WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005500080001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/08/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A005500080001-5
State Dept. review completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. AGEN Y
SECRET
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MORI/CDF Pages 7, 11-19, & 21-24
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(Information as of noon EST, 1 December 1966)
Page
VIETNAM
Operation ATTLEBORO has ended after killing 1,100
enemy troops, destroying vast amounts of war materiel
and disrupting the Communists' political and military
headquarters in War Zone "C." Communist propaganda
leaves little doubt that the Viet Cong will re-emphasize
guerrilla warfare, with only cautious use of large-scale
attacks. The controversial issue of whether military
candidates may run for public office has been raised in
the Constituent Assembly's discussions of the draft
constitution.
CAMBODIA LESS TOLERANT OF VIET CONG
Some effort is being made to limit Viet Cong use of
Cambodia as a sanctuary and a source of supply.
POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN INDONESIA
General Suharto is planning to expand parliament to
compensate for the fragmentation of his civilian sup-
port. Air Marshal Dani's much-postponed trial, now
scheduled to begin on 5 December, should clarify Su-
karno's role in the abortive coup.
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN LAOS
The end of the rainy season has brought the usual flur-
ry of Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese attacks against
government positions in northern Laos, but there is
nothing to indicate that the Communists contemplate
heavier fighting this year than in recent years.
DIVISION IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP
There is further evidence that Lin Piao's drive to
push through a major reorganization of the party has
been opposed--effectively so far--by a group in the
Politburo Standing Committee determined to preserve
the party machinery substantially intact.
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Europe
MOSCOW INTENSIFIES OFFENSIVE AGAINST PEKING
Soviet leaders may feel that with Peking's fortunes
at a low ebb, now is the time to press for a col-
lective sanction, despite the expected opposition of
many key parties.
EUROPEAN COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
The Europeans want a larger share of communications
satellite business, the only sector of space invest-
ment that promises an early commercial return.
FRANCO PRESENTS NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR SPAIN
It will not immediately affect the authoritarian nature
of the regime but will permit some liberalization after
Franco goes.
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Nno,
SECRET
DANISH ELECTION AFTERMATH
Despite his party's substantial losses in the elections
last week, Prime Minister Krag has announced that he
intends to continue to head a Social Democratic minor-
ity government.
ANTI-EGYPTIAN YEMENIS STILL SPLIT
Anti-Egyptian Yemenis have so far failed to unite for
operations against the Sallal regime and the Egyptians.
Meanwhile, the Kuwaitis are becoming discouraged with
their efforts to mediate the four-year-old struggle.
THE SITUATION IN JORDAN
Husayn and his government moved with despatch to put
down the demonstrations in Palestinian west Jordan,
but there remains an undercurrent of unrest among
Palestinians over his policy toward Israel.
PROPOSED ELECTORAL BILL EXCITES GREEK PARLIAMENT
National Radical Union (ERE) reluctance to pass a
simple proportional electoral bill has lead to a threat
of resignation from within the Stephanopoulos govern-
ment. Although the dispute may be papered over, it
will have made the government's future more problem-
atical.
REPUBLIC DECLARED IN BURUNDI COUP
Although the new regime which deposed King Ntare ap-
pears to face no serious internal opposition, the pass-
ing of the monarchy removes a major restraint on the
sometimes-violent rivalry between the Tutsis and the
more numerous Hutus.
Western Hemisphere
OPPOSITION WINS URUGUAYAN ELECTIONS; COUNCIL SCRAPPED
Uruguayans elected opposition Colorado Party member Oscar
Gestido as president and approved a constitutional reform
which sets up a government ruled by a president rather
than the present nine-man governing council.
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FAR EAST
VIETNAM
Operation ATTLEBORO, the
largest allied search-and-destroy
action of the Vietnam war ended
on 25 November. The six-week
campaign, which at one time in-
cluded as many as 17 US and two
ARVN battalions killed an esti-
mated 1,100 enemy troops and cap-
tured or destroyed vast amounts
of enemy foodstuffs and war ma-
teriel.
Over the long term, perhaps
the most. significant aspect of
Operation ATTLEBORO will be the
allies' dramatic demonstration
of their ability to commit an
overwhelming number of troops
quickly to combat in any area
without seriously weakening other
vital areas. Even the temporary
incursion into the Communists'
long-time jungle stronghold in
Tay Ninh Province probably is a
serious psychological and politi-
cal setback to them as their
aura of invincibility was once
one of their most potent politi-
cal weapons.
Guerrilla Warfare Re-emphasized
A Liberation Front broadcast
of 13 November left little doubt
that the Viet Cong high command
has decided to re-emphasize guer-
rilla warfare in South Vietnam.
This theme has been featured in
Communist publications for sev-
eral weeks, but the 13 November
broadcast is the most detailed
examination of the subject to
date.
It implicitly criticized a
decision made by the Viet Cong
high command in 1965 to trans-
fer guerrillas to main force
units. It further criticized
efforts by the Communist leader-
ship in the South to challenge
large US units equipped with
superior firepower and mobility.
It also cited Party First Sec-
retary Le Duan as an authority
for the present need to concen-
trate on guerrilla warfare and
to inte.risify Communist political
efforts in the South. This is
one of the few times that the
Liberation Front has publicly
admitted that Le Duan is one of
the principal architects of the
Communist revolution in South
Vietnam.
Heavy losses to Communist
main force units in engagements
over the past year undoubtedly
have convinced the Communists
that they should revert to smaller
scale guerrilla activity. Such
a shift, however, will not end
all large-scale Communist attacks
in the South. The Viet Cong will
undoubtedly continue to launch
such attacks when they believe
the opportunity presents itself.
It does imply, however, that
the Communists will be much more
cautious in committing their
larger units to combat. A sig-
nificant drop in the average rate
of battalion-size attacks has
been apparent since July.
The 13 November broadcast
made it clear, moreover, that
the new attention to guerrilla
tactics does not mean that the
Communists intend to stand down
militarily. The broadcast warned
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The Indochina -South China Area
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SECRET W
that to "pause at the defensive"
is to invite annihilation and it
pointed. out that even in guer-
rilla warfare the objective is
to keep the enemy under constant
attack.
Hanoi Scuttles Cambodian "Summit"
Sihanouk has reportedly
stated that his proposed "summit"
meeting with Liberation Front
and Hanoi leaders will not take
place. Hanoi apparently reacted
coolly to the proposal, suggest-
ing that preliminary meetings
be held at the foreign ministry
level to establish the purpose
of the meeting and an agenda.
Constituent Assembly
Making Progress
After nearly two months of
procedural deliberations, the
assembly empowered to draft a
new constitution has begun de-
bating the document's fundamental
principles. An agenda was adopted
on 26 November and in only three
sessions, the deputies approved
a preliminary bill of rights.
Discussions on the rights of
citizens reflected the underly-
ing regional and occupational
biases of the deputies. A pro-
posal governing the rights of
peasants to own their land and
bearing on the whole question of
land reform provoked heated argu-
ments.
At its 30 November session
the assembly approved a proposal
that "military personnel on ac-
tive duty cannot join political
parties or participate in the
government." All of the articles
adopted may be subject to further
modification when the actual
draft constitution is debated.
The assembly's action on the
issue of military candidates for
public office may affect the out-
come of its efforts to curb the
Directorate's authority to re-
vise the constitution prior to
its final adoption. Chief of
State Thieu and his colleagues
still have under consideration
an earlier assembly proposal
which would limit the Direc-
torate's amending power. They
are expected to reach a decision
on this proposal in the next few
days.
The assembly also approved
four constitutional duties of
citizens. It is now scheduled
to move on to a floor discussion
of the future institutional form
of the government. The assembly
hopes to wind up its work on the
basic constitutional principles
by Christmas, leaving nearly
three months to hammer out the
draft constitution.
SECRET. T
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CAMBODIA LESS TOLERANT OF VIET CONG
There are new indications
that
Cambodia is maki
ng at least
some
effort to limit
Viet Cong
use
of its territory
as a source
of supply and sanctua
ry. These
efforts suggest that
Phnom Penh
is re-evaluating its estimate
of both the scope of Communist
use of Cambodia and the dangers
inherent in this situation.
the Cambodian Government
was "very concerned" over possi-
ble Viet Cong incursions result-
ing from the recent allied Op-
eration ATTLEBORO, in South Viet-
nam's Tay Ninh Province (see map
page 2) .
reinforced Cambodian border
forces turned back a Viet Cong
element on 20 November and sub-
sequently refused to allow the
Communists to evacuate their
wounded into Cambodia.
Phnom Penh now is translating
into practical measures its grow-
ing concern over charges that it
Cong.
25X1
it was a common occurrence for
small numbers of Viet Cong to
take refuge in Cambodia during 25X1
allied ground sweeps or air at-
acks along the border.
Cambodian troops en-
gaged the Communists they en-
countered, but
more extensive measures would be
taken to control the border,
25X1
25X1
since the Viet Cong always re- 25X1
entered South Vietnam when the 25X1
danger was past.
25X1
lat
least some Cambodian border units
are not working with the Viet
is actively supporting the Com-
25X1
/_:.>X1
Page 4
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POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN INDONESIA
General Suharto and his col-
leagues, although well launched
on the transition from the Su-
karno era to the "new order,"
continue to encounter problems
of accommodation with Indonesia's
diverse political elements.
The civilian front that sup-
ported the army's anti-Communist,
anti-Sukarno campaign during the
past year is well on the way to
disintegration. Its elements
now run the gamut from those who
want more accommodation of Su-
karno to those who espouse all-
out opposition leading to his
eventual removal. The resulting
loss of the army's sure parlia-
mentary majority has kept Suharto
from pushing some parts of his
reform program.
To remedy this situation
General Suharto hopes to appoint
110 new members to the present
240-member legislature in the
next month. Sukarno initially
refused to sign the decree, which
authorizes an unspecified number
of appointments. He now has
signed it, obviously hoping to
influence the size and composi-
tion of the new contingent.
Some of Suharto's appointees
will be youth leaders, who are
disappointed with his gradual ap-
proach and frustrated at finding
their own political role dimin-
ished. Their dissatisfaction
focuses on the army's refusal
to condone continued demonstra-
tions against Sukarno, and Su-
harto hopes that putting youth
leaders in parliament will divert
them from street action.
An abiding problem under
the "new order" is the basic dis-
trust between the military and
most political parties. The pol-
iticians resent army encroachment
into the normally civilian sectors
of the government. The army dis-
trusts the civilian politicians,
feeling that the political leaders
have little sense of national pur-
pose and are chiefly interested
in maneuvering themselves and
their organizations into advanta-
geous positions.
Despite frustrations and in-
evitable compromises, the Suharto
regime continues its moves to re-
duce Sukarno as a political force.
Air Marshal Omar Dani's trial,
repeatedly postponed, now is
scheduled to begin on 5 December.
If Dani talks freely,
his testimony will be the most
damaging evidence to date on
Sukarno's role in the abortive
coup of October 1965.
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25X1
25X1
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Muon
Sing
LAOS
iammouah
.Qhakhek)
PLANE DES
JARRES
? National capital
R Province capital
Road
Track or trail
0 25 50 75 100 Miles
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers
SECRET
Dem calbn Zane
Auong ~'~ ' HUE
Nn
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THE MILITARY SITUATION IN LAOS
The end of the rainy season
has brought the usual flurry of
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese
attacks against government posi-
tions in northern Laos, but there
,is nothing to indicate that the
Communists contemplate heavier
fighting this year than in recent
years. On the contrary, their
ability to mount and sustain a
significant offensive has been
considerably reduced by US and
Laotian air strikes on their
troop and supply concentrations.
Government positions at Tha
Thom and Ban Ta Viang were over-
run by a battalion-sized attack
on 24 November but government
troops counterattacked on 29 No-
vember. These positions, which
defend Route 4 leading south to
the Mekong plain, were lost and
regained by government forces
earlier this year.
There have been reports that
the Communists may attempt to re-
take other positions in the north,
but they probably plan to do noth-
ing more than offset government
gains made during the past rainy
season. Rice raids can also be
expected during the coming har-
vest to compensate for the ef-
fects of US air strikes on the
Communists' resupply activities.
The resupply operation usu-
ally observed early in the dry
season apparently began several
weeks ago. From August to early
November, about 20 trucks a day
entered Laos from North Vietnam
over Route 7. During November,
the number averaaed between 30
and 40 a day.
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r-1 ME%
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DIVISION IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP
The Red Guard rallies staged
in Peking on 25 and 26 Novem-
ber did little to clear up ques-
tions about Communist China's
leadership. On 23 November a
printed Red Guard pamphlet made
serious charges, verging on trea-
son, against Chief of State Liu
Shao-chi and party general secre-
tary Teng Hsiao-ping. It demanded
their dismissal from all posts.
"bourgeois line.. .has been defeated.
A People's Daily article on
27 November described the status
of the cultural revolution in
more standard terms, however.
It said that there still remain
a "tiny handful" of powerful
party leaders to be brought down
and others who were "consciously
or unconsciously" opposing the
cultural revolution to be brought
into line.
Liu and Teng, however, were
present with Mao at the 25 Novem-
ber rally as if nothing had hap-
pened. Mao shook hands with Liu
as well as with other leaders on
the reviewing stand. According
to the New China News Agency,
Liu signed a state message sent
to Mauritania on 27 November.
The only significant absen-
tee from the rally was Li Hsueh-
feng, who replaced the disgraced
Peng Chen as first secretary of
the Peking city party committee
in May. Li has been under heavy
attack in the past two months,
through Red Guard posters and
demonstrations, but until 25 No-
vember he had appeared regularly
at Red Guard rallies. He may
have been quietly dismissed. If
so, he is the only high official
to fall in recent weeks.
In a speech at the Albanian
Embassy on 29 November, Premier
Chou En-lai described the strug-
gle in the past tense, but no
other evidence supports this
claim. Chou asserted that the "pro-
letarian revolutionary line...
has won victory" and that the
Information just received
strengthens earlier indications
that the current leadership has
been at loggerheads since the
11th party plenum in early Au-
gust over the question of bringing
down party leaders like Liu and
Teng. According to excerpts of
a speech made by Lin Piao at the
11th plenum, reported in a Red
Guard poster, Lin demanded the
"reorganization" of party cadres.
"Until this can be done," he said,
"we shall not break the situation
of stalemate." Asserting that
his actions had Mao's full ap-
proval Lin said that Mao had dele-
gated considerable authority to
him: "I do not interfere with
him on major matters, nor do I
trouble him on minor matters."
The 23 November Red Guard
pamphlet stated that it was re-
peating charges made against Liu
and Teng at the 11th plenum.
Evidently the ultraradical fac-
tion which brought the charges,
presumably led by Lin, was able
to make only minor ones stick.
Liu and Teng, although demoted
in hierarchical rank, have ap-
peared regularly at large turn-
outs of leaders since the plenum.
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Red Guard factions have been
in conflict over Liu at least twice
since the 11th plenum. According
to a lengthy polemical tract is-
sued by ultraradical Red Guard
groups on 7 October, posters had
been put up at Tsinghua University
on 24 August strongly attacking
Liu and demanding his dismissal
and the reorganization of the cen-
tral committee. A force of 2,000
Red Guards from other institutions
were promptly sent to Tsinghua to
suppress the posters and the group
--Red Guards of Maoism--which had
put them up. The tract intimates
that the suppression was authorized
by Chen Po-ta and the Cultural Revo-
lution Group of the Central Commit-
tee, and it also paints Chou En-lai
in an unfavorable light.
Several times during October
posters criticizing Liu reportedly
were put up but were promptly re-
moved. There are credible reports
that anti-Liu posters were suppressed
on the morning of the 18 October
rally, resulting in fighting among
Red Guards on such a scale that the
rally was first canceled and then
held in a curtailed form. Elaborate
preparations had been made before
18 October for Mao and other lead-
ers to appear on the reviewing stand,
but all they did was drive through
Tienanmen Square in a motorcade that
lasted only half an hour.
It now appears that an ultra-
radical faction led by Lin has wanted
all along to push through a major
reorganization of the party. It has
apparently been opposed, effectively
so far, by a group in the politburo
standing committee determined to
preserve the party machinery sub-
stantially intact. Mao's role in
all this is obscure. He may support
Lin's program in general, but be
unwilling to condone extreme action
against Liu and Teng.
The significance of attempts
to bring down Liu and Teng in dis-
grace is that they had been domi-
nant leaders in the regular party
machinery for more than a decade,
and thus many party leaders at the
center and in the provinces owe
their careers to the two. A thorough
discrediting of them would give the
Lin forces a powerful weapon to use
in dismissing, demoting, or intimi-
dating large numbers of party lead-
ers.
EUROPE
MOSCOW INTENSIFIES OFFENSIVE AGAINST PEKING
Soviet leaders have intensified
their attacks on China in an appar-
ent effort to make the Peking re-
gime anathema to the rest of the
Communist world.
Early this week, Pravda issued
a bitter, detailed indictment of
"Mao Tse-tung and his circle." The
article set out to prove that Mao's
chauvinism, and his determination
to turn the Chinese Communist party
Page 9
into "an obedient, blind weapon to
execute his will" have deprived his
regime of the right to call itself
Communist.
The editorial pointed out that
the Chinese leaders now consider the
USSR "enemy number one," and that
they are also attacking the "over-
whelming majority" of world parties.
The Soviets would clearly like
to secure a collective endorsement
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of an indictment such as that
contained in Pravda, and, in this
connection, they are keeping
alive the idea of some kind of
international Communist gather-
ing. A large-scale, formal party
meeting on the order of the Mos-
cow conferences of 1957 and 1960,
which would be at least implicitly
anti-Chinese, would be desirable
from the USSR's point of view.
The Russians have approved for-
eign party assertions that condi-
tions are "ripening" for such a
gathering.
The Soviet leaders may feel
that, with Peking's fortunes at
a low ebb, now is the time to
press for a collective sanction
of China, despite the expected
opposition of many key parties.
At the party congress in
Budapest this week, Hungarian
party chief Kadar and Brezhnev
reiterated approval of the con-
ference idea in the same quali-
fied terms used by Zhivkov and
Brezhnev at the Bulgarian party
congress two weeks ago. However,
Kadar went beyond other recent
statements to allow for a con-
ference without all parties in
attendance. Moreover, Russian
propaganda has become more openly
critical of those recalcitrant
parties who, "out of fear of of-
fending the splitters, avoid any
initiative to solve current prob-
lems."
The Russian leaders, how-
ever, have no reason to expect
%mooth sailing, should they press
in earnest for a formal, all-
party conference. The continu-
ing reluctance of several key
parties to go along with this
idea was evident in the generally
unenthusiastic reaction to it at
the Bulgarian party congress. In
order to secure the agreement of
eight ruling Communist party lead-
ers to assemble for an innocuous
gathering in Moscow last October,
the Soviets had to forgo any ex-
plicit attempt to exploit that
gathering in their offensive
against Peking.
In view of this, Moscow has
been circumspect in advancing
the meeting proposal, and there
have been no reliable reports
that the Russians are doing any
real arm-twisting. The Rumanian
ambassador in Moscow recently
told his Canadian colleague that
a conference was not envisaged
"even by the Russians for the
near future."
The evidence at hand suggests
that Moscow will eventually have
to settle for something less than
what it may now hope to achieve.
The Soviet leaders probably even
now suspect this will be the case.
In preparing a possible fall-back
position, they have been careful
to endorse other modes of "col-
lective work" such as more exten-
sive bilateral and regional con-
tacts, as well as a world meeting.
In any event, any mammoth conclave
--if there is to be one--will prob-
ably await a fitting occasion, such
as the USSR's 50th anniversary cele-
brations next year.
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EUROPEAN COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
The Europeans want a larger
share of communications satellite
business, now predominantly Amer-
ican and the only sector of space
investment that promises an early
commercial return. Interest in a
regional European satellite sys-
tem is growing, fed by mounting
resentment of US domination of
the International Telecommunica-
tions Satellite Consortium
(INTELSAT).
The European Conference on
Satellite Communications (CETS),
meeting in The Hague on 22-24 No-
vember, requested the European
Space Research Organization (ESRO)
to draw up specifications for an
experimental satellite for use in
a regional European system. The
CETS plan recommends that three
such satellites be built and that
they be orbited by the European
Launcher Development Organization
(ELDO). Although CETS, an advi-
sory group of telecommunications
authorities, has no power, its
policies generally have the sup-
port of member governments. ESRO
will decide next month whether to
accept the request.
Some months ago, in an effort
to gain the lead in European sat-
ellite technology, France com-
pleted her own plans for a commu-
nications satellite serving Europe
and Africa. On 30 November Paris
announced plans to orbit two com-
munications satellites by 1970.
Because the project would be too
costly for the French alone, they
recently decided to invite Brit-
ain and other European nations to
participate. At a meeting with
French officials in Bonn in early
November, West Germany agreed to
support the project providing it
would not prove divisive to either
ESRO or INTELSAT. The Germans in-
sisted that ESRO build the satel-
lite and asked that it be brought
under INTELSAT sponsorship in
keeping with the European commit-
ment to a single global INTELSAT
system.
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FRANCO PRESENTS NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR SPAIN
The long-awaited constitu-
tional reform which General Franco
unveiled in a speech to the Cortes
on 22 November will make some
cautious changes in the political
machinery when adopted. The
changes will not immediately af-
fect the authoritarian nature of
the regime but they will permit
some liberalization after Franco
goes.
On 14 December a national
referendum--the one occasion on
which universal suffrage is per-
mitted---is expected to endorse the
Cortes' approval of the law. The
government has begun a country-
wide propaganda campaign to get
out a large affirmative vote.
The new law reaffirms much of
the 1947 law which declares Spain
to be a monarchy and provides ma-
chinery for choosing Franco's suc-
cessor as chief of state. In ad-
dition the new law would authorize
the chief of state to appoint a
premier from among three candi-
dates proposed by the Council of
the Realm, an advisory body which
also participates in selection of
the chief of state. The premier
is to serve for five years at the
pleasure of the chief of state
and may not be removed by the
Cortes. He will administer the
government and propose other mem-
bers of his cabinet.
Thus Franco's dual positions
as chief of state and chief of
government can be separated. Un-
der Franco, a premier would prob-
ably have limited responsibility
similar to that of the French
premier under President de Gaulle.
After Franco goes, however, it is
expected that the premiership
will be the center of executive
power.
The new constitution provides
a few measures of political lib-
eralization. About one fifth of
the Cortes members are to be
chosen by direct vote of "heads
of families and married women."
The majority, however, will still
be chosen indirectly by the munic-
ipalities and various corporate
groups much as syndicates and
professional organizations.
The National Movement, which
is the only legal political organ-
ization in Spain, has had its
role reduced to that of guardian
of the nation's ideological prin-
ciples. Its high council will be
transformed into a national coun-
cil, comparable to an advisory
upper house. It loses legal con-
trol over the labor syndicates
which get a larger representation
in the Cortes. The principle of
religious liberty for non-Catho-
lics is provided as a legal right.
The chief disappointment
for those opposed to the regime
was Franco's denunciation of po-
litical parties. Nevertheless,
Franco's statement--the exclusion
of parties does not rule out the
"legitimate conflict of opinion"--
may present an opening for the op-
position to express views within
the narrow framework of the Na-
tional Council and the Cortes.
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DANISH ELECTION AFTERMATH
Denmark's swing to the left
in the 22 November general elec-
tions has stirred up its normally
placid politics. Prime Minister
Jens Otto Krag intends, however,
to reconstitute a minority gov-
ernment.
tween the two parties on domestic
issues. Larsen indicated that
the SPP will support the Social
Democrats' controversial tax re-
form proposals which in October
precipitated the call for elec-
tions.
Krag's Social Democratic
Party (SDP) was the chief loser
in the election. It dropped
seven of its 76 seats, but it
remains the largest party in the
175-member parliament. The ex-
treme leftist Socialist People's
Party (SPP) was the principal
gainer, increasing its strength
from 10 to 20 seats. The posi-
tion of the four major non-So-
cialist parties remained rela-
tively unchanged. This bloc has
86 seats in parliament.
Krag last week explored the
possibility for forming a coali-
tion with the SPP, but talks broke
down because the SSP leader, Aksel
Larsen, insisted on drastic cuts
in the defense budget and in con-
scripts' length of service. These
demands, as well as Larsen's pro-
posal to prohibit joint military
exercises on Danish soil, would
further hamstring Denmark's ac-
tivities in NATO.
There appears to be a con-
siderable area of. agreement be-
The extent to which the SPP
will be able to influence govern-
ment policy depends on how much
difficulty Krag has in trying to
put through his program and thus
on how much he has to rely on SPP
support. On foreign policy and
defense matters Krag will continue
to depend on the backing of the
"bourgeois" parties (non-Socialist).
In order to stem the grow-
in defections from the Social
Democratic left wing to the SPP,
Krag may feel compelled to pro-
pose more generous social welfare
programs as a means of competing
with the popular and dynamic im-
age of Larsen and his party.
Confronting Krag and other party
leaders are the examples set in
Norway and Sweden where long-
entrenched Socialist parties re-
cently suffered electoral defeats
that removed one from power and
greatly weakened the other.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
ANTI-EGYPTIAN YEMENIS STILL SPLIT
Despite efforts by Yemeni tri-
bal leaders to organize joint roy-
alist-republican tribal reaction
to the repressions of the Egyptian-
backed regime of President Sallal,
military activity is at a low level.
Numerous important republican
tribal leaders are reported to have
contacted royalist leaders in an
attempt to combine for operations
against the Sallal regime and the
Egyptians, but internal squabbles
have so far frustrated any over-
all organization of anti-' tian
Yemenis.
Meanwhile, there has been lit-
tle international progress toward
a solution of the four-year strug-
gle and Kuwait is discouraged with
its moribund mediation effort.
President Azhari of Sudan, now
visiting King Faysal, has indicated
his readiness to mediate
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SAUDI ARABIA
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THE SITUATION IN JORDAN
The turmoil in Jordan has sub-
sided after a week in which King
Husayn faced his most serious in-
ternal crisis in several years.
There remains, however, an under-
current of unrest among Palestinians
over the government's defense pol-
icy vis-a-vis Israel.
tian and Syrian media. The radical
Baathist regime in Damascus has
called for the formation of a pro-
gressive front" in Jordan to over-
throw Husayn by means of a "war of
liberation." Egypt's press and
radio attacks on Husayn have become
more direct during the past week.
Demonstrations against Husayn's
rule spread to virtually every town
in Palestinian west Jordan and ap-
proached riot proportions in Jeru-
salem, Ramallah, Hebron, and Nablus.
Some deaths resulted when the army
and police forces moved in to re-
store order. Curfews and tight con-
trols on travel between the towns
were imposed, and schools were
closed.
The demands of many of the
demonstrators indicated that the
Egyptian-oriented Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (PLO) was a
strong influence. In many in-
stances crowds called for arming of
civilians and for stationing PLO
military forces along the Israeli
border--PLO proposals that Amman
has rejected. PLO headquarters in
Cairo has broadcast additional ap-
peals for an uprising against
Husayn, and this cry also was
voiced by many of the demonstrators
in Jordan. The PLO, thus, has
switched from a long-term effort
to "liberate" Palestine from Israel
to agitation for the immediate lib-
eration of Palestinian west Jordan
from Husa.yn's control.
This campaign has been aug-
mented by similar propaganda in Egyp-
Nasir, however, anxious he may
be to exploit the King's troubles,
probably fears a revolution in Jor-
dan would lead to war with Israel.
Nasir's ambivalent attitude was evi-
dent in a speech he made on 25 No-
vember. "We do not want to exacer-
bate the tension on the west bank
of the Jordan," he said. "This par-
ticular line of our political and
military confrontation with Israel
requires that we fully assess mat-
ters."
An Egyptian-Israeli air clash
on 29 November underlined Israel's
continuing superiority in military
actions. The Israelis claim that
they shot down two MIG-19s; the
Egyptians admit only that one of
their MIGs "crashed" while on patrol.
The Israeli Government evi-
dently is concerned about the in-
stability in Jordan ensuing from its
13 November reprisal raid. At
least for the time being, Israel
may exercise some restraint in re-
taliating for any new terrorism.
The Jordanians have captured a ship-
ment of arms and explosives al-
legedly sent from Syria to a "Fatah"
terrorist depot in Jordan--the
first known shipment since 13 No-
vember.
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PROPOSED ELECTORAL BILL EXCITES GREEK PARLIAMENT
A dispute over a proposed bill
for a simple proportional system
for counting the popular vote in
the next Greek election is further
threatening Prime Minister Stephan-
opoulos' already shaky grasp on the
reins of government.
The National Radical Union
(ERE), which reluctantly has pro-
vided the bulk of parliamentary sup-
port for Stephanopoulos, has now
withdrawn its original support of
the bill and has proposed an in-
definite postponement of parlia-
mentary debate.
Last week a caucus of Stephano-
poulos' own Liberal Democratic Cen-
ter Party reaffirmed its support
for the electoral bill, but author-
ized further talks with leaders of
the ERE and Progressive parties.
Stephanopoulos is expected to con-
sult with the other party leaders
late this week.
Some ERE deputies fear that
this proportional system would en-
hance the electoral possibilities
of candidates from small, splinter
parties and thus discourage the es-
tablishment of a "national front"
against the alleged "popular front"
of the Papandreous and the crypto-
Communist United Democratic Left.
Others fear that passage of any
electoral bill now would prematurely
excite the political atmosphere and
hasten the date of the elections,
which are not required by the con-
stitution until 1968.
Coordination Minister Mitso-
takis wants immediate consideration
of the bill and has demanded that
Stephanopoulos resign if ERE con-
tinues to oppose debate. He has
threatened his own resignation if
Stephanopoulos gives in to the ERE
proposal to defer debate. Mitso-
takis strongly favors the simple
proportional system, which would
enhance his chances for heading a
splinter party of the center-right
group, and he is opposed to the
formation of any so-called "na-
tional front." Mitsotakis, how-
ever, may retreat from his adamant
position out of fear that even if
he resigned the government might
not fall and he would then be out
in the political cold.
An eventual agreement to post-
ponement of debate may result, but
the dispute has served to narrow
the chances for continued political
compromises on maior issues.
REPUBLIC DECLARED IN BURUNDI COUP
Burundi Army officers, backed
by an extremist faction of the Tutsi
ruling group, apparently are in
control of the Burundi Government
after deposing King Ntare and pro-
claiming a republic.
The officers announced the
King's removal while he was in Kin-
shasa attending the celebration of
the first anniversary of the Mobutu
take-over in the Congo. Prime
Minister and former army commander
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Micombero proclaimed himself
president, and set up a "revolu-
tionary council" composed of him-
self and 12 other Tutsi officers.
He named military men as governors
of Burundi's eight provinces, ap-
parently to strengthen the army's
hold in the rural areas, where
there may be considerable sympathy
for the deposed King. At present,
Micombero and his associates ap-
pear to face little opposition.
In what the British ambassa-
dor in Bujumbura called "a typical
Tutsi intriguing political mess,"
the 19-year-old King had been at
loggerheads with the Micombero
group since shortly after the
group installed him in place of
his father last July. The King
was supported by Tutsis who seem
to have been less inclined toward
harsh treatment of the country's
Hutu majority and who were not
strongly committed to the re-
establishment of relations with
Communist China.
Rwanda and B
DEMOCRATIC
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OF THE CONGO
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RWANDA
BUJUMBURA
Lake D
The faction around Micombero
apparently was ideologically com-
mitted to the abolition of the
monarchy and has in the past been
pro-Peking. At least some of its
members, including Attorney Gen-
eral Simbananiye, have been iden-
tified with harshly repressive pol-
icies toward the Hutu. Endemic
clan rivalry within the Tutsi rul-
ing group may also have played a
part in the dispute.
The new ruling group shares
the general Tutsi fear and dis-
trust of the US, and relations with
the US will probably remain chilly.
However, inexperience and a reluc-
tance to offend Belgium, Burundi's
major aid supplier, will inhibit
drastic initiatives in foreign pol-
icy, perhaps including even the re-
establishment of ties with Peking.
Moreover, the new regime will also
hesitate to offend important neigh-
bors such as the Congo.
Its attitude toward Burundi's
long-standing cross-border dispute
with Rwanda is unclear. Members
of the new regime, however, have
in the past aided Rwandan Tutsi
guerrilla forces based in Burundi.
Over the longer run, the
country will be less stable with
the removal of the King. The
throne, which has existed for 300
years, was the object of venera-
tion for Hutu as well as Tutsi,
and it thus served to dampen the
Tutsi-Hutu rivalry. With the mon-
archy removed, the Hutu--who con- 25X1
stitute a majority of the army's
rank and file as well as of the
population--now are likely to
grow increasingly restive.
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I
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OPPOSITION WINS URUGUAYAN ELECTIONS; COUNCIL SCRAPPED
On 27 November the Uruguayan
electorate approved a constitu-
tional reform plan which changes
the system of government to a
presidential one from a nine-man
governing council. The president-
elect is 65-year-old retired Gen-
eral Oscar D. Gestido, a former
council member and a member of the
opposition Colorado Party, which
swept to a decisive victory.
Gestido takes office on 1
March 1967 for a five-year term.
He is widely respected as a good
administrator and has a reputation
for honesty. He and his running
mate, vice president elect Jorge
Pacheco Areco, represent the mod-
erately conservative wing of the
Colorado Party.
Gestido won in alliance with
the Colorado Unity Front, a group
of opportunistic politicians
united mainly for electoral pur-
poses. The well-oiled party ma-
chinery efficiently delivered the
vote.
Both the Colorado Party and
constitutional reform obviously
benefited from widespread public
dissatisfaction with the continu-
ing economic and political crises
which in part have resulted from
the ineffective council system of
government and in part from mis-
management. The new constitution,
in addition to creating a presi-
dency, will facilitate land re-
form by redistribution, through
expropriation if necessary. It
eliminates the former formula for
bipartisan sharing of the executive
boards of autonomous agencies, es-
tablishes a central bank on an
effective footing, increases the
number of ministries from nine to
eleven, and exempts private
schools as well as public schools
from taxes.
The Communist electoral
front, FIDEL, made significant
gains, garnering better than six
percent of the total vote, or
twice its showing in the 1962
elections. Its congressional rep-
resentation increases from one to
two senators--out of a total of
30--and from three to five dep-
uties--out of a total of 99. The
Communists therefore could hold
an important swing vote because
the Blancos and Colorados have
divided the legislature fairly
evenly. This is especially true
since party unity is not the
norm in Uruguay.
Gestido's electoral alliance
will control less than half of
the Colorado congressional total,
and within the alliance his own
faction is weaker than the Colo-
rado Unity Front.
President-elect Gestido has
not yet announced his programs.
His new administration will face
severe challenges in dealing with
a deteriorating economy, continu-
ing Communist-inspired labor agi-
tation, and an expected surge in
the cost of living. Unless he is
prepared to make some difficult
decisions and is able to take
many austerity measures, the coun-
try may continue to suffer debil-
itating economic and political
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