WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3
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RIPPUB
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S
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48
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December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 20, 2008
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1
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Publication Date: 
February 4, 1966
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
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Approved GRQUR f ;Exttud~d froth QLtdrpatt cowngrgdirr~ and dt ia5if,catrgn!. Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 c py .'o. 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 `We SECRET *MW (Information as of noon EST, 3 February 1966) VIETNAM Three large allied operations have so far failed to engage any large main force Communist units, although small unit actions in one operation have resulted in mounting enemy casualties. Elsewhere, the intensity of VC-initiated activity picked up last weekend. Premier Ky plans to reorganize his cabinet and staff for greater efficiency. Ho Chi Minh, in an attack on the US peace initiative, insisted that the National Liberation Front must be recognized as the sole repre- sentative of the South Vietnamese people. Hanoi also quickly denounced both the resumption of US airstrikes and the US effort to bring Vietnam to the UN. Although both Moscow and Peking did likewise, the Chinese were clearly more pleased with Hanoi''s show of determination. Four US aircraft were lost in the first two days of renewed strikes in the North. A new airfield is under construction near Yen Bai. Page The Communist World SOVIET CONSERVATIVES SEEK REFURBISHING OF STALIN'S IMAGE 5 A recent Pravda article is the latest evidence of a cautious u etermined effort to halt public con- demnation of Stalin and his era,, However, the called- for rewrite of Soviet history is unlikely to convince the USSR's new generation of young intellectuals. SOVIET COMMISSION TO REVAMP COLLECTIVE FARM CHARTER By associating virtually the entire party elite with the commission's stated purpose of revising the col- lective farm charter, party first secretary Brezhnev apparently intends to commit them to the achievement of substantial improvement in agricultural production. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET SOVIET INDIVIDUAL INFANTRY WEAPONS The USSR has developed for its infantry a family of light individual assault weapons combining simplicity of design, reliability, accuracy at common ranges, and high rates of fire. It has also succeeded in standardiz- ing on a single type of short, lightweight cartridge for most of these weapons. Although not providing the long-range power of most Western counterparts, the wea- pons and cartridge are more effective at the shorter ranges characteristic of modern, mobile infantry warfare. ALBANIA SEARCHES FOR FRIENDS The Hoxha regime may be seeking friendlier relations with some Soviet bloc and Western countries, either in the belief this will make lobbying for Communist China more effective or, conversely, as a matter of prudence incase relations with Peking become unpalatable. INTERNAL SECURITY EFFORTS BOOSTED IN SOUTH KOREA 8 South Korea is showing renewed interest in its security against actions by the Communist North. RUMORS OF INDONESIAN "POLITICAL SETTLEMENT" CONTINUE 9 Civilian anti-Communist leaders are reported fesrfuJ. that Sukarno plans an imminent and dramatic political reorganization, and that the army's resistance is weakening. BURMESE INSURGENCY AT A HIGH LEVEL Various ethnic and Communist insurgent bands are becoming increasingly bold and aggressive in many parts of Burma. ZAMBIA APPARENTLY DELAYING TRADE BREAK WITH RHODESIA 12 The arrival of a UK military planning mission and the success of an emergency petroleum supply operation seem to have renewed President Kaunda's confidence in the UK's determination to bring down the rebel Rhodesian regime. MILITARY REGIME BEGINS RECONSTRUCTION IN NIGERIA 13 General Ironsi has taken some promising steps toward giving Nigeria more efficient government and is continu- ing to try to avoid arousing tribal animosities. SECRET Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 66 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 SECRET %ftw ETHIOPIAN ELITE AGAIN VOICING DISCONTENT 14 The coup in Nigeria stimulated grumbling among Ethiopia's educated elite, but the Emperor appears unready to satisfy their desire for reform. Europe ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS CONTINUES The composition of the new Moro cabinet is likely to prove the major obstacle to an, early solution of Italy's government crisis. SETTLEMENT OF EEC CRISIS LEAVES ISSUES UNRESOLVED Although De Gaulle appears to have fallen short of obtaining his maximum demands, prospects for resump- tion of normal functioning do not appear bright. French reservations play havoc with the assumption that integration is irreversible and seem likely to encourage efforts to revive Britain's interest in membership. DEVELOPMENTS IN NATO NATO seems to have come through the past year relatively well, weathering but not surmounting two very critical issues: France's threat to withdraw in 1969, and the problem of nuclear sharing. There has been, in fact, a noticeable trend toward coalescence on the part of the other 14 members in standing up to France. On the nuclear issue, most of the members have breathed a col- lective sigh of relief that the problem of creating a multiiaterai ~Fnrce is tem orar:il on i.ce. Western Hemisphere DOMINICAN CRISIS APPEARS NEAR CLIMEX The political impasse in the Dominican Republic seems to be nearing a climax, with President Garcia Godoy willing to make extensive concessions in the hope of avoiding a final showdown with the regular military. SECRET Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 SECRET POLITICAL MACHINATIONS OF BOLIVIAN JUNTA PRESIDENT 19 Although Ovando professes to support former co-president Barrientos' presidential candidacy, he is reportedly working behind the scenes to block it. SECRET Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 %NW SECRET _Wv Three large allied operations in Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, and the Phuoc Tuy - Bien Hoa border area --employing some 15,000 to 16,000 combat troops--highlighted the mil- itary situation this week in South Vietnam. Thus far, the main force Communist units (estimated at seven or eight regiments in all three areas) have attempted to avoid con- tact. A prisoner taken in Binh Dinh Province indicated that one North Vietnamese unit in the area had split temporarily into small groups to evade allied forces. Occasional resistance by Com- munist units of company size has been reported in Binh Dinh Province, however, and enemy casualties there continue to mount. Little fight- ing has developed from operations in Quang Ngai and the Phuoc Tuy - Bien Hoa area but enemy supplies and other evidence point to the re- cent presence of Communist forces. Cumulative Viet Cong losses in these operations are reported as 766 killed and 168 captured. Al- lied casualties are 136 killed (79 US) and 561 wounded (372 US). A longer term security and rice-harvesting operation in Phu Yen Province, in progress for about two weeks, has also taken a steady toll. To date over 300 Communists have been reported killed. Allied casualties total 35 killed (7 US) and 121 wounded (48 US). The intensity of Viet Cong - initiated activity picked up last weekend. A government relief force, dispatched to an outpost under at- tack in Quang Ngai Province, was itself heavily engaged on 28 Janu- ary. Resulting government losses totaled 130. Elsewhere, a Viet Cong battalion attacked government forces in Chuong Thien Province, and some ten smaller enemy attacks were also reported in the delta area south of Saigon. South Vietnam's Political Situation Premier Ky recently told a US official that he is planning to re- organize his cabinet and personal staff this month. In an effort to deal with major economic problems, he will split the present Ministry of Economy into separate ministries for foreign trade and for internal economic affairs. Four additional appointees to Ky's own staff will deal more efficiently with prob- lems of corruption, refugees, Viet Cong defectors, and port operations. Ky has indicated that he will choose native southerners for these positions to counter charges that his government is overly influ- enced by native northerners. Hanoi on US Initiatives North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh attacked the US peace in- itiative on 24 January and under- scored the importance that North Vietnam attaches to the participa- tion of the Liberation Front in any negotiated settlement. In one of the most straightforward assertions made publicly by a North Vietnamese leader, Ho insisted that the US "recognize the Front as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam and engage in negotiations with it." He also promised to "continue the fight as long as US forces remain in Viet- nam." His language implied that these two elements represented SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET / Da Laf V,ETNA M ,Athan Rang Phan Thie& ~% - SRI(k3N The Indochina -South 'China Area .__ 'South Vietnamese military bounuerles SECRET gth Division c 'I Rung Sat Special Zone (VNN) Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Nd i TN ` ,.a ... ~ 4an8 ~,mg.hs~ng L A 0 S t. yl, ~TMAM ~CA Sha Okuan ti,f 2 _ 'L'. Cho, WUChC.j \ Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET W preconditions to any talks. Ho's letter, addressed specifically to North Vietnam's Communist allies, may also have been intended to pro- vide some amplification of the DRV's terms for negotiations in the hopes of getting more effective support,particularly from European Communist party circles. In separate Foreign Ministry statements published on 1 February, Hanoi also quickly denounced both the resumption of US air strikes and the US effort to bring the Viet- nam problem to the UN. The DRV said that any UN Security Council resolution "which interfered with the Vietnam problem was null and void." The denunciation of the air strikes reinforced Ho's tough talk about troop withdrawal, main- taining that the US "must uncon- ditionally" withdraw its troops and weapons from South Vietnam." The language implies that Hanoi will not be satisfied with any par- tial US pullout as a prelude to a political settlement. Peking Propaganda The Chinese were clearly pleased by Ho's tough letter of 24 January and endorsed it immediately after the Vietnamese made the text public on 28 January. Peking not only repeated the full text, but added an appendix, not included in the Vietnamese re- lease, containing Phan Van Dong's "four points" of last April. The Chinese probably used this device to emphasize the importance of these demands--reportedly regarded by Chinese leaders as an effective obstacle to any negotiations. On 30 January, a People's Daily editorial hailed Ho s letter as new evidence of the "steel-like determination" of the Vietnamese to carry the struggle through to the end. The editorial declared flatly that "there is no room for bargain- ing" with regard to Hanoi's four- point formula or the status of the Liberation Front. It asserted that the Front "assumes and plays the role of the state organ in South Vietnam," a. declaration that moved Peking further toward open endorse- ment of the Front as a government. It was also a more forthright claim of status for the Front than any- thing either Hanoi or Front repre- sentatives have released in public. Chairman Liu Shao-chi's reply also stressed Chinese confidence in Hanoi's determination. Liu's pledge that the Chinese people will stand by the Vietnamese in a "joint struggle" no matter what the US may do was a repetition of generalized promises Peking has been making since last fall. The Chinese responded to re- sumption of bombing attacks against North Vietnam with renewed attacks on US duplicity, charging that the air strikes were a "reckless" reac- tion to the failure of the US "peace hoax." A People's Daily edi- torial on 1 February asserted that the US "is at its wits'end on the Vietnam question and is vainly seek- ing to get out of its predicament by means of war expansion." On 2 February, Peking reacted to the US proposal that the Vietnam question be put to the UN Security Council by reiterating the Communist posi- tion that the UN has "nothing to do" with the Vietnam problem, which could only be settled in accordance with the "spirit" of the Geneva agreements --a.s interpreted by Hanoi's "four points." SECRET Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET Moscow's Support for Hanoi Soviet President Podgorny's 1 February reply to Ho's letter adhered closely to standard lines, condemning "US aggression" and reaffirming Soviet pledges of po- litical and material support. A 31 January government statement claimed the resumption of US at- tacks showed that Washington's diplomatic moves are "aimed at misleading world opinion and preparing for further escalation." TASS promptly reported Ha- noi's opposition to UN involve- ment and in a 1 February speech at the UN, Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko predictably objected to Security Council discussion. Echoing the North Vietnamese statement, Fedorenko criticized the request for UN action as a "diversionary tactic designed to hide plans to expand the war." On 2 February, Pravda denounced the US move as a arce" per- petrated by those who are really responsible for the war, and who know very well that the "UN has nothing to do with the Vietnam- ese problem." DRV Military Developments US aircraft resumed the at- tack against North Vietnam on 31 January, hitting the main road network in the southern part of North Vietnam. Targets included bridges, road intersections, rolling stock, barges, and vehi- cles. Four US aircraft were lost to enemy ground fire during the first two days, bringing the total number of US aircraft lost over North Vietnam to 194. A new airfield is under con- ruction near Yen Bai the final runway will be approxi- mately 6,600 feet long. When completed, this airfield will probably be jet capable. Air- craft based here would be in a better position to defend the northwestern areas of North Viet- y US aircra nam against in over Laos from Thailand. SECRET' Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY iil? f t f l 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 *00 SECRET SOVIET CONSERVATIVES SEEK REFURBISHING OF STALIN'S IMAGE A cautious but determined effort to halt the public con- demnation of Stalin and his era has been in evidence in the So- viet Union since last March. Another step in this process was taken by Pravda last week in an article on Soviet historiography signed by Yevgeny Zhukov, lead- ing historian of the Academy of Sciences, and two of his col- leagues. The article calls for a new version of Soviet history that will emphasize the "enor- mous successes" achieved by the regime in the half century since the revolution, playing down the cost in human suffering. The authors make it plain that the purpose is not to achieve "objective" history as this term is understood in the West, but rather a history that will help the party mold an obedient population. The article calls for less discussion of what went wrong under Stalin and attacks "cer- tain" colleagues for having paid tribute in the recent past to "unprincipled opportunism"--an apparent reference to Khrushchev's use of de-Stalinization as a po- litical weapon to beat back oppo- sition to his policies. By dis- cussing--however obliquely--both Khrushchev and Stalin for the first time in the same article, Pravda raises the possibility that So- viet historians will tend to polarize around the opposing sym- bols of these two leaders. The top leaders now in the Kremlin have yet to comment pub- licly on how Stalin and his era should be viewed. The official historians who wrote the Pravda article, however, are the latest addition to a growing chorus of low-level party secretaries, Komsomol leaders, ranking mili- tary officers, and ideological and cultural, officials who de- mand the public discussion of unpleasant aspects of the So- viet past and present be halted on the ground that it breeds cynicism in the younger genera- tion. The difficulty with the ap- proach being followed by these guardians of the party's image arises from the fact that a higher level of education is.re- quired of the new generation. To- day's young intellectuals, who refer contemptuously to conform- ists as "ideological comrades" and "patriots," are unlikely to be convinced by oversimplified historiesand suppression of criticism. Therefore, even though the conservative forces have be- come more vocal in the past year, their proposed solution appears to hold little promise of success. SECRET Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET SOVIET COMMISSION TO REVAMP COLLECTIVE FARM CHARTER A 149-man commission has been formed under the chairmanship of party first secretary Brezhnev to draft a new statute for the USSR's 18,000 collective farms (kolkliozes). The commission not only includes all 24 members of the party presidium and secretariat, but regional party secretaries and top agriculture officials as well. Brezhnev appar- ently intends by this move to associate virtually the entire party elite with revision of the collec- tive farmcharter, thereby committing them to the achievement of substan- tial improvements in agricultural production. The need for revising the existing collective farm "model charter"--actually a set of statutes issued in 1935 with the force of law--has long been recognized. Khrushchev called the statutes ob- solete. He talked much of the need for revising them and of convening a new collective farm congress to do so. but repeatedly postponed the matter. Brezhnev and his cohorts are clearly prepared to substitute action for words, and to institute some reforms while at the same time keeping the basic collective farm system intact. At the central committee plenum on agriculture last March, Brezhnev said the statutes would be revised, and to this end announced that an All-Union Collec- tive Farm Congress, the third in Soviet history, would be convened some time this year. The new charter will prob- ably incorporate a number of changes already being proposed to make the collective farm a more vi- able economic entity. Certain steps have already been taken in recent years to raise collective farm in- comes, but if the hostility of col- lective members toward the kolkhoz organization is to be overcome, some method of distributing income will have to be devised that guar- antees the individual farmer a fair return for his labor. A system of guaranteed wages plus bonuses seems likely to be adopted. Many other suggestions have been advanced to promote a sense of personal commitment and responsibil- ity. The new leadership has given evidence by its industrial reform that it recognizes the need to promote local initiative and is prepared, within limits, to do some- thing about it Under the existing system, the collective farms have almost no power to make independent decisions, and some improvements may be attempted in this respect. The new regime has already reversed Khrushchev's policy of further re- stricting private plots, and addi- tional steps to provide support for the private sector may be taken. The announcement of the commis- sion's existence included the nota- tion that local bodies have been drafting suggestions for considera- tion, further evidence that the regime intends to carry through with the agricultural program announced by Brezhnev last March. Since that time, he has made it quite clear that in spite of problems and critics, the program continues to be regarded as a priority policy of the party and government. SECRET Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 SECRET Albania's leadership may be ending its self-imposed iso- lation by seeking friendlier re- lations with some Soviet bloc and Western countries. The Hoxha regime may believe that this will make it more effective as a lobbyist in behalf of its ally and benefactor, Communist China. On the other hand, the regime also may believe it prudent to establish broader ties in case relations with Peking become un- palatable. Since its break with Moscow in 1961, Tirana has relied al- most solely on Peking to sustain Albania's industrialization pro- gram and for political support. This led to strained relations with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and increased Al- bania's isolation from the West. In recent months, however, Albania seems to have shown will- ingness to improve relations with selected Communist countries. Tirana has, for example, responded positively to several Rumanian gestures of friendship. In ad- dition, the recent renewal of ambassadorial-level contact with Poland may signal closer rela- tions with that country. Albania had always left the door open for such an action, having never permanently pulled its ambassa- dor out of Warsaw. Albania has also turned a friendlier face toward the West. In a recent interview with a Turkish journalist, Albanian Foreign Minister Shtylla stated there were no problems in Turk- ish-Albanian relations and, not- ing that different political sys- tems should not prevent them from 'being friends, urged conclusion of cultural and trade agreements. A French-Albanian cultural program has included an exchange of professors and the establish- ment of a French chair at the University of Tirana. Italy and Albania signed a cultural accord last March, and there are plans to establish an Albanian commer-' cial office in Italian Trieste. Austria and Albania plan an in- crease in the exchange of goods for 1966. Albania still maintains com- plete solidarity with Peking and there have been no indications that a deterioration of relations is imminent. There have been rumors, however, that Albania has not been entirely satisfied with the amount and quality of aid received from Peking. The protracted Sino-Albanian negotiations last fall on credits for Tirana's economic plan (1966- 70) suggested that the Chinese might have been reluctant to meet Albania's requests fully. Unprec- edentedly, the Albanian parlia- ment, when it met in late Decem- ber, debated but did not approve either the 1966 national budget or the new five-year plan. Nei- ther is yet approved. The par- 25X1 liament's delay may be due to incomplete negotiations with Peking. SEC'RET' Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET South Korea is showing re- newed interest in its security against actions by the Commu- nist North. Recent Communist activity appears to have been adapted to meet the new situation result- ing from the normalization of Japanese - South Korean rela- tions and the deployment of Ko- rean troops to South Vietnam. There has been no startling in- crease in infiltrations from the North--170 agents were ap- prehended in 1965--but there have been significant. changes in agent personnel and in their missions. The chances for genuine guerrilla activity appear slim. Only small amounts of arms and ammunition have been uncovered, and the South Korean people con- tinue their deep-seated opposi- tion to Communism. Korean authorities do not want to be caught napping, how- ever. They reportedly plan to reinforce the blockade of coastal and land penetration routes, in- tensify operational measures against agents, and establish village-level organizations to foster cooperation among the military, the government, and the people. They also intend to take measures to stem agent infiltration from Japan and to Lighten up the Citizen's Regis- tration Law. The police plan to organize a Special Counter- Guerrilla Fighting Force and have been promised a 7,000-man increase over their present total of nearly 34,000. The major drawback to ef- fective internal security up to now has been lack of coordina- tion among the concerned agen- cies. At one time, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)--then headed by present Democratic Republican Party SECRET Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 MW SECRET `'0 chairman Kim Chong-pil--super- seded all other services. With the new emphasis on coordnation, however, the CIA has inaugurated an Armed Forces Situation Room where intelligence representa- tives of all services and the police monitor the activities of suspected North Korean agents around the clock. Rumors are continuing to circulate in Djakarta regarding President Sukarno's long-awaited "political settlement." Some civilian anti-Commu- nist leaders are expressing alarm over what they consider to be Sukarno's growing strength and the erosion of the army's will to resist. They fear that Su- karno now is planning an immi- nent and dramatic political re- organization that would in large part restore his former author- ity, undermine anti-Communist elements, and pave the way for an eventual restoration of Com- munist influence in Indonesia. Sukarno, however, has been delaying any such direct move, apparently in the belief that his position can best be restored by a more gradual approach and the passage of time. Aware that the future role of Indonesian Communism is the one issue on which the army has been willing to oppose him directly, Sukarno has recently been ignoring the subject. This strategy has in- deed strengthened his position during the past month, and it 25X1 seems unlikely that he wishes to risk a direct confrontation with the army now. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET CIi INA J 'BHLUTAN Bru~~Mair IN1)1A -)PAKISTAN` Imphal0 0l ?/cca ` .^ ??} f.. Akyab~ (Falam Sagaing~ Qi '1y .y -r Yenangyaung THAILAND LAOS j COCO CROUP BURMA Principal Areas of Operation and Strengths of Major Insurgent Groups O 10o MILES SECRET Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 BANGKOK s~ . Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET BURMESE INSURGENCY AT A HIGH LEVEL Various ethnic and Communist insurgent bands are becoming in- creasingly bold and aggressive in many parts of Burma. Although insurgency--endemic in Burma since World War II --normally mounts at the end the southwest monsoon season in October, an unusually high level of activity appears to have de- veloped over the past three months. Rebels are impeding the government's inept commodity dis- tribution efforts, causing un- certainty among farmers both by intimidation and by spreading rumors about the government, and are attacking transportation and communications arteries. In late December, Communist- dominated National Democratic United Front rebels raided a railway station and police post about 40 miles north of Pegu on the Rangoon-Mandalay railway. In one of the more recent inci- dents, unidentified insurgents reportedly seized two armories, one of which was at a police station in Rangoon. Active ethnic insurgents include some 4,500 Karens, 4,500 Kachins, and possibly 5,000 Shans. The most serious threat, however, is posed by some 1,000 hard-core activists of the Burma Communist Party, known as the White Flags and having links with Peking. General Ne Win's efforts 25X1 to cope with insurgency report- edly are being hampered by de- sertions and defections among government forces. an en- ire light-infant ry battalion stationed near Rangoon, one of the army's elite units, deserted in late November after being ordered into operation against Communist insurgents near Pegu. The Ne Win regime is not cur- rently endangered, however, mainly because of the insurgents' lack of unity and inability to muster any appreciable popular support. SECRET T Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 SECRET ZAMBIA APPARENTLY DELAYING TRADE BREAK WITH RHODESIA The Zambian Government is apparently no longer insisting on immediate participation in a total economic blockade of Rhodesia. This change in atti- tude came after the arrival of a UK military planning mission and the success of the emergency petroleum transport operation in delivering enough supplies to satisfy Zambia's normal needs. These developments appar- ently renewed Zambian confidence in the UK's determination to bring down the rebel Rhodesian regime. Zambian President Kaunda now appears willing to delay the threatened trade break with Rhodesia beyond the 15 February deadline he re- portedly agreed upon with Prime Minister Wilson. should Rhodesian imports be stopped, adequate transport fa- cilities to fill Zambia's mini- mum requirements would not be available at least until mid- April. Zambia's decision as to the type and timing of its sanc- tions against Rhodesia depends on its continued faith in UK policy. Should the oil embargo be broken or Rhodesian tobacco and other goods find an outlet, a rapid reversal in Zambian pol- icy could occur. Further complicating the Zambian situation is a demand by white workers in the vital copper mines for large increases in pay and allowances. The Zambian Government is publicly committed to developing a single wage scale for all mine workers regardless of race, and prob- ably will be unwilling to in- crease the disparity of wages be- tween Africans and whites. The Europeans in Zambia, however, already worried about their fu- ture if relations between Rho- desia and Zambia deteriorate further, are remaining in the country only because of the high wages. It would take very lit- tle additional tension to per- suade much of Zambia's skilled white labor force to leave the SECRET Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 SECRET %Wf MILITARY REGIME BEGINS RECONSTRUCTION IN NIGERIA General Ironsi's military regime has taken some promising first steps toward the more ef- ficient governing of Nigeria. However, an early breakdown of discipline in the army could still occur. Last week, regional military governors issued decrees designed to restore effective local gov- ernment and to eradicate corrup- tion. There appears to have been some coordination and cen- tral guidance in the drawing up of these decrees, but the mili- tary governors also seem to have some latitude in how they govern their respective regions. The efficiency with which the various regions will operate probably depends in large part on the ability of the individual gover- nors. At this time, Eastern Region Governor Ojukwu stands out as the most forceful person- ality among the key leaders. In an effort to increase efficiency and cut the cost of government, General Ironsi has reduced the number of ministries and reallocated the functions of some of them. He has appointed some new permanent secretaries to the ministries and transferred others, presumably in an attempt to increase his control over the civil service. In a further structuring of his regime, Ironsi also reportedly plans to set up both a national secretariat to coordinate the work of the regions and an executive secre- tariat to act as an arm of the central military government. The regime apparently in- tends to develop a governmental The regime apparently in- tends to develop a governmental system with a stronger central authority than Nigeria has known since independence in 1960.F- L 25X1 e present four semiautonomous regions will be supplanted by a larger number of provinces responsible to Lagos under a unitary, rather than fed- eral, structure. Although such an arrangement is likely to be resisted by older, traditional leaders, it appears that it would be welcomed by a great many Ni- gerians. However, in the key Northern Region, even the new leaders who have emerged report- edly oppose splitting up their region unless the Eastern and Western regions are similarly divided. Ironsi, a member of the Ibo tribe as are most of the younger officers who spearheaded the 15 January coup, seems to be trying to counter the impression in some quarters that the new regime will be dominated by Ibos. Most of the leading permanent secretaries appear to have.been chosen be- cause of administrative ability rather than tribal allegiance. However, there has been some in- dication of tribal conflict in the upper levels of the civil service. Tribal considerations are also evidently involved in the continuing signs of dissidence within the army. Another reported cause is dissatisfaction on the part of the still restless younger officers over the apparent deten- tion of several of the original coup leaders. SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 SECRET ETHIOPIAN ELITE AGAIN VOICING DISCONTENT There are new rumblings of discontent among Ethiopia's young educated elite--particularly in the military--in the wake of the military takeover in Nigeria. The 73-year-old Emperor Haile Selassie appears to be aware of the rumblings, but instead of moving toward needed reforms he is resorting to his traditional tactic of merely fending oft his critics. and open criticism of" the once- sacred Emperor. The Emperor had already been under fire for his failure to break diplomatic relations with the UK over the Rhodesia problem. Now the coup in Nigeria is widely discussed in military and polit- ical circles, and many believe the situation in Ethiopia is much more fragile than it was in Nigeria when that coup occurred. Less than two weeks after the Nigerian coup, top Ethiopian military leaders said they were worried about dissatisfaction among younger officers and civil- ians. They stressed again that the Emperor must make reforms to save himself and to prevent Ethi- opia from becoming the scene of a similar political and military upheaval. They gave no specific evidence of plotting, but sug- gested that the young educated elite had reached a new high of frustration and restlessness. The wily Emperor has so far been able to survive coup at- tempts and to intimidate his opponents, play them off one against the other, and prevent the formation of organized op- position. Over the past months, however, the facade of consti- tutional government and the fact of absolute personal rule have spurred increasingly widespread These half-measures may stave off an explosion as they have in the past. However, the time left to the aging Emperor for such stalling tactics is dwindling, and his once firm con- trol over the government appears to be loosening. 25X1 SECRET Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 %W" SECRET Europe ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS CONTINUES The composition of the new Moro cabinet is likely to prove the major obstacle to an early solution of Italy's government crisis. Christian Democratic (CD) leaders were able last week to paper over their differences suf- ficiently to reach unanimous agreement on a political docu- ment pledging full party support for the center-left program. The meeting made clear, however, that both former foreign minis- ter Fanfani and CD right-winger Mario Scelba will seek represen- tation for their factions in the new cabinet. While Fanfani's wishes are still not clear, his call for "cabinet changes sufficient to guarantee the program" confirms his intention to press for sev- eral ministerial posts. In Scelba's case, the US Embassy suspects his support of the CD document was a maneuver to win a place for his faction in the new government.. An attempt to placate the Scelba faction with a minor min- istry, however, is likely to be opposed by the CD left wing and could raise new demands by the other coalition partners. To offset the inclusion of the Scelba faction, according to a Social Democratic (PSDI) official, the PSDI and the Socialists (PSI) plan to ask Moro for two of the five key "political" ministries now held by his party. The for- eign.affairs and public instruc- tion posts are considered the most negotiable. PSDI leader Saragat as presi- dent, however, the CDs will be extremely reluctant to negotiate on any key posts. Further dif- fi-cult bargaining appears to lie ahead as Moro maneuvers to placate both his own party's factions and his coalition part- ne=rs. SECRET Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 SECRET SETTLEMENT OF EEC CRISIS The EEC Council reached agree- ments in Luxembourg on 28-29 Jan- uary which will evidently end France's seven-month boycott, but the political issues that caused the crisis appear basically unre- solved. Proposals which have been ten- tatively accepted for "improving Council-Commission cooperation" are much weaker than the original French demands. Several of Paris' "ten points" were dropped, others were recast in language proposed by the Five, and the Commission's right to initiate proposals was preserved. Furthermore, in con- trast to the initial French demands, which were cast in terms of a di- rective to the Commission, the pro- posed new rules are subject to fur- ther negotiation between the Coun- cil and the Commission. The French attempt to set new deadlines for agricultural financ- ing and merger of the community ex- ecutives was rejected. Although agreement was reached to hold an early Council meeting, the Kennedy Round and other issues of interest to the Five will be discussed along with agricultural financing. It is the intention of the Five not to deposit ratifications of the treaty to merge the execu- tives until the new Commission's membership is agreed on. Since the Five generally recognize that by gaining approval for "weak" per- sonnel Paris could inhibit the ex- ecutive even more than by formal restraints, the bargaining is likely to be hard. LEAVES ISSUES UNRESOLVED On majority voting, the for- mula adopted after bitter debate merely records the differences be- tween France and the Five. The Five refused to recognize a mem- ber country's continued right to a veto in "vital" decisions, but allowed France to register its po- sition that discussion of issues involving "very important inter- ests" must go on until unanimous agreement is reached. The first test on the voting issue may come in the Council discussions on a revised negotiat- ing mandate for the Kennedy Round. Some confusion exists on the ex- tent to which majority rule will apply here, since the French may demand a quid pro quo for agreeing with the Germans that unanimous voting continue to govern agri- cultural decisions pending at the end of 1965. Although De Gaulle appears to have fallen considerably short of obtaining his maximum demands, prospects for the community's re- suming its normal functioning do not appear especially bright. De Gaulle's threats and the lengthy crisis have taken their toll on the "community spirit," and his reser- vation of "freedom of action" plays havoc with the vital assumption that the integrative process is irre- versible. In these circumstances, the Dutch and the Germans in par- 25X1 ticular seem likely to continue their efforts to revive Britain's interest in membership. SECRET Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET DOMINICAN CRISIS APPEARS NEAR CLIMAX The political impasse in the Dominican Republic seems to be nearing a climax, with President Garcia Godoy willing to make ex- tensive concessions in the hope of avoiding a final showdown with the regular military. The Dominican military--from Minister of Defense Francisco Rivera Caminero to the officer corps--seem determined not to ac- cept the President's 6 January re- assignment. order without further bargaining. On 31 January, Garcia Godoy met with 60 top military of- ficers. The President was bluntly and repeatedly told that only the regular military, with its morale and integrity unscathed, can pro- vide for internal security and prevent the world-wide success of Communism. This meeting, in which Garcia Godoy hoped to both sound out the military and convince them of his desire to prevent the weakening of the armed forces, apparently convinced him that his original order would not be obeyed. In ad- dition, Garcia Godoy seems to be fearful--with some reason--that the supporters of the former "con- stitutional" cause, led by Juan Bosch and his Dominican Revolu- tionary Party, might instigate strikes or violence to force the removal of the chiefs. In order to forestall a final break with the military, and to maintain a modicum of his support in the former rebel camp, Garcia Godoy appears willing to modify his original proposal in important as- pects. The prime consideration is that Rivera must resign, since Gar- cia Godoy is well aware the leftists would not be satisfied otherwise. Garcia Godoy appears willing, how- ever, to permit Rivera and the other chiefs to name their own re- placements, and he might even be willing to let the other chiefs re- tain their positions. The Presi- dent is prepared to offer guaran- tees, backed up by the OAS, that no further changes will be made in the military leadership before elections. The military reaction is un- certain. If the proposal is only that Rivera must go, he could hardly maintain his stance that the mili- tary's morale and integrity would be seriously affected, especially since both the leading candidates for his position--navy chief Emilio Jimenez and army Colonel Enrique Perez y Perez--are competent mili- tary officers who have the respect of their subordinates. Rivera could easily be accused, with some cause, of refusing solely on per- sonal grounds. On the other hand, the military chiefs have increas- ingly lost respect for Garcia Go- doy's word, and they and Rivera might feel that the President's guarantee of no further changes would be worthless. It is also highly possible that reaction from the former rebel camp would be negative. Although Rivera now is the rebels' bete noire, both the army and air force SECRET Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY I I Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET chiefs are held in low esteem by the leftists and anything less than their replacement would probably be considered a. sell-out. Bosch and other elements might well carry through on.their threats to force the issue by calling a general strike. Caamano could use the military's recalcitrance as a rationale for returning from his London attache post. Garcia Godoy may decide, therefore, that only the forcible removal of the military chiefs will permit him to maintain his office and prestige. He now appears will- ing to use the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) to effect their de- parture, as was done with General Wessin y Wessin in September. The OAS Committee has gone on rec- ord as supporting the President and would authorize the IAPF to remove the chiefs. However, it is ques- tionable that some of the Latin American contingents, specifically the large Brazilian force, would obey such an order. Brazilian General Braga, com- mander of the IAPF, would probably have the most influence on whether Latin American governments would authorize their personnel in the ::[APF to take such action. Braga's reluctance leaves open the possi- bility that US forces would have 25X1 the primary responsibility of en- forcing the Dominican Government's decision. POLITICAL MACHINATIONS OF BOLIVIAN JUNTA, PRESIDENT fredo Ovando Candia has been work- ing behind t he scenes to block his former co-pr esident, General Rene Barrientos, from winning the presi- dency in the 3 July elections. Bar- rientos, in Europe since early Jan- uary, is scheduled to return to La Paz on 4 or 5 February after a short visit in Washington. Although professing to support Barrientos' candidacy, Ovando has undercut him in the past and would probably like to destroy him po- litically if this can be done safely. A possible move toward such a goal occurred last week when the commander of the crack para- troop regiment in Cochabamba--a staunch Barrientos supporter--was replaced by an officer loyal to Ovando. oug they have no real plan as yet for canceling elections or preventing Barrientos from running, they are said to be promoting the concept of calling a constituent assembly as a political alternative to elections. there is no indication ria e military would support the use of force to prevent Bar- rientos from assuming power through elections. Therefore, Ovando will25X1 probably continue his attempts to undercut Barrientos without pushing SECRET Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 SECRET DEVELOPMENTS IN NATO The North Atlantic Treaty Organization seems to have come through the past year relatively well, weathering but not surmounting two very critical is- sues: France's threat to withdraw in 1969, and the problem of nuclear sharing. There has, in fact, been a noticeable trend toward a coalescence on the part of the other 14 members in standing up to France. On the nuclear issue, most of the members have breathed a collective sigh of relief that the problem of creat- ing a multilateral force is temporarily on ice while the Special Committee pursues the possibilities of nuclear consultation. The narrowness of De Gaulle's victory at the polls in December is not expected to alter his op- position to NATO's integrated force structure and to the NATO- related US military presence in France. Although De Gaulle has not specified the kind of rela- tionship he wants to replace the present NATO setup, he appears to favor loose bilateral defense arrangements and a continuation of the principal Allied rights in West Germany. It is apparent that De Gaulle intends if possible to move against NATO this year. Al- though his precise timing may be affected by the course of the crisis in the Common Market, French officials have said that the first clear and specific moves can probably be expected early in the spring. Most officials believe these moves will be aimed initially at US bilateral status-of-forces agreements with France. They are expected to involve the laying down of conditions for the con- tLnued presence in France of US bases. The US has made clear that it considers these agree- ments of interest to all mem- bers of the alliance and will not be satisfied with strictly bilateral discussion if French demands would affect the ability of the US to perform NATO mis- sions assigned to its forces in Europe. Subsequent French moves could mean the ultimate removal of NATO's military headquarters (SHAPE) from France and its re- location probably somewhere in the low countries, with NATO retaining little more in France than the right to use and pass through French territory during wartime. It might also be neces- sary at some time to move the North Atlantic Council (NAC) with its staffs and secretariat from Paris, possibly to London or Brussels. In the absence of more precise announcements of French SECRET Page 1 SPECIAL REPORT Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET intentions, the other allies are able only to brace themselves for a crisis of unknown scale. Allied Nuclear Sharing The limitation of the Erhard talks in Washington on 20-21 De- cember to general principles of nuclear sharing rather than spe- cifics is in keeping with the Alliance consensus that this problem should be dealt with in a way that would not weaken the alliance in the forthcoming show- down with France. Although the communique is- sued after the meeting recognized West Germany's right to an appro- priate share in "nuclear defense" with its allies, no decisions or agreements were reached. For the time being at least, the Germans are apparently content to examine their nuclear concerns with "other interested allies." More- over, though Bonn continues to reiterate that consultation is not enough, Erhard did affirm in Washington the usefulness of the NATO Special Committee, which in late November had set up work- ing groups to study NATO's nu- clear arrangements and how to im- prove them. Inasmuch as the Special Com- mittee was established to find a generally acceptable solution for the nuclear problem, with or without French participation, the successful launching of ac- tivities has helped give NATO re- newed vitality. The Special Com- mittee's working groups are be- ginning work on three problems: the sharing of essential intel- ligence among alliance members, improvement of communications procedures to allow prompt de- cisions to use nuclear weapons, and extending of allied par- ticipation in alliance nuclear planning. The three groups are to submit their first reports to the next meeting of the Spe- cial Committee in the spring. Only three members--Luxem- bourg, Portugal, and Iceland-- -have expressed no interest at all in the committee and its ac- tivities. Norway, while in- terested, decided to defer a de- cision on whether to join. Any skepticism among those partici- pating in the committee is prob- ably due to the feeling that the outcome of its labors will de- pend in the last analysis on what the US puts into it. Some are more enthusiastic because they consider the consultative approach to nuclear sharing greatly preferable to West Ger- man participation in any "hard- ware" solution. Although West Germany has scheduled bilateral talks later this spring with the US and UK, and probably other interested countries, any early agreement on a concentrated effort to de- vise a generally acceptable "hardware" scheme is unlikely. The ideas Bonn recently ad- vancedfor a jointly owned nu- clear submarine force show some similarity to the old scheme for an Atlantic nuclear force put forth by the UK, but it re- mains doubtful that the differ- ences between these two princi- pals could easily be negotiated away--even if the other allies were reconciled to accepting a German role in such a force. SERE T SPECIAL REPORT 4 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET For the time being, there- fore, it appears likely there will be no great pressure within NATO to go beyond the Special Committee approach to the nu- clear question. France, of course, is expected to continue its campaign to terminate the committee--probably when it re- ports to the ministers in June-- because De Gaulle opposes both any nuclear role for Bonn and any strengthening of the NATO structure. Reactions to French Position France's 14 allies, noting De Gaulle's increasingly out- spoken rejection of NATO funda- mentals, appear to have tacitly accepted the possibility that they may have to move ahead with- out France on vital issues. Prior to last September, only the UK and the US had begun to think in terms of contingency planning to safeguard NATO's military capa- bilities against a possible French defection. Since that time, when De Gaulle harshly criticized NATO at one of his periodic press con- ferences, other members--among them Denmark, Italy, and the Neth- erlands--have also begun to talk about alternate plans. All mem- bers continue reluctant to visual- ize a NATO without France, but there is a better understanding of the US position that NATO's in- tegrated command structure is in- dispensable to any credible West- ern defense posture. Moreover, the decision of the US and other key allies not to confront France, but to get on with consolidating the alliance, has had a sympa- thetic response. Signs of the growing readi- ness of the "fourteen" to hold to- Page 3 ;ether against France were evi- dent at last December's minis- terial gathering. There, France challenged the standing of the Special Committee, urging its "temporary" character, and sug- gested it be terminated in June after rendering its report. The other members--led by the US, UK, West Germany, and Secretary General Brosio--lined up solidly against the French and secured the omission from the final com- munique' of any reference to the committee as "temporary." Another example of the growing impatience with Paris was the response to French ob- jections to German requests that the communique' formally reject Soviet charges of "revanchism" and nuclear ambitions against Germany. With the US in the lead, the other allies closed ranks in support of the Germans; even the Norwegians--who are notably sensitive on the ques- tion of German nuclear aspira- tions--deserted the French. Al- though the incident involved "only words," Ambassador Cleve- land believes it noteworthy for the way the allies reacted to French pressure. Some Progress in Other Fields In addition to the work of the Special Committee, the al- liance has been able in recent months to show progress in sev- eral aspects of its development, despite the problems with France. At the December meeting, for ex- ample, the ministers accepted the more modest of two sets of 1970 force goals submitted last year by the Supreme Allied Com- mander (SACEUR). The alliance's Defense Planning Committee will SECRET SPECIAL REPORT 4 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET use these goals as a basis for an effort to match national capa- bilities and proposed national force plans. Of equal importance was agreement by the ministers to put NATO's regular annual re- view on a five-year "rolling" basis starting in January 1967. Such a planning cycle carries a clear implication that integrated NATO forces will still be around after 1970. The French, surprisingly, did not choose to make an issue of this innovation--which will involve a more intimate consul- tation on national resources and budgets than ever before. They even accepted reference in the communiqud to 1970 force goals. The French defense minister has nevertheless made clear that France will under no circumstance increase its current force commit- ments to the alliance, and Paris of course can resume its opposi- tion to the force planning exer- cise at any stage. The ministers also agreed to ask the North Atlantic Council to study a US proposal for con- centrating a greater effort on SACEUR's mobile force. Composed now of six army battalions and six air squadrons from six coun- tries, the force has been increas- ingly recognized not only for its usefulness as a "fire brigade" with which to respond to threats all along NATO's defense perimeter, but also as an important symbol of the NATO integrated system. Over the past several years, how- ever, efforts to establish it on a firmer footing have been thwarted by a French refusal to share exer- cise costs of several headquarters SECRET Page 4 SPECIAL REPORT units of the force. The pre- sumption is that in agreeing to expand and regularize the force, the other 14 members will have to pick up the French share. Infrastructure and Military Budget Co.?t Sharing At a special meeting on 20 and 21 January, NATO's 15 mem- bers resolved long-standing dif- ferences over provision of funds for the alliance's infrastruc- ture program and military head- quarters budget. Last spring the US--which for years provided almost one third of the annual infrastruc- ture program funds--asked that its share be reduced to 25 per- cent in 1965 and to 20 percent in later years. No agreement was reached at that time, prin- cipally because of UK and West German objections, with the re- sult that the whole program fell a year behind schedule. By fall, financial problems in the British defense program led the UK to seek a reduction in its share of the infrastructure and military headquarters budget. All the major contenders at the recent special meeting--the US, UK, and West Germany--made some concessions. Even the French proved helpful through- out, accepting increased shares of the costs for both the in- frastructure and the military budgets he US accepted a slight F _T_ Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET the military budget, which runs about $75 million a year, in exchange for a reduction in in- frastructure from 30.85 percent to 25.77 percent for 1965 and future programs through 1969. In accepting significantly larger shares of programs that interest them directly, the other NATO countries not only gave practical recognition to the heavy world-wide defense burdens of the US but also re- affirmed their fundamental in- terest in the alliance. The Southeast Flank: Cyprus and Malta In the category of nagging problems for which no easy so- lution is in sight are the im- pact of the Cyprus dispute on Greece and Turkey, and the dif- ficulties that have emerged with Malta's independence. So long as their dispute over Cy- prus is not settled, effective cooperation on defense between Greece and Turkey is impossible. Both countries have permitted their differences to bring into question the value of their NATO ties. Both are net recipients of military and other NATO aid. It is growing increasingly dif- ficult, however, to find such assistance from the allies, none of which relishes the prospect that its aid might be used by one against the other. The question of Malta in- volves political and economic, as well as military, considera- tions. As a British posses- sion, the Maltese Islands fell within the NATO defense zone, but lost that status when they became independent in October Page 5 1964. The new government's sub- sequent overtures for full NATO membership were discouraged by the present members, even though the islands are rated as strate- gically important and have been the site of HAFMED, NATO's top Mediterranean headquarters. So far, it has been impos- sible to work out a new NATO- Maltese association beyond the statement of the Maltese Gov- ernment last fall that it would for the time being respect its previous commitments regarding NATO installations, and a state- ment by the North Atlantic Coun- cil that the alliance members intend to safeguard Malta's in- dependence and territorial in- tegrity. Meanwhile, the question has been complicated by proposals to move HAFMED to Naples, and by London's apparent intention to cut back its military presence on Malta. Malta is economically heavily dependent on the mili- tary forces and installations on its territory. Such a blow would probably greatly benefit the neutralist-minded leader of the opposition party, Dom Mintoff, in the national elections to be held this year. Conclusions and Outlook The current balance sheet for the alliance on the big is- suees is somewhat more positive today than it was a year ago but this unfortunately tells us lit- tle about how it may look a year from now. The current easing off of the nuclear sharing ques- tion does not necessarily mean that a solution has been found SECRET SPECIAL REPORT 4 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 SECRET in the Special Committee for- mula--only that some of the other solutions that have been proposed have been found impos- sible to negotiate at the pres- ent time. Over the longer term there will almost surely have to be some reckoning on West Germany's aspirations for nu- clear parity with France and Britain, and some redressing of the nuclear preponderance of the US vis-a-vis the European allies. As far as a showdown with De Gaulle is concerned, the gathering resistance to his views is a hopeful sign, but it cannot yet be said that a de- termined and viable defense against his attacks has been devised. The current opposi- tion is attributable at least in part to the immoderation of the views he has recently ex- pressed. Ironically, a softer statement by De Gaulle--with no real change in his basic objec- tive--would be far more diffi- cult to withstand. Moreover, it must be expected that at least some of the European coun- tries will in the end prove un- willing to face up to the actual psychological and political costs of a failure to reach an accommodation with France. Finally, the conflict in Vietnam is casting an ever deeper shadow over the alliance. US statements at the December ministerial meeting seemed to evoke a greater acceptance of the view that Western security is indivisible. It would be risky, however, to expect any overwhelming response by way of effective aid or even a major change in the attitude of the Europeans toward the Asian con- flict: (1) that it is capable of involving them in fighting that seems remote from European defense requirements, (2) that it diverts the energies and at- tention of the US from its proper role of leadership in the Alliance, and (3) that it pre- vents the East-West detente that would lessen Europe's de- fense burden. SECRET Page 6 SPECIAL REPORT Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRJ~ T SECRET Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 4 February 1966 SOVIET INDIVIDUAL INI'ANTR7 WEAPONS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIC, ENCE dotiurigrading arid,,declossificotion Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET SOVIET INDIVIDUAL INFANTRY WEAPONS According to Soviet tactical doctrine, the mis- sion of the infantry in nuclear or in conventional war is to move in on and destroy the enemy with su- perior maneuver and firepower. To provide the in- fantry with the firepower required for this mission, Soviet arms designers and industry have developed a family of light individual assault weapons combin- ing simplicity of design, reliability, accuracy at common combat ranges, and high rates of fire. More significantly, the Soviets have succeeded in stand- ardizing on a single type of short, lightweight cartridge for most of these weapons. Although the weapons and the cartridge do not provide the long- range power of most Western counterparts, they are more effective at the shorter ranges characteristic of modern, mobile infantry warfare. The Tsarist Heritage The best rifle in the So- viet arsenal at the beginning of World War II, the Mosin-Nagant bolt-action rifle, was a hold- over from the reign of Alexander III (1881-1894).'-A rifle of this basic 1891 design is still available in the Soviet rifle company for sniping purposes. Versions of this sturdy rifle are apparently still manufactured in other Communist countries, including Communist China. Its bullet can penetrate a quarter inch of steel at 600 yards, and a four-power telescope enables the sniper to hit targets at 800 yards or more. Long before World War II, however, the Soviets recognized the need for increasing the fire- power of the infantry squad and the rate of fire of the individ- ual infantryman. "Hand Machine Guns" To increase sharply the firepower of small units in World War II, Soviet designers such as Degtyarev, Shpagin, and Sudayev designed "hand machine guns" (submachine guns) for the individual infantryman. These weapons, the PPSh and PPS, fire a short, lightweight pistol car- tridge at an effective combat rate of 100 rounds per minute and were produced and issued in great quantity to Soviet rifle units. In recent years, these submachine guns have also been manufactured in Eastern Europe, Communist China, and North Korea. Chinese versions of the Shpagin submachine gun, called K-50, and the Sudayev model are currently used by the North Viet- namese Army and by Viet Cong main force units. SECRET Page 1 SPECIAL REPORT 4 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 SECRET Around 1949 the Soviets in- troduced a new family of small arms with a chrome-plated bore, including the SKS carbine de- signed by Simonov, the RPD light machine gun designed by Degtyarev, and the AK assault rifle designed by Kalashnikov. All three use a rimless cartridge (M-1943), shorter and lighter than either the Mosin-Nagant cartridge (or the .30-caliber US rifle round) but still effective at twice the range of the submachine guns. Of these, the SKS is becoming obsolete in Communist armies because it is fed by only a 10- round clip and has a relatively crude rear sight. It is still used, however, in militia forces. The other two weapons have proven extremely effective. The AK has become the stand- ard Soviet and East European in- fantryman's weapon. It is also used by Asian Communist forces, including the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Both the weapon and its cartridge are modeled on the World War II German "Sturmgewehr" (assault rifle MP-44) which was designed to ful- fill the roles of both the sub- machine gun and semiautomatic rifle. The Soviets have improved the German model by chrome plat- ing the bore, by refining the rear sight, and by paring off up to two pounds of weight in one version--the AKM. Elsewhere in the bloc the Czechs have modeled their most recent assault rifle, the M58, after the Soviet AK. In 1965 the Hungarians introduced their own version, characterized by an extra pistol grip, and re- portedly fitted for an infrared sight. AK models are also pro- duced in East Germany, China, North Korea, and Finland. Light Machine Guns To increase the firepower of their units below company level, the Soviets in 1949 intro- duced the RPD light machine gun, fed by a 100-round belt in a drum. This weapon was standard in the Soviet Army until 1961. It also is used by other Communist forces including the Viet Cong. Although it is an excellent am- bush weapon because of its prac- tical rate of fire of 150 rounds per minute, it cannot fire single rounds. Moreover, it lacks the quick-change-barrel feature of the US M-60, so the weapon must be allowed to cool after a few I minutes of fire. Since 1961 in the Soviet Army, and since 1964 in some East European ground forces, infantry- men have been issued large num- bers of the Kalashnikov light machine gun (RPK). The RPK is a marriage of an improved version of the AK assault rifle--the AKM --with the stock, barrel, and bipod of the RPD. The RPK can fire semiautomatically like the AKM, automatically like the RPD, or at a "slow automatic" rate to conserve ammunition. The maga- zines for the RPK and AKM are interchangeable, greatly simplify- ing problems of production, SECRET Page 2 SPECIAL REPORT Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 w Now SECRET training, and logistics. So far only the USSR is known to manufacture the RPK. New Nonstandard Weapon As a departure from the trend toward weapons standard- ization in the bloc, the Czechs have begun issuing a new machine- pistol, called the "Skorpion,'?" to certain specialized units such as border troops. The Skorpion fires Czech pistol am- munition, not Soviet ammunition, and is fed by only 10- and 20- round magazines. The weapon is likely to be used only as a side arm rather than as an assault weapon. For the rest of the 1960s, Soviet and other Communist in- fantrymen will rely heavily on the combination machine gun/rifle found in the AK. This apparently stems from a conviction, expressed by a writer in the January 1965 issue of the Soviet Military Re- view, that a short burst of bul- lets is more effective and ac- curate than single-shot firing "under conditions of limited visibility commonly encountered in modern combat." Minor improvements in the AK and RPK weapons will be made, probably including a greater use of milled and plastic parts, to reduce the number and weight of components. Infrared sights will probably be used more fre- quently in night operations. Light machine guns may be equipped with a quick-change barrel. A recent article by a Colo- nel Akimov in Starshina Serzhant, a Soviet magazine for noncommis- sioned officers, covers the lat- est developments in US small arms and provides some indication of Soviet intentions in this area. Akimov called particular atten- tion to the capability of the Stoner system, a US development in which a single basic weapon performs as either a full or semi- automatic rifle or carbine or light machine gun. He also placed special emphasis on the development of lightweight ammu- nition and noted that the US was trying to develop a plastic bul- let, suggesting that the Soviets might try to do the same. He was generally skeptical of the lethal power of a laser rifle, because of its slow rate of fire. Thus, while it is certain that Soviet and other Communist weapons specialists are investi- gating all types of small arms, they are not likely to abandon the simple and effective present family of weapons in the near fu- (SEE PHOTOGRAPHS ON SUCCEEDING PAGES) SECRET Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SOVIET SMALL ARMS SHPAGIN Submachine gun (PPSh) Modified Chinese K-50 submachine gun. Note removeable metal stock, shortened crimped barrel, jacket, and pistol grip. Date into use Weight; unloaded with loaded box with loaded drum. Operating method Rate of fire Effective range Muzzle velocity Overall length Ammunition 1941 7.7 lbs. 9.26 lbs. 11.99 lbs. Blowback Full or semiautomatic, 100 rounds per minute 35 round box (as shown) 71 round box 200 meters (219 yards) 500 meters (1,650 feet) per 0.842 meters (33.2 inches) 7.62mm M-1930 Pistol Remarks: Chinese version called K-50. SUDAYEV Submachine gun (PPS) Date into use Weight; unloaded loaded Operating method Rate of fire Feeding device Effective range Muzzle velocity Overall length Ammunition Remarks: With the stock folded the weapon is only 24.2 inches in length. The cyclic rate of the weapon has been retarded to permit touching off single rounds. Weapon is widely used in for East. SIMONOV Carbine (SKS) Date into use 1949 Weight) unloaded loaded Operating method Rate of fire Feeding device Effective range Muzzle velocity Overall length (with bayonet folded) Ammunition Remarks: Bayonet is folding type, type, 9.5 inches long. SECRET 1943 6.61 lbs. 7.98 lbs. Blowback Automatic only; 100 rds 35 round box magazine 200 meters (219 yards) 500 meters (1,650 feet) per 0.831 meters (32.7 inches) 7,62mm. M-1930 Pistol 8.49 lbs. 8.84 lbs. Gas Semiautomatic; 35-40 rds per min Box magazine, 10 rounds 400 meters (440 yards) 735 meters (2411 feet) per sec 1.02 meters (40.2 inches) both needle (cruciform) and knife. Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 MW SOVIET SMALIL ARMS KALASHNIKOV Assault rifle (AK-47) 1947 9.48 lbs. 10.58 lbs. Gas Full or semiautomatic; 80-100 rounds per minute 30 round box magazine 400 meters (438 yards) 710 meters (2,329 feet) per sec 0.87 meters (34 inches) All AK models can be equipped with folding metal stock. AK closely resembles the World War 11 German 7.92mm MP-44 "Sturmgewehr," which is still used in some East German paramilitary units. Czech M58 assault rifle is modeled on AK. AK bayonets now issued can serve as knife, saw or wire cutter. AK models are manufactured in the USSR, Eastern Europe, Finland, China, and North Korea. Date into use Weight; unloaded loaded Operating method Rate of fire Feeding device Effective range Muzzle velocity Overall length (without bayonet) Ammunition Remarks: AKM Assault rifle (Improved AK-47) Date into use 1949 Weight; unloaded 6.93 lbs. (without magazine) loaded 8.87 lbs. (with 30 rd magazine) Operating method Gas Rate of fire Full or semiautomatic; 100 rounds per minute Feeding device 30 round box magazine 40 rd RPK light machinegun box 70 rd RPK light machinegun drum Effective range 400 meters (438 yards) Muzzle velocity 710 meters (2,329 feet) per sec Overall length 0.87 meters (34 inches) (without bayonet) Ammunition 7.62mm. M-1943 short round Remarks: Unlike the AK-47, the AKM has a stamped receiver with bolt guides welded to inside walls, and an improved rear sight, graduated to 1000 meters. Also the handguard, fore-end, pistol grip and butt stock are of laminated wood. A Soviet journal published in October 1965 claimed that the loaded weight of the weapon (30 round magazine) is only 7.9 lbs., which if correct would be only a half pound heavier than the loaded weight of the US M16. The journal also claimed the bullet's effectiveness (ubo)fnaya silo) is maintained up to 1,500 meters. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SOVIET SMALL ARMS Hungarian version of AK with forehand pistol grip. Reportedly this is equipped with an inferred aiming device and has a plastic piston. DEGTYAREV Light machine gun (RPD) Date into use Weight: unloaded loaded (with drum magazine) Operating method Rate of fire Feeding device Effective range Muzzle velocity Overall length Ammunition 1949 14.5 lbs. 19.4 lbs. Gas 150 rounds per minute Automatic; 100 rd drum magazine 800-1000 meters (875--1100 yards) 735 meters (2411 feet) per sec 1.04 meters (40.75 inches) 7.62mm. M-1943 short round Remarks: This weapon has a chromed barrel, as does the SKS, AK-4T1, AKM and RPK, but no quick-change barrel mechanism. If is therefore unsatisfactory for sustained fire. It was the standard light machine gun in the Soviet Army until 1961, but it continues to be widely used in most other Communist armies, including the Viet Cong. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 "SOVIET SMAILL ARMS Date into use Weight; Soviet soldier of Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division using RPK light machine gun with 70-round drum magazine KALASHNIKOV Light machine gun (RPK) with empty box magazine 11.0 lbs. with empty drum magazine 12.3 lbs. O erati h Remark p ng met od Gas s: Rate of fire; East German defectors report the RPK will com letel single shot 50 rounds per minute p y replace the RPD in many East German units. Soviet full automatic 130-150 rounds per minute airborne troops may soon be equipped with an RPK with f l Feeding device 30 ro d AK a o ding stock. Recent models of the RPK ca f un M box magazine 40 round box magazine n ire at slow automatic as well as full automatic, thus conserving ammunition 70 round drum magazine . Effective range 800 meters (875 yards) Muzzle velocity 745 meters (2444 feet) per MOSIN.NAGANT Rifle 1891/30 Date into use 1891 Weight; unloaded 9.9 lbs. loaded 11.2 lbs. (with telescopic sight) Opera'ing method Turning bolt Rate of fire; single shot 10 rounds per minute Feeding device Box magazine, 5 rounds Effective range 400 meters (438 yards) Muzzle velocity 865 meters (2838 feet) per sec Overall length 1.23 meters (48.5 inches) (without bayonet) Ammuniition 7.62mm M-1908 rimmed Remarks: Still in service as a sniper's rifle. A shorter, lighter carbine version was issued in 7944. These two were standard weapons of the Soviet infantry at the end of World War H. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 U.S. AND SOVIET SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION U.S. US.30 caliber (7.62-mm.) M-1 RIFLE US.30 caliber (7.62-mm.) M-1 & M-2 CARBINE US 7.62-mm. (.30 caliber) M-14 RIFLE 111i1411r11~~ - . ~~ ~ US 5.56-mm. (.223 caliber) M-16 RIFLE SOVIET Soviet 7.62-mm. (.30 caliber M1908) MOSIN-NAGANT RIFLE, RP-46 COMPANY MACHINE GUN Soviet 7..6 caliber pistol) K-50 (PPSh) & PPS Soviet 7.62-mm. (.30 caliber M1943) AK-47 (oil versions), SK$, -RPD, & RPK SECRET US .45 caliber (11-mm. M40) .45 PISTOL, THOMPSON, M-3 SUBMACHINE GUN 4 FEBRUARY 1$66 60874 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100130001-3