WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005400020001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 5, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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State Dept. review completed.
5 August 1966
OCI No. 0301/66
Copy No. 52
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
D1R CTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
GROUP I Exctvded'?from autcrnat c
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C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EDT, 4 August 1966)
VIETNAM
Major allied military operations in South Vietnam continue
to keep Communist forces on the defensive. Political
developments are increasingly centered on the September
elections for a constitutional assembly. The screening
of candidates is virtually complete and thus far the
military government has given every appearance of im-
partiality. Hanoi has recently published two authorita-
tive assessments of the military situation in the South,
providing a rare insight into the DRV leadership's
concern over the adverse effects of the massive US troop
buildup. North Vietnam is stepping up efforts to keep
major rail lines open, and is continuing to send supplies
along the Laotian road system despite the weather.
NORTH VIETNAM'S OIL IMPORTS
The USSR is resuming bulk seaborne deliveries after
a two-month lull following the US air strikes at Hanoi
and Haiphong.
INCREASE OF TERRORISM IN THE PHILIPPINES
The new outbreaks in central Luzon appear to be es-
sentially a reaction to President Marcos' efforts to
end lawlessness in the countryside.
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COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN THAILAND
North Vietnam is reportedly providing direct guerrilla
training to the insurgents in northeast Thailand, sug-
gesting that the groundwork is being laid for a -more
concerted armed effort.
Europe
GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS NEAR END
Est-West differences over a nonproliferation treaty
and diminishing support from the nonaligned members for
the Western formula have precluded any real progress
:o far, and little is likely in the remaining we ks.
WARSAW PACT FORCES HOLD EXERCISE IN BALTIC
decent naval and air maneuvers involving Soviet,East
German, and Polish forces reflect the greater efjfort
being made by the Warsaw Pact to improve the effective-
ness of the "Dorthern tier" forces.
DE GAULLE'S ROUND-THE-WORLD TRIP
The announced purpose of the French President's trip
is to observe a nuclear test at France's Pacific test
site, but scheduled stops in Ethiopia and Cambodia
provide him with an opportunity to show the flag and
expound his views.
CONGO MUTINY CONTINUES
The mutiny of Katangan troops in Kisangani is still
not settled, and the Congo's relations with Belgium
are continuing to decline.
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SUDAN GETS NEW COALITION CABINET
The cabinet contains an equal number from Prime
Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi's Umma Party and the National
Union Party, but specific portfolios have not yet been
assigned.
NEW ARMY COUP THREATENS EARLY BREAKUP OF NIGERIA
The upheaval was triggered by northern dissatisfaction
with the regime of General Irnnsi, who came to power
last January after young southern officers overthrew
Nigeria's northern-dominated constitutional government.
SOVIET AID FOR INDIA'S FOURTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN
The USSR has reportedly promised a new commitment of
about $630 million for India's five-year plan, the
largest single aid package Moscow has ever offered to
a free world country.
Western Hemisphere
ARGENTINA BEGINS ITS EFFORTS AT REFORM
The Ongania regime has taken action against some of the
causes of the military criticism that led to the ouster
of the Illia administration, but the nature of the moves
adds to a growing concern about a developing dictator-
ship.
TERRORISM CAUSING PUBLIC ANXIETY IN BRAZIL
The government is attempting to determine whether a
growing number of terrorist incidents is part of a
deliberate campaign to create unrest or only scattered
acts of protest against the Castello Branco regime.
NEW BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT TO ASSUME OFFICE 6 AUGUST
The government-military relationship will be the most
difficult of the problems facing President-elect Rene
Barrientos. The key military figure is outgoing junta
chief General Alfredo Ovando, and a confrontation
between the two is possible at any time.
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GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS REJECT AMNESTY
Although Communist guerrilla leader Luis Turcios has
again turned down a government attempt to make :peace,
President Mendez' amnesty offer may turn out to be a
shrewd political move toward national unity.
SOMOZA'S NOMINATION BEGINS NICARAGUAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN
General Anastasio Somoza--whose father and brother have
already ruled Nicaragua--has been nominated by the
governing party. Although he faces an active opposition,
he is certain to be the front-runner by far.
INAUGURATION OF COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT
President-elect Carlos Lleras Restrepo begins his term
on 7 August in generally auspicious circumstances,
but he faces serious and persistent economic and
political problems.
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Far East
VIETNAM
Major allied military opera-
tions in South Vietnam continue to
keep Communist forces on the defen-
sive.
delta area of IV Corps is causing
the Viet Cong to move units there
from III Corps in the hope of scor-
ing a needed victory.
Joint US - South Vietnamese
forces continued their sweep of
northernmost Quang Tri Province in
pursuit of remnants of the North
Vietnamese 324B Infantry Division.
On 3 August, four new US Marine
battalions replaced battle-weary
marine units participating in Oper-
ation HASTINGS/LAM SON 289, and the
operation was renamed PRAIRIE/LAM
SON 289. Final casualty figures
for HASTINGS were 126 Americans
killed and 448 wounded. Communist
losses include 882 killed, 15 cap-
tured, and 254 weapons.
In the central highlands, ele-
ments of the US 25th Infantry and
lst Cavalry divisions reported
scattered contacts with Communist
units during Operation PAUL REVERE
in Pleiku and Kontum provinces.
Since 9 May, this sweep has pre-
vented any major Communist offensive
in the region and has cost the Com-
munists 803 killed and 76 captured.
Viet Cong in III and IV Corps
General Khang, new III Corps
commander, recently noted that al-
lied spoiling operations and the
destruction of enemy food supplies
in III Corps have forced the Viet
Cong to scale down their operations.
Khang also speculated that more'
available food and manpower in the
The Viet Cong have drawn heav-
ily on their delta forces in the
past year to reinforce their III
Corps strength, but there is no
confirmation yet that troops have
moved back.
Coming Elections in Saigon
Political developments are in-
creasingly centered on the Septem-
ber elections for a constitutional
assembly.
Local screening of candidates
is complete and a review board in
Saigon is considering complaints
and appeals. Thus far, the govern-
ment has given every appearance of
impartiality. Several well-known
independents have been approved
and candidates--including military
officers--have been eliminated be-
cause of clear-cut irregularities.
The appeals are to be completed by
12 August, and the campaign is to
begin on 26 August.
To maximize voter turnout and
neutralize Viet Cong antielection
propaganda and plans to disrupt the
elections through terrorism and
sabotage, the government started a
three-day seminar in Saigon on
1 August for province chiefs
and other officials on election
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organization, security, and public-
ity. Government information media
have been exhorting the population
to participate in the elections.
US Embassy officials have com-
mented that the candidates' re-
gional backgrounds appear more im-
portant than religion or party.
Most are business or professional
men--including teachers and pro-
fessors--and local councilors, but
civil servants and military offi-
cers constitute a significant group
in rural areas, where there are
fewer politically aware private
citizens. Preliminary reports
from most of the country indicate
an average of about six candidates
for each assembly seat. In central
Vietnam, few persons associated
with the recent "struggle" movement
filed, and those who did were dis-
qualified.
No specific campaign issues
have yet emerged. A few well-known
independents in the Saigon area are
planning to portray themselves as
the nucleus of a "loyal opposition,"
which may partially alleviate the
cynicism toward elections expressed
in some Saigon quarters. Presuma-
bly, most contests will be on the
basis of individual personalities
and qualifications, with victors
reflecting to some extent existing
regional, religious, and political
groupings. The elected assembly
may thus be somewhat predisposed to
provide for local autonomy in the
draft constitution.
The military has apparently
made no significant effort to par-
ticipate in the constitutional as-
sembly thus far, but may be more
concerned by future events such as
the form of the constitution and
the eventual government. Premier Ky
indicated he would not play an active
role in the new government next year,
but mentioned Chief of State Thieu
as a potential military candidate for
chief executive. Former I Corps
commander Thi announced his inten-
tion to be a candidate for the
post shortly after arriving in the
US for a three-month visit.
Hanoi's views on the War
Hanoi recently published two
lengthy, candid assessments of the
military situation in South Vietnam,
providing a rare insight into the
North Vietnamese leaders' concern
over the massive buildup of US
troops and their subsequent effec-
tiveness in military operations.
The first article was purport-
edly "sent out of South Vietnam"
under a pseudonym to the North Viet-
namese Army journal. The second,
in the authoritative party theoret-
ical journal, is by DRV politburo
member Nguyen Chi Thanh, who has
reportedly been in the South direct-
ing the war effort since early 1965.
Both articles admit American supe-
riority in numbers and equipment,
display a grudging admiration of US
tactics, and hint that US spoiling
operations have disrupted Communist
base areas.
The second article has some
pointed criticism for a few long-
standing theoretical formulations
on conducting the war. The tone
suggests that author Thanh was de-
fending his stewardship of the war
during the past year. Although he
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did not advance any new theories,
Thanh was clearly criticizing some
of his comrades--perhaps even high-
level ones--as too detached from
present realities and too reliant
on their experiences in the war
with the French.
The publication of an article
hinting at top-level differences
of opinion probably indicates these
have been resolved and that Thanh's
views--although not explicitly set
forth in the article--have prevailed.
The articles admit the Communists
have been forced to re-evaluate
some of their traditional military
plans and concepts, however, and
Thanh possibly has some authority
to adjust tactics and strategy to
meet the American troop buildup.
Hanoi's Efforts to
Keep Rails Open
North Vietnam is stepping up
efforts to build bypass bridges on
important rail lines to reduce their
vulnerability to air attack. Re-
cent photography shows nine major
bridges on the vital Hanoi - Ping-
hsiang and Hanoi-Haiphong lines with
bypasses completed or under con-
struction. Some work is probably
being done by Chinese Communist mil-
itary engineers.
Despite this obvious priority,
the Hanoi - Ping-hsiang line re-
mained closed to through traffic.
As of late July, both the main and
bypass bridges at Cao Nung and
the main rail bridge at Dap Cau
were unserviceable; the bypass
bridge at Dap Cau had not been com-
pleted.
Supplies Still Moving in Laos
Recent phonography and road-
watch reports indicate North Vietnam
is sending supplies down the Laotian
road system despite the rainy
weather. In past years, virtually no
traffic has moved here from approxi-
mately June to November.
Photography reveals
new DRV Route 13 near e Laotian
border being heavily used and in
good condition. Several small groups
of workers were engaged in road re-
pair and maintenance. Earlier pho-
tography disclosed a large military
camp, truck park, and bivouac area
in use along another segment of this
road. Laotian Route 912, which con-
nects with Route 137, is apparently
also in good shape.
Farther south, trained observ-
ers have reported a sporadic and low 25X1
level of truck traffic on Route 92
throughout June and July.
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NORTH VIETNAM'S OIL IMPORTS
The USSR, North Vietnam's
normal source of petroleum prod-
ucts, is resuming bulk seaborne
deliveries. None had arrived by
sea since the first air strikes
against petroleum storage facili-
ties in Haiphong and Hanoi on 29
June.
At least one Soviet tanker
with 10,000 metric tons of diesel
fuel aboard will deliver POL for
North Vietnam in late August. A
small tanker, en route from the
Black Sea to the Soviet Far East,
may also unload its 4,000-ton
cargo of diesel fuel in North
Vietnam.
Deliveries at this rate
should be sufficient to meet Ha-
noi's present military and eco-
nomic needs. Although Soviet bulk
deliveries had been increased in
the year preceding the air
strikes from an annual rate of
150,000 tons to nearly 275,000
tons, much of the increase was
apparently used to create stock-
piles.
The step-up in Soviet de-
liveries had overtaxed the fa-
cilities at Haiphong by mid-June
and it became necessary to di-
vert one Soviet tanker to Shang-
hai for transshipment. Subse-
quently an unusual concentration
of'Chinese tank cars observed
SOVIET BULK OIL SHIPMENTS TO NORTH VIETNAM
SEPT OCT NOV DEC I JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JULY AUG
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*An additional 24.000 tons diverted to Chinese ports for subsequent,
but undetected, transshipment to North Vietnam.
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THOUSANDS OF
METRIC TONS
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at Shanghai may have been used
to move this petroleum to North
Vietnam, despite the high over-
land transport costs. A second
tanker due to arrive in Haiphong
immediately following the fir3t
US air attack there, also was
diverted to a South China port
and its cargo may have been
transshipped via rail to North
Vietnam.
Unused rail and road capac-
ity across the China border is
adequate to sustain sizable
overland movements of oil. Only
about one percent of China's
tank-car inventory would be
required to maintain this year's
monthly rate of seaborne deliv-
eries.
INCREASE OF TERRORISM IN PHILIPPINES
The recent resurgence of
terrorism in central Luzon ap-
pears to be essentially a re-
action to President's Marcos'
efforts to end lawlessness in the
Philippine countryside. Marcos'
campaign has tended to disrupt
a mutually beneficial collusion
between local officials and law-
less elements, some of which are
still controlled or influenced
by the Huks.
The strength of the Huk move-
ment was broken in the 1950s by
the late president Magsaysay, and
subsequent efforts to revitalize
it has been hampered by dissen-
sion among its leaders. Never-
theless, remnants of the movement
have maintained a profitable al-
liance with gangster and politi-
cal elements, particularly in its
former stronghold in central
Luzon.
This area has long been
plagued by lawlessness, corrup-
tion, and civil unrest, encour-
aged by the vast divergences in
personal wealth. President Mar-
cos, soon after taking office,
began a broad program of mili-
tary and civic action aimed at
wiping out sources of discontent
in the area. In the face of the
most recent incidents, including
the assassination of a strongly
anti-Communist mayor in mid-July,
Marcos has authorized additional
troops and initiated a crash
civic reform program utilizing
the civic action troops slated
for Vietnam.
The Huk threat has frequently
been overplayed by Filipino lead-
ers and the sensationalist Manila
press, both for domestic politi-
cal reasons and as a lever for
seeking greater US aid. However,
if Marcos' reform program.fails,
central Luzon,provides an ideal
environment for a significant Huk
revival.
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COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN THAILAND
A rash of small attacks
against government troops in
northeastern Thailand last month
has not been followed up by sig-
nificant new insurgent activity.
However, a report that North
Vietnam is providing direct guer-
rilla training to the insurgents
indicates the Communists are
laying the groundwork for a more
concerted armed effort.
The government is continu-
ing to mount large-scale suppres-
sion operations, but with uncer-
tain results. Troops that re-
cently completed a sweep in Pat-
thalung Province in the south
failed to establish any signifi-
cant contact, although a number
of suspects were taken into cus-
tody. In the northeast, where
the insurgency has been strongest,
a 1,500-man security operation
is under way following state-
ments by a captured Communist
that a 50-man band in the area
was recently reinforced with
Vietnamese infiltrators.
There have been reports be-
fore of North Vietnamese troops
in the northeast, but their
presence has never been verified.
It seems unlikely that North
Vietnam would commit regular
troops there at this stage of
the Thai insurgency, although
it may have sent some cadre to
assist the weak and poorly led
Deputy Premier Praphat ap-
parently is exaggerating reports
of North Vietnamese involvement
for domestic political reasons.
He told the press last week that
documents found on two persons
killed in recent skirmishes
"proved" North Vietnamese "sol-
diers" have been infiltrating
the northeast. This statement
followed other public remarks
indicating Praphat is pushing
for yet another postponement of
a new constitution and elections
on grounds that the security
situation precludes political
liberalization.
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Europe
GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS NEAR END
Members of the Eighteen Na-
tion Disarmament Committee (ENDC)
are trying to wind up their pres-
ent session in order to report
to the UN General Assembly in
September. East-West differ-
ences over a nonproliferation
treaty and diminishing support
from the nonaligned members for
the Western formula have pre-
cluded any real progress, and
little is likely in the remain-
ing weeks.
In the past few months the
Soviets have come down heavily
on the fact that the Western
draft for a nonproliferation
treaty would not outlaw the trans-
fer of nuclear weapons to non-
nuclear powers--West Germany in
particular--but only require the
consent of a nuclear state be-
fore such weapons are used. These
Soviet attacks have tended to
erode support for the Western
formula, which was designed to
leave open the possibility for
some kind of a NATO nuclear
force.
In a recent meeting of the
NATO Council, Britain, the Neth-
erlands, and Belgium urged in
particular that the so-called
European option clause in the
Western draft, which allows for
the development of a European
nuclear force, be reconsidered.
They contended that some such
move is necessary if anything
is to be accomplished at Geneva.
By all indications, however,
the Soviets' genuine concern is
the prevention of any form of
access to nuclear weapons by
West Germany. Any tinkering
with the European option clause
is not likely to allay this.
The prolonged deadlock has
disillusioned the nonaligned
members, and they may present
their own version of a nonpro-
liferation treaty. This would
reportedly call for a ban on
the transfer of nuclear weapons
to states not already having
them, a cut-off on the produc-
tion of fissionable material for
weapons, an obligation on nuclear
states to reduce stockpiles, and
the universal application of in-
ternational safeguards to all
nuclear activities. By intro-
ducing additional measures on
which the major powers do not
agree, such a proposal would
tend to complicate the proceed-
ings further.
The Italian delegate has
revived the "Fanfani proposal,"
which calls for all states not
having nuclear, weapons to de-
clare unilaterally that they
will not acquire_ them. The Ital-
ians have also, proposed that
the the UN General Assembly
should ask the; nuclear powers to
agree not to use their weapons
against states!, who issue such
declarations arid to come to
their aid in case of nuclear
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attack or blackmail. Rome be-
lieves this would at least
avoid having the ENDC wind up
without having accomplished any-
thing, a prospect that might
lead to its abolition or to a
revived interest in a world dis-
armament conference.
The Egyptian delegate, to
help justify the existence of
the ENDC, would have the non-
aligned members issue a memo-
randum on the topic of general
and complete disarmament, men-
tioning the proposals that have
been made, recognizing the im-
portance of disarmament, and
stating that discussion should
WARSAW PACT FORCES HOLD EXERCISE I N BALTIC
Recent naval and air ma-
neuvers in the Baltic involving
Soviet, East German, and Polish
forces are part of the greater
effort being made within the
Warsaw Pact to improve the ef-
fectiveness of the "northern
tier" forces in various contin-
gency roles.
The Polish press announced
that the maneuvers were con-
ducted from 20 to 27 July under
the command of the Warsaw Pact
commander in chief, Soviet
Marshal A. Grechko, and that
their purpose was to check the
combat readiness and coordina-
tion of Pact forces. The com-
manders of the naval forces of
each of the countries, as well
as the Polish defense minister
and his deputy--who is chief of
Poland's territorial defense--
were reportedly also present.
Baltic-based Soviet, East
German, and Polish ships prob-
ably took part in the naval por-
tion of the exercise, which may
have included antisubmarine and
missile patrol-boat activity as
well as torpedo firings and
minesweeping. A small amphibi-
ous landing possibly also took
place.
The exercise may have been
the largest of its type held in
the Baltic area under Warsaw
Pact auspices. It accounts in
part for a 30 July Soviet Navy
Day statement by Soviet naval
chief Admiral Gorshkov, who said
that cooperation between the
fleets of the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries was "growing and strength-
ening with each passing day."
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DE GAULLE'S ROUND-THE-WORLD TRI P
President De Gaulle leaves
Paris 25 August on a three-week
trip with stops in French Soma-
liland, Ethiopia, Cambodia, French
Polynesia, and Guadaloupe. The
stated purpose of the trip is
to allow him to observe a nuclear
test at France's Pacific test
site during the second week of
September. The stops in Ethio-
pia and Cambodia, however, pro-
vide him with an opportunity to
show the flag and to press his
views on such issues as Vietnam.
De Gaulle has scheduled a
two-day state visit to Ethiopia,
returning Emperor Haile Selassie's
two earlier visits to France.
Although the emphasis will be or1
the protocol aspects of the visit,
l
a cutural and technical assist-
ance agreement may be signed
if negotiations are completed in
time. De Gaulle probably chose
Ethiopia as his major African
stop to avoid singling out one
of the numerous French-speaking
states that have invited him.
The announcement that De
Gaulle would visit Cambodia from
31 August to 2 September has
given rise to reports that he
would meet with Ho Chi Minh
there. These reports have been
largely discredited, however,
with both North Vietnam and Cam-
bodia having denied that a meet-
ing is planned. A' French For-
eign Ministry officcial was less
categorical, saying' only that he
had no information to confirm
the reports.
It seems unlikely that De
Gaulle would engage; his prestige
in a meeting with 110 unless he
felt that prospects, for some
movement toward a negotiated
settlement were good. All evi-
dence indicates that the general
remains convinced the time is
not ripe for a French initiative.
Nevertheless, Vietnam will prob-
ably be a major topic in his
conversations with Sihanouk.
Speculation has also arisen
over the possibilii- of a meet-
ing with President trohnson,
either when De Gaulle's plane
refuels at Guadaloupe on 13 Sep-
tember or at the UN', should De
Gaulle add a stop there to his
itinerary. There ].S evidence
that the French have encouraged
this speculation probably to
further the idea that it is
Washington which is unwilling
to exchange views. The French
foreign minister has said pri-
vately, however, that De Gaulle
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Middle East - Africa
CONGO MUTINY CONTINUES
The mutiny of Katangan troops
in. Kisangani is still not set-
tled, and the Congo's relations
with Belgium are continuing to
decline.
Shooting apparently has
stopped in Kisangani, and Pre-
mier Mulamba says he has worked
out a cease-fire. There is no
word, however, of any agreement
by the Katangans to return to
central government authority.
President Mobutu has objected
to one part of the cease-fire
arrangement which would leave
the mutineers in control of
most of the city.
The mutiny may be affect- DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TFIE CONGO
well. The Katangans stationed
along the border with the Su-
dan and Uganda apparently have
left their posts and are mov-
ing toward Kisangani. Neither
their purpose nor their rela-
tionship with the Kisangani
mutineers is clear. Even if
they are not connected with
the original mutiny, however,
they are a disruptive force
in their own right. Their de-
parture also leaves a poten-
tially restive area ungarri-
soned.
US Ambassador Godley com-
ments that the mutiny has once
again exposed the weakness of
the eastern Congo. He believes
that the government's handling
of the crisis has harmed Mo-
butu's own position, perhaps
irrevocably. Godley also
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speculates that even if the Ka-
tangans' original action was not
connected with the widely ru-
mored pro-TshombEf coup plot, the
mutinees may come to believe
they are not alone as a result.
of the government's revelation
of the plot reports. The (--ongo-
lese appear convinced of the
truth of the plot, and they are
growing jumpy over reports of
real or fancied movements by
mercenaries and I4a.tangan troops.
The Belgian 'consul general
in Lubumbashi has been expelled,
'}'"` Luluaboorpo 't Mb. MaY
S o Y ~.,
SO0AN
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Bunia,
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consolidated province boundary
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Adminlstr.tmn unresolved
100
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5 Aug 66
NORD-KATANGA
Kamina?
SUD -KATANGA
Lubumbashi
z/_ VEbsabethvllle)
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and further steps against Bel-
gians seem inevitable. For its
part, Brussels appears likely
to curtail its aid program. How-
ever, though relations probably
SUDAN GETS NEW COALITION CABINET
Newly elected Prime Minis-
ter Sadiq al-Mahdi announced the
composition of his coalition
cabinet on 2 August. Specific
portfolios, however, have not
yet been assigned.
The recent conflict within
Sadiq's Umma Party apparently
encouraged the National Union
Party (NUP), Umma's coalition
partner, to demand an increase
in its cabinet representation
as a price for cooperation. Ac-
cordingly, the new cabinet is
equally distributed between
seven Umma, including the prime
minister, and seven NUP minis-
will continue to deteriorate for
some time, a complete break seems
unlikely since both sides would
stand to lose so much.
Hamza Mirghani Hamza's re-
turn from his position with the
International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development to join the
cabinet indicates that the new
government will make a serious
effort to solve the Sudan's crit-
ical economic problems. Mir-
ghani Hamza is expected to take
over the finance portfolio.
in policy making.
ever, and the new Umma members
are for the most part untested
The US Embassy in Khartoum
feels that the new government
offers prospects for considerable
improvement over its ineffectual
predecessor. The majority of
NUP ministers are holdovers, how-
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NEW ARMY COUP THREATENS EARLY BREAKUP OF NIGERIA
A mutiny by northern-led army
elements toppled the regime of Gen-
eral Aguiyi Ironsi last weekend and
catapulted to power 31-year-old army
chief of staff Gowon, a Christian
from the predominantly Muslim North.
The successful revolt of the
northerners, mainly Muslim Hausas,
began on 29 July in army units in
Western Nigeria. It spread quickly
to the North, then to Lagos, and ap-
parently also to the battalion in
the Ibo-dominated East. It was di-
rected mainly''at Ibos, beginning with
Ironsi, who was in Ibadan. He was
apparently killed during the early
stages.
Additional- killings and the one
known clash between mutineers and an.
organized opposition force probably
have resulted',so far in several hun-
dred Ibo military casualties
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including a large number of officers.
Others have been arrested or have
taken flight as have many Ibo civil-
ians, especially in the North where
the bloody vendetta continues.
The Hausas' traditional suspi-
cion of the aggressive Ibos had been
fanned by Ironsi's failure to punish
the young Ibo officers who assassi-
nated the North's two most influen-
tial political leaders as well as
several senior northern officers in
last January's coup which overthrew
the northern-dominated civilian gov-
ernment. Northern conviction that
the Ironsi regime sought "Ibo domina-
tion" deepened in late May when
Ironsi announced unitary reforms that
would have placed the backward North
at a competitive disadvantage. Al-
though Ironsi pulled back before vio-
lent northern protests, his assur-
ances that the North would be allowed
to retain its identity and preroga-
tives were evidently considered in-
adequate.
In assuming authority at the
urging of the dissident elements--
and with the nominal consent of key
remnants of the Ironsi administra-
tion--Gowon flatly rejected the
planned unitary government. He ini-
tially had sided with extremists who
favor immediate northern separation,
but under pressure from the British
and moderate northern leaders--who
realize secession would bring wide-
spread economic disruption--he pledged
to try to save the country from "ut-
ter destruction." Gowon also prom-
ised to honor Nigeria's international
commitments. He has in the past been
very well disposed toward the US.
Gowon's prospects for establish-
ing a viable regime do not now seem
bright. Army discipline is tenuous
and its ability to function as a co-
hesive organization has been crippled
However, discipline is reported firm
and morale high among most of the
18,000-man police force, which can
probably handle disturbances that
do not involve the military.
Gowon's most immediate problem
is coping with the oil-rich Eastern
provinces. Eastern military gover-
nor Ojukwu has said the only answer
is for each of the four former re-
gions to "go its own way" and that
what was required is an early meet-
ing to settle the terms for parting.
In the North there appears to
be increasing danger that moderates
who want to preserve the country's
basic unity are losing ground to
separatist-minded Islamic extrem-
ists. Some pressure for secession
evidently also exists in the West
where Gowon has tried to gain Yoruba
support by releasing their most
popular leader, Obafemi Awolowo,
and other political prisoners.
If any form of united Nigeria
manages to survive, it presumably
will be a loose federation with
northerners and western Yorubas
playing key roles in a weak central
government. Gowon evidently in-
tends to bring important civilians
into the new military government
very soon with a view toward an
early return to civilian rule.
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SOVIET AID FOR INDIA'S FOURTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN
The USSR has reportedly
promised a new commitment of
about $630 million for India's
five-year plan, the largest sin-
gle aid package Moscow has ever
offered to a free world country.
The commitment demonstrates the
importance Moscow attaches to its
relations with New Delhi, and is
evidence of its desire to help
India develop as a counterweight
to China. The new extension ac-
counts for only about seven per-
cent of the total foreign as-
sistance India hopes to obtain
for the plan.
In addition to the new aid,
about $400 million remains from
the Soviet aid extended for the
third five-year plan, and will
be available for the current
plan. About half of this amount
represents the Soviet commitment
to the Bokaro steel mill. Al-
though the plant has become a
matter of controversy between
the two countries, this is un-
likely to affect Soviet-Indian
aid relations. India feels that
economies might be realized if
the USSR would accept design sug-
gestions of a private Indian
consulting firm, but the USSR
will probably continue to insist
on rigid adherence to its own
technical specifications.
Details on how the new aid
will be used are apparently yet
to be worked out. It is likely,
however, that about $410 million
will be allocated for the con-
struction of major projects and
about $220 million will be made
available for medium-term com-
mercial credits 'to finance im-
ports associated with the devel-
opment program. Some specifics
on the allocation of the project
aid probably will. be announced
during Premier Kosygin's visit
to India this fall.
During India's previous
five-year plans, the Soviets
supplemented their initial aid
extension with additional cred-
its as the plans progressed. How-
ever, during the previous two
five-year plans only about $650
million in Soviet aid was used.
The Soviets reportedly have
stated that co nitments in Viet-
nam and grain purchases in the
West rule out additional help
for the new plan. Despite
this, India will probably seek
more Soviet aic for the plan in
1967 or 1968.
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Western Hemisphere
ARGENTINA BEG I N$ ITS EFFORTS AT REFORM
The Ongania regime has be-
gun to attack some of the causes
of the military criticism that
culminated in the ouster of the
Illia administration.
On 26 July, police began
confiscating Communist periodi-
cals from Buenos Aires newsstands,
apparently beginning a drive to
end the distribution of Commu-
nist literature in Argentina.
However, the police also confis-
cated so-called "obscene" maga-
zines, and this and subsequent
statements by police gave the
campaign a highly moralistic
tone.
On the same day, the govern-
ment announced that it plans to
return to private ownership 36
radio stations and one TV sta-
tion nationalized by Peron and
still under government control.
These stations have often been
the means by which former govern-
ments were able to disseminate
slanted news.
On 27 July, the government
assumed direct control of the
national universities, thus end-
ing the traditional university
autonomy. The regime took this
step to end Communist agitation
and all other political activity
at the universities, one of the
major complaints of the generals
before the June coup. When the
rectors were told to accept the
government's university reform
program within 48 hours, several
either refused or resigned. Some
students and professors then oc-
cupied university buildings in
Buenos Aires, and were ousted by
police in a violent clash.
Press reaction to the re-
forms has been mixed. The press
has deplored the censorship, al-
though in guarded comments
that apparently indicate some
fear that severe criticism of
Ongania could result in repris-
als. It has applauded the take-
over of the universities, but
has expressed considerable con-
cern at the violent methods of
the police.
Despite Ongania's popularity
and the general acceptance of
the new government after the
fall of Illia, the regime is
apparently beginning to realize
that its plans are bound to
bring criticism from various af-
fected circles and that it must
prepare the public for the re-
forms it intends to make. The
nature of the more recent gov-
ernment actions has added to
growing concern, both in Argen-
tina and abroad, that the On-
gania regime is becoming a
right-wing dictatorship. This is
an image it can hardly afford if
it expects to carry out the re-
forms promised by Ongania soon
after assuming the presidency.
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TERRORISM CAUSING PUBLIC ANXIETY I N BRAZIL
A growing number of terrorist
incidents of unexplained origin
has caused widespread, if vaguely
expressed, anxiety among the Bra-
zilian public and the business com-
munity. The government is attempt-
ing to determine whether the in-
cidents are part of a Communist-
inspired campaign to create unrest
or are scattered acts of protest
by one or more groups against the
regime of Castello Branco and his
likely successor, retired Marshal
Costa e Silva, who will run as the
government's candidate in the Oc-
tober presidential election.
on 25 July three bombs were
exploded in Recife. One, which
went off in the airport lobby,
was timed for the scheduled ar-
rival of Costa e Silva. His air-
craft was delayed, however, and
he was unharmed, but two persons
were killed and several injured.
Since then, bombs have been ex-
ploded in Sao Paulo, Goiania, and
Brasilia, although none has caused
any further loss of life. The US
Embassy in Brasilia and a US bank
there have received bomb threats.
At least two foreign-owned oil
companies--Esso and Shell--have
requested addit_Lpnal police pro-
tection.
These incidents add to pre-
election tensions that have also
been heightened by the govern-
ment's obvious determination to
ensure the election of progovern-
ment candidates in the September
gubernatorial and the October
presidential elections. opposi-
tion leaders have been quick to
denounce the terrorist acts. Their
main concern apparently is that
a wave of terrorism might lead
the government to cancel the con-
gressional elections scheduled for
November; these, unlike the two
preceding elections, are to be
by direct popular vote.
Although a number of Com-
munists and extreme leftists
have been rounded up, the gov-
ernment does not yet seem in-
clined to take more drastic ac-
tion. This attitude could
change swiftly, however, should
the terrorism continue.
NEW BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT TO ASSUME OFFICE 6 AUGUST
Twenty-two months of mili-
tary rule in Bolivia will end of-
ficially on 6 August with the in-
auguration of President-elect Rene
Barrientos. The new, freely
elected regime will be hampered
by shifting political alliances,
several chronic economic prob-
lems, and governmental inexperi-
ence. However, the major prob-
lem will still be the government-
military relationship. As in the
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past, outgoing junta chief General
Alfredo Ovando will be the key to
this affiliation, and his personal
attitude may determine the success
of the new government.
Ovando is variously described
shrewd,
and anti-American. He has built
up over the years an aura of per-
sonal inaccessibility and through
this a somewhat mythical local
image of his greatness. During
the past month, he has gone to
great lengths to enhance this image
by staging a number of public
triumphs, including the announced
completion of legal formalities
and financial arrangements for con-
struction of a tin smelter in Bo-
livia by a West German company.
This meets a long-time Bolivian
national aspiration, second only
to access to the sea. In reality,
however, he has left most of the
hard financial problems concern-
ing the smelter's construction
for Barrientos to solve.
During a rare candid conver-
sation with the US ambassador in
late June, Ovando said that he
was pessimistic about prospects
for Barrientos' success in gov-
erning the country. Moreover,
Ovando had earlier implied that
he would play on the new Presi-
dent's well-known impulsiveness
until some explosion occurs.
This he believes would leave him
as the only logical person to
pick up the pieces.
The first several months of
the new government, therefore, will
probably see a major attempt by
Barrientos to build a new political
base and to strengthen his own sup-
port in the military, an endeavor
that could lead to a confrontation
with Ovando at any time.
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GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS REJECT AMNESTY
Guatemalan Communist guer-
rilla leader Luis Turcios has
again turned down a government
offer to make peace. Turcios, in
his first press conference with
Guatemalan newsmen, rejected am-
nesty and reaffirmed his inten-
tion to continue a violent strug-
gle against the army. There has
been no significant guerrilla-
terrorist action, however, since
Julio Cesar Mendez assumed the
presidential office on 1 July.
Despite earlier guerrilla
rejections, the government sought
to implement its stated policy
for reintegrating disaffected ele-
ments by promulgating generous
terms for amnesty. These desig-
nated an eight-day period ending
3 August during which the guer-
rillas might surrender kidnap vic-
tims and arms without retribution.
The government.; presumably hoped
to lure away at least some who
were not fully; committed to a
hard-line antigovernment position,
and in the process may have ef-
fected a shrew political move
toward nationa, unity.
President Mendez has dis-
played sensitivity to the poor
aftertaste left. by the arbitrar-
iness of the former military
regime and to,'the need for good
public relations. He appears to
believe that his government's
legal charity; toward the rebels
will lay a basis for judging them
in the future, when guerrilla-
terrorist action against his
regime could then be reasonably
identifiable as hard-core Commu-
nist in character. Mendez' move
may therefore serve to encourage
public cooperation with security
SOMOZA'S NOMINATION BEGINS NICARAGUAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN
The campaign for the presi-
dential election scheduled for
February 1967 is now officially
under way.
General Anastasio Somoza De-
bayle was nominated on 30 July as
the presidential candidate of the
governing Nationalist Liberal
Party (PLN), and the sudden death
of President Rene Schick on 3
August removes from the scene one
of the few moderating influences
on Somoza's ambitions. Lorenzo
Guerrero, designated president
for the remaining nine months of
Schick's term, is expected to
support General Somoza.
Somoza, son of the late dic-
tator and brother of a former
president, has made no secret of
his own presidential ambitions.
Since the assassination of his
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father in 1956, General Somoza has
been commander of the National
Guard, a position of considerable
power which he resigned upon ac-
cepting the PLN nomination. His
resignation, however, does not
remove the Guard from family con-
trol as a half brother was recent-
ly put in command of the National
Guard unit in Managua.
There will be active opposi-
tion to Somoza, although he is
certain to be the front-runner by
far.
On 27 July, the largest oppo-
sition group, the Traditionalist
Conservative Party (PCT), was
granted the status of a legal party
and will oppose the governing PLN
for the presidency as well as for
all seats in the bicameral legis-
lature and for all municipal offi-
ces. Although the governing party
has polled almost 90 percent of
the votes cast in recent elections,
a substantial number of eligible
voters have abstained and the PCT
claims these were largely its
following. On this ground, the
PCT claims to represent a sub-
stantial portion of the electorate
but the 1967 elections will be
its first real test of strength.
Although the PCT claims to be
the ideological heir to the orig-
inal conservative party which
split in 1957, a smaller faction,
the Nicaraguan Conservative Party,
took part in the last two elections
as the only legal opposition.
Even though this faction polled
but ten percent of the votes, it
was entitled to the entire one
third of the seats in both houses
of Congress that the constitution
reserves for the combined opposi-
tion. Therefore this faction
stands to lose substantially by
the legalization of a larger con-
servative rival. It has been try-
ing to increase its strength by
wooing dissatisfied conservatives
into a united front.
Another coalition has been
formed by several small parties
of extreme liberal views but is
of negligible strength.
One group not yet drawn into
either coalition is the small but
growing Social Christian Party.
However, it opposes Somoza's can-
didacy and has stated it would
support the PCT to avoid split-
ting the opposition vote.
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INAUGURATION OF COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT
On 7 August Carlos Lleras
Restrepo will be inaugurated for
a four-year term as president of
Colombia.
A member of Colombia's tra-
ditional, wealthy ruling elite,
Lleras has enjoyed a distinguished
career in both the legislative and
executive branches of government.
He has also been chairman of the
national directorate of the Lib-
eral Party, director of the Lib-
eral newspaper, El Tiempo, and
economics dean at National Uni-
versity.
Lleras' assumption of the
presidency is viewed optimisti-
cally by many, who 'believe him
far more qualified than his pred-
ecessor. He is expected to be
a strong executive, exercising
close control over his cabinet.
He is an economist: and will prob-
ably focus on Colombia's per-
sistent unemployment, inflation,
and balance of payment problems.
He has not made it.clear, how-
ever, just how he intends to im-
plement his economic policies,
which in his own words call for
a "high degree of productivity
allowing the maintenance of
reasonable prices for the con-
sumers and an adequate cash re-
turn for the producers."
key Communist insurgency.
In addition, the serious po-
litical problems facing him in-
dicate he is in for a tough pull.
Although he was elected with 70
percent of the votes cast in the
May elections, his government
does not control the two-thirds
majority in congres's needed to
pass important legislation. Also,
although essentially conservative
himself, Lleras may face stiff
opposition from the traditional
ruling class if his economic pro-
gram seems to threaten their in-
terests. There is,, moreover, the
endemic public security problem
posed by rural banditry and low-
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