SPECIAL REPORT THE WARSAW PACT UNDER INTERNAL STRAINS

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CIA-RDP79-00927A005000070003-9
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RIPPUB
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S
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12
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December 20, 2016
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January 31, 2006
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3
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Publication Date: 
September 24, 1965
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REPORT
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OCI No. 0308,/65B. Copy N THE WARSAW PACT UNDER INTERNAL: STRAINS DIA review(s) completed. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927A00500007000II?9~iuded from autovgfic ifl _ Rn downgrading and declassification ease 2006/03/16 CIA-RDP79-00927'5~g0p7BPeqRb%r 1965 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05000070003-9 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05000070003-9 Approved For Relee9e 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AOO 00070003-9 SECRET THE WARSAW PACT UNDER INTERNAL STRAINS Ten years after its formation in May 1955, the Warsaw Pact is one of the few remaining instruments of effective Soviet control over Eastern Europe. It is however, subject to increasingly visible strains. Rumania desires to loosen its ties with the pact. Some Bulgarian officers also may have objected to Bulgaria's close association with the pact. High-level Polish officials are complaining about economic aspects of the pact, and the Hungarians are professing disinterest with regard to pact ob- jectives. These sentiments contrast with the sub- servient attitudes of East German and Czech leaders, but even they are unsure of Soviet commitment to their security in a crisis. None of the East Euro- pean regimes is likely to challenge openly in the near future Moscow's domination of the forces of the pact. However, the resentments now evident, whether directed by the East European regimes against the USSR or against each other, undermine the effectiveness of the pact. Moscow is undoubt- edly concerned about this trend and may be taking steps to counter it. More Than a Military Alliance? Originally a propaganda in- strument designed to counter West Germany's admission to NATO, the Warsaw Pact has grad- ually become a framework within which the armed forces of the USSR and the six active East Eu- ropean members have conducted combined training exercises us- ing relatively modern standardized equipment for the past five years. The Soviets have recently taken pains to emphasize that the pact consists of more than a military alliance. On the oc- casion of the pact's tenth an- niversary, Soviet Defense Minis- ter Malinovskiy asserted that the January 1965 meeting of its Po- litical Consultative Committee in Warsaw "convincingly proved" that "the friendship of the peoples, born in the joint strug- gle for freedom and happiness and sealed in the bloodshed in battles against the common enemy, continues to grow, ce- mented by the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism." He stated that contacts between personnel of the "friendly armies" in- creased every year, and called for the further development of these contacts, in order to make "our unity and strength more monolithic." Possibly in order to heighten the impression of unshakable unity, the Soviets have recently taken to revealing to Western ob- servers the identity of the na- tional representatives serving at pact headquarters in Moscow. At a Moscow reception on 23 Au- gust, Soviet Marshal Rotmistrov took the unprecedented step of SECRET Approved For RePM9 1006/OVWIt:IA44YOW009V4( -0060003-9 SE CRE T ~~,,~~pp ,,,e,,g~pp~pp,~pp~~~~pp WARSA` 'rf~i~ I Clb"tgtt/OH t6 IMnOj27C.LI1VI7V17~1YV-3-9 Marshal of Soviet Union ANDREY GRECHKO Commander in Chief Army General PAVEL BATOV Chief of Staff East European Representatives POLAND General of Division JAN SLIWINSKI HUNGARY An unidentified Colonel Other representatives unidentified Marshal of Soviet Union VLADIMIR SUDETS Commander in Chief of Air Defense Forces Warsaw Pact Deputy Commanders - The East European Defense Ministers Marshal of Poland Army General Army General Army General Army General Colonel General MARIAN SPYCHALSKI LEONTIN SALAJAN BOHUMIR LOMSKY DOBRI DZHUROV HEINZ HOFFMAN LAJOS CZINEGE POLAND RUMANIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA BULGARIA EAST GERMANY HUNGARY Warsaw Pact Representatives to East European Ministries of Defense Colonel General Lieutenant General Colonel General Colonel General Army General D. S. ZHEREBIN YE. T. MARCHENKO A. M. KUSHCHEV A. I. BAKSOV V. V. KURASOV POLAND RUMANIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA BULGARIA EAST GERMANY Colonel General P. G. SHAFRANOV HUNGARY 48868 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005 00070003-9 SECRET Approved For lease 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AP05000070003-9 SECRET identifying to the US Army at- tacho the senior Polish repre- sentative. In the presence of the Pole, General of Division Jan Sliwinski, Rotmistrov point- edly stated that although Poles and Soviets, may have their "nuances,' they are all Slavs who would close ranks in the face of any US attempt to play on these minor differences. Two days later the Hungarian mili- tary attache in Moscow told the US defense attache that the senior Hungarian officer assigned to Warsaw Pact Headquarters was a full colonel. Until now, the presence of these representatives has never been publicized by the Soviets Despite Moscow's efforts to make a convincing show of unity, there is increasing evi- dence that the pact has become less rather than more "mono- lithic" than formerly, that its ideological ties are weaker, and that relations between members are more often tense than "fra- ternal." The divisive tenden- cies in the pact are especially evident in the behavior of Ru- mania. Rumania and the Chain of Command According to the formal text of the Warsaw Pact, basic policy decisions, political as well as military, are supposed to be made in the Political Con- sultative Committee, in which each member technically has one vote. However, the actual cen- ter of military policy making is the Combined Armed Forces Comz mand, which remains under the firm control of Soviet Marshal Grechko, who is also second in command in the USSR Ministry of Defense. Grechko's deputies are the East European defense ministers . He often appears to bypass some or all of them in issuing or- chief, takes orders from Grechko, F..+ 3.. where Soviet Marshal Sudets, , Grechko in air defense matters This is particularly easy for representatives to the field ders through the Warsaw Pact cept Marshal Spychalski of Poland. Grechko probably ra- tionalizes these shortcuts as imperative to ensure timely compliance with his dir cti Pa Salajan and the new Ru- manian leader, Nicolae Ceausescu have also asserted their prerog- atives within the pact in other ways. Perhaps against Soviet wishes, the Rumanians willfully displayed their Scud surface- to-surface missiles in August 1963, almost a year before any other East European country. At the same time, they apparently ~3 SECRET Approve?P(freReleas#'M6gM/tVPOKRDF$-9-M6 5000070003-9 Aw Approved For lease 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05000070003-9 SECRET refused to make any serious ef- fort to improve their lackluster air defense, which would have been more constructive from the standpoint of the USSR. An ap- parently unilateral decision by Bucharest last October slashed the basic conscription term to 16 months, which has undoubtedly decreased the size of the Ru- manian ground forces--and in all likelihood the morale of the two- year Bulgarian, Rumanian, Czech, and Polish conscripts as well. In due course, the Rumanians will also probably seek greater contacts with the military es- tablishments of countries out- side the Warsaw Pact, particu- larly the Yugoslavs, Austrians, and French. Salajan may be promoted by Bucharest to the newly created rank of Marshal of Rumania, which would place him at the same level of rank as De- fense Minister Spychaiski of Poland--or even the USSR's Mali- novskiy and Grechko. The Bulgarian Coup ficials in the Armed Forces Main Political Administration. Soviet presidium member Suslov, the party's leading Bulgarian expert, was dispatched to Sofia in May, apparently to advise on tightening party discipline over the armed forces. Subsequently measures were taken to accom- plish this, including a vigorous propaganda campaign to arouse the loyalties of the services. The Main political Adminis- tration, in the pages of the army journal, Narodna Armi_a, continues to admonish officers to develop "high ideological awareness" and the realization that the summation of all Bul- garian military virtues is "loyalty to the party." A "mil- itary"department has been estab- lished in the central committee, the first such institution in any pact country. Bulgarian officers with World War II par- tisan backgrounds--and there- fore potentially nationalistic proclivities--have been passed over in recent general officer promotions. "Bourgeois Technic ism" The situation of Bulgaria is also unsatisfactory. Inas- much as the unsuccessful coup attempt against the Zhivk:ov re- gime last April was basically anti-Soviet, the coup also may have been directed against Bul- garia's close association with the Warsaw Pact. The group of Bulgarian political and military officials included the commander of the Sofia Garrison, General Anev, and two former high of- Information on the current political motivations of the Hungarian military establishment is spar ebut ne her the Kadar regime nor Moscow can have complete confidence in its loyalty. SECRET Approved Fora, 0eapfe 204j: ft79-Q( 9M 5?60070003-9 Approved For Rele a 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927A00SG00070003-9 SE CRE T Hungarian vs. Hungarian on Modern War 'For the imperialist states such a war would be unprogressive and unjust, and for the socialist countries --- possibly .including nonsocialist but anti-imperial- (Budapest), No. 5, 1965. ical Questions of Modern War,* Valosag ist and peace-loving countries --- it would be profoundly just.' --Lt. Colonel Jozsef Forizs, Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy, 'Concerning Several Theoret- In any case, Budapest ap- pears to mistrust the temper of the times. "Nationalism," said the chief of the agitation and propaganda group at a Hungarian army-party conference in June, "is the binding material for all hostile views." Although the Kadar regime has failed to indicate the extent of its dissatisfaction with the pact, it has long permitted some writers to state a revisionist position regarding international affairs. One of them, Gyorgy Konrad, labeled a "bourgeois technicist" by his most recent critic, Lt. Col.Forizs of the Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy, has argued that no purpose, least of all an ideological one, jus- tifies the risk of a major war in the nuclear age, and insisted that the leaders of the capitalist states realize this fully as well as their socialist counterparts. Konrad also believes that until the mutual suspicions pre- venting world disarmament recede, the present balance of deterrents, 'in general there is no international right or unwritten prohibition which might be valid in this mutual wildness... What will follow after the first day no strategist can calculate.' ---- Gyorgy Konrad, - 'The Anachronism of Modern War,' Valal sag (Budapest), No. 6, 1963 and No. 1, 1964. and not attempts by the socialist countries to achieve military su- periority, lessen the threat of direct military catastrophe. The publication of such views has not been permitted else- where within the pact. However, there has not been any indication on the official level of any open Hungarian dissidence within the pact in recent years. Polish Problems Frictions and difficulties of various kinds and degrees have also developed in plenty in the northern tier of the Warsaw Pact. W'ha t- Over issension these trends may have caused among the Polish mili- tary, it does not at present seem likely to become sufficiently SECRET Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005000070003-9 Page 5 SPECIAL REPORT 24 Sept 65 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005000070003-9 SECRET grave to cause the Poles to default on their current pact commitments. The main current Polish grievances appear to be focused on the qual- ity of military materiel furnished by the Soviets, the types of equipment allocated to each mem- ber's production capacity--i.e., defense contracts--and the finan- 25X1 cial contribution made by each member to the pact's maintenance. In view of continuing Soviet shipments to Eastern Europe of surface-to-surface missiles, su- personic jet fighters, and other 25X1 modern hardware, Polish charges that the Soviets furnish inferior equipment appear to be losing much of their validity. The significance of these disputes over equipment is dif- ficult to assess. They are per- haps an inevitable accompaniment to the operation of an organiza- tion such as the pact. There seems to be little doubt, how- ever, that in some cases the grievances are deep seated, and that some officers have con- cluded that Moscow wishes only to adorn Polish forces enough to invite NATO counterstrikes in the event of hostilities, thereby re- lieving the pressure on Soviet forces. East German Uncertainty Mistrust of Soviet purposes is also evident in the situation of East Germany with respect to the pact, to which the East Ger- man Army (excluding Border Guards) was subordinated in May 1958. The Soviets have directed a continual stream of equipment to the East German forces and have consistently sought to im- press the West with its presence. SECRET Approved &r F~elea ?MQ3/4?p -RDA',79 J27Ag05000070003-9 Approved For Rele'Me 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A005G@0070003-9 SECRET East German Troops in East Berlin Parade, 8 May 1965 'Military service in a partitioned country confronts our young soldiers with difficult political problems and demands a class attitude on such fundamental questions as the problem of war and peace, the national question, the question of the fatherland, and who is your friend and who is your enemy ?.'?---Heinz Hoffman, East German Defense Minister, in V Yedinom Stroyu (In a Single Formation), 1965. 25X1 the So- viets have encouraged East Ger- man, as well as Polish and Czech, commanders to expect to receive nuclear warheads in an all-out war with NATO. The Soviets thus appear to have at least some con- fidence in the East Germans. Yet the East German leaders do not always appear certain of the nature of the Soviet com- mitment to them. East German Deputy Foreign Minister Georg Stibi told a group of East and West German journalists on 30 August in effect that there is no guarantee by the Soviet Union to defend East Germany with nu- clear weapons--a remark censored from the East German press. the Warsaw Pact is now ere men oned in the Soviet status-of-forces agreements con- tracted with Poland on 17 December 1956, East Germany on 12 March SECRET Approved For Release 27006/031 6CIC-RDP79T0092JA00S660003-9 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005000070003-9 Ask SECRET 1957, Rumania on 15 April 1957 by any public hint from Prague (nullified by the withdrawal of that the country's national in- Soviet forces in May 1958), and terests diverge from those of the Hungary on 27 May 1957. This Ipact. contrasts with the NATO Status- of-Forces Agreement of June 1951 (supplemented in August 1959) which regulates the positioning of Western troops in Europe. The Balance Sheet Czechoslovakia: A Minority View Meanwhile the combination of Soviet missile and aircraft ship- ments and their own impressive armor and artillery production has given the Czechoslovaks the best equipped East European ground and tactical air force. The Czechoslovak exception notwithstanding,there can be lit- tle doubt that the prevailing disharmony in Warsaw Pact affairs, and the limitation this imposes on the utility of the pact forces, are a matter of concern to the Soviet Union. On 13 September, party leader Brezhnev referred to the need for "improving" the pact, suggesting that Moscow may have in mind some remedial changes in its organization. If the Novotny regime in Prague, Defense Minister Lomsky, or any high-ranking Czechoslovak officers have complaints against the Warsaw Pact, they have ex- pressed them most discreetly. An article by Lomsky in V Yedinom Stroyu (In a Single Formation), a book published in Moscow on the occasion of the pact's tenth anniversary, heaps fulsome praise on the pact, the Soviet Army, and the Soviet party. The adoption last year of a new uniform more in keeping with Czechoslovak national tradi- tions has not been accompanied the Soviets are aiming at closer integration, under their control, of the mili- tary and security forces of Po- land, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. The Soviets may promote the symbolic exchange of small contin among the three, al- though the Poles, in particular, wou have reservations about having East German troops as permanent guests. 25X1 25X1 SECRET Approveff@* Fz&Iea 2 03/RSP.(MA-RDPit94@927A?05000070003-9 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005 50070003-9 SECRET The Soviets can also ex- pect the enhancement of the net capabilities of the pact when the support pipeline presently under development--similar to the NATO pipeline--comes into operation. Over time, the con- structive effect of combined ex- ercises, which the Soviets prob- ably will hold more frequently than in the past, and which will employ improved coordination at command and staff levels, will also be felt. On balance, the Soviets probably hope that measures such as these will tend to keep the wayward tendencies of the pact members within bounds. Moscow probably has noted with satisfaction the steadiness of Czechoslovakia, where high-level complaints and expressions of dissatisfaction have been con- spicuously absent. The Soviets, moreover, may reason, probably with justification, that a major- ity of the top East European mili- tary still find most Soviet objec- tives compatible with their personal and national interests. For these reasons, the USSR's policy toward the pact will probably re- main the realistic one of making haste slowly, in the recognition 25X1 that at least some friction is inevitable in the life of an formal military alliance.1 SE CRE T Approved For Russ 6/q*Jfb RA- d ,00927AO-Qe5p020~750003-9 24 - Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05000070003-9 SECRET' SECRET Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05000070003-9