WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3
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RIPPUB
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S
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35
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December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 30, 2008
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1
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Publication Date: 
February 25, 1966
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
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Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79- 00927A005200 0030001-3 COpY .No.; State Dept. review completed '~- .' !-, v. / 5-' RQUP` ['+Xq ,YCl2K~"~t,'Olf1 *to }IC _ 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 VW SECRET C O N T E N T S (Information as of noc EST, 24 February 1966) VIETNAM Large allied forces continue to maintain pressure on enemy strongholds throughout South Vietnam. Viet Cong activity increased this week in northernmost I Corps. South Vietnam's new cabinet--generally characterized by the youth and southern origin of the new appointees --should permit more effective handling of economic problems, as well as stanch charges of undue northerner influence in Saigon. Hanoi continues to attack peace talk proposals in harsh terms, but not without showing concern that its hard line is alienating its non-Communist supporters, GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS The major powers seem no closer to agreement on a non- proliferation agreement. The nonaligned states now are insisting that the nuclear powers make concessions if they expect others to agree not to acquire nuclear arms. The Communist World USSR UNVEILS FAIRLY REALISTIC ECONOMIC PLAN FOR 1966-70 The draft of the new Soviet five-year plan sets targets for 1970 which are substantially lower than the gran- diose ones promulgated by Khrushchev in 1961, Page SECRET Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 SECRET BULGARIAN PREMIER MAY RESIGN FOLLOWING NATIONAL ELECTIONS 10 Todor Zhivkov, the only bloc leader still holding the top jobs in both party and government, may use announce- ment of a new government next month as a convenient occasion to step down gracefully from the premiership. 11 HUNGARIAN REGIME ATTEMPTS TO BRAKE POPULAR DISCONTENT The Kadar regime is engaged in a campaign to impress on the population its intention to deal severely with any threat to stability--without, however, discontinuing its tolerance of criticism and differences of opinion. SUKARNO STRIKES BACK AT INDONESIAN ARMY General Nasution, leader of the army's anti-Communist campaign, has been removed as defense minister, and President Sukarno seems to have regained most of his former authority. FAYSAL AND NASIR RESUME CONTACT OVER YEMEN royalists and Although the peace conference between rrepublicans failed to resume as scheduled last weekend, a communication from King Faysal to President Nasir has restored contact between the sponsors of the Yemeni rivals. ADEN NATIONALISTS MAY BE ABANDONING TERRORISM No incidents have been reported in several weeks, a new to have political body rarist group, , plans lessens the sense of conflict. SECRET Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 SECRET LEFTIST MILITARY FACTION SEIZES POWER IN SYRIAN CAPITAL 17 The move by followers of former army chief of staff Jadid followed a series of actions by the relatively moderate government to undermine them. ARMY OVERTHROWS NKRUMAH REGIME IN GHANA 17 Officers long opposed to Nkrumah took advantage of his absence abroad to move on 24 February. They are likely to be less hostile to the West. PRIME MINISTER SEIZES SUPREME POWER IN UGANDA 18 Obote acted on 22 February in response to growing ag- gressiveness by critics within his party as well as by political opponents. Europe THE EEC AND THE KENNEDY ROUND Despite the settlement of the EEC crisis last month, indications are that the community will make only lim- ited and piecemeal advances on its Kennedy Round nego- tiating position during the next few months. PREMIER MORO FORMS NEW GOVERNMENT IN ITALY The 33-day-old government crisis ended with formation of Christian Democrat Moro's third center-left coali- tion cabinet, but the disunity within his party which precipitated the crisis has only been papered over. SECRET Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 SECRET AUSTRIA'S NATIONAL ELECTIONS Parliamentary elections set for 6 March could bring im- portant changes in the two-party coalition which has ruled since World War -II. These in turn might bring a more incisive government program for domestic affairs but no change at all in foreign policy. Western Hemisphere DEATH OF COLOMBIAN GUERRILLA LEADER MAY REDUCE TERRORISM Ex-priest Camilo Torres, killed last week in an ambush of an army patrol, had been expected to attract support for the guerrilla movement. SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN CHILE -In-response to Chilean initiatives taken in pursuit of the Frei administration's "independent foreign policy," the USSR in recent months has taken steps to increase trade. Moscow is also trying to thaw relations be- tween the Frei government and Chile's Communist Party. SECRET Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 ``e SECRET Large allied forces continue to maintain pressure on enemy strongholds throughout South Vietnam. Viet Cong activity in- creased this week in northernmost I Corps. Two Viet Cong attacks of battalion strength were reported in Quang Tri Province on 22 Feb- ruary, resulting in some 68 gov- ernment casualties. In Quang Nam on the same day, several Viet Cong companies attacked govern- ment forces guarding a bridge and battled reinforcements through- out the day. Meanwhile, South Vietnamese troops operating near Hue in Thua Thien Province encountered stiff opposition from a possible new Viet Cong regiment, and re- ported 154 casualties in two days of fighting. In neighbor- ing Quang Tin Province, US ma- rines launched an operation near the provincial capital of Tam Ky, where increasing enemy pressure had recently been reported. Lit- tle contact has resulted thus far although the Viet Cong First Regiment, the North Vietnamese 36th Regiment, and several inde- pendent battalions are suspected of being in the area. Elsewhere, allied forces continue to encounter pockets of enemy opposition in Operation WHITE WING, now in its fifth week in northeastern Binh Dinh Province. Cumulative enemy losses have risen to more than 1,600 killed and 375 captured. Allied casualties are 267 killed (146 US), 1,040 wounded (691 US), and 15 missing (all US). South Vietnamese troops on a routine search-and-destroy op- eration in northern Darlac Prov- ince this week established con- tact with large Communist forces. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 SECRET Farther south, US forces initiated a major operation against Viet Cong forces and installations in the border area of Binh Duong, Tay Ninh, and Hau Nghia provinces on 20 February. Little contact with Viet Cong main forces has resulted F - should offset criticism of the government as being overly in- fluenced by northerners. By finding other jobs within the government for the ministers he replaced, Ky apparently avoided the problem of disgruntled ex- officials. The reorganization should permit more effective handling of growing economic problems, and the US Embassy be- lieves that the new cabinet may provide stronger governmental teamwork. Hanoi on Negotiations South Vietnam's New Cabinet Premier Ky's cabinet reor- ganization was announced on 21 February, after receiving the approval of the ruling military Directorate. The most signifi- cant changes are the installa- tion of a new minister of national economy and the division of the public works and communications function into separate portfolios, with new men to handle each one. A ministry of veterans' affairs was also established, as were secretariats--attached directly to the premier's office--for montagnards, refugees, and in- spection (corruption). The new appointees are gen- erally characterized by their youth and southern origin, which DRV propaganda continues to attack current negotiations pro- posals in harsh terms. The party daily this week ran an article by Chien Si which criticized "charita- ble persons" in the world-- whether "governments, the UN, or religious powers"--for urging Hanoi to make concessions in its terms for peace. The article made it clear that no such con- cession will be forthcoming. Articles by Chien Si--whose name is a pseudonym meaning "fighter" --almost always contain some of Hanoi's toughest language. There are growing signs,how- ever, of Hanoi's concern that its continued rejection of negotia- tion proposals is losing support abroad, particularly in the non- aligned countries. SECRET Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Ite SECRET THAI LAN D J Q NG DUC K"EN cna PHONG POC QUANG ?LYGAI PHU BON P YEN Y YEN DUC 'a Lat'r1, ) 0 25 50 75 100 Mrles D 25 5~ 75 7~0 K:.lometers PHNOM PE~H ( TAYT G ~~ j INH ITAL MILI~R Gt KH N SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 SECRET Earlier this month North Vietnam- ese politburo member Le Due Tho publicly criticized Foreign Min- istry officials for failing to generate significant world sup- port for Hanoi's policies, and many DRV ambassadors are believed to be currently in Hanoi for briefing sessions. Hanoi had planned to play host to President Nkrumah of Ghana this coming week in an ef- fort to drum up African support for Vietnamese Communist policies. Nkrumah's past efforts to mediate the dispute had been politely turned aside by the North Viet- namese. The coup against Nkrumah on the eve of his arrival in Hanoi, however, leaves the whole ques- tion of his trip and its objec- tives in some doubt. Peking on War With the US Peking on 20 February re- sponded to Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy's speech of 12 February with an authoritative People's Daily article emphasizing Peking's "peaceful nature" and attempting to prove that it was the US which was threatening China. In asserting that an enemy such as the US stimulated the Chinese people to greater sacrifice, unity, and accomplishment, the Chinese came close to admitting that Peking is consciously ex- ploiting the specter of a Sino- US war for domestic purposes. The article clearly treated war with the US as a contingency rather than an inevitability and conveyed little or no sense of urgency. It concluded with a repetition of Peking's standard line implying that China will not provoke a war with the US, asserting that "should US im- perialism dare to attack China, it will be courting its doom." SECRET Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 SECRET GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS At the Geneva disarmament talks the major powers seem to have moved no closer to agreement on a nonproliferation treaty. The negotiations now are compli- cated by the insistence of some of the nonaligned states that the nuclear powers must make conces- sions if they expect other coun- tries to agree not to acquire nuclear weapons. India, which usually acts as the voice of the nonaligned at Geneva, has publicly stated that neither the Soviet nor the US draft of a nonproliferation treaty is acceptable. Not only does India oppose "special dis- pensation" for military alliances in the context of nonprolifera- tion, but its delegate has de- clared that any treaty acceptable to New Delhi must embody obliga- tions on the part of the nuclear states--such as a freeze on pro- duction of nuclear weapons and vehicles. This demand reflects the growing feeling of insecurity among Indian defense officials in light of the recent Indian- Pakistani difficulties and fur- ther development of the Chinese nuclear weapons program. There is now increasing pressure on the Indian Government to develop its own nuclear weapons. India has been supported by Japan, whose foreign minister has taken the stand that the nuclear powers should not try to prevent non- nuclear powers from obtaining nuclear capability without re- ducing their own nuclear resources. Given the special concerns of the nonaligned, Soviet Premier Kosygin's recent proposal to pro- hibit use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states which are parties to the nonprolifera- tion treaty and which do not have nuclear weapons on their terri- tories appears to have been well timed. His ideas quickly won a sympathetic response from the nonaligned, but the West sees in them an obstacle to any nuclear- sharing arrangements in NATO. They also raise the question whether the US and its Allies would be allowed to continue to station nuclear weapons in West Germany. A Western counterproposal-- perhaps one that simply offered assistance from nuclear powers to nonnuclear powers in case of attack--is being considered but no agreed draft has been produced. SECRET Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 SECRET THE NEW SOVIET FIVE-YEAR PLAN Table I OVER-ALL INDICATORS NATIONAL INCOME Merest concept.' GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 'Western concept; Gross Value of Output'' Net Value Added Gross ?" Net Average Annual Percentage Rote of Growth 1961-65 (Actual) USSR's Figure for USSR's CIA's 1966-70 (Plan) 2.2 4.6 2.3 The official measure excludes the value of services and overstates the contribution of industry by including all indirect taxes. Including double counting of raw materials and intermediate products. Including double counting of livestock products and animal feed. Average annual increase 1966-70 over 1961-65. table II PLANNED RECOVERY of SOVIET INVESTMENT Average Annual Rate of Growth (rounded to nearest %7 percent) 1961-65 (Actual) 1966-70 (Plan) Total Gross Fixed Investment 517 Industry, Transport,. and 67 Communications Housing and Consumer Services Table 111 NEW, MORE REALISTIC 1414 GOALS Claimed 1965 Item Output New 1970 Goal. Khrushchev's 1970 Goal" w.ar Oil (million metric torts) Electric Power (billion kilowatt-h1`51 507 845 950 Steel (million metric to'e) 91 127 145 Machinery (billion rubles) 60 99 115 Fertilizer (million metric tons) Plastics and Resins (1,000 metric tons) 821 2.200 5,300 Chemical Fibers (1 000 metric tons) 407 805 1,350 , Cement (million metric tons) 72 103 127 Textiles (billion square meters) 7.5 9.7 13.6 Leather footwear 486 620 825 (million pairs) Grain (million metric tons) 121 169 229 Meat (million metric tons) --- 9.6 11.8 75 Under the 1966-70 plan. tinder 20-year program outlined in 1961. Actual production estimated of IOU million metric tons of grain and t34 million metric tons of meat. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 SECRET NW USSR UNVEILS FAIRLY REALISTIC ECONOMIC PLAN FOR 1966-70 The draft of the new Soviet five-year plan is generally a realistic projection of trends of the recent past, although it in- cludes factors that make its com- plete accomplishment doubtful. In all instances the new targets for 1970 are substantially re- duced from the grandiose goals for 1970 promulgated by Khru- shchev in 1961. The plan is highlighted by an increase of about 40 percent in national income and a 36-per- cent increase in the real income of consumers--or a 30-percent rise on a per capita basis. Over-all investment is planned to increase by 47 percent over the 1961-65 total. As in the past, the an- nounced data are not precise enough to give a clear indica- tion of projected trends in de- fense spending. The most direct reference to defense is a state- ment on the need to "ensure the further growth of the defense might of the Soviet Union." A 50-percent increase in in- dustrial output is expected to result from an equivalent per- centage increase in industrial investment. This projection is in line with the performance of recent years. In contrast, a 25-percent increase in agricul- tural production is expected to require about a 95-percent in- crease in agricultural investment. The Brezhnev agricultural program --which is retained in its en- tirety--at least recognizes the high cost of expanding food pro- duction in the USSR. Even so, the agricultural goal is probably much higher than can be attained. Within industry, the produc- tion gap between capital and con- sumer goods is expected to narrow, but heavy industry is still favored for the rest of the 1960s. Large planned increases in the enumerated industrial items appear attainable in light of the projected growth in investment and labor productiv- ity. The so-called progressive industries--electronics, engineer- ing, chemistry, and metallurgy-- are singled out for especially rapid development during 1966-70. The 25-percent increase planned for agriculture is well in excess of the 12-percent rise claimed for 1961-65. This also holds for the projected 30-percent increase in grain production. Soviet statistics on grain pro- duction, which US intelligence considers inflated since 1958, show only a seven-percent rise in the past five years. The USSR apparently is count- ing heavily on the incentives contained in Brezhnevts agricul- tural program for 1966-70 to reach its 1970 goals for farm products. Increased yields are stated to be the major factor in this growth, along with a huge SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 SECRET planned increase of 40-45 percent in agricultural labor productiv- ity. A monthly guaranteed wage for collective farm workers and other steps to improve the rela- tive economic standing of the peasantry are to be primary means for achieving this rise in pro- ductivity. Large increases are planned in the production of consumer durables, including an almost fourfold rise in the output of automobiles, but effective de- mands for many of these items probably will not be met during the plan period. Even if the automobile target is reached, production in 1970 would still total only about 750,000 units, or less than ten percent of US output last year. The major em- phasis in consumer welfare will be to narrow the gap in living standards between the rural and urban population. The incomes of collective farmers, for ex- ample, are planned to grow by 35 to 40 percent by 1970, com- pared with a 20-percent rise pro- jected for nonfarm incomes. Achievement of the projected increases in the per capita con- sumption of food products would mean a significant improvement in the Soviet diet. Grain prod- ucts and potatoes, which now make up about 60 percent of the Soviet citizen's daily caloric intake, are to account for less than half by 1970. The maximum planned per capita consumption of meat by 1970 is to be almost 100 pounds per year. This would be an impressive increase on a relative basis, but still less than half of current US consump- tion. The plan directives speak in generalized terms of the bene- fits expected from technological progress and the new system of economic management now being introduced into Soviet industry. The regime apparently feels that potential but unmeasurable de- velopments in these fields should be incorporated in planning for the next five years. The plan draft stresses re- peatedly that the decisions of the March agricultural plenum and the September plenum on eco- nomic management and administra- tion underlie the achievement of the 1966-70 goals. The reit- eration of the continuing im- portance of these meetings, which are closely associated with Brezh- nev and Kosygin respectively, appears to emphasize their po- litical strength as the USSR moves toward its 23rd party con- gress a little more than a month away. The congress will un- doubtedly approve the present draft of the 1966-70 plan with only peripheral adjustments in some of the details. SEC E1 Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 SECRET BULGARIAN PREMIER MAY RESIGN FOLLOWING NATIONAL ELECTIONS Bulgarian party first secre- tary Todor Shivkov may give up his other position of prime minis- ter following the proforma na- tional elections on 27 February. Rumors to this effect have per- sisted since the ouster of Khru- shchev and were particularly prev- alent immediately following last April's antiregimc conspir- acy. The first session of the newly enlarged (416 deputies) National Assembly next month, when the old government formally re- signs, would present a convenient occasion for Zhivkov to withdraw gracefully from the premiership. On the other hand, the expected division of party-government lead- ership could be delayed until af- ter the ninth party congress later this year. Zhivkov is the only Soviet bloc leader still to hold both the top party and government po- sitions. The 54-year-old leader had said he planned to retain the two positions at least un- til the elections. Last October he told a visiting New York Times correspondent tFe party central committee wanted him to keep both jobs, but that it was too much work for one man. He may have held on this long in an effort to promote Bulgaria's new image of self-determination rather than once again be ac- cused of being a Soviet syco- phant. First Deputy Premier Zhivko Zhivkov, a capable and experi- enced administrator, is the most likely candidate to replace Todor Zhivkov as prime minister. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 SECRET Deputy premiers Stanko Todorov and Pencho Kubadinski are dark horses. Because of the trend toward splitting party-state leadership, members of the party secretariat would seem to be ex- cluded from advancement in the government hierarchy. Additional leadership reshuffling may occur during 1966 to fill long-standing vacancies created by the death of politburo member Dimitur Ganev and the promotion of former first deputy premier Georgi Traykov. The Kadar regime is engaged in a campaign to impress upon the Hungarian population its inten- tion to deal severely with any threat to stability--without, however, discontinuing its toler- ance of criticism and differences of opinion. The regime is using a mix- ture of frequent announcements of arrests, explanatory editorials, and speeches by prominent offi- cials in an effort to discourage criticism and to brake popular discontent which rose when price increases were announced 19 De- cember in connection with pro- posed economic reforms. As part of this campaign, the party daily commented on 19 February on the rearrest over the past year of a number of priests and laymen on charges of conspiracy against the state. There is no evidence of a drive aimed specifically at the church. Nevertheless, relations with the Vatican have deteriorated because of these arrests. Former Hungarian citizens, generally urged by the regime to return for visits, have also come under editorial fire and in some cases have been summarily ex- pelled for "incitement." SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 SECRET President Sukarno this week inflicted a major defeat on the Indonesian Army and now appears to have largely completed the restoration of his former author- ity. In a cabinet reshuffle an- nounced on 21 February, General Nasution, leader of the army's anti-Communist political campaign, was removed as defense minister. His other post as chief of the armed forces staff was abolished. The new defense minister is Major General Sarbini, an anti-Communist regarded in the past as loyal to Nasution. Sukarno presumably feels he will be able to exert considerable influence over Sar- bini. The cabinet changes also included replacement of several moderate members by leftists, and the general complexion of the 100-man body has now shifted leftward. Sukarno also abolished the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI) which the army during a brief period several months ago tried to expand into a super- cabinet and which it had con- tinued to use as a channel for political action. He replaced it with a new organization whose mission will be confined to mili- tary operations against Malaysia. Initial statements by army leaders expressed strong opposition to Sukarno's countermoves. Nasu- tion, however, continues to main- tain that a direct confrontation between the army and Sukarno would end in disaster, and the military now seems willing to accept Sukarno's latest actions without a contest. Following the announcement of 21 February both leftist and anti-Communist students began demonstrating in Djakarta. On 23 February leftist students staged a brief attack on the US Embassy. The following day right- wing students staged a massive demonstration in front of the palace in a futile attempt to prevent the installation of the new cabinet. The army did not connive in this, and for the present appears unwilling to give strong encouragement to its student partisans. SECRET Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Ssu maof 102 1 104 u l I N A L~ . '1 .- Nam Ou?`: Lai ChaU-. ~ng Saly, ?'!~~ 6hon Phou Khoun!!f' Xiang PLAINE DES '~' Khouang JARRES VIEI TIANE_.-- T H A I IL A N D Samneua`1-=.-- O HSri ., Muong;Hlem (Na Khang Ban Ban (~.?~,..~ /'~~? Son`; La ;Pak Sane 08L P -.Lak '~..~ Mukdahan'' .I Ha Giang N O R, T H to B Bang. c7` Khngo Se one ~Tinh Railroad T 0 under reconstruction qq MOI PON vl MUGTf(,`-`~, Quang Khe- PASS \ ~y+ D mamation Line }----y l~ g He Tchepone Atl u(r y s'HonG_'... Qakse GULF OF SJAM 00 Miles C A M B 0 D I ,A Stung 106 Ching-hsi C H I N A Hue' ~ ... SOUTH J --16 J VIETNAM tl\ 108 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 14;~ F C IC F. T Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 SECRET SECRET Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 SECRET The Harad peace conference between Yemeni royalists and re- publicans failed to reconvene on 20 February as scheduled, but the dialogue has been resumed between the rivals' backers, Saudi Arabia's King Faysal, and Egypt's President Nasir. Faysal has also been seeking international support in case the renewed relationship with Nasir breaks down completely. He has sent Prince Sultan to the US to warn of what the Saudis see as a Communist menace in the Red Sea area. Both republicans and royal- ists still seem prepared to re- sume their talks--recessed in December--although neither side has indicated a readiness to al- ter previous positions which caused a deadlock. An important reason for the lack of progress is a growing alienation between Nasir and Faysal over the inter- pretation of their Jidda agree- 25X1 ment of last August which out- lined the steps for achieving peace in Yemen. As before the Jidda Agree- ment, Cairo does not seem to be consulting the present Yemeni Government for suggestions or approval of actions. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 SECRET ADEN NATIONALISTS MAY BE ABANDONING TERRORISM There are increasing signs that the terrorist campaign against British rule in Aden and the South Arabian Federation is being aban- doned. Since early last month, when Egypt merged the two chief nationalist groups into a new or- ganization, no terrorist incidents have been reported. London's an- nouncement on 22 February of its intention to abandon the Aden mil- itary base in 1968 deprives the Cairo-backed nationalists of their prime cause. Previously the principal out- lets for anti-British activity had been the National Liberation Front (NLF), a terrorist organi- zation, and the People's Socialist Party (PSP), which had stuck to legal political methods. Despite the success of its mounting acts of violence, which led the Brit- ish to suspend the constitution last September, the NLF had failed to get along with either its Egyp- tian sponsors or moderate national- ists like the PSP. The new movement, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), is an at- tempt by Cairo to bridge the gap between terrorism and political action. FLOSY, in meetings in Cairo, is currently trying to get its organizational structure set. It has already attracted the at- tention of political groups which had shunned the NLF. Even dis- sident tribal leaders and the South Arabian League, whose strength lies in the federation, have observers at these meetings, despite their opinion that FLOSY is more likely to aid Aden alone than the broader based federa- tion. FLOSY may be preparing to set up a government in exile, although the leadership is in dispute. Former Aden premier Makkawi, whom the British de- posed in September, is the nat- ural candidate. The Egyptians, however, apparently prefer Ab- dulla Asnag, the Adeni labor leader who heads the PSP. London's evacuation plans were met with initial bitterness in the British-backed federation. Its foreign minister stated, how- ever, that evacuation would give the Federation a basis for a reconciliation with Egypt and with moderate Adeni nationalists like Asnag. The failure of the Asnag group to join recent dis- cussions of constitutional pro- posals nevertheless suggests that the Adeni nationalists have not yet made up their minds as to whether they want a completely independent Aden or to associate with the federation, SECRET Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 SECRET - A dissident hard-line mili- tary faction of Syria's Baath Party seized power in Damascus early on 23 February. The move was led by followers of Major General Salah Jadid, a former army chief of staff who was ousted by more moderate Baath leaders in December. The military clique pro- claimed a curfew, closed Syria's borders, and announced the ar- rest of Presidential Council Chairman Hafiz and the party's key civilian leaders, including Prime Minister Salah al-Din Bitar. Radio Damascus announced that a new "provisional regional command" of the party would rule until a permanent new command could be established. The extent of the group's support is still uncertain, how- ever. Radio Aleppo, in the north, announced on 23 February that army units in Aleppo and central Syria had remained loyal to Hafiz and Bitar. The key southwest frontier command also apparently opposed the coup initially. Units there, however, had made no move as of 24 February. The radicals in Damascus, for their part, claim the loyalty of all important units, and on 24 February Radio Aleppo began stating that northern military units supported the coup although the situation there remains con- fused. Damascus has announced the appointments of a new chief of staff and a minister of de- fense. Jadid's role was not clari- fied. The known leaders of the group are considered radicals, but how far to the left of the socialist Bitar regime they would shift is still uncertain. The conflict had been build- ing up since December, when the moderates dissolved the Jadid- dominated regional organization of the Baath and appointed Bitar to form a new government. The Jadidists' influence had been further dissipated last week when the regime purged the party's legislative body of its military members. ARMY OVERTHROWS NKRUMAH REGIME IN GHANA Ghanaian Army and police of- ficers long opposed to President Nkrumah took advantage of his absence on a trip to Asian Commu- nist capitals to end his radical regime on 24 February. His dis- missal was announced by Colonel Kotoka, commander of one of the army's two brigades. Ghana's only political party has been disbanded, and other offices and SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 SECRET institutions abolished, including the cabinet and parliament. Most of the military--par- ticularly in the capital area-- appear to be supporting the coup, including Colonel Ocran, com- mander of the other brigade. The top army officer, Chief of Defense Staff Aferi, is in Addis Ababa on OAU matters. Nothing has been heard from chief of staff Barwah. The air force and navy commanders were arrested at once, probably for vacillating, and General Hassan, the military in- telligence chief believed loyal to Nkrumah, has also been de- tained. The initial outlines of the new regime are beginning to take shape. The coup leaders have recalled General Ankrah--dis- missed as deputy defense staff chief by Nkrumah for suspected disloyalty last summer--and have named him commander of the armed forces. They seem generally in- clined toward a more moderate re- gime which will at least be ap- preciably less hostile to the West than Nkrumah's. Nkrumalh apparently was still unaware of the coup when he ar- rived in Peking on a flight from Rangoon. lie is unlikely to try to return to Ghana immediately in a bid to reverse the coup, but he will surely plot a comeback from wherever he lights. Prime Minister Obote seized t The well-disciplined, apo- supreme power in Uganda on 22 I litical special police who are February in a desperate bid for political survival. His sudden move, executed almost single- handedly, appears to have neu- tralized all opposition. Five moderate southern min- isters of Obote's own party are under detention in the north. The police are searching for lead- ers of the opposition parties, but most of them, including Presi- dent Mutesa, are unaccounted-for. To justify his move Obote has charged the arrested ministers with plotting to overthrow him, and he may also claim they re- ceived foreign financial aid. responsible to the prime minis- ter and commanded by a northerner accounted for Obote's initial success. Next day he ensured control of the faction-ridden army by restoring Chief of Staff Amin to active command. Obote's increasingly ag- gressive foes had previously backed him into a corner. Last week the cabinet's moderate ma- jority forced him to agree pub- licly to court-martial Colonel Amin and to set up an interna- tional commission to investigate SEAU ET Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 N"O `Vol SECRET government corruption. These boards would almost certainly have incriminated Obote, Amin, and two other radical northern ministers for pocketing some $300,000 from the Congolese rebels last year. Obote and the very few radi- cal cronies in on his plan have set themselves against almost every important element in Uganda politics. Obote can be expected to abolish the cabinet, parlia- ment, and political parties to eliminate the power of the tradi- 25X1 tional southern tribal leaders. He will also try to remove from the scene all influential poli- ticians who might serve as a rallying point for the country's conservative majority. Obote's regime will almost certainly veer to the left in African and international af- fairs and probably seek increased military aid from the USSR. The 25X1 British military attache has been advised that he is persona SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 SECRET The EEC Council will resume a semblance of normal activity when it meets next week, but in- dications now are that the com- munity will make only limited and piecemeal advances on its Kennedy Round negotiating posi- tion during the next few months. In a preliminary discussion last week by the permanent rep- resentatives of preparations for Kennedy Round negotiations--the first serious one since France's return to the EEC bodies in Brus- sels--there were signs the French intended to drag their feet. The French representative, for ex- ample, rejected a procedural sug- gestion of the Commission which he argued would imply that the EEC's list of items to be ex- cepted from tariff reductions was negotiable. On another point, the French made it clear that discussions the Commission was authorized to begin on chemicals in the Kennedy Round talks in Geneva could only be "exploratory." Although the Six agreed in the January "settlement" of the SECRET Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 SF "RE T crisis that Kennedy Round ques- tions should be taken up con- currentig with EEC agricultural financing and regulations for marketing and pricing of indi- vidual commodities within the community, it is uncertain whether this will in fact be possible. Both the French and Italians are hesitant about a German suggestion to proceed commodity by commodity in Geneva as the EEC resolves each agri- cultural regulation, rather than to wait until the community can present an agreed complete agri- cultural package balancing the individual priorities of the Six. A Luxembourg official has remarked that German pressure for "premature" consideration of Kennedy Round issues might renew or increase tensions with France and thereby result in slower rather than more rapid progress toward community agree- ment on Kennedy Round offers. High French officials, mean- while, have been making state- ments skeptical of the urgency of "early" tariff reductions and emphasizing the vulnerability of French industry to rapid lower- ing of tariffs. They have also revived political arguments against the Kennedy Round which were associated with the period preceding the collapse of the UK accession talks in 1963. Thus 1 several recent speeches Agri- ci'ture Minister Faure has played on the alleged danger to Euro- pean unity of a weakening of the community's protective external tariff. What is rapidly assum- ing the proportion of a new French campaign holding out trade liberalization only as a long- term goal is probably due in part to the influence of Michel Debr?, the new minister of economy and finance, but it may also corres- pond to a French desire to ap- pear as the best defender of Eu- ropean interests. While the EEC wrestles with the problem of meeting Kennedy Round deadlines, there are growing indications of Scan- dinavian, and possibly even some cautious British, specu- lation that the time may be ap- proaching when circumstances will favor an application to the Common Market. Although it is not clear that such thinking is related mainly to pessimistic prognoses about the Kennedy Round, several reported state- ments by Norwegian officials, in particular, indicate that it is skepticism over French intentions which may be spur- 25X1 ring a round of "contin enc lannin SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 SECRET PREMIER MORO FORMS NEW GOVERNMENT IN ITALY Italy's 33-day-old govern- ment crisis ended on 22 Febru- ary with the formation of Chris- tian Democratic Premier Moro's third center-left coalition cabi- net. Allocation of subministerial posts is likely to continue through next week, and the new government probably will be in- vested before 10 March. Major changes in the new cabinet are the assignment of two posts to members of the right wing of the Christian Democratic Party (CD) and the appointment of former finance minister Tremelloni, a Social Democrat, as minister of defense. Tremelloni replaces Christian Democrat Giulio Andre- otti, who becomes minister of industry and cnmmcrce. The US Embassy believes Tremelloni's appointment does not presage any changes in Italy's defense poli- cies. Amintore Fanfani, a Chris- tian Democrat, returns as foreign minister. Tromelloni's appointment satisfies the demand of the CD's principal coalition partners, the Socialists (PSI) and Social Democrats (PSDI), that one of their members be given a key "political" ministry. The PSI also received an additional full ministry (Foreign Commerce). In return the CD won representation-- for the first time--for all its factions in the government. The deadlock over right-wing leader Mario Scelba's demand for a cabi- net post was broken when Scelba was given presidency of the CD national council and the lay partners accepted members of his faction in the Agriculture and Transport posts. The new government's program gives priority to parliamentary action on the five-year economic plan, establishment of additional regional governments, school re- form, and urban legislation. Controversial elements of the program will be difficult to put through, as in the past. Several coalition leaders reportedly believe the new Moro government will be more stable now that all CD factions are represented. However, the dis- unity within the CD party which produced the crisis has only been papered over, and intraparty power struggles are likely to continue to plague the coalition. In particular, Fanfani can be ex- pected to seek new opportunities to wrest the premiership from Moro. The fear of some CD lead- ers that their party's dominance will be weakened by the impending reunification of the PSI and PSDI is also likely to be a source of further trouble between the coali- tion partners. SECRET Page 24 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 NOW, SECRET NOW AUSTRIA'S NATIONAL ELECTIONS Austrian parliamentary elec- tions scheduled for 6 March could result in important changes in the modus operandi of the coali- tion of the People's and Socialist parties which has ruled since World War II. The centrist People's Party, which represents the farm vote and private business, believes it may win two additional seats (see chart) and thus establish itself as the majority party. People's Party Chancellor Klaus says that his party in this event would not abruptly terminate the partnership with the Socialists but would tale incisive steps to end the government inaction of recent years. He believes that a People's Party majority would permit greater legislative ini- tiative and decision and result in an attack on certain prob- lems which the coalition has so far been unable to handle. Stimulation of production and curtailment of inflation would probably be among the targets. The Socialists stress that, if they win a majority, they too will maintain the coalition. They intend to keep it operating approxi- mately as it has been for the past 21 years. However to emphasize the dangers of change, they raise the spec- ter of 1934, the year of Aus- tria's civil war, when the predecessor of the People's Party ordered machine guns used against Socialist civil- ians. The Socialists are concerned that they may be weakened in the election by the loss of popular labor leader Franz Olah, who has established an independent polit- ical party. To counter Olah's inroads, the Socialists are ex- pected to pick up a substantial number of votes from the Commu- nist Party, which for the first time in a parliamentary election has ordered its members to vote Socialist in 24 of Austria's 25 voting districts. The Communists, who normally poll 3 percent of the total Austrian vote but are unrepresented in parliament, hope Socialists will reciprocate by helping them to elect Commu- nist secretary general Muhri in the 25th district. Communist support gave the Socialists their margin of victory in last May's closely contested presidential election. AUSTRIAN NATIONALRAT LOWER HOUSE VOTES-1962 ELECTIONS The Communist Party's 135,520 votes were insu icien 11142 SECRET Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 A^ SECRET Austria's Liberal Party, predominantly a pan-German group- ing, is expected to lose seats in the 6 March elections. Whatever the election re- sults, Austrian foreign policy is not expected to undergo any immediate change. Austria's con- tinuing drive to win association with the EEC and its attempt to improve relations with Eastern Europe both have bipartisan support. SECRE T Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 SECRET DEATH OF COLOMBIAN GUERRILLA LEADER MAY REDUCE TERRORISM The death of ex-priest Camilo Torres on 15 February, while par- ticipating in an ambush of a Colombian Army patrol by the Army of National Liberation (ELN), will probably weaken the ELN's capacity for carrying out armed guerrilla action. Torres, as the only figure with prestige in the ELN, had been expected to attract support for the guerrilla move- ment. About seven other ELN mem- bers were killed in this clash and another the following day. These clashes coincide with an outbreak of small-scale guer- rilla actions in northern Colom- bia, which have been attributed, but without confirmation, to the ELN. They are the first follow- ing a year's silence after the raid on Simacota in January 1965. Public reaction to Torres' death has, so far, been limited to noisy but small-scale stu- dent demonstrations in Bogota, 25X1 Medellin, and Bucaramanga. Fu- ture demonstrations are not likely to be serious. SECRET Page 27 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 SECRET SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN CHILE tial Frei After the Chilean presiden- elections in 1964, the new administration made it known that Chile was not to be isolated politically or commercially from the Communist bloc. In order to dramatize this "independent for- eign policy," it restored full diplomatic relations with the So- viet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. In recent months, in response to Chilean initiative, the USSR has offered credits for Chilean pur- chases of machinery and equipment in competition with US offers through the Alliance for Progress. Soviet efforts to bring about a thaw in the relations between the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) and the Chilean Government were highlighted in October 1965 when Moscow sent a high-level delegation to Chile to attend the party's 13th National Congress. This delegation, led by presid- ium member Andrei Kirilenko, was the highest level Soviet delega- tion ever to visit a Latin Ameri- can country other than Cuba. Kiri- lenko sounded strong approval of the PCCh doctrine of "via paci- fica"--the peaceful way to power --and endorsed the PCCh's posi- tion of cooperation with the Frei government on matters of mutual concern. The USSR had already dis- played some interest in commer- cial ties with Chile, but its small efforts yielded little. In October, however, the USSR took part in the Santiago International Trade Fair. Its exhibit reportedly was the most impressive there and drew immediate orders for a mil- lion dollars' worth of machine tools and agricultural equipment, The USSR and Chile are also cooperating in the field of science. They have collaborated in the establishment of one of the world's largest astronomical observatories on a mountain be- tween Valparaiso and Santiago, and both Soviet and Chilean scientists will be taking part in its activities. SECRET 25X1 Page 28 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Feb 66 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3 SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200030001-3