WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005000070001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 24, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A00)FO91-~tember 1965
State Department review completed
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On 20 September US fighter-
bombers encountered one of the
most vigorous reactions by North
Vietnamese air defenses seen to
date while they were bombing the
vital Hanoi - Lang Son rail line.
In addition to heavy artillery
fire, the aircraft were fired at
by at least ten surface-to-air
missiles--all of which missed.
US pilots reported, however, that
no MIGs were seen.
This unusual response tes-
t if ies to the critical importance
of this rail line for the con-
tinued delivery to North Vietnam
of large quantities of military
and economic aid. The strike
was successful in knocking out,
at least temporarily, one of the
rail bridges at Cao Nung.
Only a few days before the
20 September strike, the North
Vietnamese had deployed a number
of jet fighters--at least eight
--to Kep Airfield, about 35 miles
northeast of Hanoi on the rail
line. Considerable improvements
have recently been made to the
field to render it serviceable
as a jet fighter base.
Continued attacks against
the rail line in this area may
result in the deployment of addi-
tional jet fighters to Kep and
possibly to Haiphong - Cat Bi.
Future US strikes against this
important target will probably
meet a response at least as de-
termined as that encountered on
20 September.
The failure of so large a
number of missiles to hit their
targets on 20 September has raised
doubts as to the effectiveness
of the North Vietnamese SAM de-
fenses.
The relative ineffective-
ness noted in the SAM firings
may stem partly from the inex-
perience of North Vietnamese
crews now apparently taking over
some missile operations. They
may be firing the missile either
prematurely or too late to score
a hit. This is particularly
true in view of the fact that
US strike aircraft take evasive
action as soon as the pilots be-
come aware that they are in the
vicinity of an active missile
site.
It is also possible that
the equipment is not functioning
as efficiently as it was designed
to function because the Communists
are moving it rapidly from one
location to another. In addi-
tion, the radar being used in
Vietnam is of the older and less
effective "S" band type, rather
than the newer "C" band in use
in the USSR.
Situation in South Vietnam
Two large-scale South Viet-
namese - US operations in Viet
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s-_ South Vietnamese military
boundaries
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Cong strongholds were the main
incidents in the military situa-
tion in the South last week, which
was otherwise marked by a general
decrease in ground activity. The
ten-day clearing operation initf
losses of 13 killed and 52
wounded.
The political situation in
South Vietnam remains generally
quiet.
ated on
13
September northeast of
Ben Cat
in
Binh Duong Province
resulted
in
little enemy contact,
although
several Viet Cong supply
and arms
manufacturing facilities
and a field hospital were discov-
ered. Heavy fighting occurred,
however, when US troops engaged
a Viet Cong battalion north of
Route 19 near An Khe on 18 Septem-
ber during a joint operation in
Binh Dinh Province. With close
air support, US forces*killed
some 225 Viet Cong, sustaining
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PAKISTAN-INDIA-CHINA
The three-week Indo-Paki-
stani war ended on 22 September
as both sides grudgingly agreed
to a cease-fire.
Neither country has fully
accepted the spirit or letter of
the 20 September UN cease-fire
resolution, however, and the
tangle of loose ends will prob-
ably take months--possibly years
--to unravel. Pakistan's Presi-
dent Ayub ordered his troops to
remain in place for the present,
and Indian forces will probably
do the same.
The UN plans to establish a
100-man observer team in the Pun-
jab, similar to the UN team sta-
tioned along the 1949 Kashmir
cease-fire line. There is some
danger that unless a troop with-
drawal can soon be effected the
dangerous confrontation of forces
in the Punjab will, as in Kash-
mir, continue indefinitely.
Opinion in Pakistan is re-
portedly running heavily against
the cease-fire. Normally objec-
tive military commanders appear
disposed to continue the fight
despite the heavy costs and the
lack of any prospects for victory.
Ayub's position has probably been
eroded somewhat by the apparent
failure of his bid to force a
Kashmir settlement, as well as
by his agreement to the cease-
fire, but there probably is no
immediate threat to his position.
New Delhi is pleased by the
results of the war, although the
more radical anti-Pakistani ele-
ments hoped for a complete rout.
Prime Minister Shastri's willing-
ness to consider discussions on
Kashmir will be limited by the
pressure that can be exerted by
this ultranationalist lobby,
which includes important Congress
Party figures. Nevertheless,
Shastri and his closest colleagues
within the cabinet and party have
been strengthened by their polit-
ically astute management of the
crisis and may have earned a freer
hand in the long run.
Shastri will also be helped
by the remarkable absence of
serious communal disturbances
during the undeclared war. Strin-
gent security precautions and.the
careful handling of reports from
the military front have prevented
serious Hindu-Muslim disorders.
Since the acceptance of the new
cease-fire, the government of
West Bengal State has strength-
ened security forces and restricted
activities of Muslims in areas
of the state bordering on East
Pakistan to forestall possible
communal violence resulting from
the settlement.
Suspicions have deepened
in India that Pakistan's Kashmir
initiative was the result of
collusion with Communist China.
A senior Indian official told a
US Embassy officer early this
week that he feared the Chinese
were planning to send troops
through the Karakoram Pass in
northern Ladakh to link up with
Pakistani infiltrators north of
Kargil. While such a development
appears unlikely, particularly in
the light of the Indo-Pakistani
cease-fire, similar fears are
being widely expressed.
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Press reports in New Delhi
state that over 100 members of
the Indian Parliament, represent-
ing "almost all shades of polit-
ical opinion" have urged the
government to begin immediately
a nuclear weapons development
program in defense against Sino-
Pakistani plotting. There are
no indications that the Shastri
government has actually decided
to build the bomb, a step it has
heretofore resisted. However,
the Indians are probably capable
of detonating a nuclear device
within 18 months of a decision
to do so.
Chinese Activity
On 19 September Peking ex-
tended for an additional three
days its ultimatum demanding that
the Indians dismantle "military
works of aggression" on the Chi-
nese side of certain Sikkim bor-
der passes. This move was ap-
parently prompted by a desire to
broaden China's limited room for
maneuver and to undercut charges
that Peking was bent on provok-
ing a wider war.
It may also have resulted
from a Pakistani request and a
desire to avoid new moves which
would support charges of collu-
sion between Peking and Rawal-
pindi. President Ayub told the
US ambassador on 21 September
that twice in recent days Paki-
stan had asked the Chinese not
to intervene.
The sudden change in Chi-
nese Foreign Minister Chen Yi's
travel plans on 18 September to
avoid a stopover in Karachi sug-
gested that Peking was already
considering a shift in tactics.
Chen, on his way home from Africa,
made an unscheduled 25-hour lay-
over in Damascus to "rest," in-
stead of going to Pakistan, and
then continued on to China via
Afghanistan,
Late on 21 September, be-
fore the expiration of their ul-
timatum, but with an Indo-Paki-
stani cease-fire close at hand,
the Chinese backed off still
further. A brief Peking broad-
cast stated that Indian forces
had partially dismantled the con-
troversial military structures--
an allegation denied by New Delhi.
This permitted the Chinese
to allow their deadline to pass
without taking any military ac-
tion, and on 22 September an au-
thoritative People's Daily "Ob-
server"articlele- claimed hat Pe-
king's ultimatum had forced the
Indians to comply with the Chi-
nese demand for demolition of
border installations. The article
attempted to keep open, however,
the threat of further action by
claiming that other demands--for
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return of livestock and allegedly participate himself. Kosygin's
kidnaped border inhabitants-- letters, released by TASS on
are still outstanding. "The 19 September, were but the latest
matter is far from closed" Peking of many recent official state-
warned and the Chinese will un- ments reflecting genuine Soviet
doubtedly attempt to maintain concern about the crisis and
pressure in a lower key through especially about the possible
such verbal threats. consequences of any deeper Chi-
nese involvement.
.Soviet Attitude
Moscow dramatically
extended is offers of "good
offices" to help secure an end
to hostilities. Premier Kosygin
invited Ayub and Shastri to
meet on Soviet territory if it
would facilitate the restora-
tion of peace, and offered to
Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko's remarks to Ambassador
Goldberg on 21 September em-
phasized a common Soviet-US
interest in damping down the
crisis. Gromyko expressed
"gratification" at the "excel-
lent cooperation" between Gold- 25X1
berg and chief Soviet UN dele-
gate Federenko during UN deliber-
ntinnR on the
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A Soviet party central com-
mittee plenum is expected to
convene on Monday, 27 September,
followed by a session of the USSR
Supreme Soviet on 1 October. The
latter body will undoubtedly
merely ratify the organizational
and personnel decisions adopted
earlier by the central committee.
The plenum probably will reorga-
nize industrial management and
endorse some general principles
of economic reform. However,
it seems unlikely that the meet-
ing will adopt detailed decisions
on far-reaching, market-oriented
liberalization.
committee's economic newspaper
argued that long-standing admin-
istrative methods are essential
to a planned economy and in-
sisted that "further develop-
ment" of independence in enter-
prise management will occur
within the framework of a
"strengthening" of centralized
principles in planning. But on
23 September, Izvestia countered
with a demand To -move faster in
granting greater autonomy to
factory managers and criticized
"attempts to go back to the
old, to administer as before."
A disposition on the part
of the leadership to proceed
cautiously in implementing re-
forms in the economic field has
been apparent since early this
year. Some recent authoritative
statements seemed aimed at dis-
pelling any anticipation by
liberal economists that the
central committee now will fully
endorse their views. Speaking
on 14 September of the experience
of Eastern European countries in
economic reform, party chief
Brezhnev stated that work in
this direction in the USSR re-
quires time, and that "premature
and subjective decisions are
especially impermissible."
The following day, a =harply
worded editorial in the , tral
Nevertheless, the plenum
probably will substantially
modify the system of regional
economic councils (sovnarkhozy)
created by Khrushchev in 1957,
replacing it with a functionally
organized ministerial system.
Reorganization occurred earlier
this year in the defense-or-
iented industries and in agri-
culture, establishing a pattern
apparently to be followed now
throughout the rest of the econ-
omy.
Agricultural policy is also
likely to be discussed in prep-
aration for the All-Union Con-
gress of Collective Farm Workers,
which Brezhnev has proposed con-
vening in 1966.
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Some shifts in responsibili-
ties at a high level are likely
to result from a reorganization
in the administration of industry.
Rumors of a major shake-up at
the top leadership level persist,
but there is no firm evidence
to support them. Soviet offi-
cials have recently begun to
express concern over the effect
on the international situation
of such rumors, which they label
"baseless and sensational."
In addition to discussing
economic matters, the central
committee plenum. presumably will
announce the date for convoca-
tion of the 23rd party congress
early next year. In the past,
such announcements have also
included the agenda and the main
speakers, providing insight
into the relative standing of
the top leaders.
SOVIET NAVAL SHIPS MAKE EGYPTIAN PORT CALL
A destroyer, two F-class
submarines, and two auxiliary
ships of the Soviet Northern
Fleet left Port Said, Egypt,
on 20 September after a four-
day stay. This port call and
a similar one made in July at
Salum, 250 miles to the west,
are the first naval visits by
Soviet fleet units to a non-
Communist Mediterranean nation.
However, neither call appeared
to
be a formal
visit, and there
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is
no evidence
that the Soviets
are
receiving
naval logistic
support from UAR bases.
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Asia - Africa
Military activity in Laos is
rising as the rainy season ends.
Outbreaks of fighting between gov-
ernment and Communist forces have
been reported from several scat-
tered areas.
North of the royal capital
at Luang Prabang, government
forces on 19 September reportedly
recaptured Lat Hane, a village
which had been overrun by a Com-
munist unit earlier this month,
Government forces have also had
some success in limited offensive
operations along the Mekong to the
west of Luang Prabang and in the
mountains north of Thakhek in cen-
tral Laos. Fighting is continuing
east of Hua Muong, a key hill
position recently retaken by gov-
ernment troops.
These operations have all
been heavily dependent on close
air support from the T-28s of the
Laotian Air Force.
There are indications that
the Communists, who reportedly
have resorted to air and river
resupply to alleviate severe sup-
ply shortages during the summer
monsoon, may be planning an
early resumption of truck sup-
ply operations into Laos. Al-
though movement into north-
central Laos along the full
length of Route 7 reportedly is
still blocked by high water con-
ditions, reports indicate that
the Communists have military
and civilian repair teams work-
ing to reopen the route. Some
truck movement has been observed
in the Ban Ban area.
Farther south, an "unidenti-
fied tracked vehicle" was reported
moving south on Route 23 toward
Muong Phine on 17 September sug-
gesting that the Communists may
be planning to reopen this route
considerably earlier than last
year, when traffic resumed in Decem-
ber. When opened, this segment of
the road will link the North Viet-
namese border with an extensive
road net--substantially improved
over the past several months--
leading south from the Tchepone
area and feeding toward the South
Vietnamese border.
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The turbulent South Korean
political scene is witnessing
the re-emergence of the one-time
party strong man Kim Chong-pil
because of President Pak Chong-
hui's high regard for his abili-
ties and the frustration of the
leaders of the majority Demo-
cratic Republican Party (DRP).
President Pak has been rul-
ing with increasing self-assur-
ance and with decreasing regard
for the sensitivities of the
DRP politicians. Last month
he failed to consult them before
calling out troops to quell stu-
dent demonstrations. He also
rejected a demand to revamp the
cabinet and the party hierarchy.
For the most part Pak, who
retains the all-important loy-
alty of the military hierarchy,
has attempted to stay above
political controversy and to
balance contending factions. He
now may feel that the impending
settlement with Japan will soon
bring major changes to Korea's
economy and politics which re-
quire close attention.
Pak is mindful of the use-
ful role that Kim Chong-pil, his
nephew by marriage, played in
building up the DRP, and prob-
ably believes he should resume
a leading role, despite his
large numbers of enemies. Pak
is already looking ahead to the
presidential campaign of 1967,
and probably believes that Kim
can best organize his re-elec-
tion, as he did two years ago.
Competing DRP factions
share a common concern over
their declining power position.
They feel that the President
has forced unexplained legisla-
tion on them, appointed key of-
ficials without their concurrence,
and made major policy changes
without consulting them. Even
the DRP's central standing com-
mittee complains that Pak's be-
havior is lowering party morale
and threatening gradual party
disintegration.
Many of them seem temporar-
ily to be casting aside their dis-
like of Kim in the hope that he
may help restore some influence
for them with the President.
Although he has held no party
position since returning last
winter from his second exile,
Kim has been increasingly active
behind the scenes and has built
up new rapport in the National
Assembly. The key role he played
in the abortive effort to re-
shuffle the cabinet last month
suggests that he is beginning
to come out into the open. He
has buttressed his support in
the assembly with recent visits
to provincial party officials.
Although Kim has of necessity
discarded his previous steam-
roller approach as he moves to
regain direction over the DRP,
he still wants party-centered
authoritarian rule for South
Korea.
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The third Arab summit confer-
ence, held in Casablanca from 13 to
17 September,was marked by a rela-
tively moderate stand on controver-
sial issues and by a nominal truce
in inter-Arab bickering.
The conference demand for the
elimination of foreign bases "which
threaten the security of the Arab
region and world peace" contrasts
with last year's specific condemna-
tion of "imperialist" bases in Cy-
prus and Aden. With reference to
Vietnam, the Arab leaders confined
themselves to expressions of "deep
concern," and called for a solution
in accordance with the 1954 Geneva
agreement. They also expressed
"satisfaction" with steps taken to
ease the UN payments crisis.
Support accorded to Muslim
Pakistan in its war with India was
muted, presumably in deference to
Cairo's unwillingness to back the
Pakistanis strongly because of Egyp-
tian ties with India. The call to
"settle the dispute by peaceful
means in accordance with UN princi-
ples and resolutions" favor Paki-
stan but maintained a surface neu-
trality.
Nasir's machinations. The pact
was worded so as to invite future
cooperation from Tunisia's Presi-
dent Bourguiba, who boycotted the
conference.
The Palestine problem was han-
dled with moderation; the confer-
ees decided to continue work on the
Jordan Waters diversion project at
presumably less vulnerable loca-
tions than in the past, but allo-
cated no further funds to aid the
work in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.
The "new time schedule" envisioned
may reflect a fear of provoking
further Israeli retaliation. On
the other hand, the Arab leaders
more than doubled the budget for
the United Arab Command (UAC), which
has responsibility for meeting any
Israeli attack. 25X1
An Arab Solidarity Pact signed
on 15 September marks an advance on
previous nebulous statements of
unity, particularly in the extent
to which it condemned interference
in each other's internal affairs.
Its impact may be somewhat dimmed,
however, by the timing of the abor-
tive coup in Iraq which will al-
most certainly be attributed to
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NEW CABINET FOR IRAQ
A new cabinet was formed in
Baghdad on 21 September, the third
in less than three weeks. Presi-
dent Arif appointed former deputy
premier Bazzaz to replace ousted
premier Abd al-Razzaq, who fled
to Cairo after leading an abortive
attempt to oust Arif on 16 Sep-
tember.
Arif's appointment of Abd
al-Razzaq earlier this month was
generally considered a concession
to the strong pro-Nasirist faction
in Iraq. Arif had purged six pro-
Nasirist cabinet ministers in
July.
The coup attempt took place
while Arif was in Casablanca for
the Arab chiefs-of-state con-
ference. The arrival of Abd
al-Razzaq and company in Egypt
seems to have thoroughly embar-
rassed the Egyptian authori-
ties.
The new government will
probably try to steer a middle
course between pro- and anti-
Nasirist factions in Baghdad.
Premier Bazzaz has consistently
advocated friendly ties with
the Nasir regime, but he re-
cently called publicly for fed-
eration rather than full union
with Egypt. Most of his minis-
ters, apparently political non-
entities, are holdovers from
Abd al-Razzaq's cabinet, and the
weak government is unlikely to
survive for lone.
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Stephan Stephanopoulos, who
received a mandate from the King
of Greece to form a new govern-
ment on.17 September, appears to
have enough support to win a
parliamentary vote of confidence
and end the country's ten-week-
old political crisis. The vote
may come as early as 24 Septem-
ber. His conduct of governmental
affairs, however, will be hampered
by the necessity for compromise
to maintain his small margin of
support.
Prime Minister Stephanopoulos
says he is heading a "government
of national emergency." It is
composed of defectors from former
prime minister Papandreou's Cen-
ter Union, with the "symbolic"
participation of two former op-
position parties, the right-of-
center National Radical Union,
and the conservative Progressives.
Each has a minister without port-
folio in the cabinet. The prime
minister enticed the last eight
defectors to his fold by giving
each one a cabinet post. He
now seems assured of 152 votes,
one more than the minimum neces-
sary.
Many governmental decisions
have been held in abeyance in
the last two months, and Stephan-
opoulos has announced that his
main task will be to cope with
these problems. He also an-
nounced that new elections de-
manded by Papandreou could not
be held until "peace and tran-
quility" were restored.
Pacification will not come
easily. Papandreou is continu-
ing his attacks and has charged
that the King, in awarding the
mandate for the fourth time, had
violated the constitution and
that the most recent defectors
from the Papandreou party had
been "led to the palace... in
custody for fear of escape."
Papandreou's visit to Salonika
in northern Greece last week end
drew enthusiastic crowds. The
US Consulate there commented
that it was a day of great per-
sonal triumph for him.
Both Papandreou and the
Communist-front United Democratic
Left may, feel it necessary
to resort to violent measures
in order to unseat Stephanopoulos.
This, combined with stresses
which are already appearing
among the prime minister's sup-
porters, makes the future of the
new government uncertain.
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NATO IN WAKE OF LATEST FRENCH MOVES
President de Gaulle's asser-
tion in his press conference this
month that he intends to put an
end to French integration in NATO
"not later than 1969" has led Al-
liance members to expect a tougher
French line soon after the Decem-
ber presidential election. The
Benelux countries in particular,
along with the UK, are convinced
that the other allies must ur-
gently develop contingency plans
for reorganization and operation
of NATO in the face of a broad
range of possible French actions.
De Gaulle has indicated that
his first move will be a demand
that US forces and bases on French
soil be placed under French com-
mand or withdrawn. The US mili-
tary presence in France is based
on bilateral pacts which either
party can terminate on a year's
notice.
It is less clear how and
when the French leader may move
against NATO's organizational
presence in France. A series of
multilateral pacts, similar to
the US - French bilaterals, govern
the status there of NATO's mili-
tary headquarters, forces, and
bases; these also have a one-
year termination clause. This
means that if De Gaulle chose
early next year to denounce both
sets of pacts, US and NATO forces
would have to get out of France
in 1967--two years before France
could give notice of an intention
to withdraw from the North Atlan-
tic Treaty itself.
been certain in the next few
months even without De Gaulle's
explicit rejection of NATO's
present form. Nuclear arrange-
ments in the Alliance--both the
Allied Nuclear Force and Multi-
lateral Force proposals and the
nuclear select committee--have
been largely "on ice" pending
the West German elections, but
seem likely now to come to the
fore. Both Chancellor Erhard
and Foreign Minister Schroeder
have asserted during the cam-
paign that a German role in tar-
geting and planning is not enough
--Germany must participate in the
weapons system itself.
Revival of serious considera-
tion of the ANF/MLF proposals is
certain to draw strong French op-
position. NATO Secretary General
Brosio told incoming US Ambassador
Cleveland that he now believes
De Gaulle's NATO policy derives
from the General's conclusion
that "the real danger in the
world is no longer the Russians
but the Germans." He thinks this
conclusion stems from the German
refusal to be protected mili-
tarily by France's force de frappe.
Both Brosio and the US Em-
bassy in Faris have advanced the
view that the nuclear select com-
mittee might conceivably be a
bit more palatable to the French
than the ANF/MLF proposals. They
reason that giving the Germans
a greater voice in nuclear plan- 25X1
ning and targeting could obviate
the need for including them in
a separate nuclear force.
Renewed discussion of funda-
mental Alliance issues would have
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The durability of Finland's
Agrarian-doiinated coalition cab-
inet will be tested in the com-
ing weeks when parliament consid-
ers controversial economic and
fiscal measures proposed by Prime
Minister Virolainen's government.
At issue basically is the
extent to which Finland's in-
creasingly industrialized and
urbanized economy should continue
to support the heavily subsidized
agricultural sector represented
by the Agrarian Party. The
smaller coalition members--the
Conservatives, the Liberals, and
the Swedish People's Party--have
long chafed under the Agrarians'
aggressive promotion of farm in-
terests at the expense of other
interest groups. However, do-
mestic political considerations
and concern over the impact of
a government crisis on Finland's
relations with the Soviet Union
have thus far persuaded these
parties not to jeopardize the
delicately balanced coalition.
There is also recognition that
even if this government were to
be toppled the Agrarians would
in all probability stay on in a
caretaker capacity since Presi-
dent Kekkonen is determined not
to call early elections.
The opposition Social Demo-
crats are under no such restraints
and will be tempted to exploit in-
tracabinet tensions, perhaps even
to the point of cooperating with
the Communist-front Finnish Peo-
ple's Democratic League in pro-
moting legislation of particular
benefit to labor. As representa-
tives of labor and white-collar
workers who resent the use of
sizable sums in an already tight
budget to subsidize an essen-
tially noncompetitive agricul-
ture, the Social Democrats are
determined to secure increases
in such areas as housing, social
welfare, and public works. In
this situation, the Agrarians
will be hard pressed to keep
their coalition partners in line.
In pursuit of these eco-
nomic considerations, the Social
Democrats have already made po-
litical gains. In last October's
local elections, the Social Dem-
ocrats--who have been excluded
from the government since 1958
by Kekkonen and the Agrarians,
ostensibly because the Socialist
leadership is "hostile" to the
Soviet Union--received more votes
than any other party and there
is a good possibility that they
may emerge from the national
elections next summer with the
largest representation in par-
liament.
Such a development would
pose a dilemma for President
Kekkonen, who would find it dif-
ficult to deny the Social Demo-
crats a place in the government.
There already are indications
that Moscow is alert to this
possibility, and Soviet propa-
ganda media have begun reminding
the Finnish electorate that the
present party leadership does
not enjoy snuiet su ort or "con-
fidence.' 25X1
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Western Hemisphere
UNREST CONTINUES IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Dominican provisional Presi-
dent Garcia Godoy has continued
his efforts to establish a broad
political base for his government
but has made little headway in
establishing authority over the
rebel zone.
After completing his cabinet
appointments with generally non-
controversial individuals, the
President filled a number of
lesser governmental positions
with representatives of partisan
groups. Included among these
are some 27 appointments of ques-
tionable character, many with
links to the extreme left
The rebel enclave in Santo
Domingo remains intact, and to
date only a small number of weap-
ons, have been turned over to
the government. The first of a
series of ceremonial returns of
weapons took place on 22 Septem-
ber. The weapons, mostly of large
caliber, were handed over to a
committee composed of the minis-
ter of interior and representa-
tives from the Dominican Army,
the OAS, and the UN. Many of
the arms that will be turned in
appear to be inoperative.
Meanwhile the rebel zone
continues to serve as a haven
for leftist agitators and Com-
munist-oriented propagandists.
The Communist-run newspaper
Patria, now the country's lead-
ing Gaily, continues its stri-
dent campaign against the Domini-
can military, moderate and con-
servative elements, and the
United States.
Leaders of the pro-Castro
14th of June Group (APCJ) re-
portedly feel that the provi-
sional government will allow
the Communist parties to work
openly and have accordingly re-
opened their headquarters in
downtown Santo Domingo..
Secondary-school students,
protesting the continued oc-
cupation of school buildings
by Inter-AmericanPeace Force
troops, demonstrated in front 25X1
of the national palace on 21 25X1
September. No injuries were
reported
Numerous reports continue
to indicate that former presi-
dent Juan Bosch will return to
the country on 25 September,
the second anniversary of his
overthrow. Although Bosch
fears for his personal safety,
he may feel that he cannot de-
lay further without losing his
political popularity. His re-
turn could easily upset the
tenuous truce now prevailing.
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Discontent with the Bolivian
junta's mine rehabilitation pro-
gram has erupted into battles be-
tween tin miners and security
forces at the Catavi - Siglo
Veinte mine complex. The trouble
began on 18 September when po-
lice attempted to arrest a num-
ber of extremist mine union lead-
ers. Two days later, miners at-
tacked a police outpost at Llal-
lagua and, in the ensuing melee
in which army reinforcements par-
ticipated, at least 28 persons
were killed and 85 wounded. Heavy
army patrols are preserving a
fragile peace in the Catavi,
Llallagua, and Uncia area.
Mine union leadership at
Catavi Siglo Veinte has passed
to extremists of the Trotskyite
Revolutionary Workers' Party
(POR), the party which is in
the forefront of agitation against
the junta. The center-right Bo-
livian Socialist Falange (FSB)
is also active at Catavi and,
Ihas formed
an alliance with the POR for
agitation in the mines.
i
Student sympathy for the min-
ers so far has taken the form of
declarations, strikes, and de-
nunciations of the junta. Ex-
pected street demonstrations
have thus far failed to materi-
alize, probably because most stu-
dent leaders are absent from uni-
versities attending a national
conference in Tarija. Student
discontent with the government
has increased over the past few
months, however, and the pos-
sibility of eventual street ac-
tion cannot be discounted.
All major political parties
have sharply denounced the junta's
actions but most parties are
split between those counseling
moderation and those who wish
to capitalize on the unrest to
provoke a political crisis.
Although it does not ap-
pear at this time that the junta
is in immediate danger of being
overthrown, stability is dete-
riorating. Much depends on the 25X1
future actions of tudents and
political parties.
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GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS IN BRAZIL ON 3 OCTOBER
The first direct guberna-
torial elections to be held in
Brazil since the present govern-
ment assumed power early last
year are scheduled for 3 October
in half the 22 states. President
Castello Branco's decision to al-
low elections against the advice
of hard-line radicals and a num-
ber of conservative political
leaders apparently reflects con-
fidence that the results will,
strengthen the regime.
The campaigns in most of
the 11 states are being based
primarily on local issues, and
the results are unlikely to have
much impact on national politics.
Those in two key states in the
south-central industrial region,
however, have wide-ranging politi-
cal implications.
By far the most important
contest is in Guanabara where
incumbent Governor Carlos La-
cerda's hand-picked man, Flexa.
Ribeiro, is strongly challenged
by a joint opposition candidate,
former ambassador Francisco Neg-
rao de Lima. The latter was
namea uy cne Labor and Social
Democratic (PSD) parties after
the government succeeded in hav-
ing two earlier "counterrevolu-
tionary" nominees disqualified.
A victory for Ribeiro would boost
presidential prospects for La-
cerda, who has bitterly opposed
many of the regime's policies
and about whom Castello Branco
has great reservations. A win
by Negrao de Lima, who is also
receiving Communist support,
would be to some extent a rejec-
tion of the revolution that brought
Castello Branco into office.
The race in Minas Gerais
is also important and promises
to be close. Governor Magalhaes
Pinto, another presidential hope-
ful, has engineered the nomina-
tion of his nephew Roberto Re-
sende, who faces the PSD's Israel
Pinheiro, an associate of former
President Kubitschek. An earlier
PSD nominee, whom the government
charged with corruption and who
was also closely linked with
Kubitschek, had been declared in-
eligible. Pinheiro represents
the free and easy style of poli-
tics that Brazil's current leader-
ship is determined to eradicate.
The administration has also
become directly involved in the
elections in Maranhao and Goias
states in an effort to break up
the tight political grip of
traditional ruling oligarchies.
The government seems to be play-
ing largely a passive role in
the other races, where most lead-
ing candidates appear to be moder-
ates who are in sympathy with
Castello Branco's policies.
The outcome of the guberna-
torial contests will influence
Castello Branco's plans for
next year's presidential elec-
tion. He has been considering
proposals for an indirect elec-
tion as a means of assuring that
his successor would be someone
who would continue the administra-
tion's programs. His bargaining
position vis-a-vis Lacerda, the
hard-liners, and the political par-
ties will be affected by the
re-
sults on 3 October.
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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN COLOMBIA
Colombian President Valencia,
denied special powers by Congress
to deal with the country's economic
problems, has issued decrees es-
tablishing a new exchange system,
a 20-percent surtax on 1964 in-
come, a development bond issuance
of almost $45 million, a compul-
sory bond purchase for those
obliged to pay the surtax, and a
surtax of 10 percent on 1965 in-
come. He also promulgated revi-
sions in the labor code which
were approved by a "Grand Com-
mission" created in January to
review labor problems.
The reaction of the vast
majority of the public seems at
the moment to be apathetic, al-
though those who will lose money
are opposed. and those hoping to
profit by the decrees are elated.
The new labor code helped stem
the wave of strikes that threat-
ened in the first half of Sep-
tember to paralyze the already
sluggish economy, but discontent
among workers and unemployed and
the fear of inflation indicate
that labor unrest is far from
over. Valencia still faces the
threat of Communist-incited
strikes and student demonstra-
tions that could be controlled
only by using troops.
Valencia last week also
stanched an incipient "revolt" by
the Liberal Party, partner of
Valencia's Conservative Party in
the National Front government.
Irate Liberal leaders had threat-
ened to pull their representatives
out of the cabinet and other ap-
pointive posts following attacks
on the party from the floor of
the Senate which Liberal leaders
blamed on Valencia.
Valencia's success with the
Liberals was supplemented by
the army's surprisingly rapid
move into Riochiquito, the moun-
tain stronghold of the Communist
bandit Tiro Fijo and his gang.
Troops took control of the
region in less than a week, but
the brigands are still at large
and could resume activity after
the army relaxes its vigilance.
In the remaining 11 months
of his term, Valencia can expect
a continuing series of major and
minor crises in his dealings with
labor, management, landowners,
coffee growers, and international
lending agencies. Furthermore,
he realizes that he is more vul-
nerable than ever to attacks from
his political opponents, who are
keen to discredit his administra-
tion as well al
reputation
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The adjournment of the Eighteen-
Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC)
meeting in Geneva on 16 September
ended the second phase of this
year's disarmament negotiations.
No real progress was made, either
by it or by the earlier session of
the UN Disarmament Commission, and
none is likely in the near future.
The Geneva session was never-
theless useful in clarifying some
of the problems involved in con-
trolling the spread of nuclear weap-
ons, limiting nuclear testing, and
reducing nuclear stockpiles. The
introduction of a draft nonprolifera-
tion treaty by the Western powers
and the Italian proposal that each
nonnuclear state unilaterally eschew
acquisition of nuclear weapons for
a specified period of time repre-
sented at least a beginning on these
problems. The Soviets made it clear
that one precondition to their ac-
ceptance of a nonproliferation
treaty would be abandonment of
plans for a NATO nuclear force.
The nonaligned members of the
ENDC were most interested in dis-
cussing a comprehensive test ban.
The eight countries in this group
support the UAR proposal for a ban
on nuclear tests above the threshold
of 4.75 on the Richter scale for
measuring seismic disturbances and
for a moratorium on all tests be-
low that threshold. The Soviets
have also endorsed this proposal,
which approaches Moscow's call for
an unpoliced ban on all underground
testing. In future disarmament
sessions the nonaligned coun-
tries may agree that advances have
been made in detection systems
which would lessen the need for on-
site inspection..
The next phase in disarmament
negotiations will be in the 20th
United Nations General Assembly
session which opened this week. The
Italians have made it clear that
they intend to submit their. pro-
posal to the assembly, even though
the chances for its acceptance are
small. The nonaligned countries
are increasingly reluctant to re-
linquish any chance of obtaining
nuclear weapons unless this self-
denial is tied to general and
complete disarmament, and India
has repeatedly maintained that se-
curity assurances must be given the
nonnuclear states. Their attention
may therefore shift to a compre-
hensive test-ban treaty as a way to
assure the nonaligned that the
"race" among the nuclear powers
will also be checked.
The assembly will also con-
sider the Yugoslav resolution--
left over from the UN Disarmament
Commission talks--which calls for
a world disarmament conference.
Such a conference is still highly
popular despite its attendant
problems, such as the role of Com-
munist China, the question of the
representation of divided states,
and the prospect of another round
of propaganda attacks between
East and West.
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