SPECIAL REPORT PAKISTANI PRESIDENT AYUBS PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005400010002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 29, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
PAKISTANI PRESIDENT AYVB'S PROBLEMS
PN.AL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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PAKISTANI PRESIDENT AYUB'S PROBLEMS
In eight years as Pakistan's ruler, Mohammed
Ayub Khan has maintained a stable government and
has dealt effectively with economic problems. He
has failed, however, to make any significant prog-
ress toward improving Pakistan's vital relations
with India.
Ayub's inability to gain an acceptable agree-
ment on Kashmir--the outstanding Indo-Pakistani
problem--has weakened his support in the army and
added a new weapon to his opposition's arsenal. In
addition, the side effects of his ill-calculated
attempt to use force to find a solution last Sep-'
tember have revived separatist agitation in East
Pakistan.
Domestic criticism--primarily directed at his
foreign policy--has become a major problem for
Ayub. The critics can be silenced only by success
in dealing with India, which appears unlikely. In
the absence of such success, Ayub will be forced
to conduct both his domestic and foreign policies
with greater regard to the opinions of his oppo-
nents.
Ayub and the Army
Ayub appears to be most con-
cerned with criticism from the
military. If supported by the
rest of Pakistani society, the
President could probably remain
in power for some time without
the active backing of the army,
but he would fall quickly were
the army to move against him.
Ayub, a professional soldier, has
had generally good relations with
the army since he came to power.
His outlook has usually coincided
with that of other Pakistani mil-
itary leaders. He has shared the
army's high estimate of its im-
portance for the country, and he
has retained considerable per-
sonal influence in the officer
corps.
These good relations with
the army were damaged by the
failure of Ayub`s attempt to
force a Kashmir solution in 1965.
His military critics cite a vari-
ety of reasons for the failure,
among them Ayub's miscalculation
of the Indian reaction when he
sent "freedom fighters" into
Kashmir in August, the incompe-
tence of generals appointed for
their loyalty to Ayub, his agree-
ment to the September cease-fire
which allegedly cheated the army
of victory, and, finally, his
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failure to exploit what his crit-
ics considered to be Pakistan's
favorable military situation dur-
ing the Tashkent discussions in
January.
Some officers are worried
by the specter of another war
with India and b7 Pakistan's lack
of military supplies to replace
combat losses and to equip new
units they believe necessary to
offset recent Indian strength in-
creases. Prior to the September
war, the US was Pakistan's major
arms supplier, but during that
conflict Washington halted mili-
tary aid and sales to both India
and Pakistan. As Pakistan relied
far more heavily than India on
US arms assistance, the action
had a much greater effect in
Rawalpindi than in New Delhi.
Ayub has sought more arms
in several places. Iran and Tur-
key have supplied some equipment,
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money availa e!:and the supplies
received have n.dt been sufficient
to meet Pakistan's needs, how-
ever, and Ayub has turned to Com-
munist China.
The Chinese have so far sent
a few squadrons of MIG-19 Farmer
jet fighters, a!few IL-28 Beagle
jet light bombers (possibly as
many as 50 aircraft in all), prob-
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The incoming arms, the mili-
tary expansion, and the resultant
promotions have partially re-
stored the military's confidence
in Ayub's ability. The arms prob-
lem is far from solved, however,
and Ayub has been able to do lit-
tle to still criticism of his
failure to win Kashmir. Despite
his diplomatic efforts, New Delhi
has given no indication that it
will enter meaningful talks on
Kashmir. Without a Kashmir solu-
tion Ayub appears to face a
choice between shifting the
blame from himself--India would
be the most likely choice as a
scapegoat, but the US could easily
be brought into the picture--or
of eventually trying a new mili-
tary effort to force a solution.
Despite discontent within
the military, and occasional coup
rumors, Ayub's standing with the
armed forces remains fairly high.
The senior officers appear to be
loyal--many attained their present
positions partly because of that
loyalty. Dissatisfied junior of-
ficers have been unable to find
a leader of Ayub's stature, and
even many of his critics probably
do not believe that a change at
the top would be an improvement.
Ayub has to be careful to avoid
a further diminution of his
prestige in the army, but his
image has not yet been hurt enough
to threaten his retention of power.
Ayub and his Government
Criticism of Ayub in the up-
per levels of the civilian gov-
ernment has been less than in the
military. Those actually involved
in the formulation of foreign pol-
icy find it more difficult to
shift the blame for Kashmir onto
the President. Nevertheless,
Ayub has found it necessary to
ask for the resignations of two
of the most prominent members of
his cabinet, and further cabinet
changes cannot be ruled out.
Ayub encourages debate on
policy within the cabinet and
frequently accepts its advice.
However, he expects his minis-
ters to give unqualified support
to the final decision, for which
he takes full responsibility. To
prevent one-sided advice, Ayub
has tried to maintain a balance
between various points of view
in his cabinet.
Foreign Minister Bhutto, who
was placed on "sick" leave in
mid-June and later replaced after
four years in the cabinet, appar-
ently failed to measure up to
Ayub's criteria for cabinet min-
isters in several ways. He was
disloyal in failing to give
wholehearted public support to
A ub's decisions,
bus prior to is is-
missal. Bhutto probably was so
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that e
felt he could no longer trust
his foreign minister's advice.
Moreover, Ayub may have felt
that Bhutto gave the appearance
of becoming a rival.
Pro-Western Finance Minister
Shoaib, whose resignation was an-
nounced in early July, had given
no such evidence of disloyalty.
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Ayub probably felt, however, that
with Shoaib now the dominant
figure in the cabinet, advice
would tend to become distorted in
favor of the West. Shoaib's res-
ignation also served to quiet
public rumors that Bhutto's dis-
missal, which followed the re-
sumption of US economic aid by
only a few days, was the result
of US pressure.
The differing views of
Bhutto and Shoaib on East-West
relations were related to the
different priority they gave to
the. Kashmir question and Paki-
stan's economic development.
Bhutto appeared to give prece-
dence to moving closer to China
as an ally against India. Shoaib,
however, was reluctant to risk
American economic aid--halted in
the summer of 1965 because of the
war and not resumed until June
1966--by doing so.
Ayub's control of the civil-
ian government remains firm. Al-
though Bhutto may eventually be-
come an open rival of Ayub--he
has cooperated with opposition
leaders to some extent since his
dismissal--the removal of the two
cabinet members has not signifi-
cantly hurt Ayub. Ayub's rela-
tions with West Pakistan's gov-
ernor, the Khan of Kalabagh, have
been worsening, primarily because
of what Kalabagh regards as un-
necessary interference by Ayub in
the Khan's province. Backbenchers
in Ayub's Pakistan Muslim League
(PML) have echoed opposition and
military criticism of the Presi-
dent. Ayub's supporters, how-
ever, have no candidate to replace
him and are reluctant to risk
their jobs by acting against him.
Economic Problems
Pakistan cannot: continue
its present economic development
without extensive foreign aid.
Since the mid-1950s slightly less
than half of the total development
funds for Pakistan"s five-year
plans have come from foreign
sources. The Third Five-Year
Plan (1965-70) will require an
even greater amount, although the
percentage of foreign financing
in the total development funds
will fall to about a third. The
US has provided about half the
loan and grant aid--a total US
contribution through 1965 of
about $2.9 billioh-?-with other
Western nations providing most
of the balance and Communist coun-
tries only a comparatively small
amount. In fiscal 1967 US non-
project aid may :reach $140 mil-
lion.
Pakistanis are proud of the
economic progress they have made
so far, but a slowdown might turn
their pride and hope into resent-
ment against the; government. This,
reinforced by economic distress,
would create a h3.ghly unstable
situation which could easily get
beyond Ayub's control.
Development programs are po-
litically useful' to Ayub for
other than economic reasons. He
has used them to reward follow-
ers, although he has had to tol-
erate some corruption and in-
efficiency as a;'result. More im-
portant, the programs have gained
support for Ayub on the local
level. The clearest example is
among the Pathans of the North
West Frontier, who through force
of arms remained semi-independent
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even under British rule. Ayub
has given the Pathans a much
larger share of the development
funds than either their almost
negligible taxes or their effect
on Pakistan's economy warrant.
However, the new prosperity on
the frontier did much to prevent
Afghan blandishments from leading
to rebellion in the early 1960s
and has kept a generally unruly
people relatively quiet since.
The Political Opposition
The open political opposi-
tion is probably the least of
Ayub's worries. Ayub has shown
little hesitancy in arresting
leaders when they become too ob-
streperous, and the opposition
activities in parliament and
throughout the country are often
confused and futile.
All opposition parties have
tried to portray Ayub as a dic-
tator and have exploited his fail-
ure to win Kashmir. The details
of their criticism, however, in-
dicate the differences they must
overcome to pose a serious threat.
At one end of the political
spectrum the ultraconservative
Jamaat-i-Islami Party denounces
the "dictatorship" which has pre-
vented the amendment of the con-
stitution to conform with Islamic
principles, Ayub's failure to
govern according to the precepts
of the Koran, and his abandonment
of the "holy war" to save Kashmir
from Hindu idolaters. At the
other end, the far-left National
Awami Party (NAP) takes Ayub to
task for imprisoning leftist
propagandists and for bowing to
alleged imperialist pressures in
halting the war against the In-
dians who, they claim, had Ameri-
can backing.
Even within the opposition
parties--most notably the moder-
ate Awami League (AL)--there is
dissension. The AL's East Paki-
stan and West Pakistan wings
have come close to a complete
break because of widely differ-
ing views on the separatist move-
ment among the Bengalis of East
Pakistan. Other parties have
been divided to a lesser extent,
but all have been hurt, either
through a split over Bengali
separatism, or through a loss of
Bengali support when the parties'
East Pakistan branches have chosen
close ties with the antiautonomy
West Pakistan leaders.
Periodic attempts to unify
the opposition have brought tem-
porary cooperation, but no last-
ing program. In the 1965 presi-
dential election, the opposi-
tion parties were able to unite
in backing a compromise candi-
date, Fatima Jinnah, the polit-
ically inexperienced sister of
Pakistan's founder, but after her
defeat the unity quickly dissolved.
The right and center parties have
since maintained a semblance of
cooperation despite frequent
squabbles. The far left NAP has
disassociated itself from even
theoretical unity. Ayub, who
would probably do well at the
polls anyway, has reinforced his
position by careful manipulation
of Pakistan's intricate election
machinery. An indirect election
system allows him to concentrate
his efforts
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Basic Democrats--who actually
choose officials, rather than on
the much larger number of voters
who select the Basic Democrats.
The political opposition
does not appear to be in a posi-
tion to offer a serious challenge
to Ayub. None of their leaders
is as widely known or as popular
as Ayub. The opposition will
probably continue to talk, to
walk out of parliament, and to
run candidates against the PML,
but its major threat will lie in
sustaining its criticism of Ayub
and eventually striking a respon-
sive chord among a dissatisfied
populace.
East Pakistan
Potentially the most serious
threat to Ayub--and to the nation
itself--is the resurgence of
separatist sentiment in East Paki-
stan, which falls just short of
demands for complete independence.
The majority of the people of East
Pakistan are Bengalis, who have
little in common with West Paki-
stanis other than their Muslim
religion and a fear of India. East
Pakistan differs climatically,
economically, and culturally
from the western province. The
Bengalis believe--with some rea-
son--that the central government
is being run for the benefit of
West Pakistan, even though the
eastern province earns more than
its share of foreign exchange and
has over half the country's popu-
lation.
The September war awakened
dormant separatist sentiment. Many
Bengalis felt that Ayub had left
them undefended--only one under-
strength division was in East
Pakistan--while he made a futile
effort to sei$e Kashmir, an area
of little interest to Bengalis.
The central government's assur-
ance that East Pakistan could be
defended by troops in the West
had little impact on people a
thousand miles from the defend-
ing forces. Later government as-
sertions that-India's fear of pos-
sible Chinese actions prevented
an attack on East Pakistan have
only confused, the issue without
reassuring the eastern province.
Separatist sentiment is
strengthened by the large number
of non-Bengalis--including native
East Pakistanis--in high posi-
tions in the province, the pre-
dominance of West Pakistanis in
the central government and the
military, the:; fear that West Paki-
stan has plans to eliminate Ben-
gali language; and culture, and
other real and imagined griev-
ances.
The stated aim of the cur-
rent agitation is to gain provin-
cial autonomy, with most of the
demands centering on economic re-
form. Several parties have is-
sued programs, the most prominent
being the six; points of Mujib-
ur-Rahman, leader of the East Paki-
stan Awami League. Mujib is de-
manding a fed;ral government re-
sponsible for defense and foreign
affairs only, some means of pre-
venting the flight of capital
from East to West Pakistan--per-
haps a separate currency--no cen-
tral taxation., separate adminis-
tration of foreign trade, and the
right of eachl,province to raise
its own defense force. The pro-
gram is designed to eliminate the
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present alleged discrimination
against East Pakistan in allot-
ing central government and for-
eign development funds, to end
the use of East Pakistan's ex-
ports to finance West Pakistan's
imports, and to stop the use of
East Pakistani taxes to develop
and defend West Pakistan.
Factors not directly related
to autonomy, such as the rising
cost of food, also have played
a part in increasing dissatisfac-
tion in East Bengal. Uncertainty
as to the reaction of the highly
volatile population, which in
June turned a general strike into
a riot in Dacca, made the gov-
ernment cautious at first. Auton-
omy advocates were given more
freedom of action than many op-
position politicians have enjoyed
in Pakistan. Subsequently,
stronger repressive measures,
which led to the death of some
agitators, were instituted and
have increased resentment against
the government.
So far, active support of
the autonomy movement has been
largely confined to Dacca and a
few other cities, but it could
s read fairl easily.,/
Despite its strengths, how-
ever, the movement has serious
weaknesses. Mujib-ur-Rahman has
insisted on leading the movement
and has refused to cooperate with
other opposition leaders except
on his own terms. Some other
East Pakistani parties have been
able to form a tenuous alliance,
but the movement remains essen-
tially one in which the leaders
are jealous of their positions and
more interested in leading the
movement than in gaining auton-
omy.
The difficulty of solving
many of East Pakistan's problems
would hinder even the most capa-
ble and dedicated government.
The lower educational level among
Bengalis makes it inevitable
that they will receive less than
their "rightful" share of high
government positions. The ter-
rain of East Pakistan makes any
development project much more ex-
pensive than an equivalent proj-
ect in West Pakistan. Foreign
aid suppliers are less interested
in such projects and, even with
an equitable distribution of aid
funds, the lack of results would
probably leave the Bengalis feel-
ing cheated. Ayub knows that
equal defense forces for East
Pakistan would make both prov-
inces too weak to resist an In-
dian attack and has chosen to
defend the western province.
Should the government grant Mu-
jib's six points, or the programs
of his competitors, the central
government would become powerless.
Ayub's actions have at least
temporarily slowed the momentum
of the movement. Ayub began his
campaign with public speeches de-
nouncing the movement and with
harassing arrests of Mujib. Con-
tinued Bengali agitation drove
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Ayub to close an opposition news-
paper and institute large-scale
arrests, which have limited the
efficiency of the AL by removing
its first- and second-echelon
leaders. Riots followed, and the
use of armed police resulted in
the deaths of several agitators.
So far Ayub has not used the
army, in which there is almost
no separatist sentiment. He may
well do so if he feels it neces-
sary.
The odds are against Ayub's
finding a permanent solution to
his domestic problems. Paki-
stan's resources are so sparse
that it will require almost con-
stant effort to prevent a de-
cline in living standards. The
diversity of the population makes
separatism a continuing problem,
not only among the Bengalis of
]East Pakistan, but potentially
among the Baluchis and Pathans of
West Pakistan. Centuries of
:Hindu-Moslem antagonism have cre-
ated a situation in which neither
India nor Pakistan is willing to
make any significant concessions
in dealing with mutual problems,
and the people of Pakistan are
likely to regard any compromise
as a failure of :government diplo-
macy.
Ayub can hope for little
more than limited, economic prog-
ress, continued.' control of sep-
aratist movements, and enough
diplomatic success against India
to prevent criticism from get-
ting out of hand. Many Paki-
stanis, including the military,
feel that Ayub,E!ven with the
failure of his attempt to force
a Kashmir solution, has probably
done at least as well as anyone
else could have. Another major
policy failure, however, might
well change Pakistani attitudes.
Ayub will have to make this pos-
sibility a major consideration
in forming his domestic and for-
ei n policies.
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