WEEKLY SUMMARY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-00927A005100130001-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
48
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 20, 2008
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 4, 1966
Content Type:
SUMMARY
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(Information as of noon EST, 3 February 1966)
VIETNAM
Three large allied operations have so far failed to
engage any large main force Communist units, although
small unit actions in one operation have resulted in
mounting enemy casualties. Elsewhere, the intensity
of VC-initiated activity picked up last weekend.
Premier Ky plans to reorganize his cabinet and staff
for greater efficiency. Ho Chi Minh, in an attack
on the US peace initiative, insisted that the National
Liberation Front must be recognized as the sole repre-
sentative of the South Vietnamese people. Hanoi also
quickly denounced both the resumption of US airstrikes
and the US effort to bring Vietnam to the UN. Although
both Moscow and Peking did likewise, the Chinese were
clearly more pleased with Hanoi''s show of determination.
Four US aircraft were lost in the first two days of
renewed strikes in the North. A new airfield is under
construction near Yen Bai.
Page
The Communist World
SOVIET CONSERVATIVES SEEK REFURBISHING OF STALIN'S IMAGE 5
A recent Pravda article is the latest evidence of a
cautious u etermined effort to halt public con-
demnation of Stalin and his era,, However, the called-
for rewrite of Soviet history is unlikely to convince
the USSR's new generation of young intellectuals.
SOVIET COMMISSION TO REVAMP COLLECTIVE FARM CHARTER
By associating virtually the entire party elite with
the commission's stated purpose of revising the col-
lective farm charter, party first secretary Brezhnev
apparently intends to commit them to the achievement
of substantial improvement in agricultural production.
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SOVIET INDIVIDUAL INFANTRY WEAPONS
The USSR has developed for its infantry a family of
light individual assault weapons combining simplicity
of design, reliability, accuracy at common ranges, and
high rates of fire. It has also succeeded in standardiz-
ing on a single type of short, lightweight cartridge
for most of these weapons. Although not providing the
long-range power of most Western counterparts, the wea-
pons and cartridge are more effective at the shorter
ranges characteristic of modern, mobile infantry warfare.
ALBANIA SEARCHES FOR FRIENDS
The Hoxha regime may be seeking friendlier relations
with some Soviet bloc and Western countries, either in
the belief this will make lobbying for Communist China
more effective or, conversely, as a matter of prudence
incase relations with Peking become unpalatable.
INTERNAL SECURITY EFFORTS BOOSTED IN SOUTH KOREA 8
South Korea is showing renewed interest in its security
against actions by the Communist North.
RUMORS OF INDONESIAN "POLITICAL SETTLEMENT" CONTINUE 9
Civilian anti-Communist leaders are reported fesrfuJ.
that Sukarno plans an imminent and dramatic political
reorganization, and that the army's resistance is
weakening.
BURMESE INSURGENCY AT A HIGH LEVEL
Various ethnic and Communist insurgent bands are
becoming increasingly bold and aggressive in many parts
of Burma.
ZAMBIA APPARENTLY DELAYING TRADE BREAK WITH RHODESIA 12
The arrival of a UK military planning mission and the
success of an emergency petroleum supply operation seem
to have renewed President Kaunda's confidence in the UK's
determination to bring down the rebel Rhodesian regime.
MILITARY REGIME BEGINS RECONSTRUCTION IN NIGERIA 13
General Ironsi has taken some promising steps toward
giving Nigeria more efficient government and is continu-
ing to try to avoid arousing tribal animosities.
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Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 66
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ETHIOPIAN ELITE AGAIN VOICING DISCONTENT 14
The coup in Nigeria stimulated grumbling among Ethiopia's
educated elite, but the Emperor appears unready to satisfy
their desire for reform.
Europe
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS CONTINUES
The composition of the new Moro cabinet is likely to
prove the major obstacle to an, early solution of Italy's
government crisis.
SETTLEMENT OF EEC CRISIS LEAVES ISSUES UNRESOLVED
Although De Gaulle appears to have fallen short of
obtaining his maximum demands, prospects for resump-
tion of normal functioning do not appear bright.
French reservations play havoc with the assumption
that integration is irreversible and seem likely to
encourage efforts to revive Britain's interest in
membership.
DEVELOPMENTS IN NATO
NATO seems to have come through the past year relatively
well, weathering but not surmounting two very critical
issues: France's threat to withdraw in 1969, and the
problem of nuclear sharing. There has been, in fact, a
noticeable trend toward coalescence on the part of the
other 14 members in standing up to France. On the
nuclear issue, most of the members have breathed a col-
lective sigh of relief that the problem of creating a
multiiaterai ~Fnrce is tem orar:il on i.ce.
Western Hemisphere
DOMINICAN CRISIS APPEARS NEAR CLIMEX
The political impasse in the Dominican Republic seems
to be nearing a climax, with President Garcia Godoy
willing to make extensive concessions in the hope of
avoiding a final showdown with the regular military.
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POLITICAL MACHINATIONS OF BOLIVIAN JUNTA PRESIDENT 19
Although Ovando professes to support former co-president
Barrientos' presidential candidacy, he is reportedly
working behind the scenes to block it.
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Three large allied operations
in Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, and the
Phuoc Tuy - Bien Hoa border area
--employing some 15,000 to 16,000
combat troops--highlighted the mil-
itary situation this week in South
Vietnam. Thus far, the main force
Communist units (estimated at seven
or eight regiments in all three
areas) have attempted to avoid con-
tact. A prisoner taken in Binh
Dinh Province indicated that one
North Vietnamese unit in the area
had split temporarily into small
groups to evade allied forces.
Occasional resistance by Com-
munist units of company size has
been reported in Binh Dinh Province,
however, and enemy casualties there
continue to mount. Little fight-
ing has developed from operations
in Quang Ngai and the Phuoc Tuy -
Bien Hoa area but enemy supplies
and other evidence point to the re-
cent presence of Communist forces.
Cumulative Viet Cong losses in
these operations are reported as
766 killed and 168 captured. Al-
lied casualties are 136 killed
(79 US) and 561 wounded (372 US).
A longer term security and
rice-harvesting operation in Phu
Yen Province, in progress for about
two weeks, has also taken a steady
toll. To date over 300 Communists
have been reported killed. Allied
casualties total 35 killed (7 US)
and 121 wounded (48 US).
The intensity of Viet Cong -
initiated activity picked up last
weekend. A government relief force,
dispatched to an outpost under at-
tack in Quang Ngai Province, was
itself heavily engaged on 28 Janu-
ary. Resulting government losses
totaled 130. Elsewhere, a Viet
Cong battalion attacked government
forces in Chuong Thien Province,
and some ten smaller enemy attacks
were also reported in the delta
area south of Saigon.
South Vietnam's Political Situation
Premier Ky recently told a US
official that he is planning to re-
organize his cabinet and personal
staff this month. In an effort to
deal with major economic problems,
he will split the present Ministry
of Economy into separate ministries
for foreign trade and for internal
economic affairs. Four additional
appointees to Ky's own staff will
deal more efficiently with prob-
lems of corruption, refugees, Viet
Cong defectors, and port operations.
Ky has indicated that he will
choose native southerners for these
positions to counter charges that
his government is overly influ-
enced by native northerners.
Hanoi on US Initiatives
North Vietnamese President Ho
Chi Minh attacked the US peace in-
itiative on 24 January and under-
scored the importance that North
Vietnam attaches to the participa-
tion of the Liberation Front in any
negotiated settlement. In one of
the most straightforward assertions
made publicly by a North Vietnamese
leader, Ho insisted that the US
"recognize the Front as the sole
genuine representative of the
people of South Vietnam and engage
in negotiations with it." He also
promised to "continue the fight as
long as US forces remain in Viet-
nam." His language implied that
these two elements represented
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preconditions to any talks. Ho's
letter, addressed specifically to
North Vietnam's Communist allies,
may also have been intended to pro-
vide some amplification of the
DRV's terms for negotiations in the
hopes of getting more effective
support,particularly from European
Communist party circles.
In separate Foreign Ministry
statements published on 1 February,
Hanoi also quickly denounced both
the resumption of US air strikes
and the US effort to bring the Viet-
nam problem to the UN. The DRV
said that any UN Security Council
resolution "which interfered with
the Vietnam problem was null and
void." The denunciation of the
air strikes reinforced Ho's tough
talk about troop withdrawal, main-
taining that the US "must uncon-
ditionally" withdraw its troops
and weapons from South Vietnam."
The language implies that Hanoi
will not be satisfied with any par-
tial US pullout as a prelude to a
political settlement.
Peking Propaganda
The Chinese were clearly
pleased by Ho's tough letter of 24
January and endorsed it immediately
after the Vietnamese made the text
public on 28 January.
Peking not only repeated the
full text, but added an appendix,
not included in the Vietnamese re-
lease, containing Phan Van Dong's
"four points" of last April. The
Chinese probably used this device
to emphasize the importance of
these demands--reportedly regarded
by Chinese leaders as an effective
obstacle to any negotiations.
On 30 January, a People's
Daily editorial hailed Ho s letter
as new evidence of the "steel-like
determination" of the Vietnamese to
carry the struggle through to the
end. The editorial declared flatly
that "there is no room for bargain-
ing" with regard to Hanoi's four-
point formula or the status of the
Liberation Front. It asserted that
the Front "assumes and plays the
role of the state organ in South
Vietnam," a. declaration that moved
Peking further toward open endorse-
ment of the Front as a government.
It was also a more forthright claim
of status for the Front than any-
thing either Hanoi or Front repre-
sentatives have released in public.
Chairman Liu Shao-chi's reply
also stressed Chinese confidence in
Hanoi's determination. Liu's
pledge that the Chinese people will
stand by the Vietnamese in a "joint
struggle" no matter what the US may
do was a repetition of generalized
promises Peking has been making
since last fall.
The Chinese responded to re-
sumption of bombing attacks against
North Vietnam with renewed attacks
on US duplicity, charging that the
air strikes were a "reckless" reac-
tion to the failure of the US
"peace hoax." A People's Daily edi-
torial on 1 February asserted that
the US "is at its wits'end on the
Vietnam question and is vainly seek-
ing to get out of its predicament
by means of war expansion." On 2
February, Peking reacted to the US
proposal that the Vietnam question
be put to the UN Security Council
by reiterating the Communist posi-
tion that the UN has "nothing to
do" with the Vietnam problem, which
could only be settled in accordance
with the "spirit" of the Geneva
agreements --a.s interpreted by Hanoi's
"four points."
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Moscow's Support for Hanoi
Soviet President Podgorny's
1 February reply to Ho's letter
adhered closely to standard lines,
condemning "US aggression" and
reaffirming Soviet pledges of po-
litical and material support. A
31 January government statement
claimed the resumption of US at-
tacks showed that Washington's
diplomatic moves are "aimed at
misleading world opinion and
preparing for further escalation."
TASS promptly reported Ha-
noi's opposition to UN involve-
ment and in a 1 February speech
at the UN, Soviet Ambassador
Fedorenko predictably objected
to Security Council discussion.
Echoing the North Vietnamese
statement, Fedorenko criticized
the request for UN action as a
"diversionary tactic designed to
hide plans to expand the war."
On 2 February, Pravda denounced
the US move as a arce" per-
petrated by those who are really
responsible for the war, and who
know very well that the "UN has
nothing to do with the Vietnam-
ese problem."
DRV Military Developments
US aircraft resumed the at-
tack against North Vietnam on 31
January, hitting the main road
network in the southern part of
North Vietnam. Targets included
bridges, road intersections,
rolling stock, barges, and vehi-
cles. Four US aircraft were lost
to enemy ground fire during the
first two days, bringing the
total number of US aircraft lost
over North Vietnam to 194.
A new airfield is under con-
ruction near Yen Bai
the
final runway will be approxi-
mately 6,600 feet long. When
completed, this airfield will
probably be jet capable. Air-
craft based here would be in a
better position to defend the
northwestern areas of North Viet-
y
US aircra
nam against
in over Laos from Thailand.
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SOVIET CONSERVATIVES SEEK REFURBISHING OF STALIN'S IMAGE
A cautious but determined
effort to halt the public con-
demnation of Stalin and his era
has been in evidence in the So-
viet Union since last March.
Another step in this process was
taken by Pravda last week in an
article on Soviet historiography
signed by Yevgeny Zhukov, lead-
ing historian of the Academy of
Sciences, and two of his col-
leagues. The article calls for
a new version of Soviet history
that will emphasize the "enor-
mous successes" achieved by the
regime in the half century since
the revolution, playing down the
cost in human suffering.
The authors make it plain
that the purpose is not to
achieve "objective" history as
this term is understood in the
West, but rather a history that
will help the party mold an
obedient population.
The article calls for less
discussion of what went wrong
under Stalin and attacks "cer-
tain" colleagues for having paid
tribute in the recent past to
"unprincipled opportunism"--an
apparent reference to Khrushchev's
use of de-Stalinization as a po-
litical weapon to beat back oppo-
sition to his policies. By dis-
cussing--however obliquely--both
Khrushchev and Stalin for the first
time in the same article, Pravda
raises the possibility that So-
viet historians will tend to
polarize around the opposing sym-
bols of these two leaders.
The top leaders now in the
Kremlin have yet to comment pub-
licly on how Stalin and his era
should be viewed. The official
historians who wrote the Pravda
article, however, are the latest
addition to a growing chorus of
low-level party secretaries,
Komsomol leaders, ranking mili-
tary officers, and ideological
and cultural, officials who de-
mand the public discussion of
unpleasant aspects of the So-
viet past and present be halted
on the ground that it breeds
cynicism in the younger genera-
tion.
The difficulty with the ap-
proach being followed by these
guardians of the party's image
arises from the fact that a
higher level of education is.re-
quired of the new generation. To-
day's young intellectuals, who
refer contemptuously to conform-
ists as "ideological comrades"
and "patriots," are unlikely to
be convinced by oversimplified
historiesand suppression of
criticism. Therefore, even though
the conservative forces have be-
come more vocal in the past year,
their proposed solution appears
to hold little promise of success.
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SOVIET COMMISSION TO REVAMP COLLECTIVE FARM CHARTER
A 149-man commission has been
formed under the chairmanship of
party first secretary Brezhnev to
draft a new statute for the USSR's
18,000 collective farms (kolkliozes).
The commission not only includes
all 24 members of the party presidium
and secretariat, but regional party
secretaries and top agriculture
officials as well. Brezhnev appar-
ently intends by this move to
associate virtually the entire party
elite with revision of the collec-
tive farmcharter, thereby committing
them to the achievement of substan-
tial improvements in agricultural
production.
The need for revising the
existing collective farm "model
charter"--actually a set of statutes
issued in 1935 with the force of
law--has long been recognized.
Khrushchev called the statutes ob-
solete. He talked much of the need
for revising them and of convening
a new collective farm congress to
do so. but repeatedly postponed the
matter.
Brezhnev and his cohorts are
clearly prepared to substitute
action for words, and to institute
some reforms while at the same time
keeping the basic collective farm
system intact. At the central
committee plenum on agriculture last
March, Brezhnev said the statutes
would be revised, and to this end
announced that an All-Union Collec-
tive Farm Congress, the third in
Soviet history, would be convened
some time this year.
The new charter will prob-
ably incorporate a number of
changes already being proposed to
make the collective farm a more vi-
able economic entity. Certain steps
have already been taken in recent
years to raise collective farm in-
comes, but if the hostility of col-
lective members toward the kolkhoz
organization is to be overcome,
some method of distributing income
will have to be devised that guar-
antees the individual farmer a
fair return for his labor. A system
of guaranteed wages plus bonuses
seems likely to be adopted.
Many other suggestions have
been advanced to promote a sense of
personal commitment and responsibil-
ity. The new leadership has given
evidence by its industrial reform
that it recognizes the need to
promote local initiative and is
prepared, within limits, to do some-
thing about it Under the existing
system, the collective farms have
almost no power to make independent
decisions, and some improvements may
be attempted in this respect. The
new regime has already reversed
Khrushchev's policy of further re-
stricting private plots, and addi-
tional steps to provide support for
the private sector may be taken.
The announcement of the commis-
sion's existence included the nota-
tion that local bodies have been
drafting suggestions for considera-
tion, further evidence that the
regime intends to carry through with
the agricultural program announced
by Brezhnev last March. Since that
time, he has made it quite clear that
in spite of problems and critics, the
program continues to be regarded as
a priority policy of the party and
government.
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Albania's leadership may
be ending its self-imposed iso-
lation by seeking friendlier re-
lations with some Soviet bloc
and Western countries. The Hoxha
regime may believe that this
will make it more effective as
a lobbyist in behalf of its ally
and benefactor, Communist China.
On the other hand, the regime
also may believe it prudent to
establish broader ties in case
relations with Peking become un-
palatable.
Since its break with Moscow
in 1961, Tirana has relied al-
most solely on Peking to sustain
Albania's industrialization pro-
gram and for political support.
This led to strained relations
with the Communist countries of
Eastern Europe and increased Al-
bania's isolation from the West.
In recent months, however,
Albania seems to have shown will-
ingness to improve relations with
selected Communist countries.
Tirana has, for example, responded
positively to several Rumanian
gestures of friendship. In ad-
dition, the recent renewal of
ambassadorial-level contact with
Poland may signal closer rela-
tions with that country. Albania
had always left the door open
for such an action, having never
permanently pulled its ambassa-
dor out of Warsaw.
Albania has also turned a
friendlier face toward the West.
In a recent interview with a
Turkish journalist, Albanian
Foreign Minister Shtylla stated
there were no problems in Turk-
ish-Albanian relations and, not-
ing that different political sys-
tems should not prevent them from
'being friends, urged conclusion
of cultural and trade agreements.
A French-Albanian cultural
program has included an exchange
of professors and the establish-
ment of a French chair at the
University of Tirana. Italy and
Albania signed a cultural accord
last March, and there are plans
to establish an Albanian commer-'
cial office in Italian Trieste.
Austria and Albania plan an in-
crease in the exchange of goods
for 1966.
Albania still maintains com-
plete solidarity with Peking and
there have been no indications
that a deterioration of relations
is imminent. There have been
rumors, however, that Albania has
not been entirely satisfied with
the amount and quality of aid
received from Peking.
The protracted Sino-Albanian
negotiations last fall on credits
for Tirana's economic plan (1966-
70) suggested that the Chinese
might have been reluctant to meet
Albania's requests fully. Unprec-
edentedly, the Albanian parlia-
ment, when it met in late Decem-
ber, debated but did not approve
either the 1966 national budget
or the new five-year plan. Nei-
ther is yet approved. The par- 25X1
liament's delay may be due to
incomplete negotiations with
Peking.
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South Korea is showing re-
newed interest in its security
against actions by the Commu-
nist North.
Recent Communist activity
appears to have been adapted to
meet the new situation result-
ing from the normalization of
Japanese - South Korean rela-
tions and the deployment of Ko-
rean troops to South Vietnam.
There has been no startling in-
crease in infiltrations from
the North--170 agents were ap-
prehended in 1965--but there
have been significant. changes
in agent personnel and in their
missions.
The chances for genuine
guerrilla activity appear slim.
Only small amounts of arms and
ammunition have been uncovered,
and the South Korean people con-
tinue their deep-seated opposi-
tion to Communism.
Korean authorities do not
want to be caught napping, how-
ever. They reportedly plan to
reinforce the blockade of coastal
and land penetration routes, in-
tensify operational measures
against agents, and establish
village-level organizations to
foster cooperation among the
military, the government, and
the people. They also intend
to take measures to stem agent
infiltration from Japan and to
Lighten up the Citizen's Regis-
tration Law. The police plan
to organize a Special Counter-
Guerrilla Fighting Force and
have been promised a 7,000-man
increase over their present total
of nearly 34,000.
The major drawback to ef-
fective internal security up to
now has been lack of coordina-
tion among the concerned agen-
cies. At one time, the Korean
Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA)--then headed by present
Democratic Republican Party
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chairman Kim Chong-pil--super-
seded all other services. With
the new emphasis on coordnation,
however, the CIA has inaugurated
an Armed Forces Situation Room
where intelligence representa-
tives of all services and the
police monitor the activities of
suspected North Korean agents
around the clock.
Rumors are continuing to
circulate in Djakarta regarding
President Sukarno's long-awaited
"political settlement."
Some civilian anti-Commu-
nist leaders are expressing alarm
over what they consider to be
Sukarno's growing strength and
the erosion of the army's will
to resist. They fear that Su-
karno now is planning an immi-
nent and dramatic political re-
organization that would in large
part restore his former author-
ity, undermine anti-Communist
elements, and pave the way for
an eventual restoration of Com-
munist influence in Indonesia.
Sukarno, however, has been
delaying any such direct move,
apparently in the belief that
his position can best be restored
by a more gradual approach and
the passage of time. Aware that
the future role of Indonesian
Communism is the one issue on
which the army has been willing
to oppose him directly, Sukarno
has recently been ignoring the
subject. This strategy has in-
deed strengthened his position
during the past month, and it 25X1
seems unlikely that he wishes
to risk a direct confrontation
with the army now.
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MILES
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BURMESE INSURGENCY AT A HIGH LEVEL
Various ethnic and Communist
insurgent bands are becoming in-
creasingly bold and aggressive
in many parts of Burma.
Although insurgency--endemic
in Burma since World War II
--normally mounts at the end
the southwest monsoon season in
October, an unusually high level
of activity appears to have de-
veloped over the past three
months. Rebels are impeding the
government's inept commodity dis-
tribution efforts, causing un-
certainty among farmers both by
intimidation and by spreading
rumors about the government,
and are attacking transportation
and communications arteries.
In late December, Communist-
dominated National Democratic
United Front rebels raided a
railway station and police post
about 40 miles north of Pegu on
the Rangoon-Mandalay railway.
In one of the more recent inci-
dents, unidentified insurgents
reportedly seized two armories,
one of which was at a police
station in Rangoon.
Active ethnic insurgents
include some 4,500 Karens, 4,500
Kachins, and possibly 5,000
Shans. The most serious threat,
however, is posed by some 1,000
hard-core activists of the Burma
Communist Party, known as the
White Flags and having links with
Peking.
General Ne Win's efforts 25X1
to cope with insurgency report-
edly are being hampered by de-
sertions and defections among
government forces.
an en-
ire light-infant ry battalion
stationed near Rangoon, one of
the army's elite units, deserted
in late November after being
ordered into operation against
Communist insurgents near Pegu.
The Ne Win regime is not cur-
rently endangered, however,
mainly because of the insurgents'
lack of unity and inability to
muster any appreciable popular
support.
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ZAMBIA APPARENTLY DELAYING TRADE BREAK WITH RHODESIA
The Zambian Government is
apparently no longer insisting
on immediate participation in
a total economic blockade of
Rhodesia. This change in atti-
tude came after the arrival of
a UK military planning mission
and the success of the emergency
petroleum transport operation
in delivering enough supplies
to satisfy Zambia's normal needs.
These developments appar-
ently renewed Zambian confidence
in the UK's determination to
bring down the rebel Rhodesian
regime. Zambian President
Kaunda now appears willing to
delay the threatened trade
break with Rhodesia beyond the
15 February deadline he re-
portedly agreed upon with Prime
Minister Wilson.
should Rhodesian imports be
stopped, adequate transport fa-
cilities to fill Zambia's mini-
mum requirements would not be
available at least until mid-
April.
Zambia's decision as to
the type and timing of its sanc-
tions against Rhodesia depends
on its continued faith in UK
policy. Should the oil embargo
be broken or Rhodesian tobacco
and other goods find an outlet,
a rapid reversal in Zambian pol-
icy could occur.
Further complicating the
Zambian situation is a demand
by white workers in the vital
copper mines for large increases
in pay and allowances. The
Zambian Government is publicly
committed to developing a single
wage scale for all mine workers
regardless of race, and prob-
ably will be unwilling to in-
crease the disparity of wages be-
tween Africans and whites. The
Europeans in Zambia, however,
already worried about their fu-
ture if relations between Rho-
desia and Zambia deteriorate
further, are remaining in the
country only because of the high
wages. It would take very lit-
tle additional tension to per-
suade much of Zambia's skilled
white labor force to leave the
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MILITARY REGIME BEGINS RECONSTRUCTION IN NIGERIA
General Ironsi's military
regime has taken some promising
first steps toward the more ef-
ficient governing of Nigeria.
However, an early breakdown of
discipline in the army could
still occur.
Last week, regional military
governors issued decrees designed
to restore effective local gov-
ernment and to eradicate corrup-
tion. There appears to have
been some coordination and cen-
tral guidance in the drawing up
of these decrees, but the mili-
tary governors also seem to have
some latitude in how they govern
their respective regions. The
efficiency with which the various
regions will operate probably
depends in large part on the
ability of the individual gover-
nors. At this time, Eastern
Region Governor Ojukwu stands
out as the most forceful person-
ality among the key leaders.
In an effort to increase
efficiency and cut the cost of
government, General Ironsi has
reduced the number of ministries
and reallocated the functions of
some of them. He has appointed
some new permanent secretaries
to the ministries and transferred
others, presumably in an attempt
to increase his control over the
civil service. In a further
structuring of his regime, Ironsi
also reportedly plans to set
up both a national secretariat
to coordinate the work of the
regions and an executive secre-
tariat to act as an arm of the
central military government.
The regime apparently in-
tends to develop a governmental
The regime apparently in-
tends to develop a governmental
system with a stronger central
authority than Nigeria has known
since independence in 1960.F-
L 25X1
e present
four semiautonomous regions will
be supplanted by a larger number
of provinces responsible to Lagos
under a unitary, rather than fed-
eral, structure. Although such
an arrangement is likely to be
resisted by older, traditional
leaders, it appears that it would
be welcomed by a great many Ni-
gerians. However, in the key
Northern Region, even the new
leaders who have emerged report-
edly oppose splitting up their
region unless the Eastern and
Western regions are similarly
divided.
Ironsi, a member of the Ibo
tribe as are most of the younger
officers who spearheaded the 15
January coup, seems to be trying
to counter the impression in some
quarters that the new regime will
be dominated by Ibos. Most of
the leading permanent secretaries
appear to have.been chosen be-
cause of administrative ability
rather than tribal allegiance.
However, there has been some in-
dication of tribal conflict in
the upper levels of the civil
service.
Tribal considerations are
also evidently involved in the
continuing signs of dissidence
within the army. Another reported
cause is dissatisfaction on the
part of the still restless younger
officers over the apparent deten-
tion of several of the original
coup leaders.
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ETHIOPIAN ELITE AGAIN VOICING DISCONTENT
There are new rumblings of
discontent among Ethiopia's young
educated elite--particularly in
the military--in the wake of the
military takeover in Nigeria.
The 73-year-old Emperor Haile
Selassie appears to be aware of
the rumblings, but instead of
moving toward needed reforms he
is resorting to his traditional
tactic of merely fending oft his
critics.
and open criticism of" the once-
sacred Emperor.
The Emperor had already been
under fire for his failure to
break diplomatic relations with
the UK over the Rhodesia problem.
Now the coup in Nigeria is widely
discussed in military and polit-
ical circles, and many believe
the situation in Ethiopia is
much more fragile than it was in
Nigeria when that coup occurred.
Less than two weeks after
the Nigerian coup, top Ethiopian
military leaders said they were
worried about dissatisfaction
among younger officers and civil-
ians. They stressed again that
the Emperor must make reforms to
save himself and to prevent Ethi-
opia from becoming the scene of
a similar political and military
upheaval. They gave no specific
evidence of plotting, but sug-
gested that the young educated
elite had reached a new high of
frustration and restlessness.
The wily Emperor has so far
been able to survive coup at-
tempts and to intimidate his
opponents, play them off one
against the other, and prevent
the formation of organized op-
position. Over the past months,
however, the facade of consti-
tutional government and the fact
of absolute personal rule have
spurred increasingly widespread
These half-measures may
stave off an explosion as they
have in the past. However, the
time left to the aging Emperor
for such stalling tactics is
dwindling, and his once firm con-
trol over the government appears
to be loosening.
25X1
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Europe
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS CONTINUES
The composition of the new
Moro cabinet is likely to prove
the major obstacle to an early
solution of Italy's government
crisis.
Christian Democratic (CD)
leaders were able last week to
paper over their differences suf-
ficiently to reach unanimous
agreement on a political docu-
ment pledging full party support
for the center-left program.
The meeting made clear, however,
that both former foreign minis-
ter Fanfani and CD right-winger
Mario Scelba will seek represen-
tation for their factions in the
new cabinet.
While Fanfani's wishes are
still not clear, his call for
"cabinet changes sufficient to
guarantee the program" confirms
his intention to press for sev-
eral ministerial posts. In
Scelba's case, the US Embassy
suspects his support of the CD
document was a maneuver to win
a place for his faction in the
new government..
An attempt to placate the
Scelba faction with a minor min-
istry, however, is likely to be
opposed by the CD left wing and
could raise new demands by the
other coalition partners. To
offset the inclusion of the Scelba
faction, according to a Social
Democratic (PSDI) official, the
PSDI and the Socialists (PSI)
plan to ask Moro for two of the
five key "political" ministries
now held by his party. The for-
eign.affairs and public instruc-
tion posts are considered the
most negotiable.
PSDI leader Saragat as presi-
dent, however, the CDs will be
extremely reluctant to negotiate
on any key posts. Further dif-
fi-cult bargaining appears to
lie ahead as Moro maneuvers to
placate both his own party's
factions and his coalition part-
ne=rs.
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SETTLEMENT OF EEC CRISIS
The EEC Council reached agree-
ments in Luxembourg on 28-29 Jan-
uary which will evidently end
France's seven-month boycott, but
the political issues that caused
the crisis appear basically unre-
solved.
Proposals which have been ten-
tatively accepted for "improving
Council-Commission cooperation"
are much weaker than the original
French demands. Several of Paris'
"ten points" were dropped, others
were recast in language proposed
by the Five, and the Commission's
right to initiate proposals was
preserved. Furthermore, in con-
trast to the initial French demands,
which were cast in terms of a di-
rective to the Commission, the pro-
posed new rules are subject to fur-
ther negotiation between the Coun-
cil and the Commission.
The French attempt to set new
deadlines for agricultural financ-
ing and merger of the community ex-
ecutives was rejected. Although
agreement was reached to hold an
early Council meeting, the Kennedy
Round and other issues of interest
to the Five will be discussed along
with agricultural financing.
It is the intention of the
Five not to deposit ratifications
of the treaty to merge the execu-
tives until the new Commission's
membership is agreed on. Since
the Five generally recognize that
by gaining approval for "weak" per-
sonnel Paris could inhibit the ex-
ecutive even more than by formal
restraints, the bargaining is likely
to be hard.
LEAVES ISSUES UNRESOLVED
On majority voting, the for-
mula adopted after bitter debate
merely records the differences be-
tween France and the Five. The
Five refused to recognize a mem-
ber country's continued right to a
veto in "vital" decisions, but
allowed France to register its po-
sition that discussion of issues
involving "very important inter-
ests" must go on until unanimous
agreement is reached.
The first test on the voting
issue may come in the Council
discussions on a revised negotiat-
ing mandate for the Kennedy Round.
Some confusion exists on the ex-
tent to which majority rule will
apply here, since the French may
demand a quid pro quo for agreeing
with the Germans that unanimous
voting continue to govern agri-
cultural decisions pending at the
end of 1965.
Although De Gaulle appears to
have fallen considerably short of
obtaining his maximum demands,
prospects for the community's re-
suming its normal functioning do
not appear especially bright. De
Gaulle's threats and the lengthy
crisis have taken their toll on the
"community spirit," and his reser-
vation of "freedom of action" plays
havoc with the vital assumption that
the integrative process is irre-
versible. In these circumstances,
the Dutch and the Germans in par- 25X1
ticular seem likely to continue
their efforts to revive Britain's
interest in membership.
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DOMINICAN CRISIS APPEARS NEAR CLIMAX
The political impasse in the
Dominican Republic seems to be
nearing a climax, with President
Garcia Godoy willing to make ex-
tensive concessions in the hope of
avoiding a final showdown with the
regular military.
The Dominican military--from
Minister of Defense Francisco
Rivera Caminero to the officer
corps--seem determined not to ac-
cept the President's 6 January re-
assignment. order without further
bargaining. On 31 January, Garcia
Godoy met with 60 top military of-
ficers. The President was bluntly
and repeatedly told that only the
regular military, with its morale
and integrity unscathed, can pro-
vide for internal security and
prevent the world-wide success of
Communism.
This meeting, in which Garcia
Godoy hoped to both sound out the
military and convince them of his
desire to prevent the weakening
of the armed forces, apparently
convinced him that his original
order would not be obeyed. In ad-
dition, Garcia Godoy seems to be
fearful--with some reason--that
the supporters of the former "con-
stitutional" cause, led by Juan
Bosch and his Dominican Revolu-
tionary Party, might instigate
strikes or violence to force the
removal of the chiefs.
In order to forestall a final
break with the military, and to
maintain a modicum of his support
in the former rebel camp, Garcia
Godoy appears willing to modify his
original proposal in important as-
pects. The prime consideration is
that Rivera must resign, since Gar-
cia Godoy is well aware the leftists
would not be satisfied otherwise.
Garcia Godoy appears willing, how-
ever, to permit Rivera and the
other chiefs to name their own re-
placements, and he might even be
willing to let the other chiefs re-
tain their positions. The Presi-
dent is prepared to offer guaran-
tees, backed up by the OAS, that no
further changes will be made in the
military leadership before elections.
The military reaction is un-
certain. If the proposal is only
that Rivera must go, he could hardly
maintain his stance that the mili-
tary's morale and integrity would
be seriously affected, especially
since both the leading candidates
for his position--navy chief Emilio
Jimenez and army Colonel Enrique
Perez y Perez--are competent mili-
tary officers who have the respect
of their subordinates. Rivera
could easily be accused, with some
cause, of refusing solely on per-
sonal grounds. On the other hand,
the military chiefs have increas-
ingly lost respect for Garcia Go-
doy's word, and they and Rivera
might feel that the President's
guarantee of no further changes
would be worthless.
It is also highly possible
that reaction from the former rebel
camp would be negative. Although
Rivera now is the rebels' bete
noire, both the army and air force
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chiefs are held in low esteem by the
leftists and anything less than
their replacement would probably
be considered a. sell-out. Bosch
and other elements might well carry
through on.their threats to force
the issue by calling a general strike.
Caamano could use the military's
recalcitrance as a rationale for
returning from his London attache
post.
Garcia Godoy may decide,
therefore, that only the forcible
removal of the military chiefs will
permit him to maintain his office
and prestige. He now appears will-
ing to use the Inter-American Peace
Force (IAPF) to effect their de-
parture, as was done with General
Wessin y Wessin in September.
The OAS Committee has gone on rec-
ord as supporting the President and
would authorize the IAPF to remove
the chiefs. However, it is ques-
tionable that some of the Latin
American contingents, specifically
the large Brazilian force, would
obey such an order.
Brazilian General Braga, com-
mander of the IAPF, would probably
have the most influence on whether
Latin American governments would
authorize their personnel in the
::[APF to take such action. Braga's
reluctance leaves open the possi-
bility that US forces would have 25X1
the primary responsibility of en-
forcing the Dominican Government's
decision.
POLITICAL MACHINATIONS OF BOLIVIAN JUNTA, PRESIDENT
fredo Ovando Candia has been work-
ing behind t
he scenes to block his
former co-pr
esident, General
Rene
Barrientos,
from winning the
presi-
dency in the 3 July elections. Bar-
rientos, in Europe since early Jan-
uary, is scheduled to return to La
Paz on 4 or 5 February after a
short visit in Washington.
Although professing to support
Barrientos' candidacy, Ovando has
undercut him in the past and would
probably like to destroy him po-
litically if this can be done
safely. A possible move toward
such a goal occurred last week when
the commander of the crack para-
troop regiment in Cochabamba--a
staunch Barrientos supporter--was
replaced by an officer loyal to
Ovando.
oug they have no real plan as
yet for canceling elections or
preventing Barrientos from running,
they are said to be promoting the
concept of calling a constituent
assembly as a political alternative
to elections.
there is no indication
ria e military would support
the use of force to prevent Bar-
rientos from assuming power through
elections. Therefore, Ovando will25X1
probably continue his attempts to
undercut Barrientos without pushing
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DEVELOPMENTS IN NATO
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization seems to
have come through the past year relatively well,
weathering but not surmounting two very critical is-
sues: France's threat to withdraw in 1969, and the
problem of nuclear sharing. There has, in fact,
been a noticeable trend toward a coalescence on the
part of the other 14 members in standing up to France.
On the nuclear issue, most of the members have breathed
a collective sigh of relief that the problem of creat-
ing a multilateral force is temporarily on ice while
the Special Committee pursues the possibilities of
nuclear consultation.
The narrowness of De Gaulle's
victory at the polls in December
is not expected to alter his op-
position to NATO's integrated
force structure and to the NATO-
related US military presence in
France. Although De Gaulle has
not specified the kind of rela-
tionship he wants to replace the
present NATO setup, he appears
to favor loose bilateral defense
arrangements and a continuation
of the principal Allied rights
in West Germany.
It is apparent that De
Gaulle intends if possible to
move against NATO this year. Al-
though his precise timing may be
affected by the course of the
crisis in the Common Market,
French officials have said that
the first clear and specific
moves can probably be expected
early in the spring.
Most officials believe these
moves will be aimed initially at
US bilateral status-of-forces
agreements with France. They are
expected to involve the laying
down of conditions for the con-
tLnued presence in France of US
bases. The US has made clear
that it considers these agree-
ments of interest to all mem-
bers of the alliance and will
not be satisfied with strictly
bilateral discussion if French
demands would affect the ability
of the US to perform NATO mis-
sions assigned to its forces in
Europe.
Subsequent French moves
could mean the ultimate removal
of NATO's military headquarters
(SHAPE) from France and its re-
location probably somewhere in
the low countries, with NATO
retaining little more in France
than the right to use and pass
through French territory during
wartime. It might also be neces-
sary at some time to move the
North Atlantic Council (NAC)
with its staffs and secretariat
from Paris, possibly to London
or Brussels.
In the absence of more
precise announcements of French
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intentions, the other allies are
able only to brace themselves
for a crisis of unknown scale.
Allied Nuclear Sharing
The limitation of the Erhard
talks in Washington on 20-21 De-
cember to general principles of
nuclear sharing rather than spe-
cifics is in keeping with the
Alliance consensus that this
problem should be dealt with in
a way that would not weaken the
alliance in the forthcoming show-
down with France.
Although the communique is-
sued after the meeting recognized
West Germany's right to an appro-
priate share in "nuclear defense"
with its allies, no decisions or
agreements were reached. For the
time being at least, the Germans
are apparently content to examine
their nuclear concerns with
"other interested allies." More-
over, though Bonn continues to
reiterate that consultation is
not enough, Erhard did affirm in
Washington the usefulness of
the NATO Special Committee, which
in late November had set up work-
ing groups to study NATO's nu-
clear arrangements and how to im-
prove them.
Inasmuch as the Special Com-
mittee was established to find a
generally acceptable solution
for the nuclear problem, with
or without French participation,
the successful launching of ac-
tivities has helped give NATO re-
newed vitality. The Special Com-
mittee's working groups are be-
ginning work on three problems:
the sharing of essential intel-
ligence among alliance members,
improvement of communications
procedures to allow prompt de-
cisions to use nuclear weapons,
and extending of allied par-
ticipation in alliance nuclear
planning. The three groups are
to submit their first reports
to the next meeting of the Spe-
cial Committee in the spring.
Only three members--Luxem-
bourg, Portugal, and Iceland--
-have expressed no interest at
all in the committee and its ac-
tivities. Norway, while in-
terested, decided to defer a de-
cision on whether to join. Any
skepticism among those partici-
pating in the committee is prob-
ably due to the feeling that the
outcome of its labors will de-
pend in the last analysis on
what the US puts into it. Some
are more enthusiastic because
they consider the consultative
approach to nuclear sharing
greatly preferable to West Ger-
man participation in any "hard-
ware" solution.
Although West Germany has
scheduled bilateral talks later
this spring with the US and UK,
and probably other interested
countries, any early agreement
on a concentrated effort to de-
vise a generally acceptable
"hardware" scheme is unlikely.
The ideas Bonn recently ad-
vancedfor a jointly owned nu-
clear submarine force show some
similarity to the old scheme
for an Atlantic nuclear force
put forth by the UK, but it re-
mains doubtful that the differ-
ences between these two princi-
pals could easily be negotiated
away--even if the other allies
were reconciled to accepting a
German role in such a force.
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For the time being, there-
fore, it appears likely there
will be no great pressure within
NATO to go beyond the Special
Committee approach to the nu-
clear question. France, of
course, is expected to continue
its campaign to terminate the
committee--probably when it re-
ports to the ministers in June--
because De Gaulle opposes both
any nuclear role for Bonn and
any strengthening of the NATO
structure.
Reactions to French Position
France's 14 allies, noting
De Gaulle's increasingly out-
spoken rejection of NATO funda-
mentals, appear to have tacitly
accepted the possibility that
they may have to move ahead with-
out France on vital issues. Prior
to last September, only the UK
and the US had begun to think in
terms of contingency planning to
safeguard NATO's military capa-
bilities against a possible French
defection. Since that time, when
De Gaulle harshly criticized NATO
at one of his periodic press con-
ferences, other members--among
them Denmark, Italy, and the Neth-
erlands--have also begun to talk
about alternate plans. All mem-
bers continue reluctant to visual-
ize a NATO without France, but
there is a better understanding
of the US position that NATO's in-
tegrated command structure is in-
dispensable to any credible West-
ern defense posture. Moreover,
the decision of the US and other
key allies not to confront France,
but to get on with consolidating
the alliance, has had a sympa-
thetic response.
Signs of the growing readi-
ness of the "fourteen" to hold to-
Page 3
;ether against France were evi-
dent at last December's minis-
terial gathering. There, France
challenged the standing of the
Special Committee, urging its
"temporary" character, and sug-
gested it be terminated in June
after rendering its report. The
other members--led by the US,
UK, West Germany, and Secretary
General Brosio--lined up solidly
against the French and secured
the omission from the final com-
munique' of any reference to the
committee as "temporary."
Another example of the
growing impatience with Paris
was the response to French ob-
jections to German requests that
the communique' formally reject
Soviet charges of "revanchism"
and nuclear ambitions against
Germany. With the US in the
lead, the other allies closed
ranks in support of the Germans;
even the Norwegians--who are
notably sensitive on the ques-
tion of German nuclear aspira-
tions--deserted the French. Al-
though the incident involved
"only words," Ambassador Cleve-
land believes it noteworthy for
the way the allies reacted to
French pressure.
Some Progress in Other Fields
In addition to the work of
the Special Committee, the al-
liance has been able in recent
months to show progress in sev-
eral aspects of its development,
despite the problems with France.
At the December meeting, for ex-
ample, the ministers accepted
the more modest of two sets of
1970 force goals submitted last
year by the Supreme Allied Com-
mander (SACEUR). The alliance's
Defense Planning Committee will
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use these goals as a basis for
an effort to match national capa-
bilities and proposed national
force plans. Of equal importance
was agreement by the ministers
to put NATO's regular annual re-
view on a five-year "rolling"
basis starting in January 1967.
Such a planning cycle carries a
clear implication that integrated
NATO forces will still be around
after 1970.
The French, surprisingly,
did not choose to make an issue
of this innovation--which will
involve a more intimate consul-
tation on national resources and
budgets than ever before. They
even accepted reference in the
communiqud to 1970 force goals.
The French defense minister has
nevertheless made clear that
France will under no circumstance
increase its current force commit-
ments to the alliance, and Paris
of course can resume its opposi-
tion to the force planning exer-
cise at any stage.
The ministers also agreed
to ask the North Atlantic Council
to study a US proposal for con-
centrating a greater effort on
SACEUR's mobile force. Composed
now of six army battalions and
six air squadrons from six coun-
tries, the force has been increas-
ingly recognized not only for its
usefulness as a "fire brigade"
with which to respond to threats
all along NATO's defense perimeter,
but also as an important symbol
of the NATO integrated system.
Over the past several years, how-
ever, efforts to establish it on
a firmer footing have been thwarted
by a French refusal to share exer-
cise costs of several headquarters
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Page 4 SPECIAL REPORT
units of the force. The pre-
sumption is that in agreeing
to expand and regularize the
force, the other 14 members
will have to pick up the French
share.
Infrastructure and Military
Budget Co.?t Sharing
At a special meeting on 20
and 21 January, NATO's 15 mem-
bers resolved long-standing dif-
ferences over provision of funds
for the alliance's infrastruc-
ture program and military head-
quarters budget.
Last spring the US--which
for years provided almost one
third of the annual infrastruc-
ture program funds--asked that
its share be reduced to 25 per-
cent in 1965 and to 20 percent
in later years. No agreement
was reached at that time, prin-
cipally because of UK and West
German objections, with the re-
sult that the whole program fell
a year behind schedule. By
fall, financial problems in the
British defense program led the
UK to seek a reduction in its
share of the infrastructure and
military headquarters budget.
All the major contenders at
the recent special meeting--the
US, UK, and West Germany--made
some concessions. Even the
French proved helpful through-
out, accepting increased shares
of the costs for both the in-
frastructure and the military
budgets
he US accepted a slight
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the military budget, which runs
about $75 million a year, in
exchange for a reduction in in-
frastructure from 30.85 percent
to 25.77 percent for 1965 and
future programs through 1969.
In accepting significantly
larger shares of programs that
interest them directly, the
other NATO countries not only
gave practical recognition to
the heavy world-wide defense
burdens of the US but also re-
affirmed their fundamental in-
terest in the alliance.
The Southeast Flank:
Cyprus and Malta
In the category of nagging
problems for which no easy so-
lution is in sight are the im-
pact of the Cyprus dispute on
Greece and Turkey, and the dif-
ficulties that have emerged
with Malta's independence. So
long as their dispute over Cy-
prus is not settled, effective
cooperation on defense between
Greece and Turkey is impossible.
Both countries have permitted
their differences to bring into
question the value of their NATO
ties. Both are net recipients
of military and other NATO aid.
It is growing increasingly dif-
ficult, however, to find such
assistance from the allies, none
of which relishes the prospect
that its aid might be used by
one against the other.
The question of Malta in-
volves political and economic,
as well as military, considera-
tions. As a British posses-
sion, the Maltese Islands fell
within the NATO defense zone,
but lost that status when they
became independent in October
Page 5
1964. The new government's sub-
sequent overtures for full NATO
membership were discouraged by
the present members, even though
the islands are rated as strate-
gically important and have been
the site of HAFMED, NATO's top
Mediterranean headquarters.
So far, it has been impos-
sible to work out a new NATO-
Maltese association beyond the
statement of the Maltese Gov-
ernment last fall that it would
for the time being respect its
previous commitments regarding
NATO installations, and a state-
ment by the North Atlantic Coun-
cil that the alliance members
intend to safeguard Malta's in-
dependence and territorial in-
tegrity.
Meanwhile, the question has
been complicated by proposals to
move HAFMED to Naples, and by
London's apparent intention to
cut back its military presence
on Malta. Malta is economically
heavily dependent on the mili-
tary forces and installations on
its territory. Such a blow would
probably greatly benefit the
neutralist-minded leader of the
opposition party, Dom Mintoff,
in the national elections to be
held this year.
Conclusions and Outlook
The current balance sheet
for the alliance on the big is-
suees is somewhat more positive
today than it was a year ago but
this unfortunately tells us lit-
tle about how it may look a year
from now. The current easing
off of the nuclear sharing ques-
tion does not necessarily mean
that a solution has been found
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in the Special Committee for-
mula--only that some of the
other solutions that have been
proposed have been found impos-
sible to negotiate at the pres-
ent time. Over the longer term
there will almost surely have
to be some reckoning on West
Germany's aspirations for nu-
clear parity with France and
Britain, and some redressing of
the nuclear preponderance of
the US vis-a-vis the European
allies.
As far as a showdown with
De Gaulle is concerned, the
gathering resistance to his
views is a hopeful sign, but it
cannot yet be said that a de-
termined and viable defense
against his attacks has been
devised. The current opposi-
tion is attributable at least
in part to the immoderation of
the views he has recently ex-
pressed. Ironically, a softer
statement by De Gaulle--with no
real change in his basic objec-
tive--would be far more diffi-
cult to withstand. Moreover,
it must be expected that at
least some of the European coun-
tries will in the end prove un-
willing to face up to the actual
psychological and political
costs of a failure to reach an
accommodation with France.
Finally, the conflict in
Vietnam is casting an ever
deeper shadow over the alliance.
US statements at the December
ministerial meeting seemed to
evoke a greater acceptance of
the view that Western security
is indivisible. It would be
risky, however, to expect any
overwhelming response by way of
effective aid or even a major
change in the attitude of the
Europeans toward the Asian con-
flict: (1) that it is capable
of involving them in fighting
that seems remote from European
defense requirements, (2) that
it diverts the energies and at-
tention of the US from its
proper role of leadership in the
Alliance, and (3) that it pre-
vents the East-West detente
that would lessen Europe's de-
fense burden.
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4 February 1966
SOVIET INDIVIDUAL INI'ANTR7 WEAPONS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIC, ENCE
dotiurigrading arid,,declossificotion
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SOVIET INDIVIDUAL INFANTRY WEAPONS
According to Soviet tactical doctrine, the mis-
sion of the infantry in nuclear or in conventional
war is to move in on and destroy the enemy with su-
perior maneuver and firepower. To provide the in-
fantry with the firepower required for this mission,
Soviet arms designers and industry have developed
a family of light individual assault weapons combin-
ing simplicity of design, reliability, accuracy at
common combat ranges, and high rates of fire. More
significantly, the Soviets have succeeded in stand-
ardizing on a single type of short, lightweight
cartridge for most of these weapons. Although the
weapons and the cartridge do not provide the long-
range power of most Western counterparts, they are
more effective at the shorter ranges characteristic
of modern, mobile infantry warfare.
The Tsarist Heritage
The best rifle in the So-
viet arsenal at the beginning
of World War II, the Mosin-Nagant
bolt-action rifle, was a hold-
over from the reign of Alexander
III (1881-1894).'-A rifle of
this basic 1891 design is still
available in the Soviet rifle
company for sniping purposes.
Versions of this sturdy rifle
are apparently still manufactured
in other Communist countries,
including Communist China. Its
bullet can penetrate a quarter
inch of steel at 600 yards, and
a four-power telescope enables
the sniper to hit targets at 800
yards or more.
Long before World War II,
however, the Soviets recognized
the need for increasing the fire-
power of the infantry squad and
the rate of fire of the individ-
ual infantryman.
"Hand Machine Guns"
To increase sharply the
firepower of small units in
World War II, Soviet designers
such as Degtyarev, Shpagin, and
Sudayev designed "hand machine
guns" (submachine guns) for the
individual infantryman. These
weapons, the PPSh and PPS, fire
a short, lightweight pistol car-
tridge at an effective combat
rate of 100 rounds per minute
and were produced and issued in
great quantity to Soviet rifle
units. In recent years, these
submachine guns have also been
manufactured in Eastern Europe,
Communist China, and North Korea.
Chinese versions of the
Shpagin submachine gun, called
K-50, and the Sudayev model are
currently used by the North Viet-
namese Army and by Viet Cong main
force units.
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Around 1949 the Soviets in-
troduced a new family of small
arms with a chrome-plated bore,
including the SKS carbine de-
signed by Simonov, the RPD light
machine gun designed by Degtyarev,
and the AK assault rifle designed
by Kalashnikov. All three use
a rimless cartridge (M-1943),
shorter and lighter than either
the Mosin-Nagant cartridge (or
the .30-caliber US rifle round)
but still effective at twice the
range of the submachine guns.
Of these, the SKS is becoming
obsolete in Communist armies
because it is fed by only a 10-
round clip and has a relatively
crude rear sight. It is still
used, however, in militia forces.
The other two weapons have proven
extremely effective.
The AK has become the stand-
ard Soviet and East European in-
fantryman's weapon. It is also
used by Asian Communist forces,
including the North Vietnamese
and Viet Cong. Both the weapon
and its cartridge are modeled
on the World War II German
"Sturmgewehr" (assault rifle
MP-44) which was designed to ful-
fill the roles of both the sub-
machine gun and semiautomatic
rifle. The Soviets have improved
the German model by chrome plat-
ing the bore, by refining the
rear sight, and by paring off
up to two pounds of weight in
one version--the AKM.
Elsewhere in the bloc the
Czechs have modeled their most
recent assault rifle, the M58,
after the Soviet AK. In 1965
the Hungarians introduced their
own version, characterized by
an extra pistol grip, and re-
portedly fitted for an infrared
sight. AK models are also pro-
duced in East Germany, China,
North Korea, and Finland.
Light Machine Guns
To increase the firepower
of their units below company
level, the Soviets in 1949 intro-
duced the RPD light machine gun,
fed by a 100-round belt in a
drum. This weapon was standard
in the Soviet Army until 1961.
It also is used by other Communist
forces including the Viet Cong.
Although it is an excellent am-
bush weapon because of its prac-
tical rate of fire of 150 rounds
per minute, it cannot fire single
rounds. Moreover, it lacks the
quick-change-barrel feature of
the US M-60, so the weapon must
be allowed to cool after a few
I minutes of fire.
Since 1961 in the Soviet
Army, and since 1964 in some East
European ground forces, infantry-
men have been issued large num-
bers of the Kalashnikov light
machine gun (RPK). The RPK is
a marriage of an improved version
of the AK assault rifle--the AKM
--with the stock, barrel, and
bipod of the RPD. The RPK can
fire semiautomatically like the
AKM, automatically like the RPD,
or at a "slow automatic" rate
to conserve ammunition. The maga-
zines for the RPK and AKM are
interchangeable, greatly simplify-
ing problems of production,
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Now
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training, and logistics. So
far only the USSR is known to
manufacture the RPK.
New Nonstandard Weapon
As a departure from the
trend toward weapons standard-
ization in the bloc, the Czechs
have begun issuing a new machine-
pistol, called the "Skorpion,'?"
to certain specialized units
such as border troops. The
Skorpion fires Czech pistol am-
munition, not Soviet ammunition,
and is fed by only 10- and 20-
round magazines. The weapon is
likely to be used only as a side
arm rather than as an assault
weapon.
For the rest of the 1960s,
Soviet and other Communist in-
fantrymen will rely heavily on
the combination machine gun/rifle
found in the AK. This apparently
stems from a conviction, expressed
by a writer in the January 1965
issue of the Soviet Military Re-
view, that a short burst of bul-
lets is more effective and ac-
curate than single-shot firing
"under conditions of limited
visibility commonly encountered
in modern combat."
Minor improvements in the
AK and RPK weapons will be made,
probably including a greater
use of milled and plastic parts,
to reduce the number and weight
of components. Infrared sights
will probably be used more fre-
quently in night operations.
Light machine guns may be equipped
with a quick-change barrel.
A recent article by a Colo-
nel Akimov in Starshina Serzhant,
a Soviet magazine for noncommis-
sioned officers, covers the lat-
est developments in US small arms
and provides some indication of
Soviet intentions in this area.
Akimov called particular atten-
tion to the capability of the
Stoner system, a US development
in which a single basic weapon
performs as either a full or semi-
automatic rifle or carbine or
light machine gun. He also
placed special emphasis on the
development of lightweight ammu-
nition and noted that the US was
trying to develop a plastic bul-
let, suggesting that the Soviets
might try to do the same. He was
generally skeptical of the lethal
power of a laser rifle, because
of its slow rate of fire.
Thus, while it is certain
that Soviet and other Communist
weapons specialists are investi-
gating all types of small arms,
they are not likely to abandon
the simple and effective present
family of weapons in the near fu-
(SEE PHOTOGRAPHS ON SUCCEEDING PAGES)
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SOVIET SMALL ARMS
SHPAGIN Submachine gun (PPSh)
Modified Chinese K-50 submachine gun.
Note removeable metal stock, shortened crimped barrel, jacket,
and pistol grip.
Date into use
Weight; unloaded
with loaded box
with loaded drum.
Operating method
Rate of fire
Effective range
Muzzle velocity
Overall length
Ammunition
1941
7.7 lbs.
9.26 lbs.
11.99 lbs.
Blowback
Full or semiautomatic,
100 rounds per minute
35 round box (as shown)
71 round box
200 meters (219 yards)
500 meters (1,650 feet) per
0.842 meters (33.2 inches)
7.62mm M-1930 Pistol
Remarks:
Chinese version called K-50.
SUDAYEV Submachine gun (PPS)
Date into use
Weight; unloaded
loaded
Operating method
Rate of fire
Feeding device
Effective range
Muzzle velocity
Overall length
Ammunition
Remarks:
With the stock folded the weapon is only 24.2 inches in
length. The cyclic rate of the weapon has been retarded
to permit touching off single rounds. Weapon is widely
used in for East.
SIMONOV Carbine (SKS)
Date into use 1949
Weight) unloaded
loaded
Operating method
Rate of fire
Feeding device
Effective range
Muzzle velocity
Overall length
(with bayonet folded)
Ammunition
Remarks:
Bayonet is folding type,
type, 9.5 inches long.
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1943
6.61 lbs.
7.98 lbs.
Blowback
Automatic only; 100 rds
35 round box magazine
200 meters (219 yards)
500 meters (1,650 feet) per
0.831 meters (32.7 inches)
7,62mm. M-1930 Pistol
8.49 lbs.
8.84 lbs.
Gas
Semiautomatic; 35-40 rds per min
Box magazine, 10 rounds
400 meters (440 yards)
735 meters (2411 feet) per sec
1.02 meters (40.2 inches)
both needle (cruciform) and knife.
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SOVIET SMALIL ARMS
KALASHNIKOV Assault rifle (AK-47)
1947
9.48 lbs.
10.58 lbs.
Gas
Full or semiautomatic;
80-100 rounds per minute
30 round box magazine
400 meters (438 yards)
710 meters (2,329 feet) per sec
0.87 meters (34 inches)
All AK models can be equipped with folding metal stock.
AK closely resembles the World War 11 German 7.92mm
MP-44 "Sturmgewehr," which is still used in some East
German paramilitary units. Czech M58 assault rifle is
modeled on AK. AK bayonets now issued can serve as
knife, saw or wire cutter. AK models are manufactured in
the USSR, Eastern Europe, Finland, China, and North Korea.
Date into use
Weight; unloaded
loaded
Operating method
Rate of fire
Feeding device
Effective range
Muzzle velocity
Overall length
(without bayonet)
Ammunition
Remarks:
AKM Assault rifle (Improved AK-47)
Date into use 1949
Weight; unloaded 6.93 lbs.
(without magazine)
loaded 8.87 lbs.
(with 30 rd magazine)
Operating method Gas
Rate of fire Full or semiautomatic;
100 rounds per minute
Feeding device 30 round box magazine
40 rd RPK light machinegun box
70 rd RPK light machinegun drum
Effective range 400 meters (438 yards)
Muzzle velocity 710 meters (2,329 feet) per sec
Overall length 0.87 meters (34 inches)
(without bayonet)
Ammunition 7.62mm. M-1943 short round
Remarks:
Unlike the AK-47, the AKM has a stamped receiver with
bolt guides welded to inside walls, and an improved rear
sight, graduated to 1000 meters. Also the handguard,
fore-end, pistol grip and butt stock are of laminated wood.
A Soviet journal published in October 1965 claimed that
the loaded weight of the weapon (30 round magazine)
is only 7.9 lbs., which if correct would be only a half
pound heavier than the loaded weight of the US M16.
The journal also claimed the bullet's effectiveness
(ubo)fnaya silo) is maintained up to 1,500 meters.
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SOVIET
SMALL
ARMS
Hungarian version of AK with forehand pistol grip.
Reportedly this is equipped with an inferred aiming device and has a plastic piston.
DEGTYAREV Light machine gun (RPD)
Date into use
Weight: unloaded
loaded
(with drum magazine)
Operating method
Rate of fire
Feeding device
Effective range
Muzzle velocity
Overall length
Ammunition
1949
14.5 lbs.
19.4 lbs.
Gas
150 rounds per minute
Automatic; 100 rd drum magazine
800-1000 meters
(875--1100 yards)
735 meters (2411 feet) per sec
1.04 meters (40.75 inches)
7.62mm. M-1943 short round
Remarks:
This weapon has a chromed barrel, as does the SKS, AK-4T1,
AKM and RPK, but no quick-change barrel mechanism. If
is therefore unsatisfactory for sustained fire. It was the
standard light machine gun in the Soviet Army until 1961,
but it continues to be widely used in most other Communist
armies, including the Viet Cong.
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"SOVIET SMAILL ARMS
Date into use
Weight;
Soviet soldier of Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division using RPK light machine gun
with 70-round drum magazine
KALASHNIKOV Light machine gun (RPK)
with empty box magazine 11.0 lbs.
with empty drum magazine 12.3 lbs.
O
erati
h
Remark
p
ng met
od Gas
s:
Rate of fire;
East German defectors report the RPK will com
letel
single shot
50 rounds per minute
p
y
replace the RPD in many East German units. Soviet
full automatic
130-150 rounds per minute
airborne troops may soon be equipped with an RPK with
f
l
Feeding device
30 ro
d AK
a
o
ding stock. Recent models of the RPK ca
f
un
M box magazine
40 round box magazine
n
ire at
slow automatic as well as full automatic, thus conserving
ammunition
70 round drum magazine
.
Effective range 800 meters (875 yards)
Muzzle velocity 745 meters (2444 feet) per
MOSIN.NAGANT Rifle 1891/30
Date into use 1891
Weight; unloaded 9.9 lbs.
loaded 11.2 lbs.
(with telescopic sight)
Opera'ing method Turning bolt
Rate of fire;
single shot 10 rounds per minute
Feeding device Box magazine, 5 rounds
Effective range 400 meters (438 yards)
Muzzle velocity 865 meters (2838 feet) per sec
Overall length 1.23 meters (48.5 inches)
(without bayonet)
Ammuniition 7.62mm M-1908 rimmed
Remarks:
Still in service as a sniper's rifle. A shorter, lighter carbine
version was issued in 7944. These two were standard
weapons of the Soviet infantry at the end of World War H.
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U.S. AND SOVIET SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION
U.S.
US.30 caliber (7.62-mm.)
M-1 RIFLE
US.30 caliber (7.62-mm.)
M-1 & M-2 CARBINE
US 7.62-mm. (.30 caliber)
M-14 RIFLE
111i1411r11~~ - . ~~ ~
US 5.56-mm. (.223 caliber)
M-16 RIFLE
SOVIET
Soviet 7.62-mm. (.30 caliber M1908)
MOSIN-NAGANT RIFLE,
RP-46 COMPANY MACHINE GUN
Soviet 7..6 caliber pistol)
K-50 (PPSh) & PPS
Soviet 7.62-mm. (.30 caliber M1943)
AK-47 (oil versions), SK$, -RPD, & RPK
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US .45 caliber (11-mm. M40)
.45 PISTOL, THOMPSON,
M-3 SUBMACHINE GUN
4 FEBRUARY 1$66
60874
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