possibly five, SAM sites
have launched missiles against
US aircraft, and all have missed.
There now are 18 confirmed SAM
sites in North Vietnam as well
as a number of as-yet-undetected
SAM sites in various parts of the
country from which missiles have
been launched. Most of these
sites are probably crudely con-
structed to take advantage of the
mobility of the SA-2 weapons sys-
tem and to thwart US attempts to
destroy fixed SAM emplacements.
Fighting in the South
The second major US-Viet-
namese ground operation in north-
east Quang Ngai Province within
the past three weeks was initiated
on 5 September against a Viet Cong
provincial headquarters and sus-
pected troop concentration. Con-
tact with the enemy was relatively
light as compared with the previous
action.
The Viet Cong during the
past week continued to follow
recent patterns, and generally
avoided major contact with large
US-Vietnamese units. The major
exception was during a government
operation 20 miles south of Da
Nang when an enemy force estimated at
battalion strength inflicted fairly
heavy casualties. Smaller scale
attacks continue to be launched
against government outposts in the
delta region south of Saigon, par-
ticularly in Kien Giang and Bac
Lieu provinces.
South Vietnamese Politics
The student antigovernment
movement active in Hue since late
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August subsided last week. Efforts
to spread the campaign to other
cities failed, and on 5 September
student leaders in Hud announced
the cancellation of future public
meetings. The reluctance of influ-
ential Buddhist leader Tri Quang
to lend public support to the move-
ment, and the public expressions of
unity voiced by Premier Ky and Gen-
eral Thi, commander of the I Corps
in which the unrest was concentrated,
helped to stall the movement.
Decrees giving the government
authority to establish military
zones in rural areas were also made
public last week. Although details
concerning the implementation of
the decrees were not provided, the
creation of the new zones may put
renewed effort into the government's
rural pacification program.
The Communist World
BILATERAL MEETINGS BETWEEN SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS
A round of official bilateral
meetings which will bring most East-
ern European leaders in contact with
their Soviet counterparts within the
next several weeks began on 3 Sep-
tember. These meetings probably
are concerned primarily with ques-
tions of purely bilateral interest
but designed also to keep the East-
ern European leaders informed of So-
viet plans and to foster an appear-
ance of bloc solidarity.
Eastern European leaders, some
of whom have been working toward the
development of better relations with
the US, will certainly focus atten-
tion on the Vietnam war and probe
Soviet leaders for any indication
of a break in the diplomatic im-
passe. They have little choice,
however, but to endorse the USSR's
harsh indictment of US policies.
Such public shows of "bloc solidar-
ity" will abet Moscow's persistent
effort to combat Peking's charges
of a Soviet sellout on Vietnam.
In view of the rumors of pend-
ing changes in the Soviet leadership,
the Eastern European leaders may at-
tempt at the meetings to sound out
the situation. Many of them were
severely critical of Khrushchev's
ouster last October because they
were not consulted in advance.
Rumanian party Secretary Gen-
eral Ceausescu's current visit to
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TRAVELS OF SOVIET BLOC LEADERS
SINCE CHANGE OF MOSCOW LEADERSHIP
OCTOBER 24-25 Brezhnev and Kosygin meet Polish leader Gomulka
in Poland to discuss repercussions of Khrushchev
ouster and reassure Polish leader,
Party first secretaries Zhivkov of Bulgaria, Gomulka
of Poland, Kadar of Hungary, and Ulbricht of
East Germany in Moscow for revolution anniversary;
first visit after Khrushchev's ouster.
NOVEMBER 30- Czechoslovak party first secretary Novotny to
DECEMBER 4 Moscow to meet new leaders officially.
JANUARY 17-22 Brezhnev, Kosygin, Zhivkov, Novotny, Gomulka,
Kadar, Ulbricht, and Rumanian party first secretary
Gheorgiu-Dej in Warsaw for Warsaw Pact Meeting
(which reportedly ended in disagreement).
During this period Gomulka held talks with Brezhnev
and Kosygin (21-22 January) and with Kadar
(22 January) on bilateral matters.
29-31 Brezhnev in Budapest for talks with Kadar.
FEBRUARY 2 Ulbricht met with Yugoslav party secretary-general
Tito in Belgrade en route to Cairo.
FEBRUARY 19- Kosygin met Ulbricht at Leipzig for opening of
MARCH 2 Leipzig Fair.
APRIL 4-9 Brezhnev and Kosygin in Warsaw for renewal of
Polish-Soviet Friendship and Mutual Assistance Pact.
MAY 8 Kosygin in East Berlin for V-E anniversary.
22-29 Kadar in Moscow for unpublicized talks.
JUNE 2-8 Tito in Prague onofficial party-state visit,
8-12 Tito in East Berlin on official party-state visit.
JUNE 18- JULY 1 Tito in Moscow on official party-state visit.
JULY 19 Zhivkov, Ulbricht, and Brezhnev in Bucharest for
Rumanian party congress.
15 Rumanian party secretary-general Ceausescu (new
party chief) in Bulgaria for talks with Zhivkov.
23 Ulbricht in Moscow for talks.
30 Kadarin Yugoslavia on vacation, talks with Tito.
SEPTEMBER 3-11 Ceausescu in Moscow on official party-state visit.
6-15 Novotny to Moscow on official party-state visit.
'?12 Ulbricht to Moscow for official party-state visit.
20-26 Tito to Sofia for talks.
Late SEPTEMBER or
Early OCTOBER Brezhnev to Sofia for talks.
OCTOBER 12 Gomulka to Belgrade for official
12 Novotny to Sofia for talks.
Late OCTOBER or Tito to Bucharest for official party-state visit.
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the USSR, his first since he took
power last March, may be an indi-
cation of improved relations be-
tween the two countries, but Bucha-
rest's numerous differences with
Moscow probably ensure that the
meeting will not be entirely smooth.
Czechoslovak boss Novotny, also in
Moscow and reportedly at odds with
Brezhnev, probably is particularly
interested in economic matters, spe-
cifically those connected with his
economic reforms. East German leader
Ulbricht may have planned his immi-
nent visit to Moscow to counter pub-
licity generated by the West German
elections. Bulgarian leader Zhivkov,
whom Brezhnev will soon visit, will
also be interested in economic mat-
ters, but less so than in convinc-
ing the Soviets of the stability of
his regime following last April's
coup attempt.
past few years for frequent bilat-
eral rather than multilateral bloc
consultations, which create more
problems for Moscow than they solve.
This change in the Soviet modus
operandi appears to be an adjust-
ment to the growing nationalism of
the Eastern European countries and
the substantive differences among
them. The Eastern Europeans them-
selves have also been emphasizing
personal, bilateral diplomacy. Bul-
garia, which has waged a year-long
campaign to break out of its isola-
tion within the bloc, particularly
in the Balkans, has invited Ceau-
sescu, Tito, and Novotny to make
separate visits to Sofia this fall.
Also this fall, Poland's Gomulka
will make his first trip to Belgrade
since 1957, and Tito will visit
Bucharest, marking still another
step in the warming Yugoslav-
Rumanian relationship.
The Soviet Union has shown
an increasing preference over the
IMPASSE NEAR IN GERMAN INTERZONAL TRADE TALKS
The possibility of an impasse
in negotiations on interzonal trade
(IZT) between West and East Germany
has increased as a result of a Bonn
cabinet decision to reject an East
German counterproposal on the for-
mula for signing trade agreements.
For political reasons, the West Ger-
mans insist that signers of future
agreements must, as in the past, sign
as representatives of their respec-
tive currency areas, since any other
formula would make it more difficult
to include West Berlin in all trade
agreements concluded by West Germany.
The present agreement requires
that 90 days' notice be given prior
to abrogation. As both sides de-
rive advantages from maintaining
interzonal trade at a high level,
it is unlikely to be interrupted at
the end of 1965, even if the East
Germans resort to abrogation as
a negotiating tactic, If the
East Germans should denounce the
1966 agreement, they would be
most likely to do so on 28 Sep-
tember, the date of the next reg-
ularly scheduled IZT meeting.
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GERMAN
INTERZONAL
TRADE
Foodstuffs
WEST GERMAN
EXPORTS IMPORTS ? Textiles and Clothing
?
M
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4 Rolled Steel
ac
nery an
quipment
Machinery and Equipment
Other Other
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Asia-Africa
INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN OPEN WARFARE
The warfare of the past
week between Indian and Paki-
stani ground and air forces has
brought the threat of all-out
war in the subcontinent.
Indians heading toward Hyderabad
are claiming the capture of a
town some five miles inside
Pakistan. Rawalpindi denies
this.
India's decision to carry
the fighting across Pakistan's
recognized boundary was in ap-
parent reply to Pakistan's com-
mitment of its regular forces
in the Indian Kashmir area.
Pakistan's thrust toward Jammu
city, which began on 1 September,
and the aerial attacks by each
side that accompanied the ground
activity, had hardened tempers
in both capitals. India appar-
ently decided on its major
thrust across the border toward
Lahore--in fact a several-pronged
drive by approximately two divi-
sions--in order to satisfy na-
tional honor and internal de-
mands and to ease pressure on
the Kashmir front. This action
was followed by an apparently
smaller move across the border
toward Hyderabad and Karachi,
to the south, and, according to
Indian claims, a crossing of the
Jammu - West Pakistan border to-
ward Sialkot.
It appears that invading
forces in most sectors have at
least temporarily been slowed
or contained after their initial
progress. Pakistani troops in
Kashmir apparently have not yet
taken Akhnur, gateway to the
Indian supply route junction of
Jammu city. The Indian drive
toward Lahore appears to be
blunted.
An Indian ground move against
well-nigh indefensible East Paki-
stan has been rumored, and re-
ports of Indian troop movements
around its borders suggest the
move may yet materialize. Indian
Defense Minister Chavan, however,
has said that the Indians do not
visualize carrying the war into
East Pakistan "at the present
moment."
Both sides have vigorously
pursued the war in the air. Some
of Pakistan's largest cities or
their environs--Lahore and Rawal-
pindi and possibly Karachi in
West Pakistan and Dacca and Chit-
tagong in East Pakistan--have
been bombed, apparently with no
great damage. Pakistani air-
craft have attacked targets in
or near Calcutta, Amritsar, and
possibly Bombay and New Delhi.
Each side has claimed heavy cas-
ualties to the other's air force,
in both these and Kashmiri ac-
tions, but mutual denials ob-
scure actual figures.
UN Secretary General Thant's
peace mission faces formidable
obstacles because the combatants'
hostile attitudes have been so-
lidifying over the past 18 years
and have been reinforced by re-
cent events. New Delhi wishes
to force Pakistan to abandon its
efforts to reopen the Kashmir
question and to withdraw its
forces from Indian Kashmir.
Rawalpindi embarked on its
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ANiliHA
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10 SEPTEMBER 1965
48676
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Kashmir adventure after years
of embitterment over India's
control there, heightened in
recent months by Indian politi-
cal moves to perpetuate its rule.
An authoritative TASS state-
ment on 7 September reflected
Moscow's concern and frustration
over a situation in which Soviet
leaders see the USSR's policy
interests in South Asia jeop-
ardized. The USSR had been
seeking to make some adjustment
in its policy by recent tenta-
tive efforts to better its re-
lations with Pakistan without,
however, sacrificing its more
far-reaching interests.in India.
The statement blamed both
India and Pakistan for aggravat-
ing a situation that "cannot
benefit either side," but also
delivered an implicit rebuke to
Peking for its position. It criti-
cized "outside forces" for try-
ing to prevent good relations
between India and Pakistan and
for setting them at loggerheads.
In contrast to Peking's denun-
ciation of UN involvement in
the crisis, the statement noted
Soviet support for the 4 and 6
September UN Security Council
resolutions and urged both
countries to stop military op-
erations immediately and to
withdraw their troops behind
the 1949 UN cease-fire line.
Moscow's limited room for ma-
neuver was reflected by a
cautious offer of "good offices."
The Chinese Communists
probably welcome the fighting
as a new and serious problem
for the West and regard it as
an opportunity to strengthen
their ties with Rawalpindi and
to inflict further damage on
India. It seems likely, how-
ever, that Peking wishes to
avoid major involvement in a
situation it cannot completely
control, and has thus far moved
cautiously.
Peking's initial support
for Pakistan has taken the form
of propaganda blasts designed
to shake Indian resolve and to
bring deterrent pressure on New
Delhi by threats of possible
military intervention. A menac-
ing Chinese statement broadcast
on 7 September charged the In-
dians with aggression against
their neighbors which threatened
the peace "in this part of Asia."
The next day an open diplomatic
note harshly restated the Chi-
nese points in more explicit
terms.
The note protested "suc-
cessive serious violations" of
Chinese territory by Indian
troops and linked these alleged
actions with developments in
Kashmir. It cited four inci-
dents in July along the Sikkim
frontier and five more which
allegedly took place on the
Ladakh border during August.
The note made no specific threats
of retaliation but warned that
India must bear responsibility
for "all the consequences." It
concluded with the ominous state-
ment that China was carefully
watching Indian "expansionist
actions" and was strengthening
defenses and increasing the alert
along the Indian border.
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This effort to "prove" In-
dian provocation against China
may be intended to justify a re-
newal of aggressive patrolling
and small-scale clashes along
the frontier similar to those
which preceded the border war
in 1962. This would deal a
heavy blow to morale in India,
where Chinese actions would prob-
ably be regarded as precursors
of heavier attacks. The Chinese
may believe that they could in
this way assist Pakistan by
creating a cheap diversion which
would tie down substantial num- 25X1
bers of Indian troops without
the risks to Peking of a formal
involvement in hostilities.
A virulent propaganda battle
is the latest phase in the dis-
pute between Ethiopia and Somalia
over the Somali-inhabited region
in eastern Ethiopia. Its con-
tinuation could push Somalia and
Ethiopia away from their recently
moderate postures and bring on an
outbreak of fighting.
Radio Addis Ababa and other
Ethiopian news media have been
trying to depict the Somali Re-
public as an aggressive, expan-
sionist nation. Other Ethiopian
themes appear designed to foment
Somali tribal differences and
to undo the government's efforts
to unify northern (ex-British)
and southern (ex-Italian) areas
of Somalia.
Somali fear that Ethiopian
propaganda attacks might be a
prelude or pretense to invasion
has led to some military deploy-
ment, probably in border areas.
Although Somalia is capable of
small-unit actions it could not
at present mount or sustain
large operations. Likewise,
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SECRET
Ethiopian fears of Somali pre-
emptive action have caused some
troop movements in border re-
gions, but the Ethiopians are
also incapable of a large mili-
tary operation now.
The situation is confused
by clashes in recent weeks be-
tween Somali tribes on both
sides of the border. No engage-
ment has occurred between Ethio-
pian and Somali troops, but
such a clash is possible as
long as fears and nervousness
continue to mount.
Some efforts are being made
to calm tensions. OAU Secretary
General Diallo Telli visited
Mogadiscio on 3 September and
obtained renewal of Prime Minis-
ter Abdirazak's pledge to halt
"agitation, undignified and
hostile personal and national
attacks" if Ethiopia would also
stop its campaign.
The Ethiopian verbal offen-
sive has succeeded at least in
keeping Somali leaders on the
defensive and off balance enough
to delay their internal political
clean-up as well as economic de-
velopment and famine relief pro-
grams. Opposition attempts to
bring down the Somali Government
a few weeks ago were unsuccessful,
but the Ethiopian propaganda is
beginning to affect adversely the
public opinion on which the So-
mali Government mandate rests.
NASIR'S VISIT TO MOSCOW
Both Moscow and Cairo ap-
pear pleased with the results
of President Nasir's talks with
Soviet leaders during his late
August visit to the Soviet Union.
Each side will find useful the
political support voiced by the
other, and Moscow presumably
hopes that the trip will boost
its efforts to enhance Soviet
prestige and influence among the
underdeveloped countries of Af-
rica and Asia.
The cordial tone of the
visit was in keeping with the
warm Soviet-Egyptian relation-
ship which has persisted since
Khrushchev was in power, and
which will in all probability
continue. The final communique
announced that negotiations will
be held this October on a new
five-year trade agreement. Nasir
expressed his appreciation for
the substantial Soviet military
aid given the UAR, but the com-
munique contained no indication
of any additional agreement to
supplement the huge Soviet mili-
tary assistance program now being
implemented.
Moscow used the occasion
to reassert its right to partici-
pate in the Second Afro-Asian
Conference scheduled for this
November in Algiers. In a 31
August speech, Soviet President
Mikoyan, rebutting a standard
Chinese argument, stressed that
the USSR belongs "not only to
Europe, but also to Asia," and
declared that the Soviet Union,
"in the event of its participation,
will spare no efforts" toward
ensuring the success of the con-
ference. Nasir's public support
for Soviet participation as
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SECRET
expressed in the communique is
a tactical victory for Moscow.
As anticipated, Nasir
joined the Soviets in condemn-
ing US policy in Vietnam, and
in calling for an immediate
cessation of air attacks on the
North. Contrary to widespread
press speculation, however,
Nasir apparently brought no
specific Vietnam peace proposal
to Moscow.
At
a 31 August reception, the Egyp-
tian ambassador in Moscow com-
mented that the UAR delegation
realized it "would be very hard
to get peace talks started."
Nasir may feel that the
communique will provide him
with ammunition to use against
critics of his close relations
with the USSR. The US Embassy
in Cairo believes that the com-
munique provides "disturbing
evidence" of the ease with which
Egypt, like other Afro-Asian
states, finds an identity of
views with the Soviets on Afro-
Asian problems. 1 -1
25.1
25X1
The political struggle in
the Congo between President
Kasavubu and Premier Tshombe
is entering a new stage with
Kasavubu's decision this week
to convene Parliament on 20 Sep-
tember.
Kasavubu has contended that
the constitution requires that
he demand Tshombe's resignation
before Parliament meets, but
that he would then name him in-
terim premier. TshombA now has
apparently decided to refuse to
resign. He maintains that his
transitional government must re-
main in power until presidential
elections, due six months after
parliament convenes. He fears
that his resignation and subse-
quent loss of parliamentary im-
munity might lead to his arrest.
In theory, the constitution
gives Kasavubu the authority to
dismiss the premier, but for the
moment he appears to have no via-
ble alternative to Tshombd. He
has delayed the opening of Parlia-
ment for nearly three months in
an effort to cut down Tshombd's
political and popular strength.
Despite suffering some tactical
losses, the premier still appears
to retain greater mass follow-
ing than any other figure in
the Congo.
The rest of the Congo is
relatively quiet.
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Europe
A solution to the eight-
week-old political crisis con-
tinues to elude Greek leaders.
Late last week a Crown Coun-
cil failed to reconcile the long-
standing differences between King
Constantine and ex-Premier Papan-
dreou. This was followed by a
breakdown in negotiations between
Papandreou and Panayiotis Kanel-
lopoulos--leader of the right-
of-center National Radical Union
(ERE), the principal opposition
party during Papandreou's pre-
miership. Kanellopoulos had
proposed the establishment of
an ERE government to supervise
elections within the constitu-
tional limit of the 45 days.
Papandreou initially ac-
cepted this offer in principle
but rejected conditions which
Kanellopoulos later attached.
These included securing a vote
of confidence for an ERE govern-
ment which would be followed by
the enactment of certain legis-
lation. Kanellopoulos allegedly
wanted additional time to pre-
pare the country for elections,
but probably really sought to
provoke Papandreou's rejection
because of the broad ERE opposi-
tion to the proposal and strong
objections from the Palace.
Papandreou's ready accept-
ance of Kanellopoulis' initial
offer also brought protests
from the Communist-front United
Democratic Left (EDA) party,
the first EDA deviation from
Papandreou's line since the be-
ginning of the crisis on 15 July.
The drive to get approval
for a government headed by
former deputy premier Stephan-
opoulos is expected to regain
momentum.
The next move now is clearly
up to the King. He has so far
been able to adhere to his card-
inal principle of avoiding Papan-25X1
dreou's return to power, in spite
of the continuing antimonarchical
tone of demonstrations.
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Negotiations in the Ken-
nedy Round are due to resume on
16 September, when the major par-
ticipants are scheduled to pre-
sent lists of agricultural prod-
ucts on which they are willing
to lower trade barriers. Because
the EEC is almost certainly un-
able to submit offers at this
time, the US will exclude from
its list those products primarily
of interest to the EEC.
The UK's decision to table
offers announced this week will
probably stimulate most other
EFTA and Commonwealth countries,
as well as Japan, to present
lists also, but in the absence
of Common Market offers it is
questionable how substantial
these will be. UK delegates in
Geneva emphasized to the US the
difficulty of making specific
and concrete offers without par-
allel moves by the community.
The inability of the EEC
to submit offers stems from its
current crisis, which left the
community's own common agricul-
tural policy (CAP) incomplete
and French participation in com-
munity decisions suspended. Even
in the unlikely event that the
community could present a list
at this time it would have to
be only "partial," consisting
of the offer on grains already
made earlier this year and con-
cessions on products included
in the CAP for which community
decisions have already been made.
The EEC Commission and the
five EEC members other than France
have generally welcomed the US
decision to table a list, be-
lieving that, with Kennedy Round
momentum preserved, pressures on
the community to participate will
emphasize France's isolation.
Bonn continues to stress its
ability and willingness to resist
French designs to water down the
powers of the Commission. The
Germans apparently feel that De
Gaulle will eventually permit
the EEC to function normally and
that the effects of the EEC cri-
sis on the Kennedy Round will not
prove fatal. The Commission it-
self is apparently contemplating
a confrontation with the French
if the German elections provide
a government "strong and effec-
tive enough" to back it in car-
rying out such a program.
Meanwhile, there have been
no signs of any relaxation of
France's boycott of the EEC. The
French probably hope that the
desires of the other five, par-
ticularly Germany, to get on with
the Kennedy Round will press them
to meet Paris' terms on the future
evolution of the EEC. France it-
self has never manifested enthu-
siasm for the Kennedy Round, but
will nevertheless have to reckon
the costs to France should a Ken-
nedy Round failure doom hopes for 25X1
a world-wide grains agreement.
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The 10-23 September visit
of Italian President Saragat
and Foreign Minister Fanfani to
Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina,
Chile, Peru, and Venezuela is
unlikely to produce any major
agreements, but increased eco-
nomic, cultural, and perhaps
political contacts will be dis-
cussed.
Italy's interest in Latin
America has grown since Premier
Moro accepted President Johnson's
personal invitation last April
to join in a Latin American de-
velopment program. Fanfani
journeyed to Mexico in May,
and Italian naval units stopped
at various Latin American ports
in August. Chilean President
Frei talked with Italian leaders
during his European trip in July.
Rome's ability to offer
financial and economic aid to
the area is limited, but it has
decided to extend $15 million
in new credits during 1965 and
to refinance debts of $26.3
million. The Italians have an
eye on their continuing trade
deficit with Latin America and
are likely to concentrate their
offers of assistance in the
cultural, educational, and tech-
nical fields.
Saragat and Fanfani may
also offer to continue facilitat-
ing relations between Latin
America and the European Eco-
nomic Community. In a speech
to the foreign ministers of the
Western European Union in June,
Fanfani pointed out that Euro-
pean markets mean more to Latin
America than subsidies, and he
urged Europeans to be more re-
sponsive to Latin American de-
sires regarding the stabiliza-
tion of commodity prices and
the marketing of raw materials
in Europe.
On the political level,
Saragat and Fanfani are likely
to advocate democratic solutions
for problems arising from in-
dustrialization, underdevelop-
ment, and internal Communist
threats, citing parallels be-
tween Italy and many Latin
American countries. They will
probably stress the value of
social and economic reforms
while avoiding specific sugges-
tions on combating Communism.
Saragat may have difficulty in
Venezuela in avoiding discussion
of the increasing attention the
Italian Communist Party is giv-
ing to some of its Latin Ameri-
can counterparts. In Chile,
where the Christian Democrats
are in power, emphasis is likely
to be placed on tightening ties
between Italian and Latin Ameri-
can Christian Democratic parties.
Saragat and Fanfani will be
anxious to demonstrate that they
are acting on their own and not
merely as spokesmen of American
policy. They are likely to ex-
press general agreement with US
goals in Vietnam and the Domini-
can Republic, but Italian domes-
tic political considerations and
an awareness of Latin American
sensibilities regarding "inter-
vention" will make them circum-
spect in their endorsement.
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ITINERARY
OF
PRESIDENT
SARAGAT'S
LATIN
AMERICAN
TRIP
10 SEPTEMBER 1963
48678
URUGUAY
15-17 Seot
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Western Hemisphere
The Dominican Republic's
provisional government, under
Hector Garcia Godoy, was inaugu-
rated on 3 September. In his
speech accepting the presidency,
Garcia Godoy said the goals of
his regime are to develop con-
fidence in free elections and
initiate a program of moderate
reform. He promised total im-
partiality in government and com-
pletely apolitical armed forces.
The new regime is already
beset by a number of major prob-
lems stemming largely from nerv-
ousness of the military over their
position and continued efforts
of the "Constitutionalists" to
maneuver for a final victory.
Friction between the mili-
tary establishment and the new
government quickly developed
when it appeared that Garcia
Godoy was initiating military re-
forms without consulting the mili-
tary. On 4 September the official
government radio announced a de-
cree abolishing General Wessin's
Armed Forces Training Center
(CEFA) as a separate branch of
the armed forces and further in-
censed the military by making
derogatory remarks about their
leadership. Unrest in the mili-
tary was also exacerbated by the
President's failure to name a sec-
retary of the armed forces and ser-
vice chiefs.
Garcia Godoy later explained
that CEFA was to remain intact
and had merely undergone a name
change; it will hereafter be known
as the 4th Brigade of the army.
The President also canceled his
appointment of Franklin Dominguez,
a former rebel propagandist, as
director of the government radio.
In an effort to reduce tension
created by partisan broadcasting,
all radio and TV stations except
the official government station and
the Voice of the OAS were suspended
by decree on 6 September.
Garcia Godoy told a large
gathering of officers on 6 September
that he intends to reappoint Rivera
Caminero as armed forces chief
and also to retain the present ser-
vice chiefs. This seems to have
improved his standing with the
military for the time being. The
provisional President is, how-
ever, determined either to retire
General Wessin or to assign him
to an overseas position. Wessin
would not step down voluntarily
and his intentions in the present
situation are not yet clear.
The new regime has made
little progress in getting the
rebels to fulfill the commit-
ments they agreed to in the Act
of Reconciliation. Although
they have dismantled a few of
their defenses, they have re-
fused to disarm their militia pend-
ing the withdrawal of Wessin's -
troops from the northern part of
the city. They will probably also
require the departure of Wessin
himself. In any case, Communist
elements within the rebel camp
are determined to retain their
weapons.
Although the initial appoint-
ments of the Garcia Godoy regime
have on the whole reflected the
President's overriding preoccupation
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with technical competence and
political consensus, some have
caused concern. For example,
Franklin Dominguez, although re-
lieved of his duties as director
of the official radio, retains
his job as press secretary to
the president. Manuel Morel
Cerda, a leftist and until re-
cently head of the Communist-
dominated Lawyers' Association,
was appointed attorney general.
Two of the appointees to the In-
dustrial Development Corporation
(CFI) are men of questionable
to alt
The return of many exiles
is another factor that will un-
settle the political scene. The
extreme leftist secretary general
of the Revolutionary Social
Christian Party (PRSC) Caonabo
Javier, who returned on 4 Sep-
tember, has already dubbed the
provisional government "a product
of deals among negative and anti-
Dominican sectors" and said PRSC
members would not take govern-
ment jobs. There are reports
that Maximo Lopez Molina, the
head of the Communist Dominican 25X1
Popular Movement, is attempting
to return to the Dominican Re-
public.
JAMAICAN RIOTS REFLECT
The riots which erupted in
Kingston,capital of Jamaica, at
the end of August were essentially
an anti-Chinese outburst by Negro
mobs, motivated primarily by
envy of the city's prosperous
Chinese community. The incident
which sparked the rioting was ap-
parently a minor personal dispute
between a Chinese and a Jamaican,
but trouble quickly spread through
the slums of West Kingston. A
number of persons were injured by
stones and gunshots before police
dispersed the rioters and looters
with tear gas.
The rioting does not appear
to have been politically directed,
although at least one of the is-
land's several small Communist-
front groups participated in the
29 August disorders. Other front
groups evidently did not see an
opportunity to exploit the dis-
orders.
Such disturbances are an
outgrowth of the widespread un-
employment--currently estimated
at 18 to 25 percent--grinding
poverty, burgeoning population,
and racial tension which foster
an atmosphere of unrest not only
in Jamaica but in many Caribbean
islands. Although the islands are
generally calm on the surface, a
strong current of racism is pres-
ent in most cases and,when added
to the many depressing economic
factors, could combine to produce
mob violence almost without
warning,
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LACK OF EVIDENT PROGRESS ON CANAL THREATENS PANAMA REGIME
Dissatisfaction over lack of
evident progress in the canal ne-
gotiations is increasing in Panama
and could cause serious problems
for the Robles government.
President Robles' critics
are charging that the current US-
Panamanian discussions have been
unproductive and lack popular sup-
port. Last week pro-Communist Na-
tional Assemblyman Carlos Ivan
Zuniga assailed the secrecy shroud-
ing the talks and warned that the
Panamanian public cannot be ex-
pected to accept a settlement it
knows nothing about.
The radio station identified
with former president Arnulfo
Arias' Panamenista Party has
charged the government several
times with deceiving the public
about the canal treaty talks. On
1 September it predicted that
"many things will come to light"
when the National Assembly meets
and warned that Robles will be
called to account for his efforts
to "conceal the truth."
The October meeting of the as-
sembly will provide Robles' oppo-
nents with a forum to demand an ex-
planation of the government's posi-
tion in the nine-month-old negotia-
tions. A political crisis and vio-
lent anti-US reaction are almost cer-
tain if Robles is unable to make a
statement which Panamanians can
view as favorable.
Panamanian Communists and
other extremists are eager to use
the canal issue as a catalyst for
stirring up the poor and unemployed
in the cities adjacent to the Canal
Zone, and overthrowing Robles. It
was the incitement of these people
which turned the January 1964 stu-
dent disturbances into the worst
anti-US riots in Panamanian history.
GUATEMALAN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY SETS MARCH ELECTION DATE
The Guatemalan Constituent
Assembly has set March 1966 as
the date for electing a new con-
gress to take office next May. A
new president, also to be elected
in March, will be inaugurated on
1 July.
Choice of a firm date for the
elections was of prime concern to
the opposition National Liberation
Movement (MLN), which sought to
thwart any attempt by the Peralta
regime to advance the date of the
voting so as to prevent it from
entering a presidential candidate.
This schedule allows Col. Miguel
Ponciano to fulfill the require-
ment that he resign from the armed
forces six months prior to the
elections in order to campaign.
Although it is committed to
promulgating the new constitution
on 15 September, the Peralta gov-
ernment seeks to retain the power
to rule by executive decrees which
enable it to move against subver-
sives irrespective of normal con-
stitutional guarantees. The gov-
ernment's continuing concern over
internal security may lead it to
delay the elections beyond the
date set b the Constituent Assem-
bly.
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Negotiations on trade and
economic aid now in progress be-
tween Communist bloc and Latin
American countries may result in
some new economic relationships,
but their impact on the over-all
level of economic exchanges will
be delayed.
The bloc is responding to
Latin American initiatives. Bra-
zil, Argentina, Chile, and some
smaller countries seeking to
"normalize" relations with Com-
munist countries are investigat-
ing the bloc's ability to con-
tribute to their needs.
The Brazilian initiative--
now being asserted by Planning
Minister Campos in Moscow--is
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expected to be favorably re-
ceived by the USSR and may
elicit the offer of modest cred-
its. Soviet officials have al-
ready studied Brazilian electric
power plans and surveyed shale
oil resources, two areas which
Campos stated he would investi-
gate.
An Argentine oil-develop-
ment mission plans to buy a
small amount of Soviet equip-
ment during its current trip in
Europe. This prospective pur-
chase, reportedly to total only
$3 million, will be made on
credit. Earlier this year Mos-
cow had renewed offers to ex-
tend credits up to $100 million
to Argentina, and had submitted
bids to participate in proposed
large-scale Argentine power de-
velopment.
Bloc trade this year is
unlikely to amount to much more
than $400 million, or about the
same as last year. Argentina
(with a $175-million bloc trade
in 1964) and Brazil (with $160
million) remain the Communists'
chief Latin American trading
partners, accounting for 80 per-
cent of their trade with the
area. Argentina, which attained
the lead in 1964 through its
large grain sales to China and
the USSR, seems destined to lead
again this year and next in view
of grain contracts signed with
Moscow last month and reports
that Peking will again purchase
sizable quantities of wheat. So-
viet oil deliveries to Brazil
are by agreement at a higher
level this year than previously,
and Brazil has just ordered $20
million worth of East German loco-
motives.
For the future, a gradual
growth in Latin America's trade
is expected. East European
trade remains the best estab-
lished there, but some regularity
has also developed in Soviet
trade--essentially an exchange
of oil for foodstuffs. Chinese
trade is marked by wide fluctua-
tions, caused by Chinese pur-
chases of grains to meet domestic
food shortages and by politically
inspired purchases of primary
commodities.
Trade with the bloc still
does not assume significant pro-
portions for any Latin American
country, although both Argentina
and Uruguay send 10 percent of
their exports to the bloc and
about 6 percent of Brazil's total
trade is with the bloc. Chile,
Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico,
and Peru carry on only negligible
amounts of trade. Peru, which
initiated lucrative fishmeal ex-
ports to the world market a few
years ago, finds the bloc a
promising customer. 25K1
.25) .1
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