WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005300120005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2009
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 22, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2009/03/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300120005-8
[State Dept. review completed.
22 July 1966,
(SCI No, 029 /6'6
Copy No.
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(Information as of noon EDT, 21 July 1966)
Page
VIETNAM PEACE MISSIONS TO MOSCOW FAIL 1
To the surprise of none of the parties concerned, In-
dira Gandhi and Harold Wilson last week found Moscow
stony ground for planting proposals for peace in Vietnam.
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Ho Chi Minh's announcement this week of plans to "par-
tially mobilize" the DRV's reserves evidently represents
little more than a propaganda response to the POL strikes
in view of the country's already high degree of mobili-
zation. Hanoi, however, is maintaining a high rate of
infiltration into the South (via a new route directly
across the Demilitarized Zone) in an apparent effort to
relieve hard-pressed Communist forces there. Peking's
propaganda continues to play up its steadfastness in
aiding the Vietnamese Communists. The emphasis in Chinese
statements, however, remains on Hanoi's own persistence,
indicating Peking's reluctance to become directly in-
volved. Saigon, meanwhile, has restated its own uncom-
promising views on ending the war.
NORTH KOREA ENCOUNTERING SNAGS ON DIPLOMATIC FRONT
Pyongyang's diplomatic offensive in its competition
with Seoul has, in the past few :months, had setbacks
in Ghana, Indonesia, and Tanzania which are only partially
offset by Syria's decision this -week to establish
relations with North Korea.
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SOVIET SALES OF COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT
The USSR still is far from being a serious competitor
of Western manufacturers of commercial aircraft, but
its discount prices and long-term credit offers attract
purchasers in Communist and less developed countries.
FURTHER INTERNAL SHAKEUP INDICATED IN ALBANIA
Thousands of personnel were transferred from the central
government apparatus to rural posts last spring in an
apparent effort by the regime to tighten party control,
and recent remarks by top leaders suggest that additional
changes are coming.
FRENCH TAKING HARDER LINE IN NATO NEGOTIATIONS
De Gaulle seems to be trying to avoid any written state-
ment which would lead to automatic involvement of French
forces in wartime. Given the current domestic -pressure
on the government in Germany, he may also hope to hold
out for a more favorable status for French troops there.
Middle East - Africa
YEMENI REPUBLICANS CONSIDERING INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT 12
A significant number of republican leaders appear fed
up with Egyptian interference and are exploring the
possibility of a new regime.
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SUDAN GOVERNMENT STILL TROUBLED BY FACTIONALISM
The struggle within the dominant Umma party is dis-
rupting the coalition government, hindering any effort
to settle the rebellion in the southern provinces
INTERNATIONAL COURT THROWS OUT SOUTH-WEST AFRICA CASE
While the South Africans welcome the court's decision,
on procedural grounds, not to pass judgment on their
mandate over South-West Africa, they expect further
attacks on their racial policies. The African govern-
ments, however, have apparently reached no decision on
their next move against Pretoria.
BELGIAN-CONGOLESE RELATIONS UNDER HEAVY STRAIN 16
Brussels has indicated it may end its technical assistance
if Congolese provocations continue.
STEP-UP IN SOVIET MILITARY AID DELIVERIES TO ALGERIA
The current surge of arms shipments again indicates
Moscow's willingness to supply military aid to Alge-
ria despite the change of regimes last year,
ECUADOREAN PRESIDENT YIELDS TO STRIKERS
Yerovi's capitulation to provincial strikers protesting
his financial measures may lead other groups
to strike
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GUATEMALA'S REACTIONS TO RECENT GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS
Some extremists are getting government posts, possibly
because of President Mendez' inexperience or poor ad-
vice, and conservative circles are concerned.
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VIETNAM PEACE MISSIONS TO MOSCOW FAIL
To the surprise of none of
the parties concerned, Indira
Gandhi and Harold Wilson last
week found Moscow stony ground
for planting proposals for peace
in Vietnam.
About the only common ele-
ment in the missions of the two
prime ministers was the need to
accommodate political pressures
at home. Neither expected a
favorable response to proposals
which, although framed very dif-
ferently, were alike in urging
that Moscow take an active role,
as cosponsor of the Geneva agree-
ment of 1954, in arranging peace
negotiations. The two leaders
also appealed to the Russians
to intercede with Hanoi on be-
half of American prisoners of
war. Ostensibly, and for the
record, these appeals were re-
jected on the grounds that it
was a matter for Hanoi to decide.
The Soviets took what dip-
lomatic profit they could from
the Indians but gave the British
short shrift. When the high-
level meetings were over, the
visitors had at least demonstrated
that they had done what they could
for peace in Vietnam, while the
Soviets, though they would prob-
ably have been happier had their
guests stayed home, could take
credit for having shown themselves
stern, steadfast allies of the
North Vietnamese.
Mrs. Gandhi, anticipating
the problem of an unprotected
left flank in India's 1967 elec-
tions, sought to forestall do-
mestic criticism of New Delhi's
increasingly close ties with the
US by again demonstrating India's
independent outlook. However,
she accepted explicitly anti-
Western references in the commu-
nique' which closed the visit,
indicating she was no match for
the apparently hard-bargaining
Soviets. She nevertheless se-
cured for India a Soviet agree-
ment to extend about $630 million
in new aid and to carry over $420
million in previous commitments
to help finance India's fourth
five-year plan.
Wilson's impromptu trip
achieved its immediate political
purpose of delaying a confronta-
tion with domestic critics of
ais support of US policy in Viet-
nam. The trip should satisfy
some doubters that Wilson is do-
ing all he can in the cause of
peace and that Communist intransi-
gence is responsible for the
Vietnamese deadlock. The trip
is unlikely, however, to soothe
for long the growing number of
opponents of Wilson's Vietnamese
policy, and his reception by the
Russians--perfunctory bordering
on rude--did not help his efforts
to develop a "peacemaker" image.
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Far East
THE SITUATION I N VIETNAM
Allied and Vietnamese Army
(ARVN) forces have stepped up the
scale and intensity of battalion-
sized or larger spoiling opera-
tions against Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese Army (PAVN) units in
South Vietnam, with encouraging
results. Last week the number
of Communist troops killed and
captured exceeded 1,000 for the
tenth consecutive week.
The heaviest fighting occurred
in northernmost Quang Tri Prov-
ince. Six US Marine and five
ARVN battalions participating in
search-and-destroy Operation
HASTINGS/LAM SON 289 engaged in
almost continuous large-scale
combat with major elements of at
least one and possibly all three
regiments of the 324th PAVN In-
fantry Division. By Wednesday
the US and ARVN forces, supported
by heavy B-52 Stratofortress
bombing strikes, had at least
temporarily delayed or disrupted
a major Communist drive and had
killed more than 425 North Viet-
namese regulars.
Operation MACON, a clearing/
security/pacification mission
by three US Marine battalions
southwest of Da Nang, and Oper-
ation MOKULEIA, conducted by
three battalions of the US 25th
Infantry Division in the Hau
Nghia - Tay Ninh - Binh Duong
triborder area northwest of
Saigon, also achieved favorable
results. More than 240 Viet Cong
were reported killed. US losses
were moderate.
Communist-initiated military
activity during the past week
was highlighted by battalion-sized
attacks against South Vietnamese
Regional Force positions in Binh
Thuan and Binh Duong provinces
on 15 and 18 July, respectively.
In addition, an enemy unit of
undetermined strength conducted
a damaging ambush against an
ARVN road-clearing operation in
Binh Duong Province on 15 July.
Political Developments in Saigon
The 12th anniversary of
the 1954 Geneva Accords on 20
July afforded the South Vietnamese
Government an opportunity to
publicize once more its uncompro-
mising views on ending the war.
A government proclamation stated
that abandonment of the war ef-
fort by Hanoi, including with-
drawal of PAVN troops from South
Vietnam and dissolution of the
National Liberation Front, was
necessary before bombings of the
North could be stopped and allied
troops withdrawn from the South.
This position is essentially
no departure from previous govern-
ment statements. Foreign Ministry
officials reportedly were pri-
vately pleased by Ho Chi Minh's
recent public reaffirmation of
the DRV "hard line," feeling
that this should dispel any "wish-
ful thinking" in the South about
peace negotiations.
There has been no major
political activity reported since
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the announcement of Premier Ky's
revised cabinet and the initial
filing last week of candidates
for the September constitutional
assembly election. Unresolved
leadership and policy problems
within the Buddhist Institute
continued to prevent any settle-
ment between it and the govern-
ment. On his own, the institute's
moderate chairman, Tam Chau,
sought the release of Buddhist
monks under government detention
and avoided attending meetings
of the institute counci?.
South's Economic Situation
The rate of price increases
in South Vietnam has slowed some-
what since the period last month
immediately following the govern-
ment's announcement of devalua-
tion and other economic reforms.
However, high prices reportedly
remain the major topic of con-
versation among Vietnamese, out-
ranking the forthcoming elections
and even the war itself.
Workers in the Saigon area
employed by RMK, the major US
construction combine in South
Vietnam, may strike again next
week for higher pay, despite
the 15-percent raise recently
given all RMK employees.
"Mobilization" in North Vietnam
Hanoi attempted this week
to dramatize its determination
to continue the war with tough
public pronouncements highlighted
by a special Ho Chi Minh announce-
ment on 17 July that the country's
reserves would be "partially
mobilized." These statements
all emphasized an intent to stay
in the fight whatever the cost.
Ho's 17 July announcement,
well advertised in advance, turned
out to be somewhat anticlimactic.
Since April 1965 the DRV has
added some 100,000 men to its reg-
ular army, a million to its
militia forces, and 300,000 to
the paramilitary crews building
and repairing roads. In view
of this already high degree of
mobilization, the new "partial"
mobilization order is believed
to represent more of a propaganda
response to the POL strikes than
any change in Hanoi's call-up
program.
The North Vietnamese manpower
pool is believed capable of ex-
panding all categories of manpower
related to the war effort even
further. Ho's pronouncement may
have been aimed in part at pre-
paring the populace for a further
call-up of reservists and younger
men, at least some of whom will
probably end up in South Vietnam.
In the first half of 1966 some
30,000 North Vietnamese military
personnel were sent into South
Vietnam, and Hanoi appears still
to be maintaining this high
rate of infiltration.
The most significant infil-
tration this year involves elements
of the 324th North Vietnamese
Infantry Division. The presence
of one regiment of this division
--the 812th--has been confirmed
in Quang Tri Province. Two other
re invents
may also b
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These units reportedly came
directly across the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ), the first regular
North Vietnamese units reported
to have utilized this route. The
others have moved around the DMZ
through Laos. The unit report-
edly
covered the new route
in
only
12 days, whereas the
trek
down
the Laos infiltration
corri-
dor
normally takes four to
six
weeks. Groups subjected to the
long march through Laos, more-
over, reportedly suffer a high
rate of disease,
UNCODED
The infiltration of part or
all of the 324th Division at this
time may reflect Hanoi's concern
with the deteriorating Viet Cong
military position in the central
highlands. A large Communist
force very near the North Viet-
namese border could allow the
Communists to mount a number of
large-scale attacks in Quang Tri.
They might hope such actions would
draw off US forces from the high-
lands, giving the hard-pressed
Communist troops there a respite
and an opportunity to launch
some of their long-planned opera-
tions.
Chinese Propaganda Support
Chinese propaganda continues
to play up Peking's steadfast-
ness in assisting the Vietnamese
Communists, but the emphasis re-
mains on Hanoi's own persistence.
The People's Daily editorial
comment on Ho's 17 July "mobili- 25X1
zation" announcement, broadcast
by Peking on 18 July, had a sim-
ilar thrust. While promising
"resolute support," with the us-
ual caveats, it did not have the
ring of enthusiasm that marked
Chinese statements on this sub-
ject a year ago. A reference to
the possibility that all of Viet-
nam will be turned into a US
colony did not specify what China
would do in that event. In formu-
lating their own position with re-
gard to the Vietnamese, the Chi-
nese have begun to use the formu-
lation "great rear area"--which
suggests that Peking is more re-
luctant than ever to become di-
rectly involved.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 22, Jul 66
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NORTH KOREA -ENCOUNTERING SNAGS ON DIPLOMATIC FRONT
Pyongyang's diplomatic of-
fensive in its competition with
Seoul has, in the past few months,
met with setbacks in Ghana, Indo-
nesia, and Tanzania. Syria this
week announced a decision to es-
tablish relations with North
Korea, but this gain will only par-
tially offset Pyongyang's losses.
South Korea still holds a
nearly three-to-one advantage
over North Korea in terms of in-
ternational recognition. Pyongyang
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made substantial gains from 1963
to 1965 when ten states of Asia
and Africa extended recognition.
Previously only two non-Communist
states--Guinea and Mali--had done
The first reversal of the
trend in Pyongyang's favor came
in Indonesia. Pyongyang's im-
portant diplomatic success in
gaining recognition by Djakarta
in April 1964 was undercut by
the September 1965 coup attempt
in Indonesia, and North Korean
criticism of Peking's involve-
ment reflected Pyongyang's con-
cern for its own position in In-
donesia. For the past few months
Pyongyang's emissaries in Djakarta
have been on the defensive, and
in May the North Korean ambassa-
dor attempted to discourage the
Indonesians from recognizing
South Korea. However, the Indo-
nesian Government has already
agreed in principle to the open-
ing of a South Korean consulate
general in Djakarta, and Seoul
reportedly hopes to send a mis-
sion in August.
In Ghana, events since the
military take-over have brought
relations close to the breaking
point. Pyongyang did not approve
of the new regime and withheld
its recognition. The new Ghana-
ian leadership, in turn, looked
with disfavor on the North Ko-
rean mission's close and obvious
dependence on the Chinese Commu-
nist Embassy. Last month Pyong-
yang, following the example of
Hanoi, closed its embassy in
Accra. Ghana is now receptive
to the establishment of diplo-
matic relations with Seoul which
sent an emissary last week to
begin negotiations.
In Tanzania, the reception
of a North Korean good-will mis-
sion earlier this month was at
best cool. The visit was not
followed by the usual joint com-
muniqud, reportedly because of
Tanzanian refusal to endorse a
diatribe against the United
States. The mission's heavy-
handed propaganda pressure ap-
pears to have dispelled some
illusions in Dar es Salaam about
the North Korean regime.
Visits by this same mission
to the UAR immediately before
and after the Tanzanian stop re-
sulted in little more than pro
forma expressions of friendship
and solidarity. It arrived in
Iraq on 17 July and may yet visit
other countries on its present
tour.
The non-Communist states
which currently recognize Pyong-
yang, in addition to Indonesia,
the UAR, Tanzania, Ghana, and
Syria, are Algeria, Guinea,
Mali, Uganda, Yemen, Mauritania,
Cambodia, and Congo (Brazzaville).
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Europe
SOVIET SALES OF COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT
The USSR still is far from
being a serious competitor of
Western manufacturers of commer-
cial aircraft, but its discount
prices and long-term credit of-
fers attract purchasers in Com-
munist as well as less developed
countries. One of its more popu-
lar exports is the twin turbo-
prop short-range AN-24 Coke
transport. The modified AN-2
Colt biplane, widely used for
crop dusting, also has drawn a
number of customers.
Recent Czech negotiations
for Western long-range jet air-
craft still may founder over ar-
rangements for financing, servic-
ing, and spare parts, and Prague
may reconsider purchasing the So-
viet IL-62 Classic, comparable
to the British VC-10. Poland,
faced with difficulties in ob-
taining spare parts for its Con-
vairs and DC-3s and short of hard
currency, has ordered 3 AN-24s
and an unspecified number of
TU-134 Crusty medium-range jets
from Moscow for delivery this
year. Cuba has received 8 AN-24s
this year to replace the obsolete
IL-14 Crates in use on its in-
ternal routes. China also re-
ceived two AN-24s as well as two
TU-124 Cookpot short-to-medium-
range jet airliners--the first
all-jet transport aircraft in
Peking's civil air fleet. Re-
cent Soviet aircraft deliveries
to North Vietnam include 2 AN-24s,
an IL-18 Coot, and six MI-6 Hook
helicopters.
Moscow, apparently hoping
to re-establish the dominant po-
sition in Guinea's civil air op-
erations lost to Pan American
last year, provided two AN-24s
in March on a loan basis to meet
urgent Air Guinea service re-
quirements. If Guinea's current
negotiations to purchase US trans-
ports from Fairchild fall through,
it will have little alternative
but to turn back to Moscow for as-
sistance. Congo (Brazzaville) has
acquired at least one AN-24 with
possibly one more on order, and
the Somali Republic is awaiting
delivery of an unspecified num-
ber of the same aircraft.
Despite an active sales
promotion campaign in the indus-
trial West--highlighted by the
major Soviet display at the Paris
air show last year--Moscow has
made no headway there. Some
sales of Soviet helicopters may
develop. Earlier this year Mos-
cow took the MI-6 on a demonstra-
tion and publicity campaign
through a number of European
countries.
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FURTHER INTERNAL SHAKEUP' INDICATED IN ALBAN I A
Albania's top leaders appear
to be setting the stage to deal
with serious party factionalism
that became evident last spring.
Although they have not identified
those in disfavor, both party
boss Hoxha and Premier Shehu in
recent speeches have referred to
"hostile elements" within Albania
and have hinted that some are
guilty of "revisionism."
Factionalism in Albania
first came to light earlier this
year when the regime took meas-
ures to deal with "bureaucratic
excesses." As many as 8,000 gov-
ernment personnel reportedly have
since been assigned to work in
agriculture and industry brigades.
Last March, Shehu announced that
the number of personnel in the
central state administration had
been reduced by 50 percent. These
changes seem designed to tighten
party control in the central and
local governments.
Then, in a speech on 4 July,
Shehu again warned that remnants
of the overthrown "exploiting"
classes and "hostile enemies born
from our own ranks," were acting
to re-establish a capitalist re-
gime. He said that the measures
taken so far were only the begin-
ning of a general program to rev-
olutionize life in Albania.
These remarks suggest that
additional personnel changes will
be forthcoming, but the regime
apparently is not yet ready to
move. The national elections of
10 July returned every high-rank-
ing official of the party and
government to the National Assem-
bly.
At a party central committee
plenum held on 12 and 13 July it
was announced that the Fifth
Party Congress would be held in
November. The congress had been
planned for sometime in the first
half of 1966, which, in view of
the party statutes, would already
have it a year late. These de-
lays are themselves indicative of
internal party problems. Resolu-
tion of these problems may now
come in November. The draft di-
rectives for the congress, pub-
lished last week, call for a
"merciless pursuit" and determined
struggle against "internal en-
emies."
The Albanian military hier-
archy may be at the center of the
factionalism because of its op-
position to.the revolutionary,
Chinese-style approach to Commu-
nism. Predictably, Albanian sol-
diers are.not happy with a recent
decree that abolishes rank and
insignia and
Albanian officers appear
uniformly sullen about the re- 25X1
introduction of political commis-
sars in all military units. The
regime's deep concern with the
military's discontent is probably
reflected in the replacement of
the chief and deputy chief of the
army's political directorate.
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FRENCH TAKING HARDER LINE I N NATO NEGOTIATIONS
Since President de Gaulle's
return from the USSR the French
have taken a harder line in ne-
gotiations with their NATO part-
ners over the mission of their
military forces.
At the North Atlantic Coun-
cil (NAC) meeting on 19 July the
French representative told the
other fourteen that France does
not accept their statement of "as-
sumptions" regarding French in-
tentions toward military coopera-
tion with NATO. This statement
had been presented to the French
at a NAC meeting last week as a
means of meeting the requirement
laid down in the communique of
the NATO foreign ministers meet-
ing in Brussels that agreement on
political matters must be reached
in NAC before there are discus-
sions on a military level of the
future mission of the French
forces.
The French representative
maintained that the Fourteen's
"assumptions" were a distortion
of the French position and that
the Brussels requirement for an
"exchange of views" in NAC had
been satisfied by the French
statement at a meeting of NAC on
21 June. Thus, he claimed, it
was now appropriate for the French
chief of staff and SACEUR to be-
gin detailed negotiations.
The consensus of the NAC
representatives of the Fourteen
Allies is that the Brussels re-
quirement was not met by the
French statement of 21 June. The
French agreed to a request by
the NATO secretary general to
check back with their government
to determine whether the state-
ment of "assumptions" could not
at least serve as the basis for
further discussions in NAC.
Failure to do this, the secretary
general indicated, would lead to
an impasse and require referral
back to the NATO foreign minis-
ters.
It remains doubtful that De
Gaulle will agree to any written
statement--such as now contained
in the "assumptions"--which would
lead to automatic involvement
of French forces in case of hos-
tilities. The harder French
line may also be due to an aware-
ness that internal pressures on
the West German Government might
lead to an agreement allowing
French troops to remain in Ger-
many in a status more favorable
to the French than Bonn is at
present willing to accept. If
such a bargain can be struck with
the Germans, Paris may feel its
position in the negotiations with
the Fourteen would be strength-
ened.
Meanwhile, Belgium has ob-
jected to the proposed reloca-
tion in West Germany of the Head-
quarters, Allied Forces Central
Europe (AFCENT). The Belgians
were upset when the Germans made
-a firm offer to put up AFCENT
in Aachen, and the Dutch subse-
quently withdrew their offer to
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locate it in the Netherlands.
The Belgians felt the Dutch were
taking on their fair share of
NATO installations after the
Belgians quickly approved relo-
cation of the Supreme Headquar-
ters Allied Command Europe in
their country. However, follow-
ing Belgian-Dutch talks on the
matter, the Netherlands has again
offered to accept either AFCENT
or the US European Command (EUCOM).
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22 Jul 66
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Middle East - Africa
YEMENI REPUBLICANS CONSIDERING INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT
Leading Yemeni Republicans,
apparently fed up with the Egyp-
tian presence in Yemen, are cur-
rently exploring the possibility
of forming an independent repub-
lican government against Egyp-
tian wishes.
dent, who is also a member of
the dissident group.
On 17 July a representative
of the group approached a US of-
ficial in Yemen and requested fi-
nancial assistance to pay off the
republican army.
Yemeni Prime Minister Amri,
presently in Cairo, submitted his
resignation on 14 July in pro-
test over Egypt's interference in
Yemen's internal affairs, includ-
ing flooding the country with
worthless paper currency. Amri's
resignation, in turn, has report-
edly moved every member of Yemen's
Republican Council to follow
suit. Important military leaders,
including the chief of staff,
apparently support the protest
also. Even more significant is
the reported backing of leading
tribal sheiks.
The Egyptians have so far
suppressed any official announce-
ment of the resignations, even
though these have reportedly
been accepted by the acting Presi-
Discontent in Yemen has been
exacerbated by drought and in-
flation. Religious friction and
southern resentment of domination
by the predominantly northern re-
publican government recently
flared in a rebellion in the Bayda
area of southern Yemen. The ar-
rival of republican army elements
and tribal levies forced a truce,
but there have been signs of tri-
bal restlessness in other areas.
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SUDAN GOVERNMENT STILL TFOUB'LED BY FACTIONALISM
The coalition government in
the Sudan is still disrupted by
factionalism within the Umma
Party, and efforts to solve the
country's major problems remain
at a standstill.
As the political arm of the
conservative Islamic Ansar Broth-
erhood, the Umma is the Sudan's
dominant political force. The
Ansar are the descendants or
followers of the Mahdi Mohammad
Ahmad, who besieged Egyptian-
held Khartoum in 1885, killed
General Charles Gordon, and ruled
the Sudan until defeated by Brit-
ish-led forces in 1898. The
brotherhood today includes approx-
mately four million Sudanese,
roughly one third of the coun-
try's total population.
The Umma's current turmoil
has been developing for months.
Essentially, it results from the
attempts of Sadiq al-Mahdi, the
Mahdi's 30-year-old great-grand-
son and president of the Umma,
to broaden the party's base by
including elements outside the
Ansar brotherhood, particularly
more politically sophisticated
townsmen. Sadiq has obtained
the support of a number of in-
fluential parliamentarians in
this effort, but has been opposed
by his uncle, the traditional
leader of the Ansar, Imam al-
Hadi al-Mahdi.
Sadiq also wants to replace
the ineffectual Mohammed Mahjoub
as prime minister, and it is on
this immediate issue that Sadiq
and his uncle have locked horns,
since the Imam has generally
supported Mahjoub. Sadiq's
backers are now attempting to
force a showdown and install
Sadiq himself as premier. Sadiq
has been reluctant to provoke an
open conflict with the Imam or
risk a split within the party.
should the issue come to a vote
in the Sudanese parliament, how-
ever, Sadiq could almost cer-
tainly control a majority vote
despite the Imam's opposition.
The intraparty conflict has
so preoccupied the politicos in
Khartoum that they have taken no
new steps toward a settlement of
the continuing Negroid separa-
tist rebellion in the country's
three southern provinces. The
government's military campaign
against the dissidents also is
stalemated.
, EGRET'
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INTERNATIONAL COURT THROWS OUT SOUTH-WEST AFRICA CASE
South African whites are
jubilant over the decision this
week of the UN's International
Court of Justice (ICJ) concern-
ing South-West Africa. The ICJ
refused on procedural grounds to
pass judgment on whether South
Africa had violated its interna-
tional responsibilities in its
administration of South-West Af-
rica, a League of Nations man-
date. The court decided that
the plaintiffs, Liberia and Ethi-
opia, had no legal right to re-
quire South Africa to meet its
mandate obligations. According
to the court, only the defunct
League of Nations had that right.
South African Government
spokesmen have no illusions, how-
ever, that the ICJ decision will
prevent further action by African
governments and others against
Pretoria's racial policy in
South-West Africa and, ultimately,
within South Africa itself.
At the same time, these
spokesmen note that the ICJ deci-
sion relieves Western powers of
the legal responsibility to sup-
port enforcement measures, such
as sanctions against South Africa,
which a different ICJ decision
might have brought. They say
that any new responsibilities
which the West.may assume will be
taken for political reasons and
in response to new initiatives
against South Africa by the black
African states.
The African governments
have apparently reached no deci-
sion on their next step. Like
almost everyone else, they seem
not to have anticipated the ICJ's
decision and have no contingency
plans. Indeed, it is question-
able that the Africans had an
agreed plan of action in case
the court's decision had gone
against South Africa. The Af-
rica Group at the UN has set up
an eight-member steering commit-
tee to consider future action.
There is a possibility that
the Africans may call for a spe-
cial session of the General As-
sembly--an idea which the USSR
is reported to support. Another
possibility is a Security Coun-
cil meeting to constitute a spe-
cial committee on South-West
Africa to act as the interested
party and take the case back to
the ICJ on behalf of the UN. How-
ever, this raises the question
of whether such a committee can
legally do this and might re-
quire a preliminary ICJ advisory
opinion. There has alsobeen
at least one African suggestion
for a ministers' meeting of the
Organization of African Unity.
Available comments about the
ICJ decision from other parts of
the world vary from critical dis-
appointment in the Netherlands
to a sigh of relief in the Brit-
ish Foreign Office.
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BELGIAN-CONGOLESE RELATIONS UNDER HEAVY STRAIN
The Congo's President Mobutu the gap, is looking to other car-
has continued to harass the Bel- riers, including the Soviets.
gian Government and Belgian en-
terprises in his country. Brus-
sels has now indicated it may
end its technical assistance
rather than accept further provo-
cations.
Mobutu is trying to bolster
his regime's prestige at home
and throughout Africa by demand-
ing "economic independence"
through the "Congolization" of
Belgian-controlled enterprises.
One target has been Belgium's
government-controlled Sabena air-
line, which owns 30 percent of
the Congo's domestic airline.
Sabena has refused to knuckle un-
der to Mobutu's pressures to give
up this interest, and has threat-
ened to withdraw vital technical
assistance after 31 July unless
certain blocked funds are re-
leased. Mobutu is now threaten-
ing to deny the airline landing
and overflight rights and, to fill
The Belgians are chagrined by
Mobutu's unilateral moves to set-
tle such outstanding issues as con-
cession and mining rights. His
government has recently taken over
rights of two mining companies
granted by the former Belgian co-
lonial government. This move, how-
ever, was very limited since both.
companies were practically defunct
and one was almost totally owned
by the Congolese Government.
STEP-UP IN SOVIET MILITARY AID -DELIVERIES TO ALGERIA
A recent surge of military
aid deliveries to Algeria again
indicates Moscow's willingness to
supply such assistance to Algiers
despite the change of regimes
last year. Since Ahmed Ben Bella's
overthrow, Moscow has maintained
a restrained but proper relation-
ship with the Boumediene regime,
and has continued its arms ship-
ments. Algeria is the second
largest recipient of Soviet mili-
tary aid in Africa.
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In the past two months at
least six Soviet freighters car-
rying military cargo have arrived
in Algiers. Deliveries this year
have included 20 MIG-21 Fishbed
jet fighters with a limited all-
weather capability--the first
Algeria has received--as well as
additional MI-4 Hound helicopters,
surface-to-air missile equipment,
artillery, armored personnel car-
riers, ammunition, and spare
parts.
Algeria continues to be used
fcr transshipment of Soviet mili-
tary aid deliveries to other Af-
rican countries. Recently, five
Soviet AN-12 Cub transports--the
first Soviet transports used to
deliver MIG aircraft--stopped at
Algiers en route to Mali.F
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 22 Jul 66
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Iq
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ECUADOREAN PRESIDENT YIELDS TO STRIKERS
Yerovi yielded last week to de-
mands of provincial interests
striking against a revenue meas-
This is the first time
Yerovi has submitted to special
interests resisting his financial
measures. He conceded in order
to end a five-day general strike
in Cotopaxi Province protesting
a decree depriving the provincial
government of a share of banana
export tax revenues which they
have received heretofore. Ye-
rovi's capitulation will damage
his prestige and authority and
encourage other groups to strike
for concessions.
Velasco and his followers
25X1
were not able to exploit the
Cotopaxi strike
They remain eager to capitalize
on Yerovi's difficulties, how-
ever
Peruvian plans to commem-
orate the 25th anniversary of
the 1941 border war with Ecuador
have provoked press and street
reaction in Ecuador which will
probably worsen before the cele-
bration ends on 31 July. The
boundary is a hypersensitive is-
sue in Ecuador, and a frontier
shooting incident is a possibil-
ity. Velasco, during his third
and fourth presidencies (1952-
56, 1960-61), was the leading
advocate of revising the border
in Ecuador's favor, and he might
play on public emotions in an
attempt to oust Yerovi.
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25X1
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GUATEMALA'S REACTIONS TO RECENT GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS
As expected, the new Guate-
malan Government is under pres-
sure from both right and left.
Conservative circles are privately
expressing fears that the majority
of President Mendez' second-eche-
lon appointments are going to
"known leftists." The Communist
guerrillas have rejected his
"peace" overtures and pledged in-
stead to give a new push to their
revolutionary struggle.
Mendez and Foreign Minister
Arenales appear to have had a
confrontation over appointment of
Miguel Angel Asturias as ambassa-
dor to France. A long-time resi-
dent of Paris, Asturias is a poet
and writer with a long history of
Communist activities. During his
residence in France he has been
involved in activities connected
with Guatemalan and international
Communism and has traveled widely
in the Soviet Union and other
bloc countries. Last May, he
was announced as a winner of the
1966 Lenin Peace Prize.
According to the US Embassy,
Arenales was opposed to the ap-
pointment. A Foreign Ministry
official said that it was "rammed
down his throat."
In the wide-
spread confusion surrounding
the new government appointments
one fact is clear--some extremists
are getting government posts,
possibly because of Mendez' inex-
perience or poor advice. IF- -
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Vae S1.L t 140
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