ASSESSMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY AND ARMS NEEDS

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• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Assessment of Latin American Military and Arms Needs
Secret
23 December 1966
No. 0320/66A
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ASSESSMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY AND ARMS NEEDS*
Latin American armed forces consistently get
only a small portion of the resources available
within their countries yet are responsible, in ad-
dition to defense, for a host of functions normally
handled in other countries by civilian entities.
Because of rapid technological advancements in air-
craft, communications systems, and ground weapons,
these countries find themselves hard pressed to
maintain their capability for national defense and
internal security while keeping their defense budgets
to proportionately low levels.
Recent and prospective purchases of expensive
military equipment by several Latin American coun-
tries have led to talk of an "arms race" and criti-
cism of the governments involved for spending money
on armament that should be going toward houses,
schools, and roads. In fact, the countries now
buying modern equipment for their armed services
are doing so within normal budgetary limits. They
are trying to replace antiquated equipment that is
costly to maintain and unsafe to operate. There is
no evidence that any Latin American country is in-
volving itself in a genuine arms race with its
neighbors for either hostile or deterrent purposes.
There has been no international military conflict
in Latin America since the conclusion of the Chaco
War between Paraguay and Bolivia in 1935, and none
appears likely.
Historical Background
After winning their coun-
tries' independence from the Euro-
pean powers in the 19th century,
the armed forces of the Latin
American nations became a major
force in internal politics, along
with the church and the landed
oligarchy. Several major armed
conflicts involving the South
American nations, countless
border disputes, the threat of
interference in their affairs from
*ExcZuded from this discussion are Cuba, because of its dependence
on the USSR for its arms; the English-speaking new nations of the
hemisphere, which are stiZZ largely under the military protection of
Great Britain; Costa Rica, which has no military forces; and Haiti,
whose general economic and political situation is no Longer comparable
to that of the other republics.
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Chilean soldiers wearing old
German-style helmets
Ecuadorean army tank
*Irra7ilan Air Force B-17s in Recife
Argentine destroyer (vintage 1943)
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Europe, and the needs of internal
security gave the military an im-
portance that led to pressure for
well-trained and well-equipped
professional armies and navies,
instead of politically oriented
forces. The trend toward pro-
fessionalism in the latter half
of the 19th century inspired many
countries to look toward Europe
and the traditional great mili-
tary powers for equipment and for
training.
After World War II, in which
only Brazil and Mexico of the
countries south of the border had
forces actively involved, the na-
tions of the area turned to the
United States for assistance and
arms. Spurred by the signing of
the Inter-American Treaty of Re-
ciprocal Assistance in Rio de
Janeiro in 1947, the policy of
cooperative hemispheric defense
became the basis for equipping
many of the armed services with
more modern ships, planes, tanks,
and guns. In 1960, new emphasis
was placed on strengthening in-
ternal security against a growing
threat of guerrilla warfare.
Civic action was.also emphasized,
designed to assist in national
development as, well as to stem
the military's continuing in-
volvement in politics.
Professionalization and
Modernization
The military services in the
major countries have achieved
their relatively high level of
professionalism through the es-
tablishment of military academies
and technical schools. These
give as fine an education as is
available in the best civilian
schools and often a better educa-
tion than the average university
graduate receives. Academy-
trained officers are frequently
able to obtain further schooling
in the US or in the special pro-
grams in the Canal Zone, and oc-
casionally attend schools in Euro-
pean countries. Argentina, Bra-
zil, and Chile have achieved a
professional level sufficiently
high to enable them to send mili-
tary missions to some of the
smaller countries.
The Latin American profes-
sional military men who have had
this training and who are familiar
with the latest developments in
military technology are interested
in seeing their own services
adapt to the new techniques and
equipment. The prestige of their
nation's military is also im-
portant, especially in relations
with other Latin American mili-
tary forces in combined exercises.
As evidence of a danger to their
prestige, the officers point to
the supersonic planes, missiles,
and other advanced weapons pos-
sessed by African and Asian
nations which they consider far
less developed than their own.
The military uniform is no
longer a guarantee of advanced
social standing, and a military
career is becoming increasingly
less attractive because of low
pay and poor living conditions
in certain areas. Today's pro-
fessional officer sees moderni-
zation as the only effective way
to continue to attract young and
capable people to a military
career.
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Most Latin American armies
are using World War II equipment
which is still serviceable, es-
pecially rifles, machine guns,
and similar small arms. Parts
and ammunition are no problem for
the smaller weapons. The Latin
American armies are not seeking
highly sophisticated electronic
equipment, advanced missiles, or
large field weapons, and there
seems little likelihood that they
will be interested in buying
such equipment. Transport of
troops and supplies is a problem,
however, and they will probably
become increasingly interested
in the uses of helicopters and
Light aircraft of the type em-
ployed by United States forces in
Vietnam. A demand is also de-
veloping for newer tanks and mil-
itary vehicles, since the older
models in most inventories can
no longer be maintained except
by cannibalizing vehicles or by
paying outrageous prices to pri-
vate suppliers for spare parts.
Several Latin nations have
submarines and cruisers as well
as destroyers in their navies.
Argentina and Brazil also have
small aircraft carriers. Some
ships, including the carriers,
and some cruisers and destroyers,
were bought from Europe, while
others were purchased or are on
loan from the US. 41though the
carriers and cruisers are pres-
tigious flagships, especially in
inter-American maneuvers, they
are quite old, expensive to oper-
ate, and hard to maintain. These
countries also want improved com-
munications and navigation equip-
ment to support their naval
forces.
It is in the re-equipping of
the air forces that the latest
fears of an arms race have been
triggered. Most Latin American
air forces are flying jet fighters
and trainers developed at the end
of World War II or before the
Korean war, such as the US F-80
and F-86 and the British Meteor.
Latin America's rugged mountains
and extreme altitudes limit both
the kinds of aircraft that can be
used and the useful loads they
can carry. Some countries have
modern turboprop transports, but
the work-horse C-47 and C-54 of
World War II fame are still their
mainstays.
Only a few countries have
acquired any aerial attack capa-
bility and they use such aircraft
as the British Canberra (US B-57),
the older B-26, and the ancient
B-17 for reconnaissance, air-sea
rescue, and training. Many of
their so-called modern jets, such
as the F-86 and the Meteor, have
been grounded for periods of up
to a year because their advanced
age requires extensive repair
of their wings before they can
again be safely flown. Other
older propeller planes are used
mostly for parts to keep a few
aircraft serviceable.
The air forces have been
hardest hit in the matter of
equipment obsolescence because
of the rapid advancements in
aircraft technology. The nations
looking for new aircraft want
to be sure their purchases will
not become museum pieces before
they are used.
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Defense Equipment and the
Lcono m
Military purchases from
European suppliers prior to World
War II were haphazard at best,
resulting in a lack of standard-
ization. An army could have
French guns, Czech rifles, Italian
tanks, and British trucks. There
was little effort made to do more
than manufacture some small arms
and ammunition at home.
Many of the Latin American
countries used foreign exchange
reserves built up during World
War II to finance the moderniza-
tion of their services. This
modernization reflected the pol-
icy implications of the 1947
Inter-American Defense Pact and
the emphasis on standardization
provided by the US military as-
sistance program (MAP).
Since the initial re-equip-
ping of the Latin American mili-
tary forces after the war, de-
fense spending by these nations
has remained at a low and fairly
constant level. Defense budgets
form about 13 percent of the to-
tal national budgets for 17 coun-
tries (see table). Such expend-
itures for the most part are
LATIN AMERICAN DEFENSE SPENDING
1966 Est. of Defense
Expenditures
1964
1965
1966*
Argentina
15
12
13
2.0
1.5
1.6
220
Bolivia
10
15
13
1.2
1.7
1.4
12
Rrazi 1
16
16
18
4.0
3.0
4.0
576
Chile
10
11
11
2.0
2.5
2.4
158
Colombia
14
14
14
0.9
0.9
0n8
48
Dominican Republic
22
24
22
5.1
4.7
4.7
40
Ecuador
9
10
10
2.0
2.0
2.0
25
1:l Salvador
11
10
8
1.2
1.3
1.1
10
Guatemala
9
8
9
0.9
1?0
1.0
14
Honduras
10
10
9
1.3
1.2
1.2
7
Mexico
10
10
10
0.7
0.7
0.7
155
Ni carogua
10
9
10
1.1*
1.1
1.4
9
Panama
7
7
5
1.0
1.0
0,8
5
Paraguay
28
24
26
2.5
2.6
3.5
16
Peru
20
17
16
3.4
3.8
3.3
118
Uruguay
10
8
8
1.7
1.5
1.4
14
Venezuela
10
10
10
2.6
2.2
2,2
174
17 Republics
13
13
13
2.0
1.9
1.9
1,601
* Estimated
**Fffective exchange rates used to derive dollar values.
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CONFIDENTIAL
65080 12-66 CIA
SPECIAL REPORT 23 Dec 66
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equivalent to only about two
percent of their gross national
product. The percentages of
budget and gross national product
vary widely from country to coun-
try, according to the level of
sociopolitical development in
each country. Generally, however,
a growing emphasis in the hemi-
sphere on spending for social and
economic development programs
has constrained military expend-
itures. Severe balance-of-pay-
ments problems in most countries,
moreover, have contributed to the
reluctance to buy advanced weapons
systems that require large foreign
exchange expenditures.
It must also be noted that
most armed forces budgets include
a host of expenditures that are
for nonmilitary purposes. These
cover such functions as air traf-
fic control, mail delivery, health
services, housing and road con-
struction, communications, and
operation of airline services.
For example, 30 percent of the
budget of the Brazilian Air Force
is devoted to items that would be
handled by civilian agencies in
the US. The military budget
figures often also include the
cost of maintaining the national
police forces.
The Current Quest for Arms
The concentration of arms
purchases concluded recently by
several Latin American countries
has given the impression that
there has been a sudden upsurge
in this activity. Actually,
these purchases have been pro-
vided for in the budgets of the
nations involved. In some cases
they represent the culmination
of up to two years of negotiations
and shopping. They do not sig-
nify an increase in defense spend-
ing as a percent of national
budgets, and there is no indica-
tion at present that any increase
is contemplated by the nations
involved in seeking further new
equipment.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Peru, and Venezuela have all ex-
pressed interest in purchasing
the US-built F-5 supersonic
"Freedom Fighter," a twin-jet
tactical aircraft that can be
used in a variety of roles. The
F-5 is already being supplied to
a number of African and Asian
countries. When the US decided
to postpone sales of the F-5 to
Latin America, Argentina agreed
to accept the older and slower
A-4B, since it could get this
model at an attractive price.
However, the demands of the war
in Vietnam prevented further sales
of the A-4B, and the other na-
tions which wanted the newer
planes were offered only the
venerable F-86. Therefore, Chile
turned to Great Britain for
Hawker Hunters, an aircraft simi-
lar to the A-4B, but far more
expensive. Brazil, on the other
hand, asked the US for jet train-
ers, apparently with the idea of
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either waiting for the time when
the F-5 finally is made available,
or eventually looking to Europe
for tactical planes. Peru's Air
Force leaders have rejected of-
fers of the F-86, saying that it
would be like buying a "Model-T
Ford," but they have been unable
to find a satisfactory substitute
that they can afford (see Table).
These same countries have
been less insistent on buying
newer ships for their navies.
Argentina's Admiral Varela has
been most vigorous in trying to
improve his fleet, some elements
of which were built before World
War II. Argentina would like to
revamp its carrier to launch
modern jets and there were rumors
earlier this year that Chile would
also like to have a carrier. It
appears, however, that the great-
est demand will be for newer de-
stroyers and smaller ships, which
are more practical and easier and
cheaper to operate than the larger
vessels. Although there has been
a good deal of shopping, there
have been no recent purchases of
major ships by any of the coun-
tries mentioned.
Attitudes Toward an Arms
Limitation Agreement
The governments of the coun-
tries currently buying new mili-
tary equipment have generally ex-
pressed surprise and consternation
that they would be accused of en-
tering an "arms race." Several
of these same governments have
CURRENT STATUS OF JET AIRCRAFT PURCHASES
Argentina US A48 subsonic 24 (12 delivered 8.5 million Grounded F-86 and
fighter-bombers Nov. 1966 ) Meteor jets
Brazi I Negotiating for
US T-37 subsonic jet
trainers 30 7.5 million Antiquated T-6
propellor trainers
Chile British Hawker 21
Hunter subsonic
jet interceptors
Looking for sub- or
supersonic fighters
Venezuela US F-86K subsonic 74 (28 for
fighters (purchased parts)
from W. Germany)
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20 million F-80, T-33 jets
F-80 and F-86
jets
2 million Older British and
US jets
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indicated their interest in discuss-
ing an arms limitation agreement
among the Latin American nations
and have suggested that it might
be a valuable subject for discus-
sion at the proposed summit con-
ference of Western Hemisphere
chiefs of state, which may be
held next spring.
The government leaders of the
major countries generally agree
that there is no arms race, and
that they are not buying arms
with money that should be di-
verted toward nonmilitary devel-
opment. Nevertheless, they tend
to be critical of each other's
arms agreements. Also, the
presidents of some of the smaller
countries, who are not under
pressure for modernization, have
been severely critical of the
larger countries for buying
arms. Thus, there is a good pos-
sibility that some general state-
ment on arms limitations, if
brought up at the summit meeting,
would be approved. Such a ban
might cover heavy weapons, nu-
clear armaments, bombers, and
missiles, which would be of lit-
tle use to the nations involved.
Conclusion
Although there is no arms
race among Latin American nations
and there is little likelihood
that there will be one, especially
if the MAP program is maintained,
these countries will continue to
seek new equipment. In order
to maintain their capability for
national defense and internal
security, the Latin American
republics must consider the re-
placement of aging machinery,
the development of new techniques
and training, and the capabili-
ties of neighboring countries in
planning for the future.
The countries which are un-
able to buy new equipment under
the US MAP program can be ex-
pected to turn toward European
suppliers or even Japan. Although
the European suppliers agree gen-
erally that excessive defense
spending would be a mistake in
Latin America, they will, for
financial reasons (Great Britain)
or in an attempt to expand their
influence (France), continue to
try to sell their planes, tanks,
and ships. There seems little
chance that the Latin countries
will ever really be interested in
obtaining arms from Communist bloc
nations since most Latin govern-
ments are strongly anti-Communist.
(CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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