CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SPECIAL REPORT KENYA'S FIGHT AGAINST SUBVERSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 6, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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KENYA'S FIGHT AGAINST SUBVERSION
The resignation last month of Kenya's pro-Com-
munist vice president, Oginga Odinga, marked a sig-
nificant landmark in the country's political devel-
opment. When the former British colony became in-
dependent in December 1963, it faced most of the
problems encountered by all new African countries:
a rapidly growing population with extravagant ex-
pectations, modest economic resources, and keen
tribal rivalries. In addition, antagonism between
the Africans and the European and Asian minorities
threatened quickly to disrupt the economy. Hope
rested largely in the hands of Jomo Kenyatta, then
prime minister, who was acclaimed by all Africans
in the country as their national hero.
However Odinga, his principal lieutenant, was
already the main channel for the covert supply of
foreign Communist funds, and was soon to receive
arms as well. Odinga's resignation culminated a
14-month effort by Kenyatta and a group of moderate
leaders to eliminate the threat he posed. However
another threat stemming partly from the tribal ri-
valries exploited by the Odinga faction could ap-
pear when and if the present governing alliance
breaks down. The absence of an agreed successor
to Kenyatta adds to the uncertainties for the fu-
ture.
The Setting
On independence, Kenyatta
headed an uneasy tribal alli-
ance, the Kenya African National
Union (KANU), which was the more
powerful of the two political
parties then existing. KANU was
dominated by the two largest and
most politically active of the
country's 40 tribes: Kenyatta's
Kikuyu and Odinga's Luo. Ken-
yatta's reputation as leader of
the Mau Mau insurgency a decade
earlier, the consideration he
earned during nine years of de-
tention by the British, and his
role in presiding over the final
steps to freedom lent him a
status unmatched among most Af-
ricans, but contributed to the
unease of the economically im-
portant European and Asian com-
munities. His ability to man-
age the day-to-day problems of
an independent government re-
mained to be tested.
Odinga, the leader of the
Luo, was the only other figure
with a strong popular following.
Apart from his tribal position,
he had established a power base
largely through astute dispens-
ing of Communist funds and
scholarships supplied by both.
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Moscow and Peking. An estimated
1,000 or more men in reasonably
important positions in -the govern-
ment, civil service, and trade
unions owed personal allegiance
to Odinga, who either had sent
them to study in Communist coun-
tries or supplied them with regu-
lar financial aid. Several key
members of Parliament owed their
elections to him.
Odinga's bitterest opponent
has been the 36-year-old Tom
Mboya, now minister of economic
planning and development. Al-
though Mboya is also a Luo, his
constituency is in Nairobi and
he finds his greatest strength
among the new, urbanized African
,,proletariat." A former head
of the Kenya Federation of Labor
and Kenya's first minister of
labor, Mboya has labor backing
which is the foundation for his
political success. However, his
Western connections exposed him
to charges of UK-US domination
and, together with driving ambi-
tion and arrogant manner, have
earned him many personal enemies.
Kenyatta, without ever com-
pletely trusting Mboya, has never-
theless recognized his brilliance
and has used his abilities to ne-
gotiate the independence consti-
tution with Britian and to draft
and guide subsequent amendments
through Parliament. As secretary
general of KANU, Mboya has also
served Kenyatta by masterminding
much of the campaign against
Odinga.
After becoming prime minis-
ter in 1963 Kenyatta endeavored
to create a feeling of national
purpose to override the tradi-
tional tribal rivalries that had
always plagued his country. His
first cabinet was a skillful
balance of tribal representation
and KANU factions. However,
Odinga, as vice president of KANU
and minister of home affairs,
acted as he pleased, placing
leftist supporters where he
wanted them, running roughshod
through the domains of other
ministers, and frequently pre-
senting Kenyatta with accom-
plished facts which the latter
was unwilling or unable to re-
verse. Odinga's appointments
and largesse often favored the
Luo.
For a long time Kenyatta
tried to remain above the fac-
tional and tribal disputes
within his government. Even
after his "kitchen cabinet,"
Kikuyu loyalists with whom he
had associated since Mau Mau
days, convinced him that Odinga
was becoming a threat to Kikuyu
hegemony, Kenyatta refrained
from direct action for fear of
losing the support of the Luo
and precipitating a tribal
struggle.
When Kenya became a repub-
lic in December 1964, however,
Kenyatta as new President took
his first move against Odinga.
He moved Odinga up to the new
vice presidency where he enjoyed
less real authority and no right
of automatic succession. At the
same time Kenyatta moved his
fellow Kikuyu into the key cabinet
posts.
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Odinga's influence never-
theless spread, his organization
grew, and he was widely regarded
as Kenyatta's heir apparent. By
exploiting the discontent of the
masses and the frustrations of
the backbenchers in Parliament
Odinga lieutenants had built a
sizable following by early 1965
among the important Kamba tribe
which dominates the military,
and even a faction of the Kikuyu,
in addition to the Luo. They
appeared to have substantial
support in Parliament and al-
though they were a minority in
the cabinet, they were setting
the pace there. While Kenyatta
and his senior ministers re-
mained silent and inactive in
the face of growing unrest and
disunity in the country and in-
creasing opposition to the gov-
ernment, a number of second- and
third-echelon leaders began to
coalesce into what eventually
became known as the Kenya Group
(KG).
These younger, progressive
leaders were disturbed by the
effectiveness of Communist prop-
aganda and the failure of the
country's leadership to present
any effective resistance to
Odinga's bid for power. Many
of them were being undermined
in their own constituencies and
feared that Odinga would pick
them off one by one. They felt
that the apathy and divisiveness
of the older ministers were per-
mitting Odinga to capture the
party by default. Their initial
discussions were limited to
plans for working together and
supporting each other in their
own constituencies against Odin-
ga's attacks. As the discus-
sions continued, the group be-
gan to assume shape and direc-
tion, attracting other energetic,
constructive elements of vary-
ing tribes, all anxious to unite
against the common danger--
Odinga.
In late February 1965 while
the KG was still in early gesta-
tion the Odinga political forces
received a crippling blow--the
assassination of P. G. Pinto, a
dedicated Communist and their
principal brain and paymaster.
It has never been determined who
was responsible for his liquida-
tion, but following this loss
OdiLnga's power eroded steadily.
Two months later, in April
1965, the KG moved into action.
Parliament's defeat of two
Odinga-backed candidates for
legislative offices impressed
Kenyatta with the opposition to
Odinga. A parliamentary debate
on arms smuggling from Communist
countries further revealed the
pent-up resentment toward the
extremists. When the army seized
a cache of Communist-supplied
arras in the basement of Odinga's
office, Kenyatta finally seemed
to realize the seriousness of
OdiLnga's threat. As coup rumors
swirled around Nairobi and Brit-
ish troops stood by at his re-
quest, Kenyatta for the first
time openly attacked an Odinga
lieutenant--as it happened a
Kikuyu whose disloyalty chal-
lenged Kenyatta's authority in
tribe as well as government.
In a rapid succession of
events, Kenyatta sent back a
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shipment of arms supplied by
Moscow under terms humiliating
to Kenya, and Parliament ap-
proved government take-over of
the new Soviet-supported Lumumba
Institute, which Odinga had
helped establish as a political
training center for KANU cadres
of his own selection. A KANU
party convention, at which the
KG hoped to force a direct con-
frontation, was postponed for
nearly a year, however, as Ken-
yatta gradually restricted the
extremists while trying to pre-
serve tribal balance and unity.
When the convention was finally
held last March, the victory
was sealed. Steamroller tactics
planned and executed by Mboya
and a few KG members removed all
the extremists from party office.
Odinga, who had been the single
party vice president, refused
to run for one of seven regional
vice presidencies established
under a revised party constitu-
tion. A month later on 14 April,
Odinga resigned from both gov-
ernment and KANU to form an open
opposition party. Following his
course were some 30 members of
Parliament, including the minis-
ter of information and two as-
sistant ministers. Kenyatta
moved forcefully to prevent
Odinga's new Kenya People's
Union from gaining momentum.
Police kept Odinga's men under
surveillance, and seized the
passports of many. Odinga men
were purged from local KANU or-
ganizations. In Odinga's home
district all party officials
have been replaced. Probably
most effective has been a hast-
ily passed constitutional
amendment to the effect that
legislators who quit the party
which had sponsored their elec-
tion must vacate their seats
and seek re-election. By the
time the amendment passed half
the dissidents had requested
reinstatement in KANU, but Ken-
yatta intends to enforce party
discipline by having them
stand for re-election anyway.
Kenyatta has also acted
to cut off Odinga's external
financial support. Eleven
Communist diplomats and news-
papermen known to have fun-
neled funds to Odinga have been
ex eeled.
The moderates' evident vic-
tory, at least for the short
term, over the subversive threat
may allow attention to revert
to some of Kenya's more basic
problems. Most Kenyans have re-
ceived few tangible benefits
from independence, and the gov-
ernment has been unable to meet
their minimum needs from Kenya's
own resources.
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Agriculture has been the
key to what prosperity Kenya has
enjoyed. Exports of sisal, tea,
and coffee have earned most of
Kenya's foreign. exchange. Eu-
ropean farmers, despite a substan-
tial exodus just before and af-
ter independence, still provide
80 percent of the country's
agricultural exports.
The breakup of large Euro-
pean farms by the government has
diminished over-all production.
In 1965 a drought caused further
losses, and Kenya also suffered
from falling world prices for
its cash crops. In order to
feed its own people the govern-
ment has been importing large
quantities of corn, mostly from
the US.
The government land reset-
tlement program has only par-
tially satisfied land hunger
among the Africans, especially
the Kikuyu. The settlement of
165,000 people on some two mil-
lion acres of land bought from
Europeans barely scratches the
surface. Kenyatta's administra-
tion is expanding its efforts
to instruct Africans in profit-
able farming practices. Kenyatta
now favors the development of
new lands for the Africans rather
than taking over efficiently
managed farms from Europeans.
Kenya's high (three percent)
annual rate of population growth
is constantly adding to the num-
bers of landless unemployed.
Nearly one sixth of the largely
unskilled African labor force
is unemployed. Their ranks will
be swelled this year as 150,000
children leave primary school
with places for only 20,000
in secondary schools. Through
the US-assisted National Youth
Service the government is train-
ing and employing thousands of
young Kenyans on roadbuilding
and other national development
projects.
The expansion of investment
arid manufacturing provides some
hope. Under Kenyatta's moderate
leadership economic confidence
has grown. Last year the mi-
gration pattern for Europeans
was reversed, with the number
arriving in Kenya exceeding the
number leaving. The exchange
controls introduced last June
reduced capital outflow. Im-
proved prospects for political
stability may help the economic
picture further.
Disruption of Kenya's eco-
nomic union with Tanzania and
Uganda may aggravate the coun-
try's chronic balance of pay-
ments problem, however. These
two countries together purchase
over 25 percent of Kenya's manu-
factured goods. Last year Tan-
zania unilaterally imposed
restrictions on this trade. The
East African common market and
financial ties will be further
disrupted this summer when Tan-
zania's new central bank issues
its own currency.
Another source of discontent
is the slow pace of Africaniza-
tion of the security forces.
Within the army, small navy,
and fledgling air force, the
top command as well as adminis-
tration and technical functions
remain in British hands. In
the police, European officers
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retain essential command func-
tions. The British training mis-
sions are preparing Africans for
command but the changeover antic-
ipated in 1966 is not now expected
before next year. Kenyatta and
his inner circle made this policy
decision largely to avoid a de-
cline in efficiency at a critical
political time. Many Africans
believe that Kenyatta is postpon-
ing the appointment of an Afri-
can commander until a Kikuyu is
trained for the job.
Kenyatta has in fact favored
the Kikuyu in promotions to key
positions in the police and army.
New recruits have also included
proportionately more Kikuyu to
redress the present preponderance
of Kamba. This has caused grum-
blings of discontent among many
of the Kamba officers but to date
the extremists appear to have had
little success in exploiting it.
Both the army and police will
probably continue to be apolitical
as long as both Kenyatta and the
British are present. More than
200 Kenyans have returned from un-
official military training in Com-
munist countries, but government
policy has prevented all of them
except a few Kikuyus from enter-
ing the services at any level.
Among younger elements who
are Kenyatta supporters in gov-
ernment and Parliament, there are
growing signs of frustration with
scandal, corruption, and oppor-
tunism in the government. They
fear that the obvious affluence
of many ministers in contrast to
the bare subsistence standards
of their constituents is likely
to be an important factor in
the 1968 elections. Many were
impatient with Kenyatta's tactics
in dealing with Odinga's covert
political maneuvers and his
failure to grapple vigorously
with the country's problems.
Most importantly, some of the
most able believe that Kenyatta
has no clear concept of economic
development.
Leadership Problems
Young, nation-minded ele-
ments also resent Kenyatta's
increasing dependence on the ad-
vice of his Kikuyu inner circle.
All major policy decisions are
made at this level. The fast-
est rising star is Attorney Gen-
eral Charles Njonjo, an appointed
official. He is currently in
the public eye more than any
other member of the circle, and
has become Kenyatta's principal
confidant, adviser, trouble-
shooter, and right-hand man. He
is the Europeanized African par
excellence, however, and prob-
ably lacks appeal to the typical
Kenyan voter.
The 51-year-old finance
minister, James Gichuru, is also
notably intelligent and able.
Once Kenyatta's choice as his
understudy and probable succes-
sor, he has declined somewhat in
the President's favor in the past
year, and lacks a political
base or strong personal ambi-
tions. Defense Minister Mungai,
another key figure, is generally
unpopular with the rest of the
cabinet--including Njonjo, who
sees him as a Kikuyu rival for
Kenyatta's favor--and with many
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of the active young moderates.
A white Kenyan, Minister of
Agriculture and Animal Husbandry
Bruce McKenzie, is another of
the President's closest advisers.
The one non-Kikuyu African who
has recently gained Kenyatta's
confidence is Daniel arap Moi.
As minister of interior since
last December he has rapidly
made a reputation as a tough,
capable administrator.
With the problem of suc-
cession unresolved, the moder-
ates could fragment along tri-
bal lines if Kenyatta should
die before he has groomed an
heir. Despite his approximate
75 years of age, Kenyatta ap-
pears vigorous, confident, and
alert and shows every intention
of remaining in office for the
foreseeable future. Apparently,
he prefers not to think about
Kenya without Kenyatta. By ap-
pointing Foreign Minister Mu-
rumbi,a Goan/Masai with no tri-
bal backing, as the new vice
president, a largely ceremonial
post, he has avoided showing
any preference for his successor.
No Kenyan politician pos-
sesses Kenyatta's charisma or
his ability to dominate and rec-
oncile the nation's conflict-
ing forces. Any speculation
necessarily begins with the
Kikuyu contenders, including
Gichuru, Mungai, and Njonjo.
Individually they have their
limitations and lack solid Ki-
kuyu backing, but collectively
they would not willingly allow
any other tribe to get the pres-
idency. If the Kikuyu should
fail to agree on one of their
own, it is conceivable that
agreement could be reached on
a compromise choice: Interior
Minister Moi, Mboya, or Ronald
Ngala, the newly appointed minis-
ter of cooperatives and social
services and the leader of a
former opposition party now sub-
merged in KANU. Mboya will al-
ways be an ambitious contender,
but is the most controversial
and disliked among his fellow
politicians who are envious of
his abilities. He may feel he
can afford to remain a formid-
able influence in any successor
administration and wait for a
later term himself.
Because the moderate al-
liance is intertribal, it would
have a hard time uniting behind
one. candidate unless it was
simply a compromise to block
Odinga. The longer Odinga re-
mains outside the government,
however, without the prestige
and patronage of office, the
dimmer his threat will appear.
Whether focusing on Odinga
or some new figure, Communist
subversion will likely remain a
factor in Kenya's turbulent
Politics,
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Kenyatta and his moderate
alliance will remain under con-
stant pressure, however well
they have used their prestige
and authority against (?dings.
They will hear continuing
charges that they have made
Kenya a stooge of the US and
Britain, and may find attention
turning increasingly to the
country's economic and social
problems. Young KANU leaders,
in particular, unless they see
greater astuteness among govern-
ment officials than they have
seen in the past, will be vul-
nerable to the lures of an
Odinga by another name.
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