WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005300050001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 3, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

lState Dept. review completed.
3 June 1966
OCI 1V'a. Q292/66
eQ~y rro. 9 5;4
-ARMY Review
Completed
C~1`~1TRAL II~iT~LLIC~EI~IC~ A~ENG
GRQUP J Excluded from25X1'"
downgrading and decla.,.,,,.,u?~n',
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SECR.~; T
(Information as of noon EDT, 2 June 19GG)
Far East
VIETNAM
An announcement that South Vietnam's government leader-
ship councfl will be modified climaxed a hectic week
PROGRESS TOWARD INDONESIAN-MALAYSIAN SETTLEMENT
Indonesia-and Malaysia have apparently reached general
agreement on means to end their three-year-old dispute.
CAMBODIANS INCREASINGLY DISSATISFhED WITH SIHANOUK
Discontent with his economic policies is compounded
by agrowing reaction to his arbitrary exercise of
power, capricious meddling in ;government operations,
and intemperate foreign policy statements.
LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE IN PEKING
A ;shake-up of Mao Tse-tungts inner circle of advisers
appears to be .taking .place, but Mao`s own position
appears secure.
Page
CHINESE COMMUNIST DEALS FOR WESTERN STEEL PLANT EQUTPMENT $
The Chinese have recently bouglht about $36 million
worth of steel plant facilities in-the industrial West,
and are still negotiating with a West European con-
sortium which has offered a $150-million rolling
mill .complex.
CROP PROSPECTS IN CHINA AND NORTH 'i~IETNAM
The regimes in bath Peking and Hanoi seem to be facing
poor crop prospects again this .year.
SECRET
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Europe
HARVEST OUTLOOK IN USSR AND! EASTERN EUROPE
In contrast to the poor crop prospects in China and
North Vietnam, the outlook in the USSR and Eastern
Europe is favorable.
BALKAN COUNTRIES INCREASE COOPERATION
Aside from a need to e~spand trade, the recent strides
these traditionally hostile countries have made toward
regional cooperation reflect the Communist regimes'
desire to loosen somewhat their ties with Moscow.
SELF-ASSERTIVE BREZHNEV REAI'FIR3dS PRIORITY OF AGRICULTURE 12
The Soviet party leader, displaying a new self-con-
fidence reminiscent of Khrushchev, presided aver a
central committee plenum which reaffirmed. regime plans
to give priority attention to improving Soviet agricul-
ture but without being very specific as to how to ac-
complish this.
SOVIETS RE-EVALUATING THINFCING ON NUCLEAR WAR GONSEQUE'~GES 13
Recent .public statements by influential military fig-
ures seem to be trying to dispel the view--which gained
acceptance under ghrushchev--that nuclear war is always
an undesirable instrument of national Policy.
~~~~
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PLANS-FOR WEST-EAST GERMAN CONTACTS MOVE FORWARD
The major remaining problem im~~eding an exchange of
speakers between the West Germs~n Socialists and. the
East German Communistsis the matter of "safe conduct"
for East German participants.
FINLAND'S NEW GOVERNMENT
Finland's new left-of-center government faces an un-
certain future, even with a three-fourths majority in
parliament, because of the disparate political in-
terests represented in the fou:e-party coalition and
the lack of agreement on basic economic problems.
Middle East -Africa
SENATORIAL ELECT.LONS IN TURKEY.
The elections may provide an u~~nofficial referendum
on the performance of the seven-month-old Demirel
government.
UGANDAtS PRESIDENT PUTS DOWN REGIONAL REVOLT
Resistance in Buganda has faded, but the army's
brutality against civilians has added to resentment
caused by the curtailment of the regio:n's autonomy.
ZAMBIA RESUMES COPPER SHIPMENTS THROUGH RHODESTA
Easing of the snarl over. payment requirements. for
Zambian copper has improved the atmosphere for the
second round of British-Rhodesian exploratory-talks,
now under way in Salisbury.
MOBUTU F~)IX,S PLOT BY CONGOLESE POLITICIANS
Some of the impetus behind his swift and harshmoves.
against .the plotters seems to stem from a belief that
Belgium was implicated.
SEG''R~;T
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NORTHERN NIGERIANS REACT VIOLENTLY AGAINST UNITY PLAN
By exacerbating Nigeria's ethnic and regional divisions,
the disturbances will Leave scars which will impede
the Ironsi regime's efforts to forge a tighter national
unity.
Western Hemisphere
MEETING ON OAS CAARTER REVISION
A meeting this month will consider charter amendments
which, in the form developed earlier this year by
Latin American delegates, would, in effect, obligate
the US by treaty to provide aid and eliminate trade
barriers.
NEW AMBIENCE IN CUBA
The Havana regime has shown unusual sensitivity to in-
ternational and domestic irritants since the first of
the year, possibly reflecting Fidel Castra's frustration
over his unfulfilled goals after seven years of effort,
CANDIDATES CHOSEN FOR Bt)LIVIAN ELECTIONS
Seven groups say they intend tv run candidates far
Congress in the 3 July elections, and two have nominees
to appose Rene Barrientas far the presidency. Since
all expect Barrientas to win,. the real race is far
Congress.
VELASCO CONTINUES EFFORT TO REGAIN ECUADOREAN PRESIDENCY
His followers have "nominated" him and prefer a direct
presidential election rather than election of a can-
stitueat assembly-which the government now plans. If
their wish is denied, they may attempt a violent grab
far power.
URUGUAYAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
The popular will for reform--particularly of the cum-
bersome plural executive--is great, and without reform
political stability could. be jeopardized., The politi-
cians, however, so far have been unwilling to develop
a bipartisan package, the only tcind likely to win
roajarity approval.
THE DOMINICAN ELECTIONS
The general elections on 1 June were unmarred by
fraud ar violence, according to all reports, Results
announced as of Haan of 2 June--based on about a
third of the expected vote--gave Joaquin Balaguer a
commanding lead,.
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Far East
V I ETNI~M
An announcement that South
Vietnam's government executive
group will be modified has cli-
maxed a hectic week
eminence by careful selection of
civilian additions, who at the
same time will probably satisfy
general aspirations in non-Bud-
dhist quarters for some kind of 25X1
"change" in the present regime.
25X1
Following two days of ex-
ploratory talks with both mili-
tant and moderate Buddhists and
a temporary cessation of agita-
tion in Saigon, the government
announced on 1 June that the
present ten-man military Direc-
torate would be enlarged within
five days to include ten civilian
representatives of mass organiza-
tions and political and religious
groups. A 150-man "Armed Forces
- Peoples' Congress," with ad-
visory responsibilities, will
also be created by 19 June.
The decision to effect these
revisions probably stems from
a number of assessments by gov-
ernment leaders. The military
leaders will most likely be able
to ensure their continued pre-
Buddhist leaders thus far
have generally voiced no opposi-
tion to the government's announced
revision, but are in some dis-
agreement over whether it re re-
sents enough of a change.~~
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r ~~~ ~
~~~ ~ ~~
E~. ? '
S-
'EGRET
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~ ~'
SL ~i lJ~ i
PAUL REVERE ..engaged multibattalic25X1
forces of Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese on 28-29 May.. PAUL
REVERE is a 60-day sweep opera-
tion designed to disrupt Commu-
nist preparations for rainy- ,
season attacks in the central
highlands. Since its initiation
on 9 May, 357 Viet Cong have. been
killed and 14 captured.
Enemy activity was highlighted
by two battalion-size attacks in
provinces west of Saigon. On 26
May an estimated two Communist
battalions attacked a post in
Kien Phong Province, killing 51
Vietnamese and wounding 63. Com-
munist losses- were 20 killed.
On 27 May an estimated two Viet
Cong battalions attacked Doc Hue
in Hau Nghai Province, killing
eleven persons. The Communists
also mortared Vinh Long Airfield
and harassed commercial-shipping
in the main channe'1 `leading to
Saigon. ..Two ships were damaged
by underwater mines while in ,
transit to Saigon, and mines were
found attached 'to another merchant
ship in the area.-
In I Corps during the week,
the government once again re-
vamped its leadership, and dissi-
dent generals Thi and Dinh began
to waver in their support of the
struggle movement after-talks with
government leaders. However, the
temporary absence of any respon=
Bible-local authority in Hue
created a st-ate of near anarchy
in which militant students and
other undisciplined elements
freely committed random acts of
violence, including the burning
of the vacant US Consulate. Sai-
gon troops thus far Piave not been
used to restore order in Hue, al-
though alternative measures may
be rapidly running out.
Military Developments
Mil.itary.activi y in South.
Vietnam remained at a relatively
high level for the second con-
secutive.week. The heaviest
fighting took place in Pleiku
Province as elements of Operation
Hanoi's Support of`Viet Cong
Earlier reports of stepped-
up infiltration into South Viet-
nam during the first four months
of this year are beginning to be
accepted in official USMACV es-
timates. MACV now estimates that
as many as 19,000 men may have
infiltrated into South Vietnam
between January and April this
S~ CR.~, T
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year.. Some 7,000 of these are
in the confirmed or probable
category, and the rest are car-
ried as possible. This rate is
considerably higher than last
year when the confirmed total
for the whale year was 19,OOD-
20,D00.
Vietnamese Communist propa-
gandists were active this week
in attempting to stiffen Viet Gang
morale. In a series of articles
both Hanoi and Liberation Radio
claimed--that the Viet Cong in-
creased. both their political
strength and their military po-
tential during the past "dry
season." Time articles predicted
that this build-up would contrib-
ute to even greater Communist
military achievements in time
forthcoming rainy season.
PROGRESS TOWARD 1 Na{~NES i ~N-MALAYS I AN SETTLEMENT
Indonesia and Malaysia have
apparently reached general agree-
ment on means to end their three-
year-old dispute.
Indonesian Foreign Minister
Malik and Malaysian Deputy Prime
Minister Razak announced at the
end of their Bangkok talks on
31 May that agreement, subject
to ratification by their govern-
ments, had been reached on "prin-
ciples upon which practical steps
to restore friendly relations
should be based." The agreement
reached reportedly provides for
establishing diplomatic relations,
some form of determination of
Sabah`s and 5arawak's desire to
remain within the Malaysian
federation, and the "immediate"
cessation of hostilities.
a rapprochement, arrangements
for its implementation have yet
to be made. Malik told reporters
after the talks that diplomatic
relations would come "in due
course" but emphasized that
further talks would have to be
held. It appears likely that a
perhaps extended period of ne-
gotiation will be necessary be-
fore the pra:posed settlement can
be completed..
On 31 May Manila announced
its intention to establish full
diplomatic relations with ~ialay-
sia on 3 June.. The Philippine
Government had delayed this move
for several months in the face
of Indonesian pressure.
While this general agree-
ment is a significant step toward
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~"~ SE CR1~' T `~"'
CAMBODIANS INCREASINGLY D1~-SATISFIED WITH SIHANOUK
There are indications that
anti-Sihanouk sentiment in Phnom
Penh may be reaching serious pro-
portions.
dissatisfaction with his policies
has become more pronounced among
the Phnom Penh elite in recent
months as the country's fragile
economic situation continues to
deteriorate. Misgivings about
the wisdom of Sihanouk's economic
policies have been aggravated by
indications- that the 1966 rice
exports, Cambodia's major source
of income, will be substantially
below the level of past years ap-
parently as a result of a poor
harvest and the government's mis-
management of traditional market-
ing procedures.
There are some indications
that an illicit outflow of rice
to the Viet Cong is also having
an effect on the amount of rice
available to the government for
export. Although the quantity
of rice which the Communists are
purchasing from Cambodian sources
this year--probably between 20,000
and 30,000 tons--is small in com-
parison with the 500,000 tons
which Cambodia normally exports,
there is a possibility that Chi-
nese middlemen are withholding
rice from the government purchas-
~ng agency in the expectation of
making greater profits by future
sales to the Viet Cong.
Sihanouk's difficulties with
the Phnom Penh elite are based on
more than economic problems, how-
ever. There appears to be wide-
spread sentiment among the royal
family, high-ranking politicians,
and military leaders that Siha-
nouk's arbitrary exercise of
power, capricious meddling in
everyday affairs,-and intemperate
foreign policy statements must
be curbed. Their grievances have
been aggravated in recent months
by the arrest of several left-
and right-wing political figures
and by stepped-up fighting along
the Thai border, which apparently
has been a source of increasing
concern to the military leader-
ship.
These groups have long been
at odds with Sihanouk's policies,
particularly those associated with
the renunciation of US aid in late
1963. At the same time, they
have not considered moving against
him because of their vested in-
terest in the status quo, their
lack of leadership, and their
inability to match Sihanouk's
power base among the Cambodian
people. Sihanouk's decision to
cancel a long-planned European
trip--at least partially in re-
sponse to the signs of restive-
ness--suggests that this time the
situation may be different.~l
SE CR~~ T
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.SE+C.~E T
LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE IN PEKING
A shake-up of Mao Tse-
tung's inner circle of advisers
appears to be taking place. Mao's
own position appears secure.
His grip probably was loosened
for a time during his prolonged
absence from public view, but he
appeared to be healthy and
alert in movies taken in early
liay .
Peng Chen, sixth in the
Chinese Communist power
structure, seems to have been
the victim of a power play
engineered by his old party
rival, Teng Hsiao-ping. Peng's
removal would strengthen Teng's
position and perhaps weaken that
of Liu Shao-chi, who has been
nominally second in the party
since at least 1945. It is even
possible that the highly mili-
tant and vigorous Teng has
supplanted the colorless Liu
as Mao's chosen successor.
probably does not aspire to the
top slot.
The reluctance so far to
name important figures indicates
that the shake-up is still in
progress and that more revela-
tions are due. A number of key
officials who have been out of
public view for many months may
also have been casualties of the
struggle. They include Lu Ting-
yi, director of the propaganda
department of the central
committee; Yang Shang-kun, Mao's
personal link to the secretariat;
Yang Yue~g, commander of the Pe-
kngbiilitary Command; and Lo
Jui-thing, army chief of staff
and a top security official.
Chou En-lai--China's
Itlikoyan in terms of flexibility--
appears thus far to have managed
to stay aloof from the fray. He
is a useful technician and as
such has a good chance to sur-
vive regardless of the final out-
come. Contrary to Western press
speculation, Defense Minister
Lin Piao probably is not a
contender. His name -is often
used to reinforce Mao's author-
ity,but he has been chronically
ill for nearly 30 ye-ors and
Attacks on"antiparty ele-
ments" at first focused on
writers and officials belonging
to Peng Chen's apparatus in the
Peking municipality. On 26
h1ay, however, Liberation Army
Journal, which as peen spear-
e~i aging the attacks, pointed
an accusing finger at one of Lu
Tung-yi's deputies in the Propa-
ganda Department and at certain
other "muddleheaded" high
officials. In the past week or
~S'E CRE T
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so a campaign has been develop-
ing to unmask unnamed "authori-
ties" who have dared ridicule
claims that Mao's political
tracts have great practical
value. Two who have made such
claims, a melon peddler and a
pingpong player, now are being
presented as Maoist folk heroes.
Liberation Army Journal on 27
May promise" loo the
bitter end against anyone who
strikes at Mao's thinking re-
gardless of how powerful he may
be, how high his position is,
how famous., or how strong a
backer he has."
The attacks were broadened
further on 27 May when "anti-
party" charges were leveled for
the first time against a pro-
vincial official. A vice gov-
ernor of Shantung was accused of
operating a "black branch" of
the "black store" run by the
group of conspirators in the
Peking city apparatus. This
could be a signal for attacks
on higher officials in Shantung
or in other provinces.
The initiative taken by
Liberation Army Journal in
aunc.ing a~ a ks, an the
secondary--and at times oppos-
ing--position taken by People's
Daily and Red Flag are evi ence
that factions in the leadership
have been in dispute, A major
charge against Peng Chen has
been that the journals of his
municipal party committee re-
fused to accept a "correct"
dictum laid down by Liberation
Army Journal on 29 Novezn er
~ that t e play "Dismissal
of Hai Jui" was a "big
poisonous weed." Although
the parallel has not yet been
publicly drawn, People's Daily
and Red Flag--bo i~f organs o~'-
the centra committee--took the
"wrong" line of the Peking city
journals, faihing to label the
play a poisonous weed-until
April.
The record of these news-
papers implies Mao has been ~/
standing above the struggle
while the acting party leader--
who would be Liu Shao-chi dur-
ing Mao's absence--has been
under attack by someone who
controls the Liberation Army
Journal. The journa is
pu is ed by the army's General
Political Department, which is
directly subordinate to the
party secretariat headed by
Teng Hsiao-ping.
Since April both People's
Daily and Red Flag have a en
in ine wi~i 't i~k e army paper, a
sign that Mao is again exer-
cising a unif ying influence.
The army paper continues to
spearhead some `attacks, however,
suggesting that its backers
still have unattained objectives.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY
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CHINESE DERLS F(~R WESTERN STEEL PLANT EQUIPMENT
Chinese Communist trade del-
egations are in the process of
negotiating or closing a number
of steel plant purchases in the
industrial West,
Negotiations continue on a
$150-million hot and cold steel
rolling mill offered to Communist
China by a West European consor-
tium. As the consortium's pro-
posal to China now stands, West
German general contractors would
receive about $73 million in con-
tracts, Belgian firms about $48
million, and French companies
CHINESE COMMUNIST tdEGQTIATIONS FOR.
about $33 million, An additional
$18 million in contracts will be
let to electrical equipment su
pliers and subcontractors.
Apart from the consortium
deal, China recently has pur-
chased about $36 million worth
of other steel plant facilities,
including a pipe mill, a wire
plant, an oxygen converter steel
plant, a small. rolling mill,
and a steel processing plant.
Peking is also considering
as many as five additional
offers of -steel plant com-
ponents from Western or Jap-
anese suppliers. Chinese
approval appears imminent
for a $17-million extrusion
and stainless-steel tube
plant to be built by a Brit-
~~~~
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`'~ ,SE CR1~ T `~
CROP PROSPECTS I N CHINA AND NORTH VIETNAM
The regimes in both Peking
and Hanoi seem to be facing poor
crop prospects again this year.
As of early May the outlook
for the harvest of Communist
China's winter grains was not
auspicious, About half of the
early grain harvest comes from
the early rice crop, which seems
to have been planted under fa-
vorable conditions. Nevertheless
the total early grain harvest is
unlikely to exceed the mediocre
level of 1965,
China's wheat import re-
quirements in 1966 will, it is
estimated, be at least 6 million
tons--4,5 million of which have
been purchased. The tight world
wheat situation may make it dif-
ficult for China to procure the
full 6 million, although a good
Soviet wheat crop (see next
article) would ease the situation.
North Vietnam's spring rice
crop, which normally constitutes
about a third of its annual rice
harvest, does not look good as
of now. Sown acreage is below
normal, and drought, insect
damage, and the added burden of
the war effort have had an ad-
verse effect on production. The
regime has issued instructions
to plant subsidiary crops and
vegetables in areas that were
to have been sown to rice. The
success of these e~~forts is
Euro~-e
HARVEST OUTLOOK I N USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE
In contrast to the poor
crop prospects in China and North
Vietnam (see preceding article),
the outlook in the USSR and East-
ern Europe is favorable.
Soviet crop development has
been helped by an early spring
in the European USSR and abun-
dant moisture supplies in the
major winter grain areas. Rain
has retarded spring sowing in
the New Lands, but sowing in the
European USSR has proceeded at
a record pace in these early
weeks. Current crop prospects
suggest that the sizable imports
of grain required in 1963 and
1J65 will not be necessary this
year.
about two thirds.
In Eastern Europe, winter
grain prospects-have improved
substantially since early March,
and the outlook for spring-
planted grains, early vegetables,
and root crops. is also good,
Here too, early(sprin~ weather
and good soil moisture have been
conducive to timely planting
and growth of spring crops in
most countries. East European
grain import needs, however,
are likely to remain near the
1965 level of 9 mil-lion tons,
with the free world supplying
SE C'RE T
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BALKAN COUNTRIES I NCREASE COOPERATION
The Balkan countries, tra-
ditionally hostile, have made
marked strides in regional co-
operation during the past year.
The need to expand trade and the
increased freedom afforded by
the loosening of post - ltiorld
War II political alliances prob-
ably account in large part for
the more amicable relationships
that are developing.
increasing influence of the na-
tionalist faction of the Bulgar-
ian party. In their efforts to
expand their foreign i?elations
all have reasserted their his-
toric preference for bilateral
ties in contrast to the multi-
lateralism once imposed by Mos-
cow. The Communist Balkan coun-
tries apparently seek to show
that they can coexist with their
non-Communist neighbors.
This development also re-
flects the Communist countries`
desire to find a means to pro-
mote their nationalist aspira-
tions and thus to loosen some-
what their ties to Moscow. Yugo-
slavia and Rumania have expanded
b~?lateral ties in consonance
with their "national Communist
outlook," while Bulgaria's more
friendly disposition toward its
neighbors reflects in part the
70 BtAGARtA
13 feb Rumanian potty chieF Ceousescu and hseder Mwrer
3 Moy Rumanian Minister aF Chemtsai Iaduury Scarfot
S Moy President Minchev of Yuyosiav Macedonto
17 Moy Yice--rosideM Todwovic of Yupa~lavio't Federal Nx~nbty
42 May $umanian Minister d l,ipht Industry Sentar{cI
FO GREECE
~Q ~s1ar {vlporlan Mini Her o< Culture Mptev
TO RUMANIA
{ Ma yuywlav Federal Executive Vin president Krajper
S Mot Gresk MiniHer of SocioF Welfare GoHnw
1B Apr YuOeslav /resident Tiro
23 Apr Bulparion Deputy Pnmler Todorav
q May dulyorian Forefyn Minister BosMv
T07UtF~Y
LoM proposed visit of Rumanian premier Mauer
July
Aup Proposed visit of Bulparion Forelpn MiniRer BasMv
TO YUGOSLAYIA
5 Apr Rumonion Minister of fareiyn Trade Cioara
lf] Apr Bulporion Foraipn Minister 1laft~eY
17 Moy Bulporian Defense Minlster Dshurov
Trade has increased, new
transportation arrangements have
been worked out, and a coardi-
nated approach to tourism devel-
oped. Most Balkan countries
also have relaxed visa require-
ments for intro-Balkan travel.
Greece and Albania recently ne-
gotiated a preliminary trade
agreement, despite the fact that
they remain technically at war.
Cultural exchanges also
have been stepped up sharply
over the past year. Bulgaria
and Rumania, for example, have
provided sites for Balkan friend-
ship meetings, conferences of
Adriatic scholars, a regional
film festival, and a Balkan stu-
dents' meeting. Sofia alone
held four different types of
Balkan meetings last month. In
addition, most Balkan govern-
ments have agreed to an exchange
of publications even though this
raises some thorny problems.
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In the political sector,
Albania, long isolated, has
raised the lever of its mission
in Turkey to an embassy. Sofia
and Ankara will follow suit in
the near future.- Numerous ex-
change visits of Balkan mayors
and parliamentary groups have
been arranged over the past year.
In addition, several high-level
visits between Balkan leaders
(see inset) have been held in
recent months, and Yugoslavia
has suggested convening a meets=
ing of Balkan parliamentarians.
Given the sharp ideological
differences between the Commu-
nist Balkan countries and a cer-
tain political instability in
Greece and Turkey, it remains to
be seen how far this regional co-
operation will be extended. Most
Balkan leaders, however, will
probably. continue working .toward
this goal.
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SELF-ASSERTIVE BREZHNEV REAFFi PMS PRIC~R1Tl( ~}F AGRICULTURE
A continuing priority for
agriculture was affirmed. by the
CPSU central committee plenum
which met in Moscow last week.
The plenum was chiefly exhorta-
tive, however, and defined only
a few new concrete measures to
improve agriculture. Soviet
press treatment of the plenum
served to underscore Brezhnev's
pre-eminence and together' with
his speech demonstrated that he,
like Khrushchev, reg3~rds agr i-
culture as his special province.
Brezhnev was far more self-
assertive in his speech than
heretofore. His manner of Sum-
ming up the debate and comment-
ing on the various speeches and
his frequent use of the personal
pronoun were suggestive of Khru-
shchev's style.
This note of self-confidence
also appeared in his criticism
of the Azerbaydzhan and Uzbek
republic party organizati~ans.
He also criticized a number of
industrial ministers for remain-
ing silent instead of asking to
report on how they planned to
implement the plenum's decisions.
Such criticism suggested that
there may have been some opgosl-
tion within the regime to the
emphasis being given to agricul-
ture.
An accelerated program for
irrigation and Land reclamation
is now planned after 1970. Total
improved land area in the USSR
by 1975 is planned to be 91-96
million acres as opposed. to 37
million today. ,
Ths current five-year plan
calls for irrigation and drain-
ing of 21-24 million acres by
1970. It will be difficult for
the USSR to achieve these goals
despite Brezhnev's description
of the program as "minimal" and
"cautious."
The ten-year program also
envisages measures to combat
erosion, laws on allocation. of
land for industrial, construc-
tion, and other purposes, and
laws on land and water utiliza-
tion.
The figures given at the
plenum for supply of equipment
to agriculture by 1970 and for
investment in agriculture dur-
ing this period are consistent
with those announced by Brezh-
nev in March of last year--a
program which the recent plenum
endorsed. Fifteen billion rubles
have been allocated for land rec-
lamation and improvement during
the next five years.
The responsibility of de-
fining measures to implement
the ten-year goals was left to
the USSR State Planning Commis-
sion and to the appropriate
ministries and scientific bodies
and republic ;governmental organs.
These bodies are to submit 10-
to 15-year proposals for fur-
thering more rational land use
USSR Council of Ministers
before 1 ,January 1969 to the
.central committee and to t~
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SOV[ETS RE-.EVALUATING THINKING ONI NUCLEAR U~AR CONSEQUENCES
A public re-evaluation of
military doctrine on the conse-
quences of nuclear war has been
initiated by influential Soviet
military figures. The focus of
this critical scrutiny is the
view--which gained acceptance
.under Khrushchev--that nuclear
war is in all circumstances an
undesirable instrument of na-
t.ional policy. The proponents
of a new look appear to believe
that current positions limit the
flexibility of_Soviet_ policy and
.promote an attitude of defeatism.
The first entry..in the pub-
,lic record:was made ,last fall by
a medium-rank military expert on
the .interrelation on-war and
politics. He denounced the view
that nuclear war represents an
unacceptable strategic option
anal that it-could not serge as
an instrument of politics, He
argued that to deny the possi-
bility of victory in such a war
was incorrect theoretically and
dangerous politically, leading
to "moral disarmament...fatalism,
and passivity," These views,
he contended, also ignored the
possibility of achieving victory
when circumstances--such as de-
velopment of counterweapons--
would reduce the. unfavorable
consequences of war.
More recently Marshal Soko-
lovsky and Major General Chered-
nichenko, military strategists
and strong advocates of nuclear
weaponry, also cited the-need
for a further study of strategy
in order to reinforce the USSR's
defensive capability. Although
the authors recognized anew that
"unprecedented destruction"
would result from a world: nuclear
war, they injected the optimis-
i;ic view that a surprise-.attack
on the USSR could be prevented.
This wiew.was given added.
a~,uthority in a speech at the
23rd Party Congress in April by
C~eneral? Yepishev (chief of .the
political administration-of.the
armed forces) caa ling for-in-
tensified study of the problem
"of war .anal peace as. connected...
particularly with the nature-of
a possible thermonuclear war."~_
Yepshev scored "incorrect and
confused" opinions which per-
mined "extremes" in-the, inter-
pretation of the possible con-
sequences of the:use of nuclear
weapons. He: concluded that the
Sovietpeopl!eand-military cadres
required a bei;ter education "in
a spirit of optimism, a firm
belief in their own strength
and in the inevitable defeat of
a;ny aggressor . "
'It is evident; that one of
tine "extremes" Yepishev had in
mind is the -view that nuclear
w;~.r is too horrible to contem-
paate and that he believes that
doctrines which rest on this
a:~sumption weaken the fiber of
the Soviet population in general
acid that of the Soviet military
forces in particular.
The aim of these military
si7okesmen seems to be a more
flexible doctrinal position per-
mitting the-use. of, ar threats
to use, Soviet military power to
achieve national objectives.
sECRE ~r
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PLANS FOR WEST-EAST GERIViAhI CONTACTS MOVE FORWARD
Further progress has been
made in arranging for an exchange
of speakers between the West Ger-
man Socialists and the East Ger-
man Communists. The two sides
are agreed on dates, locations,
and press and television coverage
for these addresses. The major
remaining issue to be settled is
the matter of "safe conduct" for
East German participants.
Representatives of the West
German Social Democratic party
(SPD) and the East German Commu-
nist party (SED) last week set
14 July as the date for the ap-
pearance of SPD Chairman Brandt
and his two deputies before an
audience at the East German city
of Chemnitz. The East German
representatives--not yet named--
are scheduled to speak in Hanover
a week later.
The problem of "safe con-
duct" arises from West German
laws which hold East German lead-
ers accountable for such actions
as orders to shoot persons at-
tempting to flee. The Communists
are balking at any temporary im-
munity and are insi-sting on re-
peal of West German laws which
"discriminate against East Ger-
man citizens."
A further complicating fac-
tor is an unexpected invitation
from SED boss Ulbricht to the
SPD to secret, high-level talks
on "disarmament and peace" ques-
tions. It is unlikely that the
East Germans expect an acceptance.
The invitation may have been is-
sued simply to sow dissension
among and within the West German
parties.
Meanwhile, the West Berlin
government is trying again to
interest the East Germans in re-
placing the West Berlin pass
agreement which expires on 30
June with a long-term, liberal-
ized pact.. City officials will
propose a one-year agreement
covering four holiday visiting
periods of 16 rather than 14 days
each as at present. They also
will seek approval for visits to
cemeteries within and just beyond
the limits of East Berlin, and a
broadening of the categories of
those eligible for special hard-
ship passes,
Still more ambitious is the
desire of West Berlin leaders to.
explore prospects for their cit-
izens to visit East Germany as
well as East Berlin. Alt~iough
this would pose certain legal
and jurisdictional problems, US
officials are willing to go
along with. a West Berlin attempt
to deal with the East Germans
on this matter.
West Berlin authorities
probably would settle for con-
siderably less than they will
ask. In previous negotiations,
the East Germans have taken an
increasingly tough stand in ne-
gotiating even short-term ar-
rangements for the passage of
West Berliners through the Wall.
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FINLAND'S NEW GOVERNMENT
Finland's new left-of-cen-
ter government faces an uncer-
tain future, even with a three-
fourths majority in parliament,
because of the disparate polit-
ical interests represented in
the four-party coalition and the
lack of agreement on basic eco-
nomic problems. The government,
formed on 26 May, is composed of
the Social Democratic Party (SDP),
which won a plurality in the
March elections, plus President
Kekkonen's Center (Agrarian)
Party, the Communist-front SKDL
party, and a Social Democratic
splinter group.
The parties are in general
accord on foreign policy, espe-
cially the need to maintain
friendly relations with Moscow.
However, the farmer-oriented
Center Party and the labor-ori-
ented Social Democrats and Com-
munists have widely divergent
views on domestic economic is-
sues that are likely to lead to
contention in the government. In
addition, there are factions in
the Center and Social Democratic
parties bitterly hostile to the
Communists and unreconciled to
cabinet cooperation with them
After almost two months of
negotiations, presided over by
Paasio, formation of the so-
called "big three" government
was in doubt up to the last min-
ute. The visit this week of
Secretary Rusk and Premier Ko-
sygin's scheduled arrival in mid-
June prompted President Kekkonen
to press for a speedy solution.
The Communists, excluded
from the government since 1948,
scored a major breakthrough by
gaining cabinet representation.
Social Democratic leaders mini-
mize the risk of their participa-
tion, maintaining that it is nec-
essary to make the SKDL share
responsibility for the hard de-
cisions which Finland's budgetary
problems will require. The SKDL's
awareness that it is in the gov-
ernment on sufferance, and the
fact that it was assigned only
three minor cabinet posts may
serve, initially at least, to
inhibit any disruptive tenden-
c,ies the party may have.
The SKDL can be expected to
use its position in the govern-
ment to oppose any moves to de-
velop closer relations with the
We;~t, such as arrangements be-
tw~een Finland and the EEC. It
ca:n also be expected to advocate
me~~,sures at variance with the
in~Cerests of NATO members Norway
an~~ Denmark .
The emergence of the Fin-
ni:~h Communists as partners in
th~~ new government will command
the attention of many Western
Eu~copean socialist parties whose
le:~ders are faced with increas-
in?; defections by their left-
wing elements. The most imme-
di~~te impact may be felt in
SwE>den, where there is some
sentiment to follow the Finnish
example.
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Middy East - Africa
SENATORIAL ELECTIONS I N TURKEY
Political circles in Al~kara
view the 5 June Turkish senatorial
elections as an unofficial refer-
endum, It will be the first op-
portunity for voters to judge the
performance of the seven-month-
old Justice Party (JP) government
headed by Prime Minister Demirel.
The vote will also test public at-
titudes toward the obstructionist
tactics o1' the major opposition
group, the Republican Peaples Party
(RPP), headed by former p~?ime min-
ister Inonu.
The elections involve a third
of the 150 elective seats in the
senate, which plays only a Second-
ary role in the 'Turkish legisla-
tive process. The JP may lose a
few seats, largely because of
changes made in the electoral law
by the Inonu government. "The RPP,
however, can be expected to use
any such result t-o claim that the
public has lost confidence in the
Demirel regime, and may even call
for a new coalition to replace the
single party government. During
the campaign, the RPP, which has
shifted from a left-of-center to-
ward a middle-of-the-road course,
reiterated earlier veiled warnings
of revolution if the government
resorted to arbi-trary action dur-
ing or after the election.
There have been indications
that a cabinet reshufi'le may fol-
low the elect ions, but major changes
do nat appear likely. It is barely
possible, howcvex?, that the mili-
tary might issue an ultimatum de-
manding a national coalition. The
recent legislative impasse caused
ley an opposition filibuster against
proposed changes in the electoral
law has probably stx?engtihened the
conviction in some military cir-
cles that a civilian regime is in-
capable of giving Turkey the strong
leadership it needs. Px?esident
Sunny intends to call an early
meeting of all party leaders to
discuss the over-all political
Sltu~itl?I1. He will probably tell
the politicians to put aside their
partisan diff-erences and get on
with the common task of governing
Turkey.
There has been little popu-
lar enthusiasm demonstrated dur-
ing the campaign. This lack of
interest grobably reflects a
growing disillusionment with in-
terparty rivalry and possibly
revulsion against the thug-like
behavior of some of the JP de
uties
UGANDA'S PRES 1 DENT PUTS DOWN REGIONAL REVOLT
President Obote has suppressed
the revolt of Uganda's importa-lt
Buganda region. This will mean
the end of the kingdom's semi-
autonomous status.
Resistance of the Bugandan
people faded in the face of severe
military repression and government
intimidation. The militant minor-
ity of Bagandan leaders who favored
~~ ~t..+ ~ J~ l
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an armed showdown with Obote have
fled ar are-under arrest. .The re-
maining leaders have appealed to
their people to avoid further
bloodshed. No support for the
dissidents developed outside Bu-
ganda, and many of them are obey-
ing the government's call to turn
in their weapons.
Sporadic incidents are likely
to continue in reaction to the
ill-disciplined army's brutality
against civilians.
Obote is moving rapidly to
consolidate his gains and to
strip Buganda of its. remaining
prerogatives. Last week. he
pushed constitutional amendments
through the National Assembly
permitting the central .government
to tkke over the administration
of Buganda's,public services.
He also closed its main newspaper.
He now plans to divide the king-
.ZAMBIA.,.RESUMES. COPPER. SHIPMENTS `THROUGH RHODESIA
The Smith regime in Rhodesia,
presumably with an eye on the
second round of talks now under
way-with Britain, has .eased the
political atmosphere by at least
temporarily rescinding what was
in effect a ban on transshipment
on Zambian copper.
A copper-laden train crossed
the Zambian border into Rhodesia
on 31 May, three days after-the
Zambian High Court issued a tem-
porary injunction against. the Rho-
design Railways, jointly owned
by the'-two governments. The
court held that the railroad
board's recent edict on payment
conditions--issued after Zambia
refused to .turn over railroad
revenues it had collected--ex-
ceeded its authority.
The Salisbury-based chair-
man of the railway-, facing the
prospect that the road might .split
into two national systems, an-
n~~~unced he would heed the in-
junction. The Smith government
overruled its finance minister,
a:nd went along,
Exploratory talks between
British and Rhodesian govern--
m~:nt representatives resumed
yesterday in Salisbury. The-
earlier meetings in London left
Brritain cautiously.hopeful about
the prospects for negotiation,
b~xt the two parties have not
sE:ttled the two major problems:
getting the agreement of )&ho-
desian Africans to any settle-
ment, and persuading Rhodesia to
rf;turn to constitutional--i.e.,
British--rule before independence
nE?gotat one can proceed.
SECRET`
WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Juri '66
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Other African governments
distrust Britain"s decision to
hold talks with the rebel re-
gime--especially in Salisbury.
Aside from Zambia's precipitation
of the railroad crisis, however,
they have made no significant
moves against the talks since
their UN Security Council resolu-
Lion calling for stronger action
against Rhodesia failed to pass
last week. In the UN Committee
of 24 and elsewhere, however, Af-
ricans have continued a propaganda
attack against a British "sell-
out" of Rhodesian African inter-
ests in any settlement with the
Smith government.
MO~~UTU F~JILS PL~QT BY CaN~OLESE POLITICIANS
Congo moved swiftly and harshly
against the participants in a
plot which he and his military
lieutenants broke up on 30 May.
One of his aims clearly is to dis-
courage other would-be plotters,
but some of the impetus behind.
his moves seems to come from a
belief that Belgium, his current
bete noire, was implicated.
The army's role confirms that
although there is some grumbling,
the upper levels of the officer
corps still consider that their
power is derived from Mobutu and
not vice versa. As long as the
their power against Mobutu"s, the
disruptive opportunities for op-
ponents of the regime will be
severely limited.
The government's pronounce-
ments claimed from the beginning
that "foreign embassies" had
been involved with the plotters.
The principal suspect apparently
is the Belgian Embassy, whose
first secretary was ordered out
of the country vn 3i May. Press
reports suggest that Mobutu be-
lieves the plotters also got:.en-
couragement from the French.
_ ~ What-
ever the degree of actual Belgian
involvement, Mobutu is likely to
believe the worst. His attitude
may be reflected in a harder
Congolese line in the current
economic talks with Belgium, now
recessed after two weeks of in-
conclusive negotiations.
~.lr~ ~L 1
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NORTHERN NIGERIANS REACT VIOLENTLY AGAINST UNITY PLAN
An outbreak of violent dem-
onstrations in the main towns of
northern Nigeria has confronted
General Ironsi's military regime
with its first major crisis since
it assumed power last January.
The demonstrations were in pro-
test against recently announced
plans for a unitary national ad-
ministration and unified civil
service. By exacerbating the
country's basic ethnic and re-
g~ional divisions, the disturbances
ax?e certain to leave lasting psy-
ckiological scars which will impede
tYie regime's efforts to forge a
t9-ghter union in Africa's most
populous nation.
The demonstrators, mainly
northern Hausa tribesmen, targeted
most of their attacks against the
?Laria
~_~Kadun3
N O R Z' d--I E R N
l~s
W ESTER N
~Ibadan
_-~`%~~ -.Beni CityC
LAGOS -' ~.
MID-
ESTERN
Katsina Principal Locations of Unrest
Former regional houndaries now
connote ""groups of provinces`"
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persons, homes, and property of
Ibo southerners. Even when north-
erners dominated Nigeria's power
structure before the January coup,
the Muslim Hausa feared domina-
tion by the better educated
southerners--espccially the .ag-
gressive Ibas of Eastern Nigeria.
Following the coup, they became
increasingly convinced that the
Ironsi regime represented Ibo
domination in thin disguise.
Some demonstrators distrib-
uted leaflets protesting the
military government's reforms
and calling for secession. The
fact that the disturbances oc-
curred in a large number of
Hausa-inhabited northern local-
ities within two days--28 and
29 liay--indicates some degree
of coordination, presumably
provided by northern civil serv-
ants and dispossessed political
leaders. The greatest violence
occurred in Kano, where over 60
persons were killed. Same af-
fected towns were still experi-
encing disturbances as of 1
June. So far the south has re-
mained calm, but as the full
import of the northern events
become clear there will be an
increasing danger of retaliatory
action against Hausa communities
there.
Security forces, with rein-
forced police elements most
prominent, have so far been able
to maintain essential control,
but they probably would be un-
able to handle more widespread
disorders. Despite threats by
Ironsi to impose martial law,
he has avoided as much as pos-
Bible committing the army to an
active pacification role because
of concern that discipline, which
has seemed uncertain since Jan-
uary, might break dawn completely.
In addition to its own tribal
frictions, the army is especially
troubled by the internal contro-
versy surrounding the fate of
still-detained but unprosecuted
mutinous younger officers--
mostly Ibas--who sparked the
January coup. In the present
crisis there evidently has been
fear that northerner troops
might refuse to obey or might
even fire upon their predomi-
nantly southern officers, partic-
ularly Ibos. Should the army
disintegrate under such pressures,
a large-scale breakdown of law
and order would seem inevitable.
The military government
belatedly has been trying to
make its reform plans more pal-
atable to the north and to work
with traditional authorities in
damping down the current unrest.
Northern Military Governor Kat-
sina is endeavoring to enlist
broad support from the area's
still-powerful emirs and chiefs
at a special meeting which be-
gan in Kaduna on 1 June. How-
ever, the tensions and tribal
enmities aroused by -the reforms
and the disorders will undoubt-
edly continue for some time, and
may load to additional local-
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~S'E CR.E; T
Western Hemis~, here.,
MEETING ON OAS CHAF;TER REVISION
A special meeting of the In-
ter-American Economic and Social
Council at the expert level will
begin in Washington on 6 June.
It will try to harmonize Latin
American and US views on OAS
charter amendments dealing with
economic and social standards.
Differences center around
the Latins' desire to see incor-
porated in the charter very
specific language which would, in
effect, obligate the US by treaty
to provide aid and to take cer-
tain actions to eliminate trade
barriers. The US has informed the
Latins that although it has no de-
sire to go back on any of the
ideals of the Alliance for Prog-
ress it cannot bind itself by
treaty to specific amounts of aid
and it must preserve the preroga-
tives of Congress with regard to
appropriating funds.
The meeting, therefore, will
be attempting to reconcile two
draft charter amendment packages.
The one embodying the Latin Ameri-
can position was developed at the
February-March charter amendment
congress held in Panama. The
other, in more general language?
was developed by the US after the
Panama meeting.
The US has presented its
draft to the individual Latin
American governments and received
assurances that they understand
and are sympathetic with the US
position. Although the bulk of
their objections to the US draft
can be satisfied by minor changes,
some basic problems exist. For
example, nearly all the Latin
Americans are insisting on removal
o:f the sentence of the US draft
which stipulates that ".nothing
...shall be construed as a cornmit-
m~~nt by any member state to sup-
p:1y any specific .amount of aid
to any other member-state or
grouping of member states."
Furthermore, Chile., probably
reflecting the feelings of many
otther Latin American governments,
has insisted that the concept of
solidarity and economic coopera-
t~ion be stipulated in a form simi-
lar to that drawn up in Panama.
However, aS a result of
Lincoln Gordon's May visit to
Craile, many substantial differ-
ences with the US position may
have been overcome and, at the
Ju~.ne meeting, Chile and the other
Latins are expected to be less
intransigent and to seek to came
up~ with a draft acceptable to the
US.
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NEW AMBIENCE 4N CUBA
Fidel Castro's regime has
shown unusual sensitivity to in-
ternational and domestic irri-
tants since the first of the
year. His behavior in connec-
tion with recent events at the
US Guantanamo Naval Base is the
latest and most dramatic instance.
proach to domestic problems.
Similarly, the attempted hi-
jacking of a CUBANA airliner on
27 March .produced a harsh re-
sponse. At least 300 to 400
GUBANA employees reportedly are
being replaced because of their
alleged lack of "revolutionary
integrity."
On 2 January, by starting
a public polemic with Communist
China over its intent to cuir 1966
rice shipments to Guba, Castro
brought the year-long deteriora-
tion in Sino-Cuban relations to
a head. In another evidence of
frustration anti displeasure at
international trends,. Guba has
fulminated on behalf of armed
revolution during and since the
January Tri-Continent Conference
with an intensity not seen since
1963
In March and April, Gastro
launched a bitter propaganda at-
tack against moderate-leftist
President Frei of Ghile and in
early May he renewed old charges
of "softness" against President
Tito and the "so-called League
of Yugoslav Communists." Cas-
tro's May Day speech was notable
largely for its thinly veiled
anti-Russian barbs.
Castro's campaign against
regime "dilettantes and playboys"
inaugurated in mid-March pro-
vides the most dramatic example
of his recent heavy-handed ap-
The reasons for Castro's
erratic response to these and.
other irritants are not readily
apparent. High on the list,
however, probably is his per-
sonal frustration that after
seven years of effort his inter-
national and domestic goals are
still far from attainment. At
the same time, he has found him-
self under increasing Soviet
proscriptions which have curbed
his maneuverability. The Guan-
tanamo incidents, in which armed
Cuban soldiers were discovered
inside the base, may have been
provocations designed to divert
popular attention from Cuba's
economic difficulties.
Gastro's charisma has begun
to fade somewhat, but there are
no reports of antiregime groups
operating in the Cuban country-
side or of plotting within the
regime. Continuation. of the
present climate in Cuba, how-
ever, could lead to further dis-
enchantment with the regime.
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SECRET
is the presi-
CANDIDATES CHOSEN FOR BCILIVIAN ELECTIONS
The Bolivian electoral sit-
uation is beginning to stabilize.
The military junta now has no po-
litical reasons to cancel the
elections, and only serious vio-
lence could interfere with the
3 July schedule.
Seven groups have declared
their intention to run candidates
for Congress. Two groups have
also named candidates to oppose
Rene Barrientos for the presidency.
These are the Christian Democrat-
ic Community (CDC)--a front for
the rightist Bolivian Socialist
Falange (FSB)--and the Andrade
faction of the Nationalist Revo-
lutionary Movement (MNR). Re-
tiredoGeneral Bernandino Bilbao
dential candidate of the CDC.
Gonzalo Romero, subchief of the
FSB, is his vice-presidential run-
ning mate. Victor Andrade will
run for president on the MNR ticket
and leftist.Augusto Cespedes
wit.L be his running -mate.
All parties expect Barrien-
tos to win the presidency. The
bat7~le will be for congressional
seats, with 102 at stake in the
Chamber of Deputies and 27 in the
Senate.
VELASCQ CONTINUES EFFORT TO REGAI IN ECUADOREAN PRESIDENCY
The 28 May convention of fol-
lowers of Ecuadorean ex-President
Velasco Ibarra resulted in his
"nomination" for the presidency.
The Velasquistas oppose the gov-
ernment's plan to yield power only
to a constituent. assembly to
be chosen in September, they now
appear inclined to strive for a
direct presidential election,
which Velasco is confident he
could win. If he decides, however,
that the relative prospect for
success of this approach to a new
term is unfavorable;, Velasco may
attempt a violent grab for power
in the coming weeks.
The convention papered over
differences among factions within
thE~ movement by retaining the
prE~sent national director. Major
elements of the party platform
reX~ortedly are national
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self-determination noninterven-
tion in~foreign affairs, and the
nullity of the 1942 Rio Protocol
which defined the boundary with
Peru. Velasco in the past has
fanned the border question as a
foreign diversion for Ecuadorean
nationalism and he may do so
again.
Although he has asserted
that he is "non-Communist,"
Velasco has come out in favor
of diplomatic and commercial re-
lations with Communist countries
and retains a close association
with pro-Castro extremist Manuel
Araujo.
As the possible beginning
of a counter-Velasco movement,
the Radical Liberal and Social-
ist parties have held a meeting
in Guayaquil aimed at rallying po-
litical forces within the con-
stituent assembly against Velasco.
6Yhile the factious politicians
can agree on blacking the former
president, there is little like-
lihood that they will be able to
attain unanimit on anything
else.
URUGUAYAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Three plans -for -constitu-
tional reform have been approved
for submission to the voters in
Uruguay's November general elec-
tions. All three--sponsored re-
spectively by the ruling Blanco
Party, the opposition Colorado
Party, and the Uruguayan Commu-
nist Party--propose to substitute
a president for the present weak
and divided nine-man executive.
In order to become law, a
proposal for constitutional re-
form must be approved by a major-
ity of those voting, who must
comprise at least 35 percent of
the registered electorate. This
latter condition is not easy to
fulfill because voter rolls have
Page 24
not peen updated far years. It
is statistically demonstrable
that unless one of the two major
parties wins a landslide victory
of nearly two to one--which is
unlikely--no single plan will get
the required 7?0,000-add votes.
Some politicians have proposed
that voters ensure ado-ption of
reform by voting yes for more
than one plan; debate over the
legality of this procedure has at
least temporarily diverted pres-
sure for a bipartisan approach.
The popular will for reform
is great, and if it should be
frustrated political stability
could be jeopardized. Only a
bipartisan project would seem
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able to overcame the obstacles
and win approval. The Colorados,
however, believing that they are
likely to win in November and
can then put through their plan,
may refuse to compromise.
In addition to its provi-
sions for a one-man executive,
the Colorado plan, which gathered
an impressive number of sponsor-
ing signatures, would permit
state expropriation, without pre-
payment, of land not being pro-
ductively employed--an idea which
is anathema to the Blancos and
the conservative Ruralist League.
In addition, it would eliminate
constitutional provisions which
ensure bipartisan representation
on the directorates of Uruguay's
autonomous agencies. Many en-
trenched politicians in both ma-
jor parties do not wish to do
away with this system which as-
sures them patronage privileges
even when they lose elections.
Although..they pay lip service to
reform, their behind-the-scenes
opposition may well help to kill
it.
The Communists--who probably
originally had not expected to
obtain enough signatures to put
their scheme on the ballot--are
elated at their success. Party
leaders hope that in addition to
helping take votes from the
B:Lanco and Colorado proposals,
they can convince at least some
oi' the 225,000 signers to vote
for a Communist-backed popular
front slate.. The US Embassy be-
l~.eves that unless the two tradi-
tional parties agree on a biparti-
s~~n approach to reform before No-
vE~mber, potential voter disil-
lusionment could result in a
windfall protest .vote for such
a front. Uruguayan politicians
have not tended to take the Com-
munist reform plan seriously and
most scoffed at the thought. it
would appear on the ballot. Most
Uruguayan politicians believe that
i;raditional parties will always
control the country and tFuis leads
them. to discount-the threat of
Communism. Many observers in-
cx?easingly believe that the tradi-
tional leaders have lost touch
with Uruguayan political reality.
As elections near, each of
tYie two major parties will prob-
ably increasingly attack fea-
tures of the-other's proposi-
tion, thus hardening its own
si;and and reducing opportunities
for compromise. In this atmos-
phere it is hard to conceive of
significant numbers of voters
casting votes for the rival
palrty's plan--i.f this is indeed
lE~gal--and chances for reform
?,r~ November must now be rated
slim.
SE CRE ~C'
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THE ~3t~M~PJ~CAN ELECTI+QNS
The general elections held.
on 1 June in the Dominican Re-
public were unmarred by violence
or fraud, according to all re-
ports, Results announced up to
noon of 2 June, based on about
a third of the total vote expected,
gave Joaquin Balaguer a command-
ing lead.
between the two principal candi-
dates, Balaguer and Juan Bosch,
would, however, give the winner
neither a strong popular mandate
nor the congressional support
considered necessary for effec-
tive democratic leadership in the
Dominican Republic.
Balaguer may have profited
greatly from last-minute conces-
sions he won from the provisional
government, In the last -days of
the campaign his threat to resign
unless unregistered women over
25 were allowed to vote quickly
brought a change in the voting
requirements, There appeared to
be a heavy turnout of women, who
in general are believed to favor
Balaguer.
The atmosphere of calm and
order on election day, together
with good weather, brought a
large turnout of voters, which
will help to gain acceptance of
the final result. A close finish
Much now depends on the
manner in which the loser con-
cedes. Balaguer has said pub-
licly that he will accept the
election results unless widespread
fraud is evident, and Bosch made
similar statements, but in pri-
vate, contested elections would
furnish extremist partisans with
both. an issue and an atmosphere
conducive to violence.
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