WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005500090001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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WEEKLY
State Dept. review
completed ARMY review(s)
completed.
CEEleiTRI
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
9 December-1966
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(Information as of noon EST, 8 December 1966)
VIETNAM
The Viet Cong stepped up terrorist attacks in the
Saigon area this week while military activity in
other parts of the country remained light. In-
creased political friction could result from the
assassination this week of a prominent Constituent
Assembly member known as a critic of the govern-
ment, and from the Directorate's decision to re-
ject an assembly proposal to limit the govern-
ment's power to modify the constitution.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD UN
Its scornful reaction to the debate on Chinese
representation re-emphasized its view that there
is no early prospect of achieving admission on its
own terms.
SPLIT IN CHINESE RED GUARD MOVEMENT
Recent information reveals that from the outset
there have been opposing groups of "militants" and
"moderates" within the movement.
INDONESIAN TRIAL IMPLICATES SUKARNO IN LAST YEAR'S COUP
Testimony of former air force chief Omar Dani, on
trial for complicity in the murders of six top army
generals in October 1965, discloses that President
Sukarno approved the antiarmy move and probably knew
of it in advance.
CHINESE COMMUNIST PRESSURE ON MACAO
Rioting has subsided, but the Chinese are keep-
ing up pressure in an apparent effort to force
full acceptance of their demands.
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PHILIPPINES REASSESSING RELATIONS WITH USSR
President Marcos, while maintaining publicly
his policy of nonrecognition, has ordered a
review of the issue and might shift his course
in order to further his pretensions as an
"honest broker" in the Vietnam conflict.
Europe
BRITISH TALKS WITH RHODESIA COLLAPSE
The selective, mandatory UN economic sanctions
London is requesting to increase pressure on
Salisbury are unlikely to produce the desired
effect.
THE SOVIET ECONOMY AT YEAR END
The country's economic performance this year
has been mixed. Excellent results in agricul-
ture have been offset by continued mediocre
performance in industry.
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RECENT SOVIET-EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS
The Soviets are still reluctant to bail Egypt out
of its economic difficulties.
HUNGARIAN PARTY CONGRESS CONCENTRATES POLITICAL POWER
The congress ratified command decisions to concen-
trate authority and to assign party leader Kadar's
associates to key problems.
Middle East - Africa
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE IN INDIA
The principal internal subversive threat against
the democratic government in India comes from
domestic Communist forces. For over 40 years the
Communists, concentrated mainly in the states of
Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and West Bengal, have based
their political programs on exploiting the dis-
content among the poorer classes, the urban middle
class, and the unemployed intellectuals. In at
least one state--Kerala--the leftist Communist
Party of India seems assured of an impressive
victor in February's election3. F_
SECRET ARMS AGREEMENT STIRS UP GREECE-CYPRUS DISPUTE
New difficulties have arisen between Greece and
Cyprus following unloading of Czech arms for
Cyprus police force.
THE SITUATION IN JORDAN
Antiregime sentiment is still strong in Palestinian
west Jordan and sporadic demonstrations are con-
tinuing. Syria is becoming increasingly. active
in attempting to exploit the unrest.
CONFLICT IN NIGERIA BETWEEN GOWON AND OJUKWU SHARPENS
Supreme Commander Gowon and Eastern military gov-
ernor Ojukwu have sharply divergent positions on the
future of the Nigerian federation and refuse to com-
promise. Prospects for an early agreement are dimmer
than ever.
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Western Hemisphere
INCIDENT SPARKS ANTI-US SENTIMENT IN PANAMA
Panamanian leftists and ultranationalists have joined
the country's sensationalist news media in an anti-
US clamor over an incident at the US-leased Rio Hato
training area.
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT MEETS OPPOSITION ON RAILROAD REFORM
Both government and labor seem anxious to avoid a
major confrontation on the issue, but it seems in-
evitable that some kind of railroad strike will be
added to the current port workers' strike and the
24-hour general strike already called for 14 December.
INTRIGUES OF DOMINICAN PRESIDENT'S MILITARY AIDE
The activities of Dominican President Joaquin Bala-
guer's military aide, Colonel Neit Nivar Seijas,
are threatening to undermine Balaguer's relations
with important elements in the military, and may
also build up Nivar's personal power base.
LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS REACTING AGAINST UNIVERSITY
STUDENTS
Authorities in Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Chile,and
Panama are cracking down on student demonstrations
which show signs of Communist involvement.
ECUADOREAN MILITARY REACTION TO CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
DECISIONS
The military appear to be vacillating while the
new constituent assembly passes some harassing
resolutions, but continued goading by the assembly
could lead the military to strike back in frustra-
tion.
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Far East
VIETNAM
Communist sabotage and ter-
rorism in the Saigon area increased
this week, while Communist forces
elsewhere in the country evaded
allied search-and destroy opera-
tions.
Viet Cong terrorists made two
major attacks in the Saigon area
on 4 December. Infiltrators, iden-
tified as part of the 165A Viet
Cong regiment which has been noted
operating in the Saigon area, at-
tacked Tan Son Nhut Airfield early
on 4 December and again later in
the same day. Three Americans
were killed, 29 others wounded,
and 18 aircraft damaged. Four
Communists were captured and 31
were killed. Three days later two
large explosive charges were dis-
covered near an ammunition dump
on the airfield.
On 4 December in an attack
on a US Army Psychological Group
headquarters facility in downtown
Saigon, Viet Cong terrorists placed
a bomb under the roof of the build-
ing. The explosion wounded 12
Americans.
The Viet Cong also attempted
to interdict allied lines of com-
munication in III Corps this week.
On 2 December, and again on 5 De-
cember, they ambushed units of
the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regi-
ment in southern Long Khanh and
northern Phuoc Tuy provinces. In
the first attack by a 400-man Com-
munist force against an American
convoy on National Route 1, enemy
casualties were 94 killed as com-
pared with American losses of one
killed and 22 wounded. The sec-
ond attack took place on Route 2,
and a subsequent American sweep
of the area discovered a Viet
Cong base camp. More than eight
tons of rice and many bunkers
and tunnels were destroyed. Four
Viet Cong were killed, 41 cap-
tured, and 278 suspects appre-
hended. American casualties were
light.
MACV has accepted the 10th
North Vietnamese Army Division
in Kontum and Pleiku provinces
near the Cambodian border in the
"probable" category. This 5,700-
man division has three subordi-
nate units: the 88th, 95B, and
101C regiments. The existence
of this division was first re-
ported by prisoners of war in
August of this year. There are
now nine division-level units in
the Communists' main forces in
South Vietnam.
Constituent Assembl - GVN
Re ations
Current South Vietnamese
political developments are in-
creasingly centered on relations
between the government and the
Constituent Assembly, and, more
broadly, on military-civilian
relationships.
On 1 December, the ruling
Directorate decided to reject
all Constituent Assembly propos-
als for modifying the assembly's
founding law. The most impor-
tant of the modifications would
abolish the government's power
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 9 Dec 66
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 PHNOM
PENH
loo
MILES
9 DECEMBER
KIEN
GIANG
SOUTII
CHINA
SEA
QUANG
TRI
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THIEN
PHUOC
LONG
QUANG
DUC
QUANG
NGAI
PHU
BON
DUC
KHANH
HOA'
PHU
YEN
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The Indochina -South China Area
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to make changes in the draft con-
stitution which could be reversed
only by a two-thirds assembly
vote. The assembly has not yet
been officially informed of the
decision, although many delegates
are aware of it. Assemblymen had
been optimistic that the govern-
ment would at least compromise on
some of the less controversial
proposals, and it is still possi-
ble that the Directorate's formal
reply to the assembly will be
softened by minor concessions. If
the Directorate remains inflexible
on all issues, however, it could
provoke a new round of criticism
directed at the military oligarchy.
The assembly currently is
debating the principles of the
future governmental system. Its
constitution drafting committee
proposed that the government con-
sist of four separate branches--
an executive, a bicameral legisla-
ture, a .judiciary, and an inspec-
torate. A straight presidential
system for executive organization
was recommended by the committee
chairman, but during the ensuing
debate the assembly was divided
between those favoring such a
system and those preferring a
modified presidential - prime
ministerial arrangement.
The assembly's debate was in-
terrupted on 7 December by the
assassination of Tran Van Van, a
well-known southern factional
leader in the assembly who has
been a strong critic of the north-
ern-dominated Ky regime. There
was no immediate political reac-
tion within the assembly, but
southern militants either within
or outside the assembly may ac-
cuse the government of complicity
in Van's assassination. Although
one of Van's assailants was cap-
tured and has admitted he was a
member of a Viet Cong assassina-
tion squad, critics of the regime
may try to discredit police di-
rector Loan by implying that he
falsified evidence of Communist
responsibility.
Air Raids in the Hanoi Area
Hanoi radio portrayed the
2 December US air strikes in the
Hanoi area as directed primarily
against the civilian population,
calling the raids a serious new
escalation of the war, but with-
out threatening any specific re-
prisals. Liberation radio, how-
ever, claimed that the 4 December
Viet Cong attack on Tan Son Nhut
Airfield was in direct retalia-
tion for the 2 December bombings.
The main theme of Communist
propaganda was that the North
Vietnamese people were adequately
prepared for air strikes, that
Hanoi air defenses inflicted
maximum losses on the raiders,
that bomb damage was minimal, and
that disrupted services were re-
stored in a very short time.
Hanoi featured a tour of selected
bombed areas for foreign newsmen
within three hours of the attack
and produced an American pilot
shot down in the raids for a
press conference. The regime
claimed that 26 civilians had
been killed.
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COMMUNIST CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD UN
Peking's scornful reaction
to the annual United Nations de-
bate on Chinese representation
re-emphasized its view that there
is no early prospect of achieving
admission on Communist terms--
the foremost of which is the re-
moval of Taipei. The Chinese Com-
munists remain unwilling to make
concessions that would attract
greater support or to push ac-
tively for membership, since they
believe that pressure within the
UN will eventually bring admis-
sion on their own terms.
In the past year Peking has
made relatively little comment on
UN developments. It has derided
U Thant's Vietnam peace efforts
on several occasions and has re-
peatedly flayed the US and the
Soviet Union for alleged manipu-
lation of the annual debate on
China. This year it dismissed
Canada's efforts to promote a
"two-Chinas" solution as a US
"plot," and accused Ottawa of
"fronting" for Washington. Pe-
king also excoriated Moscow for
"double-faced tactics" in profess-
ing support for Peking while dis-
tributing to delegates, just be-
fore they cast their votes, cop-
ies of a recent polemical edito-
rial in Pravda.
At the UN, Italy's proposal
of a study committee to consider
the problem of Chinese membership,
with implications of a two Chinas
solution, introduced an important
new element in this year's voting.
Although it was decisively defeated
by the combined opposition of both
the supporters of Peking and Taipei,
the Italian plan offered an option
to a number of delegations that,
might otherwise have voted for
the customary Albanian resolution
to cast out Taipei and seat Peking.
In addition, the Communist coun-
tries lobbied less vigorously than
usual for the Albanian proposal
and it was defeated by an unex-
pectedly large majority.
SPLIT IN CHINESE RED GUARD MOVEMENT
Since the Red Guards first
appeared in August, the Chinese
Communist regime has consistently
described them as a unified force
that serves as the cutting edge
of the "cultural revolution."
Information that recently became
available, however, reveals that
from the outset there have been
opposing groups of "militants"
and "moderates" within the move-
ment.
By October this split had
become institutionalized with the
emergence of two rival "headquar-
ters" in Peking and in several
provinces. They appear to be
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responsive to different groups of
individuals within the leader-
ship--the militants presumably to
Defense Minister Lin Piao.
The militant groups claim
in their posters and newspapers
that they are "rebels"--the only
"true revolutionaries"--and that
their rivals are "revisionists"
who shield party committees and
suppress revolutionary activities.
Militant groups consistently
praise Red Guards who attack or
demonstrate against factories,
government institutions, and
party committees. If the attacks
lead to violence, resistance by
the attacked organization or per-
son is always blamed. Many coun-
terposters have been seen in Pe-
king and elsewhere defending tar-
gets which the militant Red Guards
attacked. These posters use ven-
omous terms like "evil," "counter-
revolutionary," "fascist," and
"torturers," to describe the at-
tackers.
Police and public security
forces seldom interfere with
clashes between Red Guard groups,
suggesting that each force has
protectors at the highest level.
In Peking city, most Red
Guard violence reported in recent
weeks is believed to have been
directed by the "Revolutionary
Rebel" Red Guard Headquarters,
also known simply as the 3rd
Headquarters. This headquarters
on 22 November publicized its in-
tention to ransack the headquar-
ters of its main rival--the 2nd
Page 5
Headquarters. (According to pos-
ters, the lst had been dissolved
by late October.) The earliest
reference to the 3rd Headquarters
appears in a wall poster, just
available. The poster describes
the headquarters direction on 21
October of a force of more than
2,000 Red Guards, gathered from
20 institutions, who invaded and
ransacked an agricultural insti-
tute. The leader of that attack
was identified as Kuai Ta-fu, the
3rd Headquarters vice commander.
Kuai is a controversial militant
student leader, who had been si-
lenced by a central committee work
team in June and July and "reha-
bilitated" in August.
Outside of Peking, "rebel"
Red Guard headquarters have been
competing with rivals in several
provinces. In at least one prov-
ince--Anhwei--this conflict may
have created a state of near an-
archy. According to a poster re-
port, Red Guards backed by the
"rebel" headquarters in Anhwei
seized the party first secretary
on 11 November, and "tortured"
him for several days. Attempts
by workers and (moderate) Red
Guards to rescue him led to vio-
lent clashes on 16 and 17 Novem-
ber, in which three people were
killed and 170 were injured.
Typically, a counterposter
has been seen in Peking putting
the blame for the incident on the
Anhwei secretary. The poster also 25X1
accused Tao Chu, 4th ranking leader
of the regime of exonerating the
secretary.
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INDONESIAN TRIAL IMPLICATES SUKARNO I N LAST YEAR'S COUP
Testimony of former air
force chief Omar Dani, on trial
for complicity in the murders of
six top army generals in October
1965, discloses that President
Sukarno approved the antiarmy
move and probably knew of it in
advance.
Dani himself is the only
high-ranking leader who openly
supported the 1 October action
in which the generals were mur-
dered and a revolutionary coun-
cil was proclaimed. He and Su-
karno spent most of 1 October at
Dani's headquarters at Halim Air
Force Base. The chief judge and
the prosecuting officers are
pressing Dani hard to obtain in-
formation on Sukarno's conversa-
tion and activities that day.
Dani has related one in-
teresting prelude to the coup.
He said that in mid-September
Sukarno sent him to Peking where,
among other matters, he discussed
with Chou En-lai an alleged Chi-
nese offer to provide 100,000
small arms to Indonesia. On his
return from China, Dani reported
only to Foreign Minister Suban-
drio and did not inform the army
or the armed forces staff.
Later in September, Dani
said, he told Sukarno that army
General Supardjo, a Communist,
was planning to take action
against the generals and he re-
ceived the impression that the
President already knew about it.
When Sukarno was briefed at Halim
Air Force Base on the morning of
1 October on the events of the
previous night, he replied--ac-
cording to Dani--"Good, this is
clearly a revolutionary incident.
In a great revolution bloody
events occur." Sukarno then
stated that he wanted no further
bloodshed and approved Dani's
draft order-of-the-day, which
supported the coup.
When the revolutionary coun-
cil was announced on the radio
about mid-day and Sukarno's name
was not included, Sukarno laughed
and said, "It's just a game." The
group at the air force base was
not disturbed at the announcement
because, according to Dani, they
knew the "President was still in
charge."
Supardjo conferred with Su-
karno several times during the
day and, on learning that anti-
coup forces had retaken the radio
station, advised the President
to go to East Java. On the ad-
vice of a civilian cabinet member,
however, Sukarno went instead to
his palace at Bogor, West Java.
Dani admitted writing a letter
to his successor as air force
chief which stated, "Keep the
President's name out of this. I
take full responsibility for what
happens to the air force."
In order to make full polit-
ical use of the trial, testimony
is being broadcast verbatim to
a nationwide audience. The army's
strong approach to the Dani trial
should considerably relieve the
concern of many of the army's
civilian supporters that General
Suharto, who heads both the army
and the government, is moving too
slowly against Sukarno.
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CHINESE COMMUNIST PRESSURE ON MACAO
Rioting in Macao has subsided, I the Portuguese on 3-4 December and
but the Chinese Communists are keep-
ing up pressure in an apparent ef-
fort to force full acceptance of
their demands.
A Peking broadcast on 6 Decem-
ber accused the Macao Police Com-
mandant of involvement in "savage"
attacks on unarmed students and
teachers who were attempting to
see the Macao governor. The broad-
cast asserted that seven Chinese
demonstrators had been killed by
o
Kong oon
warned that the Macao authorities
would be held responsible for the
"serious consequences" of their
actions.
The demonstrations last week-
end were launched by pro-Chinese
elements in Macao in an effort to
force the newly arrived governor to
yield to their demands for action
against police who suppressed a riot
on 15 November. Macao officials
apparently again used strong-arm
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methods to disperse these demonstra-
tors. However, the governor has
gone most of the way in yielding
to Chinese demands for disciplinary
action, compensation, and apology.
Even so, Peking commentary indicates
that the governor's capitulation
was not sufficiently abject, and
Chinese in Macao on 6 December de-
manded additional concessions, in-
cluding the removal of the chief
of police. An increase in the num-
ber of Chinese gunboats in the Ma-
cao area is also intended by Peking
to convince the Macao authorities
that the Chinese are determined to
obtain complete satisfaction of
their demands.
Despite the hard Chinese stance,
Peking is unlikely to push the Macao
authorities too far at this time,
because of the effect such a move
would have in neighboring Hong Kong.
Business confidence could be shaken,
producing a sharp decline in the
British colony's economic activity
and affecting Peking's foreign ex-
change earnings. Nevertheless, Pe-
king may see an advantage in main-
taining pressure on the Macao author-
ities not only to show the Portuguese
that Macao exists only on Chinese
sufferance but also to remind the
British indirectly that similar in-
cidents could occur in Hong Kong.
PHILIPPINES REASSESSING RELATIONS WITH USSR
The Philippine Government is
reassessing its nonrecognition
policy toward the Soviet Union.
The major proponents for rec-
ognition have for some time been
the small but vocal leftish minor-
ity, whose views are widely and
sympathetically disseminated in
the Manila press. These views ap-
peal to student and intellectual
groups, who are sensitive to in-
sinuations that the Philippines
are still under the American thumb
and who see recognition of the USSR
as a demonstration of Philippine
independence.
tion, he has ordered a review of
the issue and might shift his course,
particularly to further his preten-
sions as an "honest broker" in the
Vietnam conflict.
An expected proposal of recog-
nition by former presidential can-
didate Senator Manglapus should at-
tract substantial support from the
Philippine Congress, especially
from Senate President Tolentino.
Opponents who have been concerned
about the effect of recognition on
Manila's close ties with the US
feel they have been undercut by
trends in US-Soviet relations dur-
ing the past three years.
Since the relaxation last
March of the ban on travel to Com-
munist countries, there have been
several visits to the USSR and Com-
munist China by newsmen and govern-
ment officials. An Izvestia cor-
respondent who was allow weed to visit
the Philippines in August addressed
student groups and was lionized by
the press. These exchanges, plus an
increasing interest in trade, have
helped to stimulate interest in
establishing diplomatic relations.
Although President Marcos con-
tinues publicly to oppose recogni-
There is still considerable
opposition to recognition within
the government, however. Foreign
Secretary Ramos, who is taking an
adamant stand against allowing stu-
dent groups to visit Communist China,
will probably argue against recog-
nition of the USSR. Many other of-
ficials fear that the establishment
of a Soviet mission would allow 25X1
large-scale espionage and subver-
sive activities which the Filipinos
are ill-equipped to control.
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Europe
BRITISH TALKS WITH RHODESIA COLLAPSE
Prime Ministers Wilson and
Smith, after agreeing on a con-
stitutional settlement for Rho-
desia consistent with the com-
promise proposals Wilson has been
making since last June, differed
over who should govern the coun-
try during the interim period of
British sovereignty before legal
independence.
In line with its commitment
to the Commonwealth last Septem-
ber, London now has asked the
United Nations Security Council
for selective, mandatory economic
sanctions against Rhodesia. These,
however, are designed to avoid
confrontation with Rhodesia's
main supplier, South Africa, and
will neither satisfy African gov-
ernments nor have significant im-
pact on Rhodesia.
The key issue is the oil
which Rhodesia receives through
South Africa, and to a lesser ex-
tent through Portuguese Mozam-
bique. Some compromise may be
worked out to include a reference
to oil in the initial sanctions
program, but no action Britain is
willing to back can do more than
temporarily satisfy the Africans.
Prime Minister Smith has of-
fered to let an "impartial, un-
biased" commission look into the
problem, and has asked permission
to address the Security Council.
African Commonwealth members be-
lieve they have Wilson's promise
not to grant independence before
majority rule, once the issue goes
to the United Nations. They will
be alert to any indications that
Wilson might respond to Smith's
proposals and attempt once more
to reach a compromise settlement.
THE SOVIET ECONOMY AT YEAR END
Next week's session of the
Supreme Soviet will meet against
the background of a mixed eco-
nomic performance during 1966.
Excellent results in agriculture
have been offset by the continued
failure of industrial output to
improve on its mediocre perform-
ance of recent years. That basic
problems remain is attested to
most clearly by the continuing
failure of the regime to approve
the 1966-70 plan.
Page 10
Soviet agriculture has been
highlighted this year by a record
grain crop, impressive harvests
of most row crops, and generally
good results in the livestock
sector. Weather contributed in
large part to this satisfactory
state of affairs but a number of
provisions of
the
1965-70
agricul-
tural program
also
clearly
helped
significantly
to raise production.
Foremost among these were the
numerous measures to increase the
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farmers' incentives, a return to
a more rational cropping pattern
and the greater application of
fertilizers and herbicides.
In industry, the increases
in civilian industrial production
through October indicate that
there has been no significant
change from recent lackluster
performance. Investment this
year, moreover, probably will be
unsatisfactory. Data for the
first six months--the latest
available--show that state plan
investments rose only two per-
cent over the first half of 1965,
the lowest increase since the
war. For the same period, the
figures for commissioned fixed
assets and for the volume of
construction respectively were
the same and below performance in
1965.
As 1966 ends the USSR
has slowed down the transfer of
industrial enterprises to the
new system of management and in-
centives, apparently to try to
solve some of the thorny problems
encountered. The movement is
to regain momentum next year,
however, with a number of branches
in the light and food industries
converting in January and several
other sectors of industry follow-
ing suit during 1967.
The basic problem of price
reform is central to the success
of the new system of industrial
operation, and indeed to over-
coming the relative inefficiency
of the Soviet economy. Some
progress has already been made,
but the first important step will
not take place until the second
half of 1967, when new wholesale
prices for heavy industrial prod-
ucts are to go into effect.
A'host of difficulties con-
tinue to plague those concerned
with the pricing problem, among
them the transfer of enterprises
to the new system of management.
Planning on both an annual and a
five-year basis has also been
affected. The latest instruction
requires all appropriate economic
agencies to recast their plans in
terms of their new prices by
May 1967.
The price question is an im-
portant factor in delaying the
final approval of the 1966-70
plan, but the general underlying
cause is the failure of the re-
gime to settle definitively the
pattern of resource allocation
during this period. Industry,
agriculture, defense, space,and
the consumer--claimants for the
various resources--all have per-
suasive cases and powerful de-
fenders, but the economy is not
large enough or growing fast
enough to satisfy them all
equally.
Next week's session of the
Supreme Soviet, accordingly,
will only approve the plan and
the budget for next year, with
final approval of the 1966-70
plan coming sometime late next
spring, according to information
ascribed to the chairman of the
State Planning Committee.
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COSMOS 133 PROBABLY NEW SPACECRAFT FOR MANNED FLIGHT
The launching of the unmanned
satellite Cosmos 133
on 28 November probab y was the
first flight test of a new cap-
sule to be used in the next So-
viet manned space flight.
Since the last Soviet
manned flight in March 1965,
spokesmen for the Soviet manned
space program have indicated
that work was under way on new
spacecraft in the Vostok/Voskhod
weight class as well as on heavier
manned orbital stations.
The launch vehicle used in
the Cosmos 133 operation prob-
ably was the standard SS-6
booster.
Page 12
Cosmos 133 probably is de-
signed for rendezvous and dock-
ing, and is probably fitted for
cosmonaut activity outside the
spacecraft. Neither the original
Vostok capsule nor its improved
version, the Voskhod, were de-
signed for rendezvous and dock-
ing. Additional unmanned flight
testing of the Cosmos 133 type
of spacecraft can be expected be-
fore the Soviets use it in a
manned mission. The develop-
ment of this capsule probably
will contribute to advanced So-
viet space programs such as
manned circumlunar flight and
space stations in earth orbit,
both of which are likely Soviet
space goals for the 1967-1969
period.
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RECENT SOVIET-EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS
Economic matters appear to I Cairo in late October to begin
have been a principal topic of work. In the recent discussions
Egyptian First Vice President Amir's Moscow emphasized Egypt's consid-
recent talks in Moscow. erable potential in the oil indus-
The talks apparently dealt
with adjustments in Soviet eco-
nomic aid deliveries to conform
with changes in Egyptian economic
plans, but the extent to which the
Soviet aid program will be affected
is not yet known. Egypt has been
modifying its development plan
over the past two years. An
earlier review of the plan, un-
dertaken by former prime minister
Muhi al-Din, resulted in the
cancellation or postponement
of about $150 million worth of
Communist aid projects, about $80
million of which were Soviet. Can-
celed projects involving Soviet
aid included the construction of
factories to produce agricultural
machinery, roadbuilding machinery,
electrical instruments, towers for
transmission lines, and a wide-
plate rolling mill, as well as a
contract for the development of
coal mines in the Sinai Peninsula.
A new project, however, was
agreed to in February which pro-
vided for Soviet assistance to the
Egyptian General Petroleum Company
for exploration in the area be-
tween Suez and the Sudanese border.
A Soviet technical team arrived in
try and indicated it would assist
in expanding oil production, thus
augmenting Egypt's export capa-
bilities.
During Amir's visit Moscow
probably repeated the recommenda-
tions for reforming the shaky
Egyptian economy made by a nine-
man Soviet economic planning dele-
gation which visited Cairo in Sep-
tember. The projected visit to
Washington of the Deputy Governor
of the Egyptian Central Bank for
discussions with the IMF suggests
that Moscow also may have re-
peated its advice to Egypt to
reach a compromise with the Fund,
which is its only source for
much-needed hard-currency loans.
According to an Egyptian Em-
bassy official in Moscow, the USSR
offered some relief by agreeing to
meet some of Egypt's wheat needs
next year. No firm commitment was
made on the amount to be supplied,
however, suggesting that Moscow
remains reluctant to replace the 25X1
US as the major supplier of Egypt's
annual 2.5-million-ton import re-
quirement.
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HUNGARIAN PARTY CONGRESS CONCENTRATES POLITICAL POWER
At its recent congress, the
Hungarian Communist Party ratified
decisions of the party high com-
mand to concentrate authority and
to assign First Secretary Kadar's
most capable lieutenants to key
problems. These innovations were
introduced by Kadar to minimize
resistance from conservative party
elements to Kadar's relatively
liberal reform programs, which
were routinely endorsed at the
congress.
Despite frequent references
at the congress to greater party
democracy, fewer officials now
will be responsible for the direc-
tion of party policy. The polit-
buro and secretariat were both
reduced in size, as was the cen-
tral committee, for which the
roster of alternate members was
abolished.
The new central committee
will be a more influential body.
The congress transferred to it
the supervision of the adminis-
tration, finances, and working
plans of the Budapest and county
party committees. The central
auditing committee was abolished,
and responsibility for the finances
of the central committee was given
to the central control committee.
The central committee was also
given the power to convene special
national party conferences pre-
viously held by the membership-at-
large.
"working communities." The group
concerned with "party construc-
tion," that is, administration
and planning, will be headed by
Kadar's heir apparent, Bela Biszku.
HUNGARIAN PARTY HIERARCHY
OLD
Antal Apro
Bela Biszku
Lajos Feher
Jeno Fock
Sandor Gaspar
Janos Kadar
Gyula Kallai
Zoltan Komocsin
Antal Apro
Bela Biszku
Lajos Feher
Jeno Fock
Sandor Gaspar
Janos Kadar
Gyula Kallai
Zoltan Komocsin
Ferenc Munnich
Dezso Nemes
Dezso Nemes
Rezso Nyers
Miklos $omogyi
IstvanSzirmai Istvan Szirmai
Alternate Politburo Members
Miklos Ajtai
Janos Brutyo
Lajos Cseterki
Lajos Czinege
Pal IIku
Bela Biszku
Lojos Cseterki
Zoltan Komocsin
Mihaly Korom
Rezso Nyers
Probably the most important
innovation was the attachment to
the central committee of three
Istvan Szirmai
IstvanSzurdi
Bela Biszku
Lajos Cseterki
Zoltan Komocsin
Rezso Nyers
Arpad Pultoi
SE Cy RE T
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SECRET
The "economics" community will be
led by Rezso Nyers, one of the
architects of Kadar's economic
reform program, and the "coopera-
tive policy" group dealing with
agriculture, by Kadar's long-time
confidant, Lajos Feher.
These personnel changes ele-
vate younger and more effective
adherents of Kadar's "middle
course" policies. Nyers was pro-
moted to full politburo member-
ship, and Arpad Pullai, a young
but experienced official, was
elevated to the secretariat, where
he will continue in party and mass
organizational administration.
No new foreign policy lines
emerged at the congress, although
the party's propaganda chief im-
plicitly criticized Rumania for
its current views regarding an
historic dispute with Hungary,
an unusual development at such a
gathering. This suggests that 25X1
Budapest may become more assertive
on traditional national themes.
Middle East - Africa
SECRET ARMS AGREEMENT STIRS UP GREECE-CYPRUS DISPUTE
The secret procurement of arms
from Czechoslovakia to strengthen
the Cypriot police force has
sparked new tensions between Presi-
dent Makarios and the Greek Govern-
ment.
Preliminary negotiations for
the arms deal were begun last Au-
gust. Most of the weapons and am-
munition, mainly automatic weapons,
mortars, and antitank grenade
launchers, were delivered to the
island in late November.
The Greeks are concerned
that Makarios will use his aug-
mented police units as a defense
force independent of Greek Govern-
ment control, long an aim of the
Cypriot president.
The Greek minister of defense
informed the US ambassador in
Athens that an agreement was
reached whereby the arms would not
be distributed and would be left
in the custody of the Cyprus Na-
tional Guard, which is under the
command of a Greek officer. How-
ever, the Cypriot minister of in-
terior and defense informed the US
ambassador in Nicosia that the gov-
ernment of Cyprus had no intention
of surrendering the weapons to the
national guard.
Even though the Greeks may
emerge with at least temporary
control of the weapons, the arms
deal has reactivated the dispute
between the two governments over
control of Cyprus' defense force.
In addition, the issue is likely
to complicate any discussion of the
Cyprus dispute between the Greek
foreign minister and his Turkish
counterpart during NATO meetings
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Al Qu5aymah`
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SECRET
Tel Avivj
Yafo
25 50 MILES
50 KILOMETERS
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THE SITUATION IN JORDAN
Antiregime sentiment is still
strong in Palestinian west Jordan,
and sporadic demonstrations are
continuing. Syria, by open sup-
port of a Jordanian rebellion
against King Husayn and by infil-
trating saboteurs across the bor-
der, is increasing its attempts
to exploit the unrest.
Palestinian resentment was
fanned again when Husayn ini-
tially approved and then banned
a conference of Palestinian lead-
ers in Jerusalem scheduled for 5
December? He apparently thought
at first that the meeting would
provide an orderly outlet for
Palestinian grievances but can-
celed it upon learning that plans
for a civil disobedience campaign
were to be discussed. The deci-
sion precipitated a protest demon-
stration in Nablus, a focal point
of recent antagonism toward Husayn.
The Cairo-based Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) is
capitalizing on the situation.
After visiting Damascus, PLO
chairman Shuqayri said in Cairo
on 5 December that he had "reached
a joint struggle agreement" with
Syria. His statement suggests
that attempts by Syria, the Syr-
ian-supported Fatah terrorists,
and the PLO to subvert Jordan now
will be better organized and co-
ordinated. Jordanian authorities
intercepted a group of saboteurs
infiltrating from Syria near
Irbid on 30 November.
Syrian agitation against
Husayn included a public offer
on 7 December of armed support
for Jordanian insurgents. Syria's
chief of state, Nur al-Din Atasi,
said "our weapons are available
to those national rebels who
want them."
There was virtually no pros-
pect that Jordan's dispute with
the PLO, Damascus, and Cairo over
whether to station foreign Arab
troops in Jordan, including those
of the PLO, would be resolved at
the Arab Defense Council meeting
in Cairo. The meeting convened
on 7 December ostensibly to dis-
cuss Jordanian defense policy
against Israel. The issue in
reality is whether Husayn, by
permitting the PLO and other for-
eign Arabs to "aid" Jordan, should
acquiesce in further disruption
of order in Palestinian west
Jordan.
Soviet commentary on the
situation has been restrained,
and Moscow apparently would pre-
fer to avoid a major crisis in
Jordan which might precipitate
direct US involvement. Last
week the USSR signed a $1.7-
million contract with Amman for
work on the Khalid Dam project--
the first Soviet contract ever
made with Jordan.
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Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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CONFLICT IN NIGERIA BETWEEN GOWON AND OJUKWU SHARPENS
The rift between Supreme
Commander Gowon and Eastern mili-
tary governor Ojukwu widened last
week as each made a major speech
setting forth sharply divergent
positions on the future of the
Nigerian federation. Neither
would compromise on the basic is-
sue of central government author-
ity, and prospects for an early
agreement or even a meeting be-
tween the two leaders appear dim-
mer than ever.
Ojukwu reiterated the East's
proposal to reduce interregional
ties to the level of a confedera-
tion. He insisted upon stripping
the central government of all but
the most nominal power, leaving
each region free to levy taxes,
control its own army, and even
secede. Ojukwu continued to op-
pose the creation of additional
new states--an essential aspect
of the federal government's plan
to maintain Nigeria as a single
unit.
Gowon flatly rejected Oju-
kwu's proposals. He instead an-
nounced plans to convene a broadly
representative constituent assem-
bly to which he would submit a
draft constitution designed to
create and preserve an "effective
federation" of 8-14 states. Show-
ing more firmness than previously,
Gowon also appeared to commit his
military regime to a wider and
larger role in the effort to re-
build Nigeria. He said he would
continue both the preparation of
the second national development
plan and the campaign to eliminate
corruption.
Eastern leaders reportedly
reacted to Gowon's speech with
shock and disappointment. Ojukwu
told a group of oil representa-
tives on 1 December that the North
wanted to dominate the country,
and the East did not intend to
subordinate itself. He implied
that the oil companies would be
held partly responsible if the
East were invaded by Northern
troops.
Ojukwu's options are clearly
narrowing but he appears unwill-
ing to take any action--such as
secession--at least until the
Eastern provincial administration
now being set up is well estab-
lished. Ojukwu hopes that more
effective local government will
quell minority separatist senti-
ment in the East and enable him
to preserve the region intact.
The regionalization of the
federal army is progressing with
the recruitment of westerners and
midwesterners to replace even-
tually the northern troops in
those regions. A recent clash
between middle-belt and far north-
ern soldiers in one of the bat-
talions stationed in the North,
however, shows how fragile the
army is there. So far the ten-
sion has been confined to the
army, but if continued it could
spill over into the civilian com-
munity.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 9 Dec 66
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INCIDENT SPARKS ANTI-US SENTIMENT IN PANAMA
Panamanian leftists and ul-
tranationalists have joined sen-
sationalist news media in an anti-
US clamor over an incident at the
US-leased Rio Hato training area.
The incident bears the marks
of being contrived by ultrana-
tionalists. On 1 December a Pan-
amanian commercial aircraft made
an "emergency" landing at the Rio
Hato Airfield some 70 miles south-
west of Panama City. The pilot,
who recently had made a similar
landing at Rio Hato, refused to
divulge his flight plans or pas-
senger list as required by US mil-
itary regulations and Panamanian
law. He asserted that he was on
Panamanian territory and there-
fore not responsible to US per-
sonnel. After a check with the
National Guard and local civil
air authorities the aircraft was
allowed to proceed.
was Arnulfo Arias' Panamenista
Party mouthpiece Radio Aeropuerto,
which broadcast a balanced ac-
count of the incident.
Several National Assembly
deputies, including one from Pres-
ident Robles' Liberal Party, de-
nounced the US from the assembly
floor and the foreign relations
committee chairman erroneously
announced that Eleta had delivered
an oral protest to the US ambas-
sador.
On 6 December Eleta issued
a note which, although not offi-
cially a "protest," asserted com-
plete Panamanian sovereignty over
the Rio Hato area and stated that
when US forces there are faced
with the necessity of having an
authority intervene, they must
summon the National Guard or Pan-
amanian civil authorities.
News media in Panama City,
owned or controlled by the oli-
garchy, gave wide and emotional
coverage to the incident and
called on Foreign Minister Eleta
to protest the "affront" to Pan-
amanian sovereignty. Finance
Minister Samudio's newspaper
stated that the affair was part
of a 60-year "cold war" between
the US and Panama and charged
that the Rio Hato training area
was being converted into an ex-
tension of the Canal Zone.
The US Embassy and military
officials issued clarifying state-
ments but neither government dep-
uties nor news media retracted
inaccuracies. The only exception
The Rio Hato affair typifies
the use of many minor incidents
by politicians of the Panamanian
oligarchy to divert popular re-
sentment away from themselves
and against the US. As campaign-
ing for the 1968 elections ap-
proaches and pressures for a canal
settlement increase, it will be-
come increasingly difficult for
politicians to take a rational po-
sition on US-Panama relations. The
base rights and status of forces
agreement has been one of the most
difficult aspects of the canal
treaty settlement the US is try-
ing to negotiate with Panama and
this latest incident is likely to
add further complications. 25X1
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ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT MEETS OPPOSITION ON RAILROAD REFORM
President Ongania's reported
softening of the railroad reform
decree before he signed it on
2 December may reflect pressure
of military leaders on the govern-
ment to be more flexible in deal-
ing with organized labor.
Ongania has insisted on
going ahead with reorganizing the
railroads even though the govern-
ment has not settled the situa-
tion in the nation's ports. Dock
workers have been on strike since
the end of October. Labor Secre-
tary Rubens San Sebastian and
leaders of the railroad unions
and the General Confederation of
Labor (CGT) have been meeting
frequently in an effort to come
to some agreement over the new
work rules for railroad workers
and the possible massive dismiss-
als of surplus railroad employ-
ees.
Union leaders have condemned
the government's plan as exces-
sively harsh and antilabor
Both 25X1
government and labor seem anxious
to avoid a major confrontation
over the issue, but some kind of
railroad strike seems inevitable.
Pressure from member unions has
already forced the CGT to call
a 24-hour general strike for
14 December. This strike is
specifically to protest the gov-
ernment's measures against the
dock workers' union, but will
also be an expression of opposi-
tion to the government's over-
all policy toward labor.
Ongania has named General
Julio Alsogaray, an ambitious
and influential officer, to re-
place General Pistarini as com-
mander in chief of the army.
With Alsogaray as its spokesman,
the military are likely to sup-
port moderate government poli-
cies, especially in labor reform.
Pistarini requested retirement
after a disagreement with Ongania
over the forced retirement of an
army corps commander.
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INTRIGUES OF DOMINICAN PRESIDENT'S MILITARY AIDE-
The activities of Dominican
President Joaquin Balaguer's
military aide, Colonel Neit Nivar
Seijas, are threatening to under-
mine Balaguer's relations with
important elements.in the mili-
tary. Nivar's intrigues could
also build up his personal power
base and might draw either the
President or Nivar's adversaries
into a rash move that could in
turn provoke renewed political
turmoil.
Nivar's recent activities ap-
pear to be the culmination of a
long campaign to discredit his
enemies and to build up his own
personal power. He seems to be
using his position as Balaguer's
key military and intelligence
adviser to pass to the President
reports
of antigovern-
ment plotting by a civilian-mili-
tary group headed by Antonio Im-
bert and former General Wessin.
Balaguer, however, appeared to
play down Nivar's.reports in a 5
December radiobroadcast. He
stated that allegations of anti-
government plotting were only ru-
mors and attributed them to the
efforts of "well-known Communists"
to create an atmosphere of uncer-
tainty and unrest.
Nivar has portrayed his ac-
tivities as being only in the
interest of Balaguer, but they
appear to serve his own ambitions.
Nivar has an inflated ego and he
has given one US Embassy officer
the impression that he believes
that with sufficient power he
could correct all that plagues
the country. Nivar recently
sought to improve his relations
with the embassy and may be seek-
ing US support for his ambitions.
In addition, Nivar has cultivated
key military officers and has
sought to advance his own mili-
tary followers to key posts.
Balaguer appears to appreci-
ate Nivar's past aid and to place
considerable faith in his loyalty.
Although the President is prob-
ably aware of the animosity his
aide has aroused in the regular
military, he has not taken signif-
icant steps to curb him.
If the President replaces
security force leaders with of-
ficers linked with Nivar it would
greatly increase Nivar's power
and to some extent free him from
his present dependence on Bala-
guer. In any event, Nivar's con-
tinued influence on Balaguer is
sure to lead to decreased confi-
dence in Balaguer by both moder-
ate and right-wing military of-
ficers.
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LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS REACTING AGAINST UNIVERSITY STUDENTS
Some of the most democratic
Latin American governments have
taken firm steps, in some ways
comparable to those of the military
regimes in Argentina and Brazil, to
deal with troublesome student demon-
strations. One result has been a
setback to the concept of university
autonomy, under which the universi-
ties have provided a haven for ex-
tremist student agitators.
In October, President Diaz
Ordaz of Mexico ordered army occupa-
tion of Michoacan University after
the identification of agitators
trained in Communist bloc countries
pointed up Communist involvement in
student disturbances. Over the past
year, Mexico has experienced a se-
ries of student riots at various
universities, incited or exploited
by Communists.
Faced with the threat of a stu-
dent strike in September, Colombia's
President Lleras decreed penalties
for students missing classes because
of political activity. On 24 Octo-
ber, students organized a minor
riot during Lleras' visit to the
National University of Bogota. To
quell the disturbances, army troops
violated university autonomy and ar-
rested about 50 of the trouble-
makers. Lleras quickly issued a
series of antisubversive decrees,
including a ban on travel to Cuba.
He affirmed the right of government
authorities to enter the university
grounds.
In late November, Guatemalan
President Mendez privately warned
leaders of the leftist-dominated
student association that he would
crack down on students involved. in
subversive actions. The government
Page 23
subsequently arrested several per-
sons involved in illegal activity
after evidence of Communist involve-
ment was discovered in the home of
a student leader. Mendez, while
professing that he had no intention
of interfering with university au-
tonomy, said he would not allow
rebel student groups to operate with
impunity.
Extremist students in Peru were
arrested in November following vio-
lence at Cajamarca University. Uni-
versity authorities closed Lima's
prestigious Agrarian University
when irresponsible elements sparked
a strike demanding student control
over faculty appointments.
A student strike in October
at Chile's University of Concepcion
precipitated an ultimatum by the
rector closing the university and
suspending student privileges. Stu-
dent disturbances in Panama have led
to a government crack down on sub-
versive elements and discussion. of
revoking the university's autonomy.
Recent events affecting uni-
versity immunity have their roots
for the most part in the domestic
political problems of the countries
concerned. The growing propensity to
confront the students with force,
however, could be a reaction to
Cuba's efforts to dominate the stu-
dent movement in the southern hemi-
sphere. Although there is no evi-
dence to link the recently created
Latin American Students' Continental
Organization (OCLAE) directly with
increased student agitation and vio-
lence, the existence of the Havana-
based OCLAE serves as a psychologi-
cal stimulus for heightened extrem-
ist political activity.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 Dec 66
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SECRET
ECUADOREAN MILITARY REACTION TO CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DECISIONS
A resolution of the consti-
tuent assembly stripping members
of the former military junta of
their rights as citizens for three
years did not draw any violent
reaction from the military. Pro-
motions, pay, and other issues of
vital interest to the military,
however, may give the military
additional cause for unrest when
the assembly discusses them.
The constituent assembly,
which has been acting in a con-
fused and irresponsible manner
since its opening session on
16 November, may take further
action which will harass the mil-
itary into defending itself. The
US Embassy believes a "whole gal-
axy" of issues could threaten
political stability and Ecuadorean
relations with the US. The em-
bassy cites as examples attacks
on the junta for abandoning Ecua-
dor's claim of a 200-mile limit
for territorial waters, the as-
sembly's review. of the govern-
ment's 1967 budget, and planned
investigations of "foreign" in-
terests in Ecuador.
The prestige of the military
has reached a low point because
of the failure of the former mil-
itary junta to bring notable
gains to Ecuador during its 20
months in power, and because of
the subsequent unceremonious dump-
ing of the junta. The consequent
low morale militates against the
military taking strong action as
an institution, but continued
goading by the assembly could lead
the military to strike. back in
frustration.
The military may also seek
to turn the flare-up of the per-
ennial border problem with Peru
to its advantage by picturing
Peru's alleged border violations
as a serious threat and pointing
out the importance of the army
as defender of the national ter-
.
ritory
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StLRL I
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