WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005600050001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 20, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/08/29: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600050001-7
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
54
State Dept. review DIA review 20 January 1967
completed completed. No. 0273/67
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SECRET
(Information as of noon EST, 19 January 1967)
Far East
VIETNAM
Discussions under way in South Vietnam between Con-
stituent Assembly leaders and members of the ruling
Directorate are aimed at avoiding a confrontation
over controversial constitutional issues. Communist
military forces displayed increased aggressiveness
this week, although they continued to avoid major
contact with such large allied search-and-destroy
operations as CEDAR FALLS northwest of Saigon. North
Vietnam, meanwhile, has replaced the MIG-21s lost in
recent combat. Hanoi's leaders are preparing the
North Vietnamese people for increased difficulties in
the coming year.
TROUBLE DEEPENS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Regional opposition to Mao Tse-tung is growing, and
disorder is spreading in the provinces. Mao's op-
ponents may have been encouraged to launch counter-
attacks against his chief lieutenants'.
PEKING RENEWING PRESSURE ON MACAO
The Chinese, seeking a stronger statement from the
Portuguese accepting responsibility for the Macao
rioting last month, are conducting a press campaign
threatening, among other harassments, to cut off the
colony's water.
Page
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SECRET
CAMBODIAN GOVEFNMENT SHOWING INDEPENDENCE OF SIHANOUK
Prime Minister Lon Nol reportedly has been taking
important cecisions recently without advance clear-
ance with the chief of state, whose leftist policies
are unpopular among the Phnom Penh elite.
Europe
Meeting last week with De Gaulle, the new German chan-
cellor managed to improve the atmosphere
sti disagree on a number of key issues
NATO FACES NEW PROBLEMS
The French are trying to keep a voice in a number of
sensitive NATO activities involving the military
structure from which they have withdrawn. The other
fourteen are also troubled by planning difficulties,
a delay in settling the German offset problem, and
protests from the government of Malta over the pro-
posed downgrading of the NATO headquarters there.
SECRET
25X6
25X6
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SECRET Iwo,
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 21
ISRAELI-SYRIAN HOSTILITIES REACH CRITICAL STAGE
Although Israel and Syria now have agreed to discuss
the issue--farming activities in the demilitarized
zone--which has been a major cause of border clashes,
recent terrorist bombings by Palestinian infiltrators
in Israel raise a more contentious issue
NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT GAINS PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL
The Paraskevopoulos government won an overwhelming
vote of confidence last week, but Greece may face new
political troubles before the general elections sched-
uled for May.
TENSION
EASES IN CONGO'S DISPUTE WITH UNION
MINIERE
24
The
the
dialogue has been reopened by a new
company and responsive conciliatory
proposal
gestures
from
from
Kinshasa.
TOGO'S INTERIM REGIME
Although the army's take-over was unopposed, the new
regime faces trouble in reorganizing the government
and holding elections.
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 27
NEW GOVERNMENT IN BAHAMAS
The first Negro leader of the Bahamas, L. O. Pindling,
has rushed to reassure foreign investors and tourists
that he plans no radical changes in economic policy.
SLUGGISH ECONOMY REMAINS A MAJOR DOMINICAN PROBLEM
Some improvement is expected this year, but not enough
to regain the level reached before the revolt in April
:L965. Depressed economic conditions in Santo Domingo
will provide a ready reservoir of discontent for Pres-
ident Balaguer's opponents.
NICARAGUAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN HEATS UP
Opposition efforts to end the 30-year rule by the Somo-
za family could bring violence before the elections on
5 February.
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S 1; (IRE' I'
REACTION TO ARGENTINE RAILROAD REFORM LIMITED
Labor may Le avoiding a major confrontation with the
regime becE.use of the recent cabinet reorganization
that put ar. army general in, charge of railroads and
strengthened the Defense Ministry.
CHILEAN SENATE REJECTS PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO THE US
The vote seems to be one more demonstration of the
Senate's general hostility to the President but it
will have widespread repercussions on Chilean foreign
policy as TAell as on domestic politics.
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... SECRET
FAR EAST
Despite propaganda claims from Peking that Mao Tse-
tung's opponents are on the verge of collapse, there are
growing indications that the struggle is becoming more
intense and that Mao's drive to destroy the opposition
has run into serious difficulty. Authoritative journals
under Maoist control now acknowledge that the struggle
against entrenched enemies is "acute, complicated, and
tortuous." Assertions that the army is "infinitely loyal"
to Mao are contradicted by an admission in the leading
army journal that an acute struggle is being waged
against "bourgeois reactionaries" within the army. Deep
divisions among military leaders were also reflected in
Red Guard attacks on prestigious commanders and in charges
that key military and party leaders plotted a coup against
Mao and Lin Piao last February.
Regional opposition to Mao apparently is growing and
clashes between pro-Mao "rebels" and local party forces
continue to be reported from Tibet to Shanghai. Peking
has responded to this growing resistance by ordering the
"rebels" to intensify their efforts to seize enemy strong-
holds. The prospect is for even greater violence and
chaos.
There is no evidence thus far that the upheaval in
China has affected rail shipments to North Vietnam. Com-
munist forces in South Vietnam continue to avoid large-
scale engagements with the major allied force sweeping
the Iron Triangle north of Saigon. The Constituent As-
sembly in Saigon has opened debate on the draft constitu-
tion as assembly and Directorate representatives seek to
resolve points of contention.
The Chinese Communists have renewed pressure on Ma-
cao authorities because of Lisbon's equivocation in ne-
gotiations over a Portuguese statement accepting respon-
sibility for the December riots. Macao authorities have
taken the precaution of evacuating some Portuguese depend-
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%W SECRET
C H I
g
~?..Y..T ~.Jr~'?~Lao Cai Nan-nin
NnnruLang SonCll
BWRl. ?Airfield
Vinh
THAILAND
HANOI Haiphong
S
1
PHNOM
PENH
)SOUTH
`VIETNAM
The Indochina - South China Area
SECRET
A
MACAO HONG K)NO
(FOn.I ll-K.)
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SECRET
VIETNAM
Members of South Vietnam's j on 10 January assembly leaders
ruling Directorate and Constituent
Assembly leaders are currently
seeking to resolve differences
over the draft constitution.
An assembly debate on the
initial draft constitution sched-
uled to begin on 16 January was
postponed for two days to allow
further informal talks. The Di-
rectorate's major objections to
the current draft involve the
relatively large degree of power
vested in the legislature, the
popular election of province
chiefs, and the authorization for
the Constituent Assembly to act
as an interim legislature pending
formation of a permanent govern-
ment.
Constituent Assembly leaders were
amenable to most of the Directo-
rate's suggested changes. There
were also some indications of a
possible compromise which would
allow the assembly a supervisory
role in the initial electoral
process, but not a complete leg-
islative function. Meetings be-
tween assembly and Directorate
members are scheduled to continue
while the assembly debates the
draft constitution.
The trend toward closer
relations between assembly and
government leaders began to emerge
last week. At a press conference
Page 3
argued that there were no dif-
ferences between them and the
military government. It appears
that the earlier efforts by both
Chief of State Thieu and Premier
Ky to cultivate various groups
of delegates were fruitful and
probably figured significantly
in the assembly's conciliatory
attitude.
Such efforts by the mili-
tary leaders have probably been
prompted by their apparent desire
to avoid a confrontation with
the assembly. This attitude may
also reflect the potential presi-
dential ambitions of both Ky and
Thieu, and their belief they may
need some civilian support.
No insoluable constitutional
issue seems to remain, providing
that the Directorate concedes
some sort of transitional role
to the assembly after the consti-
tution is accepted. Even if all
the differences cannot be ironed
out and the government finally
deems it necessary to veto con-
stitutional provisions after they
have been approved by the assem-
bly, the limited cooperation
demonstrated between the two
groups should help to lessen
civilian reaction to a veto.
Military Action Picks Up
Communist forces this week
continued to display increased
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SECRE I'
aggressiveness against South
Vietnamese and allied defensive
positions in the northern coastal
provinces and in `he Mekong Delta.
The majority of t.aese actions
were conducted by enemy units of
company size or smaller, and of-
ten at a high casialty cost to
the attacking force. Viet Cong/
D;orth Vietnamese \rmy (NVA) main
force units generally continued
io avoid major co.itact with wide-
ranging allied search-and-destroy
operations.
In one of th, enemy's most
successful actions of the week,
cn 15 January a Communist force
estimated at company strength
launched a mortar and ground pene--
t:ration assault against a South
Vietnamese Army (ARVN) district
headquarters near Quang Tri city,
the capital of South Vietnam's
rorthernmost province. Government
defenders sustained 127 casualties
and lost 88 weapo7s, in contrast
to known enemy losses of 47
killed.
On the same day, elements of
the ARVN 21st Division were heav-
ily engaged by the Viet Cong
during the conduc: of search-and-
destroy Operation DAN CHI 275 in
Chuo:ng Thien Province,, south of
Saigon. Twenty-two government
troops were killed and 44 wounded,
compared with enemy losses of 96
killed. The Viet Cong massacred
41 of 48 South Vi,=_tnamese military
and civilian personnel incarcer-
ated in a POW cam! before it was
cver:run by the 21st Division sweep
force.
Two days later Viet Cong
forces overran a town 140 miles
southwest of Saigon, in the same
creneral area as DAN CHI 275, in-
flicting 80 casualties on the
garrison's paramilitary defenders.
The Viet Cong sustained
sharp reverses, however, in a
series of abortive attacks against
US Marine positions in Quang Nam
Province and against ARVN infan-
try and ranger elements in the
c'elta provinces of Vinh Binh and
Kien Hoa. On 13 and 14 January,
US Marines killed 120 members of
a. company-sized or larger enemy
force which was massing for at-
tacks near Da Nang. In the delta,
three ARVN battalions reacting
to a. 15 January Viet Cong attack
on an ARVN outpost in Vinh Binh
Province inflicted losses of 63
killed on the attacking force.
7n adjacent Kien Hoa Province,
the Viet Cong lost 57 killed dur-
ing a 17 January attack against
an ARVN ranger battalion.
Operation CEDAR FALLS
Allied forces continue to
press the largest offensive of
the Vietnam war--Operation CEDAR
FALLS--against a major Communist
base area north of Saigon in Binh
Duong Province. The operation
is aimed at the systematic de-
struction of a 60-square-mile
Viet Cong jungle preserve known
as the Iron Triangle, through
a combination of ground and air
action, and evacuation of the
population.
SECRET
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SECRET
Battalion-sized or larger
enemy main force units known to
be operating in the area have
offered little resistance to the
20 US Army and five ARVN battal-
ions thus far committed, although
small-unit enemy contacts have
been numerous.
As of 19 January, the 12-
day allied drive had resulted in
Viet Cong losses of 524 killed
and 85 captured. Some 460 weap-
ons, more than 45,000 rounds of
ammunition and nearly 3,000 tons
of rice, had been captured or
destroyed. A large number of
enemy documents were also re-
covered.
US casualties to date stand
at 53 killed and 282 wounded.
North Vietnamese internal
propaganda continues to emphasize
the possibility of increased
difficulties for the regime and
its people during 1967. A recent
article in the party theoretical
journal admitted that US air
strikes had created "certain dif-
ficulties" in both production
and transportation. A series of
year-end statements by top lead-
ers hit hard on the theme that
the North Vietnamese people will
be called upon for greater sacri-
fices to support the war in 1967.
This campaign appears to be
precautionary rather than re-
medial. There is no indication
that it reflects any sudden or
drastic deterioration of morale
or economic conditions in the
DRV.
SECRET
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jan 67
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SECRET
TROUBLE DEEPENS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The trouble in Communist Mayor Tsao Ti-chiu, the ranking
China continues i:o deepen. In- party official in the city--
formation received during the past paraded through the streets on
week suggests that regional oppo-- 14 January indicates that local
sition is growing, and that dis- forces had received a heavy blow.
order is spreading in the prov- They are apparently still re-
inces. Widespread resistance to sisting, however. On 19 Jan-
Mao may have encouraged his op- nary, Peking Radio said that
ponents in Peking to launch a "rebels" in Shanghai were still
counterattack against his chief working hard to "expose the
lieutenants. behind-the-scenes plotters and
a wa
commanders." On the same day
poster signed by Red uards from (Shanghai radio stations initiated
four high schools appeared on 18
January praising Liu Shao-chi and
criticizing Madaiie Mao and purge
official Chen Po?-ta as "opportun--
i_sts."
Conflict between pro-Mao
forces and the local authorities
apparently continues in Shanghai,
which has been in the throes of
a political struggle for weeks.
Pro-Mao forces had appeared to
gain the upper hand in early Jan--
nary but on 15 January Shanghai
radio announced :he abolition of
a "rebel liaison station," set up
with much fanfare three days
earlier, because it had been dis-
covered to be "c Ompletely" con-
trolled by local party forces
opposed to Mao. This body, which
supposedly represented 32 "rebel"
organizations, was said to have .
been supplanted 3y a new group--
a "rebel liaison department" serv-
ing only 15 organizations.
a "blackout" on reporting of
local news, and carried only pro-
grams originated by Peking.
This phenomenon has now
been noted in about half of
China's regional broadcast sta-
tions and is taken to be a sign
of local resistance.
Local news has not been
broadcast in Nanking, apparently
a stronghold of anti-Mao forces,
since about 7 January. The
blackout spread to other cities
after Peking made a strong ap-
peal--rebroadcast repeatedly by
nearly all regional stations
on 12 and 13 January--to rally
behind Mao against his enemies.
The rail line between Nan-
king and the capital, which was
cut late last month, apparently
.remains out. A Peking broadcast
on 15 January admitted that a
serious breakdown had occurred
at Pang-fou, between Nanking and
Peking, because railroad workers
had walked off the job.
SECRET
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`"''` SECRET ~00
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NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION 1
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SECRET
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SVC-RE'I'
The situation is also unclear
in Canton. On 16 January the
local radio station broadcast an
"'urgent notice" attributed to 28
"rebel" organizaticns making
routine professions of loyalty
to Mac, and denouncing unnamed
bourgeois reactionaries in the
local party apparatus. The mes-
sage lacked the vitriolic tone of
.imilar pronouncements issued
by groups in cities where gen-
uinely pro-Mao "rebels" appear to
have taken over propaganda media
and may have been issued by
local leaders seeking to give
themselves a Maoist coloration.
The Canton notice denied
'"curious rumors" that leading
figures of the Cultural Revolu-
tion Group in Peking were com-
incg to Canton.
e city was plastered wit
posters stating that Madame Mao
was coming to preside over a
rally to denounce Teo Chu.
These rumors may reflect plans
to attack Tao in his own politi-
cal. stronghold where he ruled
for many years as party boss of
the Central South Region.
It is possible that Tao,
who ranked fourth ii the new
hierarchy until aroind the turn
of the year when he was denounced
by Madame Mao and other leaders,
has fled to Canton and is organiz-
ing a redoubt. A Red Guard
leaflet in Canton on 14 January
complained that the "rebel"
forces who had attempted to take
over the South China Daily on 10
January were actualLy controlled
by Tao Chu.
Tao has not appeared in public
since 29 December, and, according
to one unconfirmed poster report,
he flew south to Nanking on 1 Jan-
uary following a showdown several
days earlier with Lin Piao, who
wanted to arrest regional chiefs
from the Northeast, Northwest,
and Southwest Regional Bureaus
who had come to Peking in mid-De-
cember for parleys under a safe-
conduct issued by Tao.
New trouble is reported else-
where in China. An "open letter"
from a "rebel" organization in the
army, broadcast by the Sian radio
in western China on 18 January,
claims success in the battle
against local party enemies
but admits that resistance is
still stubborn and calls for
stronger efforts to strike them
down. Curiously, the chief vil-
lain mentioned by name is not a
party official but the "political
commissar of a certain unit."F-
These developments took
place against a backdrop of new
attacks on military leaders which
strengthen the supposition that
the armed forces are divided and
perhaps in part disaffected. Two
members just named to the Cul-
tural Revolution Group for the
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%-WI7 SECRET -law
armed forces--reorganized on 11
January--were denounced in appar-
ently authentic posters put up in
Peking on 17 and 18 January.
They are Hu Chih and Tang
Ping-chu, editors of the Libera-
tion Army Journal, who have oc-
cupied top propaganda posts in
the regime since last summer.
New charges brought against
Ho Lung--the most senior military
leader to be attacked thus far--
assert that he was a leader in a
group of important political and
military figures alleged to have
plotted a coup in February 1966.
The posters claim that "many" mil-
itary leaders from the army general
staff, air force, navy, and the
Peking and Cheng-tu Military Dis-
tricts were involved. Other former
leaders implicated by the charges
are Peng Chen, Lo Jui-ching, Lu
Ting-i, and Yang Shang-kun, one-
time aide to Mao now revealed to
be Ho Lung's nephew. A news-
paper distributed in Peking on 19
January accused Yang of being an
"important spy" for the USSR.
Even Mao's old long-march
comrade Chu Teh has not escaped.
Numerous posters since 15 January
charge that he opposed Mao in the
early 1930s, supported the traitor
Kao Kang in 1953, backed Peng Te-
SECRET
huai in 1959, and was a member of
the February 1966 coup group.
Through all this Lin Pia
remained a shadowy figure
Lin has not made a s
o has
peech
since 3 November and has not ap-
peared in public since 26 Novem-
ber. Propaganda broadcasts do
not depict him as playing a sig-
nificant role in the latest de-
velopments affecting the armed
forces, and attention to his po-
sition as number-two man has be-
come perfunctory during the past
two months.
Chou En-lai, by contrast,
has been playing a prominent role
and continues to take a somewhat
different tack than Madame Mao
and Chen Po-ta. He has recently
defended three proteg6s who have
been under attack and, according
to a poster seen on 11 January,
Chou has defended several mem-
bers of the Military Affairs Com-
mission currently under fire from
the Red Guards. He may be striv-
ing to maintain a swing position
between the Maoist faction and
its opponents in the hope of
emerging at the end of the cur-
rent struggle as the one leader
who can be accepted by all par-
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PEKING RENEWING PRESSURE ON MACAO
The Chinese Communists have
renewed pressure on Macao. Their
aim is to end Lisbon's foot-
dragging in curreni: negotiations
over the wording o::= the Portuguese
statement accepting responsibility
for the December rots. Lisbon
is attempting to substitute less
offensive language than the Chi-
nese demand.
In an attempt to intimidate
the Portuguese, Communist news-
papers in Hong Konq and Macao
this week carried ::-eports that
the mainland autho::-ities had de-
cided to cut by haLf the water
supply to Macao, w'iich is com-
pletely dependent on China for its
water. Other press reports quoted
the Macao Trade UnLon Federation
as declaring that Lf the governor
continued to procrastinate, Macao
Chinese should refuse to sell
gcods to the Portuguese officials,
cut off electricity and water to
their offices and quarters, deny
them transportation, and demand
that the governor leave.
On 17 January, the Macao
authorities began evacuating
some Portuguese dependents to
Hong Kong, although the situa-
tion in Macao has remained quiet.
There is no indication that
the Chinese are prepared sub-
stantially to reduce their de-
mands on the Portuguese for a
full and abject apology. Un-
confirmed press reports from Hong
Kong that the Chinese have ac-
cepted a revised Portuguese text
may indicate that a compromise
solution is in prospect. How-
ever, any further Portuguese ef-
fort to procrastinate in imple-
menting the settlement will re-
sult in renewed Chinese pressure.
S LAC RET
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CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT SHOWING INDEPENDENCE OF SIHANOUK
The government of Prime
Minister Lon Nol Ls taking an
increasingly actiie role in the
c;ay-to-nay conduc: of Cambodian
affairs.
Such a .tion by a Cam-
Lodian prime mini3ter is vir-
tually without precedent during
the past several 'Tears.
yihanouk, whop has hereto-
fore made decisions on even triv-
ial foreign police matters, is
said to have been particularly
disturbed in late December when
the Lon Nol government issued a
communique on an alleged US at-
tack against the Cambodian vil-
lage of Bathu without first con-
sulting him. He also character-
ized the tone of the communiqu?
as too mild and e;:cessively "dip-
lomatic. "
The government's desire to
assume greater responsibility
in part reflects the personali-
ties and broad experience of Lon
Nol and the cabinet. It may also
be symptomatic of a general re-
luctance on the part of the
Phnom Penh elite to be bound by
Sihanouk's leftist policies,
with which they have long been
unsympathetic, or to accept unques-
tioningly some of the excesses
of Sihanouk's autocratic rule.
Except for some discredited
leftist elements, there is gen-
eral agreement in Phnom Penh
that Cambodia's neutrality has
leaned too far to the left in
recent years and that a new
balance should be struck.
Sihanouk is now in France
on an oft-postponed rest cure.
His abrupt departure on 6 Jan-
uary has prompted rumors in Phnom
Penh that he may have left under
duress, but these appear to be
without foundation. Before his
departure, Sihanouk indicated
that the Lon Nol government would
be held responsible for solving
long-standing domestic problems.
In the past, such statements by
Sihanouk usually indicated that
he was considering a change in
personnel. A shuffle in cabinet
posts might occur following Si-
hanouk's return, although Si-
hanouk has also stated that the
Lon Nol government would con-
tinue at least through 1967.
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EUROPE
The USSR's top-ranking leaders now have briefed
party stalwarts in more than 60 cities in what has be-
come the most far-flung and intensive explication of
policy ever undertaken in that country. Party organi-
zations in major military units are also receiving the
briefings which appear to emphasize developments in
China and the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.
The meetings are probably intended to impress on party
members the seriousness with which the leadership views
events in China and to prepare the party rank-and-file
for any developments which may stem from the upheaval in
China.
The first meeting between Kiesinger and De Gaulle
took some of the recent chill out of Franco-German re-
lations but left major political problems unresolved.
For the Germans, the most significant result of the
talks was French agreement to assist them in their ef-
forts to normalize relations with East Europe. The
French, in turn, welcome the renewed emphasis on bi-
lateral ties in hopes of eventually enlisting German
support for De Gaulle's concept of East-West detente.
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GERMANY AND FRANCE SEEK IMPROVED COOPERATION
In his talks last week with
President de Gaulle, Chancellor
f:iesinger was successful in re-
storing a positive tone to Franco-
German relations and instilling
new life into the 1963 friendship
treat
Also potentially important
is an agreement to form a joint
working group to explore the ex-
pansion of cooperation in the in-
dustrial, scientific, cultural,
and military fields. Military
cooperation, however, will prob-
ably remain limited by German-US
arms arrangements and by Bonn's
financial problems.
Spokesmen for both sides
acknowledge continuing differ-
ences on key issues such as the
future of NATO G ~~~ tr
the US
25X6
25X6
25X6
France also
agreed to try to discourage the
Afro-Asian countries from using
this German initiative to justify
their recognizing East Germany.
JJe Gaulle welcomes the re-
newed emphasis on bilateral re-
]_ations in Hopes of eventually
enlisting German support for his
concept of an East-West detente.
This he believes, would reinforce
his claim to speak for Western
Europe.
De-
spite the improved atmosphere, it
appears that the "harmonization" 25X1
of Franco-German foreign policies
envisioned in the friendship treaty
remains a distant goal,
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NATO FACES NEW PROBLEMS
The modus operandi between
France and the other fourteen
members of the Atlantic Alliance
which emerged from the December
NATO ministerial meeting may be
in for some further testing. The
French now have expressed a
priority interest in participat-
ing in the proposed NATO communi-
cations satellite program, in the
Committee of National Armaments
Directors (CNAD), and in "nu-
clear consultation."
With regard to the satel-
lite program--directly related
to the operation of the NATO
military structure from which
France has withdrawn--the French
say they "hope" satisfactory
liaison arrangements will be
worked out between French and
NATO commanders. The other Al-
lies suspect that Paris is pri-
marily motivated by a desire to
retain access to US technology.
They also fear that if the
French retain a large role in
CNAD activities, the US may re-
duce its input of technical in-
formation.
In clarifying their posi-
tion on "nuclear consultation,"
the French say they are talking
about "crisis consultation" lead-
ing to a final decision on
whether to use nuclear weapons.
The other NATO countries have
Page 19
already agreed to consider ar-
rangements for "crisis consulta-
tion" separately from the recently
instituted arrangements for deal-
ing with nuclear strategy and de-
ployment. The French, therefore,
view their participation in that
consultative process as not in-
consistent with their refusal to
participate in NATO nuclear plan-
ning. They allegedly foresee,
moreover, a possible need for
consultation in the North At-
lantic Council--NATO's political
arm in which Paris retains its
membership--during the late
stages of a crisis requiring a
decision on the use of nuclear
weapons.
However, participation by
the French in crisis consulta-
tion and related nuclear affairs
could place them in a position
to interfere with the work of the
new Nuclear Defense Affairs Com-
mittee and Nuclear Planning Group
and to reinject themselves into
Alliance discussion of strategic
military issues.
The fourteen have other
problems. Their five-year (1968-
1972) force planning exercise,
for example, is moving against
a tight schedule and needs pre-
liminary guidance papers before
the opening of the spring minis-
terial meeting. However, the
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SECRET
issues involved depend on deci-
sions still to be reached in the
badly lagging tri-ateral (US,
UK, and German) talks on force
levels, strategy, and German bal-
ance-of-payment offset quarantees.
Also the proposed reorgani-
zation of NATO's Mediterranean
command has been delayed by Malt-
ese protests stemning from fears
shat the present plan, if imple-
mented, will ultimately involve
moving the command's headquarters
from Malta to Ita_.y. This, the
SECRET
Maltese believe, would be a
serious blow to the island's
economy and to the continuation
of its pro-Western government.
Secretary General Brosio has put
off final Defense Planning Com-
mittee consideration of the re-
organization plan until after
the visit of Maltese Foreign Min-
ister Amato Cauci to Paris on
23 January. NATO officials fear
that further delay in approving
the plan will jeopardize the
delicate UK, Turkish, Greek,
and Italian compromise of the
many thorny issues involved.I
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_ftoll SECRET ..'
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Tension in the Middle East continues to mount. This
is the season for plowing and sowing in the contentious
area of the demilitarized zones--a time of hazard even
when terrorist activities are at a lull. Now, however
the recent terrorist operations against Israel have,
in the words of Prime Minister Eshkol, brought Tel Aviv
perilously close to retaliatory action aaainsi- Gw?-in
The thorny question of Cyprus rocks along. The dia-
logue between Greece and Turkey over the fate of the is-
land has ceased with the installation of the new Greek
Government. Both countries, however, say they would like
to reinstitute the talks if a way can be found to do so.
There is some doubt in Athens, however, whether Greece's
admittedly interim government should take any initiative
on this problem.
Rumbles of coup plotting--punctuated by the recent
"second stage" coup in Togo--dominated the week's activi-
ties in Africa. The upheaval in Togo, where the first of
many military coups in tropical Africa occurred in 1963,
brought to the fore leftist intellectuals who are less
pro-French and inclined toward Marxist solutions for
their country's problems. Such elements are likely to
be heard from increasingly in the former French African
colonies.
In the Congo, the dispute between Mobutu and Union
Miniere has been somewhat eased by a new proposal by the
mining company to act as sales agent and by Mobutu's con-
ciliatory public response. One of the most difficult
problems may be whether the vital European labor force
will remain under Congolese management to keep the cop-
per moving.
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l .~
?Tibnin t*) i/ %' DEMILITARIZED,
ZONE
t 1i'({c / '
is
r (lam 1 l 1 ,:Ounavhirn6
1
n
?nsniye5
LEBANON i
q
/ I
DEMILITARIZED
ZONE
I S R A E L
Tiberias i Fig0.
Khisfino
D
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\ _ J Dishon ) (,
`AfulaT
Tsem
f tau.
0Umm Oays
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ISRAELI-SYRIAN HOSTILITIES REACH CRITICAL STAGE
Israel and Syria, with UN
prodding, have agreed to discuss
the issue that has been a major
cause of the recent clashes
along their border--farming ac-
tivities in the demilitarized
zones. However, even before
their concurrence on this point
was achieved, tension between
the two countries had reached
an especially critical stage
following a terrorist mine ex-
plosion on 14 January which
caused the first Israeli fatal-
ity in the current series of in-
cidents. These operations by
Palestinian infiltrators--who
now appear to be entering Israel
from Lebanon--are more likely
than the border clashes to lead
Israel to retaliate against Syria.
Foreign Minister Eban has
publicly blamed Syria for the
mine incident which killed the
Israeli (a civilian in the town
of Dishon near the Lebanese
border) and for other recent
sabotage incidents in the same
area. "Fatah," the principal
Palestinian terrorist organiza-
tion, had claimed responsibility
for these incidents in a communi-
que published in the government-
controlled newspaper in Damascus.
Eban said that the success of
any Israeli-Syrian meeting on
activity within the demilitarized
zone would depend on cessation
of "shots and explosions."
Israel and Syria agreed to
discuss the situation in the de-
militarized zones in response
to a 15 January appeal from U
Thant. A date for the meeting,
which will be arranged by local
UN officials, has not been set.
Israel has specified that it
will discuss only the issue of
farming in these disputed areas
and will not tolerate any Syrian
attempt to bring up the broader
question of their political
status which has paralyzed the
UN's armistice commission for
several years.
Prime Minister Eshkol told
Israel's parliament on 17 Jan-
uary that Israel had refrained
from immediate retaliation
against Syria because his gov-
ernment wanted to exhaust politi-
cal and diplomatic efforts to
"restrain" Syria. He added
that Israel would reply "to con-
tinued Syrian aggression accord-
ing to circumstances and neces-
sity."
Israel strengthened its
forces near the border last week
and, in the opinion of the US
defense attache in Tel Aviv,
now has sufficient equipment in
position to launch either a
limited ground attack or a joint
Syria
also has moved "much new armor"
into forward areas.
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NEW GRI=EK GOVERNMENT GAINS PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL
The "interim" Paraskevopoulos
cabinet--the latest step toward
patching up the Greek political
fabric--easily won a parliamen-
tary vote of confidence last
week with the support of the Na-
tional Radical Union (ERE) and
ex-premier George Papandreou's
Center Union (EK) party. The
crypto-Communist United Demo-
cratic Left, the small Progres?-
sive Party, and the "apostate"
Liberal Democratic Center party
of former premier Stephanopoulos
voted against the new government.
Following the vote parlia-
ment adjourned until 31 January,
when it is scheduled to begin
debate on a new electoral bill
to administer general elections,
now slated to be held in late
May. The electoral bill is ex-
pected to be the only parliamen-
tary business for the new govern-
ment. Apparently all parties
have agreed to support a simple
proportional system, although
FIRE leader Kanellopoulos has
been opposed to such a system
in the past.
Andreas Papandreou, the
EK's leading maverick, submit-
ted to his father's demand to
toe the party line and voted
for Paraskevopoulos. However,
in a stormy pre-vote parliamen-
tary session marked by sharp ex-
changes between the opposing
factions, Andreas returned to
his hard line and bitterly at-
tacked the palace, the new
"palace government," and his
fellow politicos. This prob-
ably sets the tone for the
coming election campaign.
In spite of the vote of
confidence, many observers fear
that the government may not have
an unruffled trip to the ballot
box. The press is devoting
considerable coverage to the
pros and cons of convening a
crown council to deal with
Cyprus, Greek foreign policy's
thorniest problem. Argument
centers on whether an interim
government like the present one
can or should make any signifi-
cant moves.
TENSION EASES IN CONGO'S DISPUTE WITH UNION MINIERE
The confrontation between
the Congolese Government and
Union Miniere appears to have
lost. much of its crisis aspect
in the wake of a new company
proposal and conciliatory ges-
tures from Kinshasa.
Late last week Union Miniere
offered the Congolese a contract
under which the company would
supervise copper production and
act as sales agent. Among other
-things, the company demanded a
five-percent management fee,
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insisted on broad autonomy in
its operations, and stipulated
that the contract must run for
five years. Moreover, the com-
pany reserved its position on
several key issues, notably the
question of payment for the ex-
tensive unsold stocks of Con-
golese copper outside the Congo.
It is doubtful whether Union
Miniere would even be willing
to submit this "pipeline" issue
to arbitration.
Although it was politically
impossible for President Mobutu
to accept such proposals out-
right, the company's offer did
give him a chance to make a move
which, although aggressive in
appearance, was conciliatory in
substance. On 15 January his gov-
ernment issued ordinances imple-
menting the 1 January seizure
of Union Miniere's Congolese op-
erations and of the company's
various Congolese subsidiaries--
an action with considerable propa-
ganda resonance but little prac-
tical effect. At the same time
it announced that the vast Con-
golese assets of Societe Gen-
erale, Union Miniere's largest
stockholder, would not be seized
as Mobutu had threatened. The
Congolese also praised the Bel-
gian Government's mediation ef-
forts and announced that they
had presented counterproposals
to Union Miniere.
With these moves the dialogue
has been reopened. The negotia-
tions promise to be long and dif-
ficult, but the two sides seem
likely eventually to work out some
arrangement for Union Miniere to
mine and market the Congo's cop-
per under contract. Such an ar-
rangement would give Mobutu the
political benefits of having as-
serted Congolese dominance over
Belgian "high finance" and would
give the company a fair return
at relatively little risk.
If some agreement is not
reached soon, there may be trouble
in the Katanga mining region. Un-
ion Miniere operating officials in
Lubumbashi (formerly Elisabeth-
ville) say that some company in-
stallations will have to cease op-
erations within two weeks because
spare parts are not available.
They also assert that European
workers, who are essential to cop-
per production, have shown no in-
terest in working for Union Mi-
niere's Congolese successor, and
that some of them are leaving be-
fore their contracts expire.
These officials may be exag-
gerating the gravity of the situ-
ation in order to bring further
pressure on Mobutu. Even a rela-
tively minor cutback in the com-
pany's activities in Katanga, how-
ever, would exacerbate the already
tense situation in the region.
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SEC'RE'T
TOGO'S INTERIM REGIME
The 13 January army take-
over in Togo was apparently un-
opposed, but the _.nterim regime
will be hard put to fulfill its
promise to reorganize the gov-
ernment and hold new elections
within three months.
The provisional government
presented by coup leader Etienne
Eyadema on 14 January is region-
ally balanced, but. is weighted
heavily with younc, anti-French
intellectuals. The nominal pres-
ident of the eight.-man "Recon-
ciliation Committ?e" and its
only military member is Colonel
25X1 K.leber Dad'o
The
majority of the civilian members
represent the activist, leftist
faction of the Togolese Unity
Party which had opposed the
Grunitzky government since its
inception in 1963. The new
leaders possess technical com-
petence, but their political
strength is untested.
Eyadema remains army chief
of staff, the position which
controls the instruments of
force. He
is liable to be shunted asi e
either by the civilian elements
he has brought to power or by
younger, better trained army
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Forthcoming elections in Nicaragua and El Salvador
shared the spotlight this past week along with the after-
math of those in the Bahamas.
Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza has his political ma-
chine in high gear to assure that his family and cronies
will still control the country by electing him president
on 5 February. Anti-Somoza elements may be able to stir
up enough trouble to cause some violence, but government
forces are capable of using whatever rough tactics are
necessary to stay on top.
The leading contender in El Salvador's presidential
election on 5 March is Colonel Fidel Sanchez, favored by
the incumbent President who is also a military man.
As a result of the 10 January election in the Baha-
mas, Premier Lynden Pindling has formed the first all-
Negro government in the island chain. Elsewhere in the
Caribbean, the British are going ahead with plans to de-
crease their involvement by letting Antigua, Dominica, St.
Kitts - Nevis and Anguilla, Grenada, and St. Lucia form
a group of "Associated States" next month with control
of their own internal affairs. Conflicts following
elections last August in St. Vincent may cause postpone-
ment of the same status for that island.
Legislative elections are slated in Haiti on 22
January and President-for-Life Duvalier has already se-
lected the winners, including a lot of new faces.
Brazil's President-elect Costa e Silva is in the
United States on the last leg of a world tour preceding
his inauguration on 15 March.
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Page 27 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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NEW GOVERNMENT IN BAHAMAS
The first Ne;ro leader of
the Bahamas, L. O. Pindling, has
rushed to give public assurance
of his government's dedication
to free enterprise, fostering
of foreign investment, and con-
tinuance of the rDle of the Ba-
hamas in the defense pattern of
t:he Western world.
After his inauguration,
Premier Pindling told US Consul
General Shelton in Nassau that
he was most anxious for the US
Government to know that it had
nothing to fear relative to his
{:tovernment. He has also at-
tempted, following reports of a
considerable flight of capital
from. the Bahamas during the past
several days, to calm the fears
of investors and tourists by
stating that tourism, upon which
the Bahamian economy depends,
should be increased, and that the
tlaha.mas' doors will be open to
legitimate English and American
Industry. Pindling himself has
assumed the major cabinet post
of Tourism and Development.
The new all-Negro cabinet
has been characterized by Shelton
as young, inexperienced, aggres-
sive, and probably left of
center. Although its members
are not considered likely to pur-
sue extreme left-wing policies
_tor ideological reasons, there
may be follies and errors from
inexperience and vindictiveness.
The British governor believes
the main questior will be whether
'3indling can control his less
conservative associates.
One of the new premier's
principal stated aims is to
make it possible "for more Ba-
hamians--black as well as white--
to obtain a more equal share of
the country's wealth than in the
past." Over 80 percent of the
some 150,000 Bahamians are
Negro. Roughly half live on
New Providence Island where the
capital is located. Although
Nassau has a growing colored
middle class of doctors, law-
yers, and small businessmen,
most of the colored population
live "over the hill" in virtual
slum conditions.
During the election cam-
paign PLP leaders had accused
members of the white-led United
Bahamian Party of involvement
with American gangsters and of
graft and corruption. On this
point, the British governor
notes that the PLP itself al-
most certainly incurred obliga-
tions in the election campaign
that may have to be paid off by
concessions to foreign interests,
and that the police and he will
have to be increasingly watch-
ful lest "alleged gangster in-
fluence in gambling turn to
reality."
The British have two ships,
one destroyer and one frigate,
which patrol the Caribbean and
could be called on in the event
of internal difficulties.
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SECRET `"'0
BAHAMAS
U.S.
MILITARY
FACILITIES
GRAND
BAHAMA
GREAT
ABACO
CAYMAN ISLANDS
(Jan.laica)
ANDRO$
ISLAND
9
;,,Governors
Harbour
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NASSAU
Nicholls Town NEW
PROVIDENCE
-.Coakley Town
CAT
ISLAND
GREAT
EXUMA
9
(Support Facility for Eastern
Testing Range
(Atlantic Underwater Test
and Evaluation Center
(Radio Direction Finding
Facility
(Naval Research Station
o I I I loo
STATUTE MILES
LONG
ISLAND
ACKLINS
ISLAND
GREAT
INAGUA
t
~t3 fix ,.
f I CAITI
Gonaiv s
JI LA y
";0NA V'T'
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SLUGGISF ECONOMY REMAINS A MAJOR DOMINICAN PROBLEM
Stimulation of the Dominican
economy remains a major problem
for the Balaguer regime. The US
Embassy expects that this year
the economy will ::_mprove over
1966 but not enough to regain
the :Level it had :-eached before
the April 1965 rerrolt. Since
then, taking into account a pop-
ulation increase of about 3.5 per--
cent a year, there has been a
significant drop :_n per capita
income.
The depressed economic sit-
uation is particu:_arly trouble-
some in Santo Dom:.ngo, where op-
position strength is greatest.
The capital has borne the brunt
of. Balaguer's ausi:erity program,
and the US-financed emergency in-
vestment program has mainly bene-
fited rural areas where President
Balaguer's suppor-: lies. Unem-
ployment and unde::employment, es-
timated at 30 perr:ent of the cap-
ital's labor fcrce, provide a
ready reservoir o:: discontent
for the apparentl,7 mounting oppo-
sition to Balague:-.
Balaguer's ei:onomic policies
thus far have bee:a generally re-
sponsible and sound. The deficit--
ridden sugar industry is operating
more efficiently and development
efforts are being concentrated on
agriculture..
economy, has increased only mod-
erately, however, and the massive
repatriation of private captial
he expected has not materialized.
Balaguer recognized this situa-
tion in his 1967 budget message
and made clear that the govern-
ment must expand its own invest-
ment activities.
The President's operating
style, moreover, appears to be
adversely affecting his economic
programs. He has shown a predi-
lection for off-the-cuff invest-
ments from a special presidential
fund that has resulted in financ-
ing projects of questionable pri-
ority. He is distrustful of tech-
nicians in the government, many
of whom are sympathetic to the
left, and has removed some of
them at the cost of slowing im-
plementation of development plans.
His insistence on centralized con-
trol, as demonstrated in his own
overinvolvement in the expenditure
process, has curtailed corruption
somewhat, but has stifled initia-
tive on the working level.
It is apparent that sizable
sums of foreign financial assist-
a.nce--as much as $75 million--will
continue to be needed if the econ-
omy is not to founder. The Domin-
icans also are counting on retain- 25X1
:Private investment, which
Balaguer in:itiall'j hoped would
provide a major bDost for the
ing the substantially augmented
share of the US sugar quota they
had this past year.
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NICARAGUAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN HEATS UP
With general elections to
be held on 5 February, the atmos-
phere in Nicaragua is one of un-
easy calm that could erupt into
violence.
Charges of fraud in the voter
registration have already been
made, and there is good reason
to believe that the rolls have
been padded with somewhere between
10,000 and 100,000 names.
The leading presidential
candidate is General Anastasio
Somoza Debayle, backed by the
well-organized and well-financed
Nationalist Liberal Party (PLN),
the tool of the Somoza family
that has governed the country for
more than 30 years. His major
opponent, Traditionalist Conserv-
ative Fernando Aguero Rocha, is
supported by a loose coalition
of most of the opposition parties
whose platform is essentially
negative--"no more Somoza."
The PLN seems capable of
winning a free election, but there
are indications that Somoza will
not be content with a close win.
In addition to padding the voter
rolls, his brother, former presi-
dent Luis Somoza, has been en-
couraging voters not to vote se-
cretly, asserting that those in
favor of Somoza should be proud
to make their choice public--
an obvious attempt at electoral
coercion.
The more dangerous periods
will probably be the last two
Sundays in January when major
rallies are to be held in the
capital.
REACTION TO ARGENTINE RAILROAD REFORM LIMITED
Argentine labor has been sur-
prisingly quiet regarding the
government's implementation of
new work rules for the nation's
railroad workers. The 24-hour
railway strike last week received
little support among other groups.
Only the sugar workers in Tucuman
Province, who struck at the same
time to protest the closing of
seven unproductive sugar mills,
created disturbances that re-
quired police action.
Labor may be adopting a
"wait-and-see" attitude toward
the Ongania regime because of the
recent cabinet reorganization
that installed tough-minded An-
tonio Lanusse as minister of de-
fense and put an army general in
charge of railroads. Government
officials have apparently made
it clear to labor leaders that
they intend to proceed with the
revamping of the railroads,
whose inefficient operations and
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redundant personni?l caused a $400
million operating deficit in 1966?
Although some labor leaders have
called for a tougher stand against
the government, including the use
of sabotage and terrorism, the union
officials who con-:rol the railroad
workers and the major unions in the
General Confedera-:ion of Labor seem
to be continuing -:heir- policy of
avoiding a major confrontation. How-
ever, they have been unable to pre-
vent outbreaks of violence in Tucu-
man, where sugar workers have been
struggling against government au-
thority for almost two years.
Success in instituting rail-
road reform would be the govern-
ment's greatest accomplishment
since coming to power last year and
might convince its many detractors
that it will take steps necessary
to improve the nation's economy.
CHILL-AN SENATE REJECTS PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO THE US
The Chilean Senate's rejection
of President Frei s request for per-
mission to visit the US in February
is certain to have widespread reper-
cussions on Chilean foreign policy
as well as on domestic politics.
The vote aga__nst Frei appears
to be primarily one more demonstra-
tion of the Senate's general hosti.l-
ity to the President and its eager-
ness to embarrass him. It was car-
ried by the swing vote exercised by
the centrist Radical Party, which
frequently votes with Frei's leftist
opposition. The Communists and So-
cialists mouthed the usual anti-US
diatribes in their speeches.
Unless Frei': parliamentary
maneuvering persuE.des the Senate to
reverse itself, which at least some
Chilean officials doubt, the effect
of the vote will lie to limit his
freedom to visit z.ny other country.
This might prevent. his attendance
at the inter-American summit meeting
scheduled to be hE,ld in April, and.
it would certainly hamper his ef-
forts on behalf of Latin American
integration. If Frei leaves the
country without Congressional ap-
proval, he will open himself to
charges of unconstitutional, dicta-
torial action.
Frei's Christian Democratic
Party (PDC) is certain to exploit
this issue during the municipal
election campaign in the spring.
It can claim that an irresponsible
political opposition has put do-
mestic concerns ahead of Chile's
international responsibilities.
The lack of widespread public
reaction to the Senate's vote will
limit the pressure that Frei can
exert on the Senate. The PDC has
attempted to organize demonstra-
tions, and in fact scattered vio-
lence has been directed at the
headquarters of the Radical Party
(PR). This has only hardened Rad-
ical opposition to the government.
Frei is unlikely to make the legis-
lative concessions that the PR is
demanding for a reversal of its
position.
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