WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
On file Department of Commerce release
instructions apply.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
50
13 January 1967
No. 0272/67
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,% SECRE'T' % of
(Information as of noon EST, 12 January 1967)
Page
1
VIETNAM
3
Although
contact
the Viet Cong continued to
with allied operations last
avoid
week,
significant
they con-
ducted a damaging mortar attack against a principal
US Army helicopter base and sharply increased attacks
against both regular and paramilitary South Vietnamese
forces. North of Saigon, US forces have fielded the
largest allied task force of the war against a strong
Viet Cong base area. Premier Ky has publicly softened
his attitude toward a negotiated settlement
several delta province chiefs and possibly Defense
Minister Co, one of the few southern generals still in
high military positions.
THE CRISIS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Significant breakdowns in transportation services and
public security have taken place in some areas. There
are indications that the shaky leadership coalition
is falling apart, and that the loyalty of some im-
portant military figures is in question.
CHINESE COMMUNIST DIPLOMATS ORDERED HOME
The most likely explanation of the recall of an un-
precedented number of overseas personnel is that they
are being pulled back for screening and reindoctrina-
tion as part of the "cultural revolution."
SUKARNO STATEMENT FAILS TO SATISFY OPPONENTS
The Indonesian President's 10 January statement con-
cerning his role in the antiarmy action of October
1965 will not satisfy the Suharto regime and will in
tensify demands for his ouster. However, General Su-
harto will probably continue with deliberation and
rely on constitutional means despite expected in-
creased pressures from anti-Sukarno activists.
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CURRENT DEVELC.PMENTS IN LAOS
If Prime N..inister Souvanna Phouma's gains from the 1
January National Assembly elections are to last, he
will need to continue good relations with key re-
gional commanders. The Communists, meanwhile, have
apparently launched their annual campaign to clear
government forces from northern Laos.
Europe
SOVIET LEADER CONDUCT NATIONWIDE BRIEFINGS OF
PARTY WORKERS
The briefings, by virtually all of the highest party
leaders, are meant to bring home to the party's work-
ing level the leadership's concern over events in
China and to put on record a broad affirmation of sup-
port for the Kremlin's policies.
LUNAR PROBES I:IGHLIGHT SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHINGS IN 1966
The Soviets made five successful probes, their first
since 1955.. They put no men in space but tested a
new capsule that may be used for manned space flights
this year. Their programs for military reconnais-
sance, con.munications, and. weather satellites con-
tinued.
SOVIET NAVAL IXPORTS TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The USSR Exported a large number of naval craft in
1966 and c:.eliveries are expected to remain high this
year. ThEy will include more OSA-class guided-mis-
sile patrc,l boats, first exported to non-Communist
countries in 1966, and possibly the initial delivery
of F-class submarines.
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WEST GERMANY SEEKS FORMAL TIES WITH EASTERN EUROPE
Rumania is the most likely country to go along with
the German initiative, but Bonn is also sounding out
the Czechs and the Hungarians.
Middle East - Africa
ISRAEL WARNS SYRIA ON BORDER FIRING
A series of incidents has led to a tank duel. Israe-
li officials speak of the mounting gravity of the
situation, and the Syrians appear to be bracing them-
selves for an attack.
ELECTION CAMPAIGN UNDER WAY IN INDIA
Present prospects are that the voting from 15 to 21
February will reduce the ruling Congress Party's
majority in the national parliament. The campaigning
has begun in a period of unusual social and political
turmoil.
NIGERIAN RULERS MEET IN GHANA
The first meeting since the July coup of all key
leaders of the military regime has at least tempo-
rarily checked Nigeria's long drift toward fragmenta-
tion, but disagreement continues on basic issues.
UNION MINIERE TAKES HARD LINE IN DISPUTE WITH CONGO
The company does not seem interested in rescuing the
Congolese from a potentially disastrous economic cri-
sis, which could stir political unrest.
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Western Hemisphere
CHILEAN OPPOSITION PARTY IMPROVES POSITION
The Socialist Party, which takes a more extreme line
than its Communist coalition partners, has put its
leader, Salvador Allende, into the Senate presidency,
thereby erhancing the party's political standing and
enabling it to harass the Frei administration and to
delay parts of the government's reform program.
ACHIEVEMENTS C:F CHILE'S CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
In two years in office President Eduardo Frei--despite
opposition from both left and right--has put through
laws enabling him to begin social reforms, sign agree-
ments for government participation in Chile's all-im-
portant ccpper industry, and make some progress in eco-
nomic stabilization. He early attempted to stake out
an "independent" position in international affairs
which brought differences with the US on some issues,
although Chilean-US cooperation has since increased.
During his visit to Washington next month Frei will
probably concentrate on a general improvement in US-
Chilean understanding. (Published separately as Spe-
cial Report OCI No. 0272/67A)
GUYANA'S COALITION GOVERNMENT FALTERS
The coalition leaders appear to be trying to patch up
their current differences, but even if they reach an
agreement other problems are sure to threaten the
coalition in the future.
DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS WITH OPPOSITION
DETERIORATE
Radical elements in control of the left-of-center Do-
minican Revolutionary Party are militantly attacking
the Balaguer government for "neo-Trujillo" policies.
Meanwhile, prospects for a rapprochement between dif-
fering factions in the party are dim.
NO CLEAR VICTORY IN BAHAMAS ELECTIONS
The standoff in the legislature will make it difficult
to form a new government and possibly necessitate new
elections. A period of general economic and political
confusion could result.
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FAR EAST
Events in the fast-moving drama in China last week were
highlighted by the first significant and widespread breakdown
in public order and by mounting indications of divided loyal-
ties in the army. Official Chinese Communist media disclosed
that strikes and violence occurred in at least ten major cities.
These clashes between Maoist Red Guards and workers apparently
were precipitated by the Mao-Lin faction's recent decision to
launch a drive for final victory in an effort to destroy op-
ponents in the party apparatus who control the urban proletariat.
The gravity and scope of this resistance to Mao and Lin Piao
was also reflected in posters asserting that the nation's police
and security troops under the Ministry of Public Security have
opposed the "cultural revolution" and that they have been trans-
ferred to army control. The unity and reliability of the army
itself, however, has been called into question by attacks on sev-
eral major military figures, including a vice minister of national
defense. According to Red Guard posters, public security forces
supported by the army were used against pro-Mao Red Guards in Nan-
king. The situation created by this growing resistance to the Mao-
Lin faction could well develop into something even more violent.
Although Hanoi has maintained a prudent silence on develop-
ments in China, the North Vietnamese leaders almost certainly are
gravely concerned about the possible implications of disarray in
China for their ability to prosecute the war. Hanoi's sensitivity
to any suggestion of a decline in its will to persist in the war
reflected in a terse statement denying, in effect, that Premier
Pharn Van Dong's statements to Harrison Salisbury implied a soften-
ing in North Vietnam's terms for a settlement.
Communist forces in South Vietnam continued to avoid contact
with major allied operations, but there has been a sharp increase
in attacks on South Vietnamese troops and outposts.
In Laos the 1 January National Assembly elections produced
the expected heavy majority of deputies pledged to support Prime
Minister Souvanna, and Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces
have launched their annual campaign to clear government guerrillas
from northern Laos. In Indonesia, an evasive statement by Sukarno
on his role in the abortive coup in October 1965 will probably in-
SECRET
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Aw SECRET
C H I
.?r LI ~L Lao Cai
~.~ NORTH Lang So
VI ETNAM
Yen Bai .r:
Fzsel'hong
HANOI
Panh Hoa
THAILAND
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MILES
12 JANUARY
The Indochina -South China Area
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Pleiku
SOUTH1
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CAPITAI.
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SECRET
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MAGAG H11NG KONG
(Part.) (U.K.)
AN N
GIANG C D
PHUOC
TUY
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BON
DUC
BINH
Hollowa
DINH
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VINH
RI-.IH
QUANG
TRI
QUANG
NGAI
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PHU
YEN
HOA
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VIETNAM
Communist forces this week
sharply accelerated the scale
and intensity of military activ-
ity against vulnerable South Viet-
namese paramilitary targets. At
the same time, however, enemy
main force units continued to
avoid major contact with large-
scale allied search-and-destroy
operations.
One battalion-sized and at
least seven company-sized attacks
were launched by Viet Cong/North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) units
against South Vietnamese Regional
and Popular Forces outposts and
patrols in widespread sections
of the country. Cumulative losses
to government irregulars in these
actions included 102 killed, 77
wounded, and 56 missing.
In addition company-strength
enemy strike forces mounted four
heavy assaults against battalion-
sized or smaller troop forma-
tions of the South Vietnamese
Army (ARVN) in Kien Hoa and Quang
Nam provinces, resulting in more
than 100 friendly casualties.
Enemy-initiated operations
against US forces were highlighted
by a damaging attack on 7 Janu-
ary against one of the US Army's
principal helicopter bases in the
central highlands, Camp Holloway,
near Pleiku. Under cover of a
45-minute mortar bombardment,
elements tentatively identified
as subordinate to the Viet Cong
407th Sapper Battalion penetrated
the camp's defensive perimeter,
placing satchel charges against
numerous parked aircraft and sup-
ply installations. Postaction
reports placed friendly losses at
12 killed (6 US), 63 wounded (61
US), and 34 aircraft damaged.
The Communists continued to
harass Camp Holloway with mortar
and small-arms fire for three
more days (8-10 January), but
failed to inflict significant
casualties or damage.
The most important allied
military activity in South Viet-
nam during the week was the in-
itiation on 7 January of a major
ground offensive, Operation
CEDAR FALLS, 20 to 30 miles north
of Saigon in Binh Duong Province.
The largest allied task force
ever fielded in the Vietnam war
has been committed to this
sector--twenty US and three ARVN
battalions together with heavy
artillery support.
The operation is targeted
against the Viet Cong base area
known as the Iron Triangle, a
60-square-mile region of aban-
doned rubber plantations, vil-
lages, and jungle which has been
under firm Communist control for
years. The over-all allied ob-
jective is to neutralize Commu-
nist presence and influence in
the Iron Triangle area by relo-
cating an estimated 10,000
civilian inhabitants to areas
under GVN control, disrupting
the local Viet Cong organiza-
tion, and denying the enemy
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future use of this area as a
staging base for nilitary and
political operatiDns against tar-
oets in and near Saigon.
By 12 Januar ,r, CEDAR FALLS
had resulted in e:iemy losses of
1.89 'killed, 40 ca-:)tured, 256 sus-
pects detained, aid 205 weapons
seized. In addition, vast supply
caches of war materiel and food-
stuffs had been captured or de-
stroyed by allied sweep forces.
Casualties to US :orceshave thus
far been moderate---20 killed and
102 wounded.
UB combat forces operating
for the first timE! in the Mekong
F). lta had little success in find-
a_:ag elusive Viet C ong units.
)pear.headed by onE US Marine bat-
LL,zlion, a three-bz ttalion US/
7.ietnamese Marine task force has
continued to press Operation
DECKHOUSE V in sortheastern
coastal Kien Hoa province with-
out significant eremy contact.
Politics in Saigon
Premier Ky and his close sup-
porters have been juggling sev-
eral sensitive issues
Ky twice last week made im-
promptu public remarks on the
possibility of negotiating a
peaceful settlement with North
Vietnam. This marks an apparent
easing of the South Vietnamese
military regime's previously
rigid stand against talks and
its increased confidence in the
strength of its position vis-a-
vis the Communists.
Ky is planning a good will
visit to Australia and New Zeal-
and next week, although there has
been a volley of criticism within
both countries over the visit.
The Ky government is also
apparently receptive to a resump-
tion of diplomatic ties with In-
donesia
On the domestic front, Ky
has reportedly sanctioned the
replacement of several province
chiefs in IV Corps in addition
to the two who have already been
dismissed. Such wholesale
changes would almost certainly
represent a coordinated effort
by Ky and Chief of State Thieu
to strengthen the government's
hand in the delta. The moves
come at a time when Ky is said,
once again, to be considering
the removal of Defense Minister
Co, one of few southern generals
left in high military positions.
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As the assembly moves closer
to agreement on a constitution,
prospective candidates for the
office of president of South Viet-
nam are beginning to assess their
chances of being elected. On the
civilian side, the front runners
at this point appear to be tradi-
tional favorites such as Phan
Khac Suu, president of the Con-
stituent Assembly, and Tran Van
Huong, a former premier and re-
spected southerner.
Thieu are the obvious front run-
ners, although neither has openly
Among the military, Prime
Minister Ky and Chief of State
Meanwhile various inactive
military men such as retired
southern general Tran Van Don
and former I Corps commander Ngu-
yen Chanh Thi, currently exiled
to the United States, have
thrown their hats in the ring be-
hind the scenes.
The presidential elections,
presently envisaged by the assem-
bly to take place soon after mid-
1967, may open up a political
Pandora's box as the aspirants
attempt to enlist support. Re-
ligious differences, the future
role of the military, the evolu-
tion of legal political parties,
and the influence of the more
dynamic northern groups as op-
posed to that of the southerners
with a larger popular base, will
all probably affect the politi-
cal atmosphere.
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THE CRISIS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The decision by Mao-Lin forces
to launch late lE.st month what ap-
pears to be a dr-_ve for final vic-
tory over their apposition has
triggered a counterattack which
iias plunged Chine. into the most
serious crisis since the estab-
lishment of the Communist regime.
']'here are indications that the
shaky coalition cf leaders formed
.it the eleventh plenum is falling
apart, and that the loyalty of
Some military leEders is increas-
i..ngl.y in question..
Significant breakdowns in
transportation sErvices and pub-
i.ic order have occurred in some
areas. These breakdowns reflect
successful efforts by local party
;authorities, prolably encouraged
by elements at tte center, to
pit workers in tre provinces
against pro-Mao Red Guard activ-
i.sts.
A Red Guard poster seen in
Peking on 10 January reported
!_.hat one of China's most impor-
tant. rail lines--the one linking
Shanghai and Peking--was still
out because service across the
`rangtze River at Nan-:king was
blocked. A Shanghai :broadcast
on 11 January reporting that
service had been restored as far
as Nan-king is the first public
admission that the line was out.
Whether it has been reopened north
of Nan-king is unknown.
Other posters put up in Pe-
king have reported heavy fighting
in Nan-king from 3 to 6 January
between pro-Mao Red Guards who
call themselves "rebels" and
workers mobilized by local party
authorities. The incidents, which
took place in factories and other
organizations, reportedly re-
sulted in 900 casualties with
54 deaths. Public security
forces supported by the army are
said to have arrested 6,000 of
the "rebels."
The situation in Shanghai
and Foochow may be equally dis-
orderly, although few details
are available. Broadcasts indi-
cate that a sharp struggle be-
tween pro-Mao "rebels"--who have
taken over some functions--and
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forces responsive to local au-
thorities has been under way
:luring the past ten days.
tary Teng Hsiao-ping, and rallies
were held in Peking on 8 and 10
January to denounce the three.
A joint Peo le's Daily - Red.
-Flag editoria sues on 11 Janu _
-
ary implies that these are not
isolated examples. The most
sweeping official statement seen
co date on this subject, the
editorial charges: that reaction-
ary officials posing as "extreme
leftists" are instigating armed
struggles which lead to "serious
incidents" and are causing fac-
t=ories and transport services
to shut down by bribing workers
with. wage increases and other
Inducements.
The Chinese press and radio
have reported recent strikes
and absenteeism in Shanghai, Foo-
chow, Peking, Canton, and Cheng-tu
as well as violent clashes in
Nan-king.
Several major party and
military figures aho were work-
ing side by side with Mao-Lin
forces have now cDme under sharp
Red Guard attack. This is the
first time since .he new leader-
ship was formed iz August that
Mao and Lin have :urned against
active members of the coalition.
The most sta:-tling casualty
is Tao Chu, fourth-ranking mem-
ber of the hierare;hy and through
December a key f iijure in the
regime's Cultural Revolution
Group. He has been savagely at-
tacked for being it follower of
disgraced Chief o: State Liu
Shao--chi and party General Secre-
Others denounced in the past
two weeks include Wang Jen-chung,
a proteg6 of Tao and a deputy head
of the Cultural Revolution Group,
Minister of Public Security Hsieh
Fu-chih, and three major military
leaders.
The most significant of these
is Liu Chih-chien, deputy direc-
tor of the army's political con-
trol organization and until 11
January probably head of the
army's Cultural Revolution Group
--its current purge organization.
The reorganization of this group,
announced on 11 January, tends
to confirm suspicions that the
army's political loyalties have
been divided.
Other military leaders at-
tacked in the past week are Liao
Han-sheng, who holds the crucial
post of political commissar of
the Peking Military Region, and
politburo member Ho Lung, a mem-
ber of the party's Military Af-
fairs Commission.
Premier Chou En-lai, who
has consistently taken a less ex-
treme stand than Mao and Lin in
the drive against their opponents,
still survives but has been
sharply criticized for the first
time and appears to be fighting
back. Posters displayed in Pe-
king on 6 and 10 January accused
Chou of trying to soften the
charges against Liu and Teng and
blunting the drive against their
followers.
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Several of Chou's protegis,
including standing committee mem-
ber Li :Fu-chun and politburo mem-
bers Li Hsien-nien and Chen Yi,
have again been denounced in
posters.
Developments during the past
week indicate that the line be-
tween opposing forces in China
has become sharper. The demon-
stration of strength by opponents
of Mao and Lin makes it seem
likely that the struggle will be-
come even more violent before a
resolution is achieved.
CHINESE COMMUNIST DIPLOMATS ORDERED HOME
Peking since late December
has recalled an unprecedented
number of its representatives
abroad in a move which will prob-
ably affect all of its 58 for-
eign missions. Some Chinese dip-
lomats have stated that they
were returning for "vacation" but
the most likely explanation is
that they are being pulled back
for screening and reindoctrina-
tion as part of the "cultural
revolution."
More than 300 personnel in
22 countries--at every level
from chauffeur to ambassador--
are involved, and in most cases
at least a third of the staff is
included. If this pattern is
followed in all 58 foreign mis-
sions, the total returning could
reach 750--a third of the ap-
proximately 2,200 Chinese serv-
ing abroad in a political capa-
city. As yet there is no indi-
cation how many Chinese techni-
cians stationed abroad--2,000 are
in Mali and Guinea alone--will be
recalled.
Thus far at least 13 chiefs
of mission are returning, but the
across-the-board nature of the
personnel cutback makes it appear
unlikely that the recall is con-
nected with one of the periodic
ambassadorial-level reviews of
foreign policy. The most recent
such meeting took place in De-
cember 1965 and was attended by
15 chiefs of mission.
Some of the officials now
leaving their posts will prob-
ably return after undergoing the
required political retreading.
Peking may, however, take the
opportunity to reduce its rep-
resentatives in those countries
where there is little prospect
of improving China's position
at this time.
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SUKARNO STATEMENT FAILS TO SATISFY OPPONENTS
President Sukarno's evasive
10 January statement concerning
his role in the abortive Indo-
nes.ian coup attempt of October
1965 is likely to lead to an in-
tensification of demands for his
ouster.
Sukarno, in his brief state-
ment, refused to recognize the
pre-eminent constitutional au-
thority of the Provisional
People's Consultative Assembly
(MPRS)--Indonesia's policy-making
body--or to cond.amn the Communist
Party (PKI) as tie regime had
wanted him to do. He denied any
responsibility for the attempted
coup and the economic and moral
decline in Indonesia.
Sukarno said that his own
investigation of the 1 October
incident showed :hat it was
brought about by three factors--
Communist leadership, neocoloni-
alist and imperia:_ist subversion,
and the existence of "undesirable
elements" in Indonesia. He re-
iterated that the events of 1 Oc-
tober were a "complete surprise"
to him.
This unsatiEfactory state-
ment: will provide added ammuni-
tion for those who want to mount
an accelerated campaign against
Sukarno. Even before it was
issued, ten "action fronts" had
demanded that the MPRS remove
him from office, and three popu-
lar newspapers had highlighted
some of his financial manipula-
tions.
Despite the prospects of in-
creased activist pressures, in-
dications are that General Su-
harto will continue to move with
deliberation and to rely on con-
stitutional methods. Parliament
will reassemble on 23 January
and may be asked to call a special
session of the MPRS, which could
then vote on some means to remove
Sukarno from office.
In the meantime Suharto may
proceed with his long-pending
plans to enlarge parliament by
appointing 110 new members from
groups regarded as anti-Sukarno.
Since parliament is part of the
MARS, this would also ensure a
more responsive congress.
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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS
Prime Minister Souvanna
will probably get a more coopera-
tive National Assembly as a re-
sult of Laos' 1 January election,
but the outcome has also strength-
ened the hand of key regional
military commanders.
A still incomplete tally of
votes indicates that possibly 40
of the new assembly's 59 seats
will be occupied by deputies who
were elected on the prime minis-
ter's "united front" slate. Al-
though these deputies are pledged
to support Souvanna and Laos'
tripartite government, they prob-
ably owe primary allegiance to
the military commanders respon-
sible for their success. The
deputies will probably back Sou-
vanna only as long as he retains
the support of these commanders.
In addition, it remains to
be seen how much control the re-
gional commanders can exercise
over their delegates. Much will
depend on Souvanna's attitude
and how adroitly he handles is-
sues that are almost certain to
rise between him and the new
assembly.
One suggestion of greater
flexibility in his approach ap-
peared in a recent conversation
in which he indicated that he
plans to expand his cabinet--a
move he refused to make when the
previous assembly demanded it.
As expected, the election
has weakened the positions of
neutralist and rightist politi-
cians. More important, however,
were the losses suffered by Gen-
eral Kouprasith, chief of the
general staff, who managed to
elect only three of his nine
candidates. Kouprasith, long
the strongest military figure
in Laos, will be especially con-
cerned over the gains made by
regional commanders whose power
and independence he has been
trying to curtail.
On the military front, Com-
munist troops, including substan-
tial numbers of North Vietnamese,
overran several government posi-
tions at Na Khang (see Indo-China
map on page two) on 6 January,
before being driven off by a
vigorous counterattack which cost
them 40 to 50 casualties. Sev-
eral other small government po-
sitions in this area of northern
Laos were overrun early last week,
however, and a concerted enemy
push has been expected for: several
weeks.
If the Communists succeed in
taking Na Khang, friendly opera-
tions will be hampered for a time,
but it is doubtful that the Com-
munists would be able to hold it
for any extended period.
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EUROPE
Soviet concern over events in China has been
further demonstrated by a campaign, unprecedented
in scope, to indoctrinate party workers. During
the last ten days, almost all the top Soviet lead-
ers have fanned out across the nation to explain
the outlines of Soviet policy on China and to re-
ceive in return the usual unanimous pledges of
local party support. By this burst of activity,
the leadership probably hopes that the lower party
ranks will be psychologically prepared for what-
ever happens within China or to Sino-Soviet rela-
tions.
President Tito is said to be planning a
visit to the USSR soon--possibly at the end of
this month. During Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade
in September, the two leaders' divergence of views
both on Yugoslav internal developments and on an
international conference of Communist parties was
evident.
Chancellor Kiesinger is holding discussions
with President de Gaulle in Paris on 13 and 14
January. Both will try to generate a warmer at-
mosphere for Franco-German relations. Bonn's cau-
tious moves toward closer relations with Eastern
Europe should be well received by De Gaulle, who
believes that his own three-stage formula ("detente,
entente, and then cooperation") for developing
some kind of Euro can unity is well into its first
phase.
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S FCRE`7,
SOVIET LEADERS CONDUCT NATIONWIDE BRIEFINGS OF PARTY WORKERS
In a campaign of unprecedented
scope, Soviet leaders fanned out
last week across tie nation to
brief regional party workers on
the regime's policies, particularly
relations with China. The high-
.evel briefings arc meant to bring
home to the party's working level
the leadership's concern over events
in China and to put on record a
broad affirmation of support for
the Kremlin's policies.
General Secretary Brezhnev led
off the campaign with a report to a
-fathering of 6,000 Moscow party of-
ficials on 4 January. since then
virtually all members of the polit-
'luro and secretariat have left Mos-
cow to address meetings in key
cities. Leading military figures
have carried the message to major
units of the armed Forces in the
USSR and East Germany. Brezhnev
Flew to Donetsk and now is in
Corky; party secretary Suslov went
to Leningrad; and P:-emier Kosygin
Spoke in industrial centers in the
I:Jrals and then went on to Vladivos-
t.ok and Khabarovsk. At week's end
Soviet leaders had met with party
activists in more taan 30 cities.
The last campa_gn of a simi-
t_ar nature--though on a more modest
scale--took place in the spring of
1_064 when party sta=_wart.s were in-
''_ormed of the central committee's,
condemnation of the Chinese.
The current meetings are tak-
ing place behind closed doors
There has been little pub-25X1:
licity beyond the formal announce-
ment that each local meeting heard
a report on the results of the De-
cember central committee plenum and
adopted a resolution unanimously ap-
proving its decisions.
That plenum's principal busi-
ness was to consider Brezhnev's re-
port on foreign policy with emphasis
on increasing tensions with China.
The leadership apparently in-
tends next to brief the party rank
and file and ultimately the popula-
tion at large. According to Pravda,
1.50 propagandists who attended the
Leningrad briefing were sent out to
pass on the word to party members
in their districts. The next step
may be publication of a position
paper in a more generalized form ap-
propriate for a mass audience.
The Soviet leaders during their
travels have also inspected indus-
trial and agricultural sites, dis-
cussed production problems with
local officials, and plumped for
greater output. They probably
raised the specter of an increas-
ingly hostile China to exhort the
workers to greater effort on the
home front.
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SECRET
LUNAR PROBES HIGHLIGHT SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHINGS IN 1966
During the year the Soviets
conducted 47 space operations--
five less than in 1965, their most
active year in space. Except for
a new spacecraft probably intended
for future manned flights, no rad-
ically new or advanced systems made
their appearance, and not a single
manned mission was attempted.
The program of unmanned lunar
exploration produced the most dra-
matic successes in the 1966 launch-
ings. Lunas 9 and 13 soft-landed
on the moon and returned photo-
graphs of the surface, and Luna
13 added a soil analysis experi-
ment. Lunas 10, 11, and 12 went
into orbit around the moon. Al-
though both 11 and 12 were designed
to photograph the lunar surface,
only Luna 12 successfully transmit-
ted pictures, and these were of
very poor quality when compared
with those from the two US lunar
orbiters.
Military reconnaissance was
the most active single program and
accounted for half the launchings
last year. While the number of
reconnaissance satellites orbited
from Tyuratam declined, seven were
launched from Plesetsk bringing
the total to 23--five more than in
1965. In March, the first space
launching from Plesetsk occurred.
The Soviets have put no men
in space since March 1965 but in
late November conducted the first
unmanned orbital test of what may
be a new spacecraft. If so, it
would indicate that their manned
program is still very much alive.
A new type of capsule may be used
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SECRET
for manned. flights this year and
probably will be capable of ren-
dezvous and docking and fitted
for cosmonaut activity outside
the spacecraft. The 22-day flight
in February of a satellite con-
taining two dogs and other bio-
logical specimens provided impor-
La.nt biomedical data useful in
planning future long-duration
manned missions. Serious defects
in the spacecraft's life support
systems apparently forced the So-
viets to bring the capsule down
a week earlier than planned.
was orbited in July.
The USSR continued to launch
experimental weather and communica-
tions satellites, but only the com-
Page 17
munications program shows signs of
becoming operational soon. A weath
satellite launched in June was the
fifth orbited by the USSR since 196
and produced the first satellite
cloud photographs released by the
Soviets. Data from this satellite
were sent to the US from August
through October in partial fulfill-
ment of an agreement signed in 1962
to exchange weather satellite data.
This satellite ceased operating on
28 October, however, and the Soviet
have not attempted to orbit another
The third and fourth Molniya
communications satellites were or-
bited last year for further experi-
mentation with the system.
Seven scientific satellites
were orbited in 1966 from Kapustin
Yar--the same number as in 1965.
Three of those launched in 1966 op-
erated much longer than previous
Kapustin Yar satellites, indicatinc
improvements in solar-powered bat-
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SECRET
SOVIET NAVAL EXPORTS TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The USSR exported a large
number of naval craft in 1966 and
deliveries are expected to remain
high this year. They will include
more OSA-class guided-missile pa-
trol boats, first exported to non-
Communist countries in 1966, and
possibly the initial delivery of
F-class submarines.
The bulk of deliveries last
year were to Egypt in fulfillment
of a 1964 arms agreement. Since
October the USSR has exported ten
OSAs to Egypt and at least two
more are scheduled for delivery
this month. Five R-class sub-
marines, a later model of the W-
class formerly supplied to nonbloc
countries, arrived in Alexandria
in mid-1966. In addition, Egypt
exchanged two W-class submarines
for reconditioned models, and re-
ceived four SO-1 submarine
chasers and a POLUCHAT-1 torpedo
retriever.
Algeria, which has the second
largest ground and air force in
North Africa, now is building up
its naval force with Soviet equip-
ment. It has obtained six KOMAR-
class guided-missile patrol boats
since November, and will probably
get a destroyer and possibly a
submarine after Algerian naval
personnel are trained to operate
them.
Somalia has received four
and Guinea two POLUCHAT-1s, to
be used as coastal patrol boats,
and under a recent agreement
Tanzania will get four recondi-
tioned P-4 class motor torpedo
boats. Iraq has eight KOMARs
and eight minesweepers on order
under an arms agreement signed
last May and is expecting de-
liveries to begin this year.
The first deliveries--two
POLNOCNY-class LSTs--under the
USSR's October 1965 naval aid
agreement with India were made
last year. Four submarines, a
submarine tender, five PETYA-
class patrol boats and five
small patrol boats are on order.
Although New Delhi may, as part
of its austerity program, cancel
some of these orders, it is ex-
pected this year to get an F-
class, long-range, diesel-powered
submarine, the first the USSR
will have exported.
Cuba's fleet has just been
increased by six KOMARSf
The
KOMARs may replace Cuba's coastal
defense cruise missile system
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25X1
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SI;("RET
Soviet Naval Equipment Being Exported for the First Time
Delivered to UAR in 1966
OSA-CLASS
Guided Missile Patrol Boat
R-CLASS
Submarine
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SECRET
WEST GERMANY SEEKS FORMAL TIES WITH EASTERN EUROPE
Bonn is cautiously sounding
out East European capitals on pos-
sibilities for establishing dip-
lomatic relations. A Foreign Min-
istry delegation left for Prague
on 9 January, and a ranking min-
istry official is scheduled to go
to Budapest later this month.
Probably the most serious discus-
sions will be undertaken by a ne-
gotiating team which recently ar-
rived in Bucharest.
This initiative is a follow
up to Chancellor Kiesinger's
13 December policy statement call-
ing for diplomatic relations with
East European countries 'Wherever
this is possible under the circum-
stances." It is also a natural
extension of the policy of relax-
ation toward the East that former
foreign minister Schroeder began
in the latter years of Adenauer's
rule. West German officials in
recent years have reasoned that
if the Federal Republic could win
greater trust from the East Euro-
pean states, the climate for
eventual reunification of Germany
would be improved.
According to the German
charge in Washington, the Kie-
singer government believes Ru-
mania offers the best chance for
a diplomatic breakthrough. Thus,
the major emphasis will be placed
on the Bucharest talks, despite
the feeling of some of Foreign
Minister Brandt's Social Demo-
crats that an accord with Warsaw
or Prague would be a more signifi-
cant achievement.
While Kiesinger's policy
statement did speak of German
desires for "reconciliation with
Poland," the charge explained
that Warsaw was not included in
the current campaign because it
would demand recognition of the
Oder-Neisse line. Prague, like-
wise, is likely to attach numer-
ous conditions to an agreement,
including German acceptance of
its view that the Munich Pact of
1938 was invalid from its incep-
tion.
On the other hand, Rumania
is expected to give serious con-
sideration to the German initia-
tive since an agreement would
help advance its independent
image. The main problem is the
applicability of any agreement to
West Berlin, but a West German
official recently indicated that
a simple verbal understanding
might be sufficient.
Bonn hopes ko preserve the
Hallstein Doctrine, under which
it threatens to sever diplomatic
relations with any country recog-
nizing East Germany. The charge
said that Bonn would seek the
help of its Western allies in
convincing third countries that
the doctrine excepts East Euro-
pean states on the ground that
they recognized the Ulbricht re-
gime at Moscow's behest. 25X1
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Syria's exchanges of fire with Israel, includ-
ing two tank skirmishes, have overshadowed other
Arab-Israeli incidents.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, the Turks are
mounting a wide-ranging diplomatic campaign to en-
sure that Czech arms the Makarios government brought
into Cyprus last month are placed under UN custody.
Ankara is also expressing some concern over the
lack of a stable government in Athens with which
to deal. Andreas Papandreou's belated acceptance
of his father's decision to support the interim
Greek Government has removed the immediate threat
of a split by one of the country's two major parties
before the elections next spring.
The conflict between aggressively nationalist
Africa and some European interests continues to
keep the Congolese and Rhodesian situations hot.
Union Miniere evidently is standing up against
Congolese President Mobutu's further demands follow-
ing his seizure of the company's local properties.
The Portuguese foreign minister has reiterated Lis-
bon's intention to defend its interests in Africa
and implied resistance to the UN sanctions program
against the rebel Rhodesian regime. With few other
exceptions, the program is receiving world-wide
compliance.
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W SECRET r
i
LEBANON/
0Tibnin
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7Sheag
0
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DEMILITARIZED
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OUmm Qays
nsT
OHOR
CANAL
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NOW' SECRET
ISRAEL WARNS SYRIA ON BORDER FIRING
While Israel's Jordanian
border has been relatively quiet
for several weeks, the situation
along its disputed frontier with
Syria has worsened. The almost
daily series of incidents that
began in late December have in-
cluded tank duels on 9 and 11
January. The Syrians had used
tank fire during earlier ex-
changes, but the Israelis had
not previously responded in kind.
The use of heavier weapons
increases the possibility of an
Israeli retaliatory strike against
Syria. Although Israel has suf-
fered a few minor casualties,
thus far there have been no fa-
talities. As in the past, the
death of Israelis or extensive
damage to Israeli property could
quickly trigger a reprisal.
Israeli officials in recent
days have referred frequently
to the mounting gravity of the
situation. Prime Minister Esh-
kol, in a press interview, said
the shootings "are not the usual
seasonal business.... I must warn
those who are responsible in
Damascus that we will tolerate
no attacks on the well-being of
our citizens or our sovereignty.
Syria is not immune." Israel
has also sent notes to the
UN Security Council but as yet
has made no formal complaint.
The current recriminatory
exchanges among the Arab states
over defense policy toward Israel
probably have encouraged the
Syrians to be especially belli-
cose at this time. According
to the US Embassy in Damascus,
they appear to be bracing them-
selves for a possible Israeli
strike. There is no indication,
however, that Syria intends to
stop trying to prevent Israeli
"incursions" on Arab-claimed
lands, which have been the al-
leged cause of many of the in-
cidents.
Many of the recent incidents
stem from long-standing differ-
ences over rights to fields in
the demilitarized zones estab-
lished by the 1949 armistice
agreement between the two coun-
tries. Syria contests Israel's
claim to sovereignty over the
zones and each year fires on
the Israelis who attempt to work
in "Arab" fields within them.
Local UN officials have been un-
able to resolve the dispute.
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S EC,' R.ET
ELECTION CAMPAIGN UNDER WAY IN INDIA
Serious campaigning for India's
15-21 February general election now
has begun in an unusually turbulent
political atmosphere, and prospects
For the ruling Congress Party are
uncertain. With a month to go,
Congress is expected to retain a
comfortable, but reduced, majority
is the national parliament, but to
do less well in the balloting for
16 state legislative assemblies.
'[he stultifying effects of
almost 20 years in power have weak-
ened the party's appeal and effec-
t:_ven.ess. It is faction ridden,
internally divided on major issues,
and to some extent blamed for the
country's current economic prob-
lems. A prolonged struggle for
party nominations has further
hardened the lines of caste and
Faction within the party organiza-
t:_on.
In several states dissident
leaders have resigned, have set up
rebel parties, and are negotiating
w:Lth opposition groups to form anti-
Congress electoral fronts. As a
result, Congress stands a good
chance of losing power or being
forced into coalition governments
in at least three states, and will
face a hard fight in one or two
others. Politically volatile West
Bengal will probably remain under
Congress rule, but mainly because
the leftist opposition has been
unable to form an electoral alli-
ance. In the southern state of
Kerala, a Communist-led electoral
front. is almost certain to win
against two rival Congress organi-
zations.
Despite these problems and
the loss of the charismatic lead-
ership of Jawaharlal Nehru, Con-
gress still has some advantages
over its splintered opposition.
No other party has been able to
attract a significant following
on an all-India basis. Some have
only regional support. Others
with aspirations for national
standing--such as the conserva-
tive Swatantra, the two rival Com-
munist parties, and the Hindu com-
munal Jan Sangh--have only pockets
of strength in widely scattered
parts of the country.
Congress, on the other hand,
has a generally strong nationwide
organization and in most areas is
well financed. As the party that
led the independence movement and
that has dominated the political
scene since independence, it is
in a position to dispense patron-
age and commands decades-old loy-
alties. It has also acquired a
degree of expertise in manipulat-
ing caste and communal groups, an
important element in winning In-
dian elections.
The pre-election period has
thus far been one of unusual so-
cial and political turmoil, even
for India. Opposition parties,
especially the Jan Sangh and both
Communist factions, have been
quick to capitalize on this un-
rest and in some cases have been
the prime instigators. Voting
patterns will probably be deter-
mined more than ever before by
the performance of Congress-con-
trolled national and state gov-
ernments and the ability of Con-
gress and its rivals to get out
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NIGERIAN RULERS MEET IN GHANA
Nigeria's long drift toward
fragmentation and possible civil
war has been checked at least for
the moment by the meeting of all
key leaders of the country's mili-
tary regime in nearby Ghana on
4 and 5 January. However, the
small measure of agreement re-
flected in their communiques is
still offset by wide divergencies
on basic issues.
The meeting was recalcitrant
Eastern military governor Ojukwu's
first face-to-face encounter with
the head of the federal government,
Lt. Col. Gowon, and the other
three regional governors since
Northern soldiers killed General
Ironsi--the Easterner who led the
previous military regime--and in-
stalled Gowon in power last sum-
mer. It was brought about largely
by the quiet go-between efforts
of British trouble shooter Malcolm
MacDonald. The Ghanaian hosts--
British-trained army and police
officers like the Nigerians--also
helped to arrange the talks and
then to preside over them.
Early agreement on a decla-
ration renouncing the use of force
as a means of settling the complex
Nigerian crisis helped restore a
degree of confidence and trust
among the leaders--the most im-
portant single achievement of the
meeting. They all agreed their
interim regime should continue
for some time and made some prog-
ress in spelling out powers and
functions of its basic central
and regional institutions. Lim-
ited agreement was also reached
on reorganizing the shattered army
into regional commands and on
measures to ease the plight of
victims--mainly Easterners--of
last year's upheavals.
The leaders who make up the
Supreme Military Council (SMC)
made no real attempt, however,
even to come to grips with such
difficult core questions as the
creation of new states and the
allocation of revenues and powers
in a permanent government system.
Their final communique merely
provided for the resumption "as
soon as practicable" of the ad-
journed constitutional conference,
and looked forward to future
meetings of the SMC within Ni-
geria itself. Ojukwu has indi-
cated that three special new ex-
pert committees concerned with
finance, the army, and federal
decrees are to meet over the next
month, with an SMC session to
follow if a venue can be agreed
on. Early implementation of the
limited agreements reached in
Ghana will be a prerequisite to
more significant progress.
Nigerian reaction to the
meeting and its communiques has
so far been highly favorable
with the Eastern media and Ojukwu
himself hailing it as a triumph
for the regionalism they espouse.
A general relaxation of major
tensions, already reflected in
the Western governor's 7 January
announcement that roadblocks were
being lifted in his region, thus
seems likely for the immediate
future.
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UNION MINIER
r TAKES HARD LINE IN DISPUTE WITH CONGO
Congolese President Mobutu's
confrontation with union Miniere
continues, with no sign that the
company is particularly inter-
ested in rescuing the Congolese
from a potentially disastrous
economic crisis.
There are some indications
.hat Mobutu is becoming less in-
transigent. Nothing has been
heard recently, fir instance, of
his threat to seize the extensive
Congolese assets Df Union Miniere's
largest stockholder, the Societe
Generale holding company, on 15
,-anuary unless Union Miniere
yielded to his demands.
Union Miniere has still not
made public its attitude toward
such indications Df a softening
on Mobutu's part.
Union Miniere has a substan-
tial amount of unsold copper out-
side the Congo. It thus can
satisfy its regular customers for
several months and can play a
waiting game at relatively little
cost.
The Congo, on the other hand,
cannot. Kinshasa's foreign ex-
change reserves are nearly ex-
hatisted, and stocks of consumer
goods and materials needed to
keep the country's industry going
are measured in days and weeks
for most articles. A long im-
passe would probably force the
shutdown of the mines, which are
still producing at the moment
although exports have been
halted.
While the majority of Congo-
lese still are largely outside
the cash economy and would not
be seriously affected by an eco-
nomic crisis, considerable unrest
in the large and politically im-
portant urban areas would be ex-
pected if the crisis should con-
tinue.
SIEC R E'r
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Recent developments in several Latin American nations in-
dicate an upsurge in contacts--primarily commercial--with Com-
munist states. Other Western Hemisphere nations will be watch-
ing the results and, if they see economic benefits or prestige
for themselves, may well move in a similar direction.
In some cases, the initiative evidently has come from the
Latin Americans. Colombia's five-month-old Lleras administra-
tion, for example, has moved to establish diplomatic and trade
relations with several Eastern European nations and may soon
approach the USSR and other Communist countries as well. The
main inducement here would appear to be the possibility of ex-
panding trade, and Soviet and Polish trade missions are due in
Bogota within the next few weeks.
Moreover, the Communists are offering trade deals to coun-
tries hungry for nontraditional markets for their primary ex-
ports. Should such deals be consummated, local pressures for
exchanging diplomatic missions with Communist countries will
be stepped u .
Since last August, Ecuador has signed agreements to sell ba-
nanas and coffee to East Germany and Poland, and has had over-
tures from the Czechs and Hungarians aimed at expanding com-
merical ties.
~A Brazilian delegation
will visit Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague beginning on 14 January
but is not expected to come home with any startling new trade
deals.
On another front, Argentina's 4 January decision to claim
sovereignty over waters within 200 miles of its coastline will
further complicate chances of achieving any common hemispheric
position on this matter soon. Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and El
Salvador also claim a 200-mile territorial sea and can be ex-
pected to applaud the Argentine move, but the Brazilians are
said to be upset by it and other countries which fish in this
area probably will oppose it as well. The problems posed by
such extensive claims were illustrated by Ecuador's detention
on 7 January of three US-owned tuna boats which Quito alleged
were fishing well within Ecuadorean waters.
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CHILEAN OPPOSITION PARTY IMPROVES POSITION
The electio~-i of Socialist
Party leader Sal'iador Allende as
president of the Chilean Senate
has enhanced the opposition role
in that body and improved the So-
cialists' political position. The
Frei administration, although it
controls the lower house, lacks a
majority in the ,senate but pre-
viously held the leadership there
by virtue of the swing vote exer-
cised by the vaguely rightist Rad-
ical Party (PR). Although no se-
rious obstructio:iism is expected,,
Allende's election is a definite
slap at Presiden: Frei--who is
about to visit t.ae United States.
The Socialist Party (PS) co--
operates with tht~ Communist Party
(PCCh) in a PopuLar Action Front
(FRAP), but thei..- relations have
become strained because the PS
generally espouses a more extreme
line than the PC(,h and is less
willing to coope.:ate with the gov-
ernment.
On 21 December, the PDC
president and vie president of
the Senate were :)usted in a vote
in which the Radicals cooperated
with FRAP. This situation had oc-
curred twice before in 1966, but
FRAP and the PR iad never been
able to agree af:erward on a new
leadership. This time the PR was
determined not t,:) re--elect the
PDC leaders and, while not op-
posed to a Socialist president,
refused to accept a Communist vice
president. The ?RAP partners
stood firm against naming a Rad-
ical. The slate finally agreed
to give the presidency to the
Socialists' Alle:Zde and the vice--
presidency to Luis Fernando
Luengo, a member of the small
left-wing Social Democratic
Party.
Allende, who lost the na-
tional presidential election in
1958 and was again defeated by
Frei in 1964, has been one of
the Frei administration's loudest
critics. He is a firm supporter
of Fidel Castro and has on sev-
eral occasions praised Castro's
attacks on Frei. As Senate presi-
dent he will be able to guide
debate and to some extent control
the movement of bills through
the Senate machinery. As a re-
sult Frei will probably face in-
creased harassment in Congress,
especially when it debates his
request for permission to leave
the country for his US visit in
February.
An example of Allende's
power as Senate president was his
granting permission to use Senate
facilities for a local celebra-
tion of the Cuban revolution an-
niversary on 2 January. This ac-
tion displeased the Radicals,
however, so Allende in the future
may have to make greater efforts
to heed their wishes or risk
losing their votes.
The Communists' failure to
elect a member to the Senate
leadership was a blow to their
position as an important leftist
force. They now face the pros-
pect of operating in the shadow
of the more extremely leftist So-
cialist Party.
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GUYANA'S COALITION GOVERNMENT FALTERS
Political differences between
Guyana's Prime Minister Burnham
and his junior coalition partner,
Finance Minister D'Aguiar, nearly
broke up their shaky two-year-old
partnership last week. The two
leaders have never gotten on well
and, although they now appear to
be trying to patch up their most
recent quarrel, they have not yet
reached complete agreement.
D'Aguiar has reluctantly
withdrawn his demand for complete
jurisdiction over economic devel-
opment and Burnham has agreed to
postpone the transfer of civil
service control from D'Aguiar's
ministry--two of last week's
sticking points. Burnham has
also agreed to grant D'Aguiar's
request that Minister of Works
and Hydraulics Mohamed Kasim be
removed from the cabinet. How-
ever, he has not yet asked for
Kasim's resignation and the de-
lay is beginning to antagonize
D'Aguiar.
The prime minister is reluc-
tant to dump Kasim, a Burnham
supporter who is a member of
D'Aguiar's United Force (UF)
party, because he believes that
Kasim would remain in the govern-
ment and help him retain a working
majority in the legislature should
D'Aguiar resign. D'Aguiar wants
the way cleared for another, more
acceptable UF member to be ap-
pointed to Kasim's post and his
determination to see this accom-
plished is growing.
Both leaders understand that
the alternative to their coali-
tion government would be, at best,
a Burnham-led minority government
or, at worst, one headed by pro-
Communist opposition leader
Cheddi Jagan, whose party holds
the largest single block of seats
in the legislature. For this
reason Burnham and D'Aguiar have
declared themselves willing to
make an extra effort to stay to-
gether. Nevertheless, they both
feel justified in their positions
and, as always, seem unable to
keep from antagonizing each other.
Even if they manage to patch up
the current quarrel, other dis-
agreements are sure to threaten
the coalition in the future.
If D'Aguiar were to resign,
Burnham could probably at least
temporarily hold the support of
enough members of the finance
minister's party to maintain a
slim working majority in the
legislature. Many members of
D'Aguiar's party are dissatisfied
with Burnham's administration,
however, and without D'Aguiar in
the government the coalition
would be on a much weaker footing.
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DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS WITH OPPOSITION DETERIORATE
Radical elements in control.
of the left-of-center Dominican
Revolutionary Pnn.rty (PRD) appear
headed toward more militant oppo-
sition to the Bn:.laguer government
after a period of hesitation over
the past few months.
The major theme in the PRD
attack on Balaguer is the allega.-
tion that his government is "neo-
Trujillista." The PRD has charged
the President, who faithfully
served Trujillo for many years,
with systematic political perse-
cution and authoritarian implemen-
tation of his pc,licies. Jottin
Cury, the PRD's far left fire-
brand in Congress, has said he
will present to the legislature
formal charges Egainst Balaguer
for "grave faults in the exercise
of his duties." PRD Secretary
General Pena Gon.ez has charged
that the government is becoming
"de facto" throigh arbitrary ac-
tions.
The conduct. of the Balaguer
government has lent a degree of
credibility to the often exagger-
ated PRD charges. The government
has not appearec concerned about
sporadic acts of political vio-
lence and the pclice at times ap-
pear heavy handed. Balaguer him-
self has shown r.o disposition to
seek a reconciliation with the
left and elements in his entourage
consider the PRE little better
than Communists.
Although the rhetoric of the
PRD radicals is often more in-
flammatory than their acts, re-
cent statements by the leaders
suggest they may be moving toward
violent opposition to Balaguer.
Pena, for example, has said that
the PRD rank and file, having had
five months of Balaguer's "re-
pression," hope he will be over-
thrown. Cury's statement that
the political spectrum is polariz-
ing into "Trujillismo versus anti-
Trujillismo" rather than left
versus right, and statements by
Pena absolving rightist civil-
military elements of responsibil-
ity for political terrorism sug-
gest that the party may seek an
alliance with political opportun-
ists of the far right.
Meanwhile, dissident PRD
moderates and conservatives, hav-
ing failed to shake the radicals'
hold on the leadership, have an-
nounced plans to hold a "conven-
tion," apparently to establish
an "authentic" PRD. Past efforts
by party dissident Angel Miolan
to establish a party independent
of the PRD have failed but en-
couragement of the new effort
by Balaguer and the radicalism
of the new leaders may make
this try more successful. Such
a movement would probably lead
to stepped-up efforts by the dis-
sidents to tag the present PRD
leadership with the Communist
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NO CLEAR VICTORY IN BAHAMAS ELECTIONS
The standoff in the 10 Jan-
uary House of Assembly elections
presents the British governor
general with a difficult task
in trying to form a new govern-
ment. The government had called
the election following allega-
tions by the opposition Progres-
sive Liberal Party (PLP) of cor-
ruption on the part of the ruling
United Bahamian Party (UBP).
The Negro-led PLP dramati-
cally increased its representa-
tion in the House of Assembly
from four to 18 seats, equaling
the number won by the conserva-
tive UBP. One of the two remain-
ing seats was won by a member of
the Labor Party who is expected
to vote with the PLP. The other
went to an independent whose
alignment is in doubt. The more
moderate opposition National
Democratic Party lost all repre-
sentation.
The PLP, campaigning on the
issues of alleged gambling cor-
ruption in government and white
rule, captured 12 of the 17
seats from populous New Provi-
dence Island, where the capital
is located, while only four
went to the UBP and the remain-
ing one to the Labor Party. UBP
Premier Sir Roland Symonette re-
tained his seat by the slim mar-
gin of some 50 votes. The out-
lying islands on which the UBP
had heavily depended failed to
deliver the expected victories.
Under the constitution the
governor appoints as premier the
man he believes best able to com-
mand the confidence of the major-
ity of House of Assembly members.
If neither party can form a work-
ing majority, or is unwilling to
enter into coalition with the
other, new elections would have
to be held.
The PLP, formed in 1953, has
for the first time effectively
challenged the tight control of
the Bahamas by the white-led UBP.
Jubilant Negroes marched through
the streets celebrating what
their leaders called an end of
"three centuries of white rule."
If the PLP is chosen to
form the next government, party
leader Lynden O. Pindling will
become premier. Pindling is
an energetic and intelligent
individual. He told the US
consul general that he acts as
a moderating influence on party
extremists.
Investors are apparently
concerned over a possible end to
their freedom from taxation in
the Bahamas. PLP views vary on
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SFC,RE'l,
this issue. The Bahamian consti-
tution provides that legislation
proposing taxation can be delayed
by the Senate for at least 15
months. The control of the Sen-
ate is "nonpartisan" because even
the combined representatives of
the two main parties cannot de-
feat a solid vote of the gover-
nor's eight apoiatees--white
businessmen. According to a
leading Bahamian barrister this
ensures ample time for an ex-
pression of public opinion and
also gives investors the oppor-
tunity to take action on their
assets if they deem it expedient.
The US consul general in
Nassau predicts a period of gen-
eral economic and political con-
fusion.
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