SPECIAL REPORT THE WARSAW PACT UNDER INTERNAL STRAINS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005000070003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 24, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

OCI No. 0308,/65B.
Copy N
THE WARSAW PACT UNDER INTERNAL: STRAINS
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THE WARSAW PACT UNDER INTERNAL STRAINS
Ten years after its formation in May 1955, the
Warsaw Pact is one of the few remaining instruments
of effective Soviet control over Eastern Europe. It
is however, subject to increasingly visible strains.
Rumania desires to loosen its ties with the pact.
Some Bulgarian officers also may have objected
to Bulgaria's close association with the pact.
High-level Polish officials are complaining about
economic aspects of the pact, and the Hungarians
are professing disinterest with regard to pact ob-
jectives. These sentiments contrast with the sub-
servient attitudes of East German and Czech leaders,
but even they are unsure of Soviet commitment to
their security in a crisis. None of the East Euro-
pean regimes is likely to challenge openly in the
near future Moscow's domination of the forces of
the pact. However, the resentments now evident,
whether directed by the East European regimes
against the USSR or against each other, undermine
the effectiveness of the pact. Moscow is undoubt-
edly concerned about this trend and may be taking
steps to counter it.
More Than a Military Alliance?
Originally a propaganda in-
strument designed to counter
West Germany's admission to
NATO, the Warsaw Pact has grad-
ually become a framework within
which the armed forces of the
USSR and the six active East Eu-
ropean members have conducted
combined training exercises us-
ing relatively modern standardized
equipment for the past five
years.
The Soviets have recently
taken pains to emphasize that
the pact consists of more than
a military alliance. On the oc-
casion of the pact's tenth an-
niversary, Soviet Defense Minis-
ter Malinovskiy asserted that the
January 1965 meeting of its Po-
litical Consultative Committee
in Warsaw "convincingly proved"
that "the friendship of the
peoples, born in the joint strug-
gle for freedom and happiness
and sealed in the bloodshed in
battles against the common
enemy, continues to grow, ce-
mented by the great ideas of
Marxism-Leninism and socialist
internationalism." He stated
that contacts between personnel
of the "friendly armies" in-
creased every year, and called
for the further development of
these contacts, in order to
make "our unity and strength
more monolithic."
Possibly in order to heighten
the impression of unshakable
unity, the Soviets have recently
taken to revealing to Western ob-
servers the identity of the na-
tional representatives serving
at pact headquarters in Moscow.
At a Moscow reception on 23 Au-
gust, Soviet Marshal Rotmistrov
took the unprecedented step of
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Marshal of Soviet Union
ANDREY GRECHKO
Commander in Chief
Army General
PAVEL BATOV
Chief of Staff
East European Representatives
POLAND General of Division JAN SLIWINSKI
HUNGARY An unidentified Colonel
Other representatives unidentified
Marshal of Soviet Union
VLADIMIR SUDETS
Commander in Chief
of
Air Defense Forces
Warsaw Pact Deputy Commanders - The East European Defense Ministers
Marshal of Poland Army General Army General Army General Army General Colonel General
MARIAN SPYCHALSKI LEONTIN SALAJAN BOHUMIR LOMSKY DOBRI DZHUROV HEINZ HOFFMAN LAJOS CZINEGE
POLAND RUMANIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA BULGARIA EAST GERMANY HUNGARY
Warsaw Pact Representatives to East European Ministries of Defense
Colonel General Lieutenant General Colonel General Colonel General Army General
D. S. ZHEREBIN YE. T. MARCHENKO A. M. KUSHCHEV A. I. BAKSOV V. V. KURASOV
POLAND RUMANIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA BULGARIA EAST GERMANY
Colonel General
P. G. SHAFRANOV
HUNGARY
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identifying to the US Army at-
tacho the senior Polish repre-
sentative. In the presence of
the Pole, General of Division
Jan Sliwinski, Rotmistrov point-
edly stated that although Poles
and Soviets, may have their "nuances,'
they are all Slavs who would close
ranks in the face of any US attempt to
play on these minor differences. Two
days later the Hungarian mili-
tary attache in Moscow told the
US defense attache that the
senior Hungarian officer assigned
to Warsaw Pact Headquarters was
a full colonel.
Until now, the presence of
these representatives has never
been publicized by the Soviets
Despite Moscow's efforts
to make a convincing show of
unity, there is increasing evi-
dence that the pact has become
less rather than more "mono-
lithic" than formerly, that its
ideological ties are weaker, and
that relations between members
are more often tense than "fra-
ternal." The divisive tenden-
cies in the pact are especially
evident in the behavior of Ru-
mania.
Rumania and the Chain of Command
According to the formal
text of the Warsaw Pact, basic
policy decisions, political as
well as military, are supposed
to be made in the Political Con-
sultative Committee, in which
each member technically has one
vote. However, the actual cen-
ter of military policy making
is the Combined Armed Forces Comz
mand, which remains under the
firm control of Soviet Marshal
Grechko, who is also second in
command in the USSR Ministry
of Defense.
Grechko's deputies are the
East European defense ministers
.
He often appears to bypass some
or all of them in issuing or-
chief, takes orders from Grechko,
F..+ 3..
where Soviet Marshal Sudets, ,
Grechko in air defense matters
This is particularly easy for
representatives to the field
ders through the Warsaw Pact
cept Marshal Spychalski of
Poland. Grechko probably ra-
tionalizes these shortcuts as
imperative to ensure timely
compliance with his dir cti Pa
Salajan and the new Ru-
manian leader, Nicolae Ceausescu
have also asserted their prerog-
atives within the pact in other
ways. Perhaps against Soviet
wishes, the Rumanians willfully
displayed their Scud surface-
to-surface missiles in August
1963, almost a year before any
other East European country.
At the same time, they apparently
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refused to make any serious ef-
fort to improve their lackluster
air defense, which would have
been more constructive from the
standpoint of the USSR. An ap-
parently unilateral decision by
Bucharest last October slashed
the basic conscription term to
16 months, which has undoubtedly
decreased the size of the Ru-
manian ground forces--and in all
likelihood the morale of the two-
year Bulgarian, Rumanian, Czech,
and Polish conscripts as well.
In due course, the Rumanians
will also probably seek greater
contacts with the military es-
tablishments of countries out-
side the Warsaw Pact, particu-
larly the Yugoslavs, Austrians,
and French. Salajan may be
promoted by Bucharest to the
newly created rank of Marshal of
Rumania, which would place him
at the same level of rank as De-
fense Minister Spychaiski of
Poland--or even the USSR's Mali-
novskiy and Grechko.
The Bulgarian Coup
ficials in the Armed Forces
Main Political Administration.
Soviet presidium member Suslov,
the party's leading Bulgarian
expert, was dispatched to Sofia
in May, apparently to advise on
tightening party discipline over
the armed forces. Subsequently
measures were taken to accom-
plish this, including a vigorous
propaganda campaign to arouse
the loyalties of the services.
The Main political Adminis-
tration, in the pages of the
army journal, Narodna Armi_a,
continues to admonish officers
to develop "high ideological
awareness" and the realization
that the summation of all Bul-
garian military virtues is
"loyalty to the party." A "mil-
itary"department has been estab-
lished in the central committee,
the first such institution in
any pact country. Bulgarian
officers with World War II par-
tisan backgrounds--and there-
fore potentially nationalistic
proclivities--have been passed
over in recent general officer
promotions.
"Bourgeois Technic ism"
The situation of Bulgaria
is also unsatisfactory. Inas-
much as the unsuccessful coup
attempt against the Zhivk:ov re-
gime last April was basically
anti-Soviet, the coup also may
have been directed against Bul-
garia's close association with
the Warsaw Pact. The group of
Bulgarian political and military
officials included the commander
of the Sofia Garrison, General
Anev, and two former high of-
Information on the current
political motivations of the
Hungarian military establishment
is spar ebut
ne her
the Kadar regime nor Moscow can
have complete confidence in its
loyalty.
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Hungarian vs. Hungarian on Modern War
'For the imperialist states such a war
would be unprogressive and unjust, and
for the socialist countries --- possibly
.including nonsocialist but anti-imperial-
(Budapest), No. 5, 1965.
ical Questions of Modern War,* Valosag
ist and peace-loving countries --- it
would be profoundly just.' --Lt. Colonel
Jozsef Forizs, Miklos Zrinyi Military
Academy, 'Concerning Several Theoret-
In any case, Budapest ap-
pears to mistrust the temper of
the times. "Nationalism," said
the chief of the agitation and
propaganda group at a Hungarian
army-party conference in June,
"is the binding material for all
hostile views."
Although the Kadar regime
has failed to indicate the extent
of its dissatisfaction with the
pact, it has long permitted some
writers to state a revisionist
position regarding international
affairs. One of them, Gyorgy
Konrad, labeled a "bourgeois
technicist" by his most recent
critic, Lt. Col.Forizs of the
Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy,
has argued that no purpose, least
of all an ideological one, jus-
tifies the risk of a major war
in the nuclear age, and insisted
that the leaders of the capitalist
states realize this fully as well
as their socialist counterparts.
Konrad also believes that
until the mutual suspicions pre-
venting world disarmament recede,
the present balance of deterrents,
'in general there is no international right
or unwritten prohibition which might be
valid in this mutual wildness... What will
follow after the first day no strategist can
calculate.' ---- Gyorgy Konrad, - 'The
Anachronism of Modern War,' Valal sag
(Budapest), No. 6, 1963 and No. 1, 1964.
and not attempts by the socialist
countries to achieve military su-
periority, lessen the threat of
direct military catastrophe.
The publication of such
views has not been permitted else-
where within the pact. However,
there has not been any indication
on the official level of any open
Hungarian dissidence within the
pact in recent years.
Polish Problems
Frictions and difficulties
of various kinds and degrees
have also developed in plenty in
the northern tier of the Warsaw
Pact.
W'ha t-
Over
issension these trends may
have caused among the Polish mili-
tary, it does not at present seem
likely to become sufficiently
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grave to cause the Poles to default
on their current pact commitments.
The main current Polish grievances
appear to be focused on the qual-
ity of military materiel furnished
by the Soviets, the types of
equipment allocated to each mem-
ber's production capacity--i.e.,
defense contracts--and the finan-
25X1 cial contribution made by each
member to the pact's maintenance.
In view of continuing Soviet
shipments to Eastern Europe of
surface-to-surface missiles, su-
personic jet fighters, and other
25X1 modern hardware, Polish charges
that the Soviets furnish inferior
equipment appear to be losing much
of their validity.
The significance of these
disputes over equipment is dif-
ficult to assess. They are per-
haps an inevitable accompaniment
to the operation of an organiza-
tion such as the pact. There
seems to be little doubt, how-
ever, that in some cases the
grievances are deep seated, and
that some officers have con-
cluded that Moscow wishes only
to adorn Polish forces enough to
invite NATO counterstrikes in the
event of hostilities, thereby re-
lieving the pressure on Soviet
forces.
East German Uncertainty
Mistrust of Soviet purposes
is also evident in the situation
of East Germany with respect to
the pact, to which the East Ger-
man Army (excluding Border Guards)
was subordinated in May 1958.
The Soviets have directed
a continual stream of equipment
to the East German forces and
have consistently sought to im-
press the West with its presence.
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East German Troops in East Berlin Parade, 8 May 1965
'Military service in a partitioned country confronts our young soldiers
with difficult political problems and demands a class attitude on such
fundamental questions as the problem of war and peace, the national
question, the question of the fatherland, and who is your friend and
who is your enemy ?.'?---Heinz Hoffman, East German Defense Minister,
in V Yedinom Stroyu (In a Single Formation), 1965.
25X1
the
So-
viets have encouraged
East
Ger-
man, as well as Polish
and
Czech,
commanders to expect to receive
nuclear warheads in an all-out
war with NATO. The Soviets thus
appear to have at least some con-
fidence in the East Germans.
Yet the East German leaders
do not always appear certain of
the nature of the Soviet com-
mitment to them. East German
Deputy Foreign Minister Georg
Stibi told a group of East and
West German journalists on 30
August in effect that there is
no guarantee by the Soviet Union
to defend East Germany with nu-
clear weapons--a remark censored
from the East German press.
the Warsaw Pact is
now ere men oned in the Soviet
status-of-forces agreements con-
tracted with Poland on 17 December
1956, East Germany on 12 March
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1957, Rumania on 15 April 1957 by any public hint from Prague
(nullified by the withdrawal of that the country's national in-
Soviet forces in May 1958), and terests diverge from those of the
Hungary on 27 May 1957. This Ipact.
contrasts with the NATO Status-
of-Forces Agreement of June 1951
(supplemented in August 1959)
which regulates the positioning
of Western troops in Europe.
The Balance Sheet
Czechoslovakia: A Minority View
Meanwhile the combination of
Soviet missile and aircraft ship-
ments and their own impressive
armor and artillery production
has given the Czechoslovaks the
best equipped East European ground
and tactical air force.
The Czechoslovak exception
notwithstanding,there can be lit-
tle doubt that the prevailing
disharmony in Warsaw Pact affairs,
and the limitation this imposes on
the utility of the pact forces,
are a matter of concern to the
Soviet Union. On 13 September,
party leader Brezhnev referred
to the need for "improving" the
pact, suggesting that Moscow may
have in mind some remedial changes
in its organization.
If the Novotny regime in
Prague, Defense Minister Lomsky,
or any high-ranking Czechoslovak
officers have complaints against
the Warsaw Pact, they have ex-
pressed them most discreetly.
An article by Lomsky in V Yedinom
Stroyu (In a Single Formation),
a book published in Moscow on
the occasion of the pact's tenth
anniversary, heaps fulsome praise
on the pact, the Soviet Army, and the
Soviet party. The adoption last year
of a new uniform more in keeping
with Czechoslovak national tradi-
tions has not been accompanied
the Soviets are
aiming at closer integration,
under their control, of the mili-
tary and security forces of Po-
land, Czechoslovakia, and East
Germany. The Soviets may promote
the symbolic exchange of small
contin among the three, al-
though
the Poles, in particular, wou
have reservations about having
East German troops as permanent
guests.
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The Soviets can also ex-
pect the enhancement of the net
capabilities of the pact when
the support pipeline presently
under development--similar to
the NATO pipeline--comes into
operation. Over time, the con-
structive effect of combined ex-
ercises, which the Soviets prob-
ably will hold more frequently
than in the past, and which will
employ improved coordination at
command and staff levels, will
also be felt.
On balance, the Soviets
probably hope that measures
such as these will tend to keep
the wayward tendencies of the
pact members within bounds.
Moscow probably has noted with
satisfaction the steadiness of
Czechoslovakia, where high-level
complaints and expressions of
dissatisfaction have been con-
spicuously absent. The Soviets,
moreover, may reason, probably
with justification, that a major-
ity of the top East European mili-
tary still find most Soviet objec-
tives compatible with their personal
and national interests. For
these reasons, the USSR's policy
toward the pact will probably re-
main the realistic one of making
haste slowly, in the recognition 25X1
that at least some friction is
inevitable in the life of an
formal military alliance.1
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