CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SPECIAL REPORT SYRIA UNDER THE BAATH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005300030004-9
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• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORT

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SYRIA UNDER THE BAATH
Syria has been led for more than three years
by the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party, more
commonly known as the Baath. The country's several
Baathist governments, however, have been able only
partially to implement the party ideals of "liberty,
unity, and socialism." Like the predecessor Baathist
regimes, the radical military clique which seized
power in a violent coup d'etat in February 1966 pro-
claims its loyalty to the Baathist ideology, but the
party veneer is worn thin. The endemic power poli-
tics and military factionalism which have determined
the course of Syrian political life since the late
1940s are essentially unchanged, despite the current
shift toward the left and Syria's full-blown embarka-
tion on the path to socialism.
The Baath was founded in
1940 by Michel Aflaq, a young
Syrian intellectual who had been
attracted to Marxism while study-
ing in Paris during the 1930s.
Aflaq, who has been the party's
chief theoretician, found Marx-
ist doctrine inapplicable to the
modern Arab state and, with the
help of fellow Syrian student
Salah al-Din Bitar, evolved the
Baath's complicated, semimysti-
cal doctrine.
The central thesis of the
Baathist program is Arab nation-
alism. The doctrine proclaims
that the party's mission shall
be "one Arab nation with an im-
mortal mission, the Arab Resur-
rection Socialist Party, a popu-
lar national revolutionary move-
ment striving for Arab unity,
freedom, and socialism." The so-
called national leadership of the
party is in theory pan-Arab,
directing the movement within
present individual Arab countries
through a series of "regional
commands." The party is small
in most of the Arab countries,
however, and has achieved power
only in Syria and, briefly in
1963, Iraq.
The Baath is a secular
movement, professing the sub-
stitution of Arab nationalism
for Islam as a unifying force
throughout the Arab world.
Aflaq took pains to differentiate
the Baathist movement from Commu-
nism, stressing the personal
freedom of the individual and
his freedom of action. The basic
organization of the party and
much of its socialist doctrine,
however, stem directly from Marx-
ist theory.
During the 1940s the Syrian-
based Baath played an insignifi-
cant role in active political
life. In 1953 the Baath amalga-
mated with another Syrian group,
the Arab Socialist Party led by
Akram Hawrani, and began to gain
supporters within the army.
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SYRIA=
TURKEY
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During this period the Baath-
ists worked closely with the
Communist Party of Syria (CPS)
in opposing the traditional
conservative elements who at
the time dominated the politi-
cal scene. In the fall of 1957,
however, when CPS strength
reached an all-time high, the
Baath broke from its alliance
with the Communists to urge im-
mediate union with Egypt in or-
der to prevent what threatened
to be a CPS takeover of the
government. After the Egyptians
had accepted the Syrian over-
tures, the Baathist leaders
were chagrined to discover that
Narir's view of the new United
Arab Republic was that of a
unitary state, with Egypt di-
rectly controlling Syrian af-
fairs. The Baath, which had
hoped to rule Syrian politics,
was soon effectively dissipated
as a direct political force.
Aflaq and other party
leaders exiled themselves to
Beirut in 1960, where they
attacked Nasir's monolithic
leadership of the UAR. After
the Syrian breakaway from the
union in September 1961, how-
ever, the dominant Bitar-Aflaq
wing of the party reconsidered
its attitude toward Egypt and
urged a reunification of the
two countries on a loose fed-
eral basis. This alienated the
violently anti-Nasir branch of
the Baath led by Hawrani, and
in 1962 the Hawranists were ex-
pelled from the party over this
issue. A series of generally
weak civilian regimes governed
Syria during the postunion era
until March 1963, when the
Baathists and their supporters
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within the army took power and
began the Syrian Baathist ex-
periment.
Domestic Opponents
The Baath's experience in
three years of rule has been
characterized by a series of
realignments within both the
party and the associated mili-
tary power structures. Cloaked
in secrecy, narrowly based, and
lacking any charismatic public
figure such as Egypt's Nasir to
rally popular support, the Baath
has clung to power by gradually
eliminating a series of opposi-
tion forces and, until last
February, effectively concili-
ating factionalism within its
own ranks.
The chief rival to the
Baath and its military support-
ers after the March 1963 Syrian
coup was the pro-Nasirist move-
ment. The Syrian Arab Nation-
alist Movement, a tool of the
Egyptian Government, sparked a
series of pro-Nasirist demon-
strations in various parts of
the country during the months
following the Baath take-over.
At the same time, the regime
was maintaining a facade of
friendship with Cairo and con-
ducting a series of unity talks
with both the Egyptians and the
new Baathist government in
Baghdad.
An abortive pro-Nasirist
coup in July 1963, however,
spelled the end of any plans for
a tripartite unity. The Baath-
ists' harsh suppression of the
uprising--most Syrians were
shocked when the regime executed
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28 of the rebels--and purges in
the army largely eradicated mil-
itant Nasirist sentiment. Nasir-
ism as a potential force to
overthrow the Baath has been
generally ineffective since that
time.
Conservative-elements op-
posed to Baathist efforts to
implement socialist doctrine
have rebelled against the re-
gime and staged several protest
demonstrations. After a large-
scale series of nationaliza-
tions in late 1964 and early
1965, merchants in Damascus
closed down their shops and
refused government orders to re-
sume business. The Baath again
reacted violently, and the par-
ty's paramilitary arm, the na-
tional guard, was sent to the
markets with crow bars to open
the striking shops. Many demon-
strators were arrested and their
properties confiscated. In a
similar incident several months
earlier, government troops
shelled a mosque in which demon-
strators had taken refuge, prob-
ably killing at least 40 people.
Since early 1965 the con-
servative elements have been
quiescent. Victims of the na-
tionalizations, particularly in
such politically turbulent
cities as Aleppo continue to
grumble at the government's in-
ept handling of Syrian industry.
They lack any militant support
with which to push their griev-
ances, however.
Akram Hawrani and his Arab
Socialist Party supporters who
had once been aligned with the
Baathists were eliminated as a
political opposition force in
1963. The movement still con-
trols some localized support,
but Hawrani himself was expelled
from the country in late 1965 on
charges of collaboration with an
unspecified foreign state.
Rivalries Within the Baath
The only real threat to the
Baath's position since the de-
struction of the Nasirist move-
ment in 1963 has been dissension
among regime leaders themselves
along ideological, religious,
and personal lines. The chief
factor which held the regime to-
gether for almost three years
was the conciliatory talent of
the military strong man, Lt.
Gen. Amin al-Hafiz. Hafiz held
a succession of leading posi-
tions in the government from
March 1963 until February 1966,
throughout a series of cabinet
permutations and combinations.
Rivalries usually were
eliminated by purging dissident
elements. Members of a radical
clique were removed from their
posts in 1964 after one prolonged
intraregime conflict, and later
that year, another dispute was
solved by appointing the former
deputy prime minister as ambas-
sador to Madrid. Friction be-
tween civilians and military
officers provided a constant
source of tension but, with all
real power concentrated in the
hands of the army, the civilian
party leaders could do little to
increase their direct influence.
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Sectarian rivalries between
the majority Sunni Muslims and
members of minority Muslim sects
caused further divisions. Under
the French mandate, members of
the minority groups, slightly
removed from the mainstream of
Arab nationalism and generally
considered more loyal to the
colonial power, were encouraged
to enter military service, and
the result was a preponderance
of minority elements in the
Syrian Army. Among them, sup-
port for ideological theories
within the Baath has usually
been subordinated to individual
loyalty to fellow religious or
tribal connections.
On the international scene,
the proclaimed Baath goal of
Arab unity has only become more
remote. Since the breakdown of
the unity talks among Syria,
Egypt, and Iraq in 1963 and the
overthrow of the Baath regime
in Iraq in November of that year
Syria has become almost totally
isolated from the rest of the
Arab world.
At the first Arab summit
meeting in Cairo in January 1964
the Syrian delegation promoted a
violent anti-Western line, at a
time when Nasir and other Arab
leaders were anxious to maintain
some semblance of neutrality be-
tween Moscow and Washington. The
Syrians' efforts to "out-Nasir
Nasir" on the anti-US and anti-
Israel propaganda front and their
efforts to compete with Nasir's
Arab socialism for leadership
of the pan-Arab movement have
left Syria with no supporters
among Arab rulers. The Iraqis
have continued to follow the
Egyptian line, with both coun-
tries voicing their desires for
eventual Egyptian-Iraqi unity,
and anti-Baath sentiment on the
part of such conservative regimes
as Jordan and Saudi Arabia has
continued unabated. The Jordan-
ians are genuinely frightened
of the strongly leftward bent of
the new Damascus regime on their
northern border. In April they
took the precaution of arresting
a large number of Jordanian Baath
members in a general security
sweep.
Although before last Febru-
ary's coup the Baath regime pub-
licly maintained a vitriolic
anti-Western posture and the
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia
provided most of its arms and
economic aid, it tried to keep
some ties with the West. The
regime carefully watched the
Syrian Communists, who probably
number about 3,000. Last year
it rebuffed CPS efforts to en-
courage the formation of a pop-
ular-front government.
The only real political
concession made to the domestic
left was the expansion of the
National Council of the Revolu-
tionary Command (NCRC) in August
1965 to include several Commu-
nLsts or Communist sympathizers.
The NCRC, however, had evolved
by that time from a small and
powerful military/civilian
c=lique which had largely directed
the country's affairs after the
1963 coup into a rubber-stamp
legislative body with no sig-
ni. f icant influence. "Progres-
sive forces"other than the Baath
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were allowed no real role in
determining Syrian policy.
ferring to wait until the situa-
tion in Damascus is clarified.
The new leftist government
was fortunate, however, in that
its takeover and subsequent
search for support seem to have
coincided with a Soviet decision
to increase its interest in the
Middle East. Moscow expressed
surprisingly quick support for
the shaky new junta and enthusi-
astically welcomed a Syrian eco-
nomic delegation in early April.
had opposed the apparent willing- Both Moscow and Damascus widely
ness of Hafiz and his military publicized a Soviet agreement to
supporters to allow the civilians supply $150-175 million in eco-
a meaningful voice in the govern- nomic credits to finance Syria's
ment and to downgrade military long-pending Euphrates Dam project,
The February Coup
On 23 February a radical
army clique proclaiming itself
the true revolutionary arm of
the Baath took power, dissolved
the more moderate international
command, and either arrested or
forced underground such party
leaders as Aflaq, Bitar, and
Hafiz. The leaders of this mil-
itary group, predominately mem-
bers of the sectarian minorities
influence. When the Hafiz
clique took steps to curb the
power of the radical group with-
in the party hierarchy, the rad-
icals seized power.
The new regime is a poorly
cemented amalgam of military
officers representing a variety
of ideological and confessional
interests. The coup leaders
began arguing among themselves
as soon as they took control of
the country, and the variety of
rival minority religious sects
represented among them has been
a continuing source of tension.
Several key participants are re-
portedly wildly erratic, includ-
ing the com-
mando chie who triggered he
23 February violence. In addi-
tion, army units which had ini-
tially resisted the coup in key
positions such as the Southwest
Frontier Command on the Israeli
border are still apparently
withholding full support, pre-
and the Soviet press began to ex-
press propaganda support for the
regime in the face of an alleged
series of plots by the imperial-
ists. An exchange of military
delegations between Moscow and
Damascus in April presumably
worked out delivery schedules for
equipment remaining under exist-
ing agreements. Preliminary dis-
cussions for a new arms agreement
are believed to have also been
held.
Nevertheless, the new regime
is less cautious than some of its
predecessors in dealing with the
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far left. Casting around for
supporters who might broaden its
narrow base of support and con-
solidate its shaky position, it
has made some gestures toward
conciliating the Syrian Commu-
nists. A CPS member was included
in the cabinet formed in early
March. Several Communists re-
portedly have been given second-
echelon government positions.
In early April CPS Secretary
General Khalid returned to
Damascus after eight years in
Eastern Europe.
The new regime has not
abandoned all caution in this
regard, however. It apparently
did not give advance approval
for Bakdash's return.
It
still seems to be unwilling to
recognize the party as a legal
organization or to accord its
members a real voice in the gov-
ernment. The Communists' hopes
that they would be permitted to
publish a newspaper in Damascus
have not been realized as yet.
Both Moscow and the CPS
have apparently urged the new
regime to seek some rapproche-
ment with Egypt. Whether or
not either Nasir or the Baath-
ists will be willing to settle
their long-standing differences
is still uncertain.
The regime, already under
the threat of a countercoup by
more moderate military elements
who fear that Syria will be
drawn too far into the Commu-
nist camp, is also concerned
over the less immediate problem
of maintaining a semblance of
legitimacy as a genuine Baath-
ist government. A new party re-
gional command was elected dur-
ing a series of meetings in March
to replace that dissolved last
December. The government an-
nounced in April that a meeting
would be convened within a few
weeks to elect a new international
command, but any such group ap-
pointed by the present junta
would probably not be recognized
by i3aathist wings in other Arab
countries. The Lebanese Baath,
for example, has expressed sup-
port for the ousted leaders.
The coup leaders claimed to
have captured such key figures
of the old regime as Aflaq,
Bitar, and NCRC Chairman Mansur
Attrash immediately following
the 23 February action, but they
are apparently still in hiding,
probably within Syria, and could
be in touch with army groups plan-
ning a new coup to reinstate the
moderate elements of the party.
The primary concern of suc-
cessive Baathist governments
with maintaining their own power
position and eradicating con-
tinuing opposition has largely
precluded any full implementa-
tion of Baathist doctrines. The
"Baath" has ruled in effect as a
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military power group similar to
previous Syrian juntas, and
such basic plans as setting up
a constitution have never been
realized.
appearances have been likened to
President Roosevelt's "fireside
chats," has come the closest.
He lacked the inspirational
talent of Nasir, however.
The Baath has, however,
carried out extensive socializa-
tion measures since 1963. Al-
though a large part of Syrian
industry had already been na-
tionalized during union with
Egypt from 1958 to 1961, the
Baathists have gone on to take
over most of the rest, includ-
ing the crucial cotton ginning
and marketing industry.
Land reform projects have
been somewhat less successful.
The redistribution of privately
owned land and state domains has
been slow, despite the enthusiasm
for land reform implementation
on the part of such regime lead-
ers as Minister of Agrarian Re-
form Abd al-Karim Jundi.
Baathism as proclaimed has
proved to be inapplicable to the
present-day Arab state. Prob-
ably most troublesome has been
the emphasis on anonymity within
the party hierarchy--membership
in the Baathist command struc-
tures has until recently been a
closely guarded secret. This
has encouraged the development
of personal rivalries and fac-
tionalism and left the party with
no central rallying figure who
might muster public enthusiasm
for the party program. Amin al-
Hafiz, an effective public
speaker whose frequent television
Public sentiment is still
almost unanimously hostile to
the regime. The merchant and
landowner classes are strongly
anti-Baath. The regime has been
unable to develop any real en-
thusiasm for its idealistic poli-
cies among the peasants. The
basis of regime strength still
lies with the army, and even
there the power balance has be-
come increasingly uncertain since
the February coup.
Outlook
Any successor regime to the
present junta would almost cer-
tainly be still another Baathist
military group, probably one
which supported the Aflaq/Bitar
wing of the party. Such a gov-
ernment might present a more
legitimate image as a Baathist
regime, but it would continue to
rely on the military to maintain
its position. The Baath itself
seems unlikely ever to become a
truly popular movement, and the
present pattern of military power
politics in Syria will probably
continue indefinitely. In ad-
dition, Syria will almost cer-
tainly maintain its vitriolic
anti-Western posture and close
ties with the Communist bloc.
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