WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
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RIPPUB
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S
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40
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December 21, 2016
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June 3, 2008
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1
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Publication Date: 
February 10, 1967
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SUMMARY
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Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY State Dept. review completed Secret 52 10 February 1967 No. 0276/67 AGENCY Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 SECRET (Information as of noon EST, 9 February 1967) VIETNAM Pare-Tet Viet Cong attacks directed against US airfields inflicted only minor damage. There are indications of a sizable buildup of enemy main-force elements in the northern provinces and possible post-Tet attacks in this area. The Constituent Assembly adjourned for a ten-day Tet holiday and postponed consideration of im- portant issues such as the powers of the proposed leg- islature. Hanoi insists that its foreign minister's recent offer to consider talks if the US will stop the bombings is a "serious gesture of good will" which the US ignored. Peking, impervious to North Vietnam- ese sensitivies, has carried its anti-Soviet agitation to Hanoi. COMMUNIST CHINA Maoist leaders seem to be intensifying their drive against opponents throughout the country, but it is not clear that they are making much headway. In some localities the armed forces seem to have sided with Mao's opposition. Difficulties in the army seem to have hurt the standing of Defense Minister Lin Piao. CHINESE STEP UP ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN The harassment of Soviet personnel still in China, now in its third week, is designed to goad Moscow into a diplomatic break. Peking's aim is not only to bolster its "cultural revolution" by uniting the Chinese against a foreign enemy, but also to complicate Soviet problems connected with the Vietnamese war. ANTI-SUKARNO CAMPAIGN IN INDONESIA GAINS MOMENTUM Most Indonesians no longer debate whether the Presi- dent should be removed, but how to accomplish the oust- er. Appointment of 108 new members of parliament has strengthened the anti-Sukarno forces. SECRET Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SI CRET FACTIONAL MANEUVERING IN LAOS Neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna appears able to cope with pressure from the rightist leader in the National Assembly, but still faces resistance to his effort to integrate the neutralist military into the Royal Armed Forces. JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MAY RENEW FOCUS ON DEFENSE Prime Minister Sato considers the election an endorse- ment of his support for US-Japanese defense ties Europe UK AND MALTA AT IMPASSE OVER PLANNED BRITISH TROOP CUTBACK Britain's plan to reduce its forces on the island has embittered the Maltese but newly proposed talks offer some hope of an agreed solution. .PACE OF KENNEDY ROUND TRADE TALKS STEPPING UP The principal negotiators are trying to get agreement on the key issues by the beginning of April in order to be able to meet the 30 June deadline. Middle East - Africa INDIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN INTENSIFIES Electoral prospects for the Congress Party have not materially changed, but the campaign itself has grown more heated and violence has increased. SE(]RE7` Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 SECRET REVIVING OPPOSITION IN PAKISTAN President Ayub Khan faces mounting political problems which, unless he handles them deftly, could be ex- ploited by his opponents. The opposition forces, with the expiration of the seven-year ban placed on promi- nent civilian politicians by Ayub, are beginning to gain strength. EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA TO VISIT UNITED STATES Haile Selassie arrives on 13 February to discuss his growing concern over Somali, Arab, and Communist pres- sures in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin. TALKS BEGIN BETWEEN UNION MINIERE AND THE CONGOLESE President Mobutu and Union Miniere have both shown somewhat greater willingness to resolve their dispute by discussing the formation of a new international "association" to mine and market the Congo's copper. ALGERIA HOLDS COMMUNAL ELECTIONS The successful holding of communal elections on 5 February--the first balloting for local officials since independence five years ago--is the Boumediene regime's first achievement toward putting the country's administration on a firm foundation. Western Hemisphere FRAUD CHARGED IN NICARAGUAN ELECTION Preliminary returns give General Somoza a substantial lead in Nicaragua's presidential election on 5 Feb- ruary, but official results are being announced so slowly that the opposition is claiming fraud in the ballot count. SECRET Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 SEC R ET SOVIET-CUBAN ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS CONCLUDED Moscow will continue under this year's trade agree- ment to provide substantial financial assistance. DOMINICAN PRESIDENT MOVES TO SHORE UP POLITICAL POSITION 30 Balaguer's efforts to ensure the support of the secu- rity forces and improve relations with moderate opposi- tion elements suggest some apprehension that chal- lenges to his government may be developing. BRAZIL PROMOTING TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND USSR A high-level mission that has visited Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague has produced some tangible results, and its leader, Minister of Industry and Commerce Martins, is optimistic about long-range trade prospects. HEMISPHERE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET NEXT WEEK The Third Special Inter-American Conference and the 11th Meeting of Foreign Ministers will begin in Buenos Aires on 15 February to make final decisions on amend- ments to the OAS Charter and arrangements for the inter-American summit meeting this spring. 25X1 SECRET Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET FAR EAST The dramatic deterioration of Communist China's relations with the Soviet Union has tended to over- shadow further Chinese domestic fireworks. The abuse heaped upon the departing dependents of So- viet diplomats and the concerted harassment of the remaining officials suggest that the Chinese are trying to force the Soviets to close their embassy. As the pressure in Peking increases, the Soviets will have great difficulty maintaining their pres- ence there. In the struggle between supporters and oppo- nents of Mao Tse-tung, the shakiness of Mao's mili- tary backing continues to be evident Almost daily exhorta- tions to supposed followers of Mao to unify them- selves so as better to oppose the "handful in power" betray their disarray. The formation of "communes" --patterned on the short-lived Paris commune of 1871--to rule Shanghai and several provinces is the regime's latest improvisation in the effort to re- gain clear control. In South Vietnam, the New Year holidays have brought a pause both in military action and consti- tution-making. Hanoi is extending its campaign to persuade the US that peace talks could begin if the bombing of North Vietnam were ended. In Indonesia, pressures continue to mount for the ouster of President Sukarno, with even some leaders of his once reliable National Party adding their voices to the chorus. Final action might come through the policy-making Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, which is scheduled to meet next month. SECRET Page 1. WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 0 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET VI ETNAM Both military and political activity in Vietnam has slowed down with the beginning of the five-day lunar new year celebra- tions (Tet) on the morning of 8 February. Pre-Tet military activity initiated by the Viet Conq was highlighted by four attacks against US airfields in South Vietnam on 6 and 7 February. Three of the raids--those at Binh Thuy, Tra Cu, and Tra Noc in the Mekong Delta--caused few casualties and only minor damage to the installations. The fourth, against a US Army airstrip in cen?- t.ral Binh Dinh Province known as "English Airfield," resulted in casualties of one killed and 59 wounded. Shortly before the truce the Viet Cong destroyed more than $5 million worth of ordnance at the Long Binh ammunition dump northeast of Saigon and nearly 150,000 gallons of napalm at. the Bien Hoa Air Base. Six US Army battalions of Operation GADSDEN, reported sev- eral heavy engagements with enemy forces while sweeping the western section of the long-time Commu- nist sanctuary known as War Zone "C" in northern Tay Ninh Province.. There have been continuing :indications of possible Communist troop deployments in the northern provinces. There are also re- ports of Communist units moving south from Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces into Quang Ngai Province. Enemy strength in Quang Ngai Province is now estimated to be as high as 15 main-force bat- talions, and several indicators point to enemy preparations for offensive operations in this province in the near future--a recent rallier stated that Quang Ngai would soon become a "major battlefield." Possible objec- tives include the Special Forces camps scattered throughout the province and/or US Marine and South Korean base camp areas. At the same time, a con- tinuing high level of truck traf- fic has moved southward on the Laotian panhandle's infiltration road network. Nearly 500 ve- hicles were observed entering Laos from North Vietnam during the first three weeks of Janu- ary--a level of activity al- most comparable to last year's SECRET Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 e: GULF OF ,-- 'ra jc Az ,rfie d SOUTH VIETNAM J 25 50 75 IOOMile~ % ~~ 25 5(1 75 1 O Kilometers SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 SECRET and higher than any other period since the current dry season be- gan in October. South Vietnamese Politics South Vietnam's Constituent Assembly adjourned on 3 February for about ten days without hav- ing begun discussions on the more significant aspects of legisla- tive power in the future govern- ment. Some public criticism of the as- sembly's work, echoing that of military leaders and given prominent coverage in the gov- ernment-controlled press, has irritated the assemblymen, but apparently not to the extent of seriously damaging their relations with the government. Hanoi on Negotiations Hanoi propaganda has con- tinued to press for a permanent cessation of the bombings. On 5 February the party daily news- papers underscored the signifi- cance of recent North Vietnamese offers to consider talks with the US in exchange for a cessa- tion of the air strikes and chal- lenged President Johnson's 2 February statement that there had been no "serious effort by the other side." Hanoi charac- terized Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's 28 January inter- view expressing a willingness to talk as a "serious effort full of good will" and charged that the US had ignored it. In another commentary, on 7 Febru- ary, Hanoi publicly denied that "secret talks" were being held with the US. The commentary called such talks "ambigious rumor" and "sheer fabrication." Peking-Hanoi Relations Page 4 The virulent Chinese anti- Soviet campaign has spread to Hanoi. Indicating Peking's will- ingness to ignore North Vietnam- ese sensitivities, Chinese stu- dents and diplomats carried their SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET W demonstrations in front of So- viet embassies to Hanoi for the first time on 30 January. Al- though both the Soviet and the Chinese press reported the dem- onstrations, Hanoi authorities refused to allow any local re- lease of the news. The demon- strators were "gently dispersed," Local authorities sup- pressed the French AFP corres- pondent's dispatch. The next day's edition of the local Chi- nese-language daily was delayed, possibly because of censorship problems. Peking may also have en- gaged in some limited "obstruc- tionism" in connection with So- viet aid personnel. The Soviet press charges that the Chinese harassed Soviet technicians en route to Hanoi at the Peking Airport. COMMUNIST CHINA The supporters of Mao Tse- tung seem to be intensifying their drive against opponents through- out China, but in spite of numer- ous claims of victory it is un- clear how much headway they are really making. In some areas army forces appear to have sided with Mao's opposition in party organizations. This is not sur- prising since the local party boss usually is political commissar of army units in his jurisdiction and has a higher party rank than the local. military commander. In Sinkiang and Tibet the party chieftain is concurrently the military commander. Opposi- Page 5 tion to Mao has been especially stubborn in these two provinces. According to posters, pro-Mao Red Guards have been attack- ing Sinkiang boss Wang En-mao for five months and Chang Kuo-hua, top man in Tibet, for about two months. Maoist forces may be gain- ing the upper hand in Sinkiang. The Urumchi radio station has been broadcasting vitriolic at- tacks on the Sinkiang party com- mittee since about the first of February, when propaganda media were apparently taken over by pro-Mao forces. Posters seen in Peking claim that Wang has SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 ..' SECRET been in Peking for six weeks "consulting" with Premier Chou En-lai. A wall poster seen in Peking on 7 February reported that "reac- tionary" army troops in six Szech- wan cities had been suppressing "revolutionaries." The troops were said to be led by political commissars of the Cheng-tu Mili- tary Region (Szechwan Province) who are responsive to Li Ching- chuan, first political commis- sar of the region and first sec- retary of the Southwest party bureau. Other posters have reported recent clashes between troops and Maoist militants in Honan Province and in the Mukden (Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilung- kiang provinces), Inner Mongolian, Tsinan (Shantung) and Canton (Kwangtung, Hunan, and Kwangsi) military regions. Such reports appear to be designed to dis- credit local military commanders and may be a prelude to their dismissal. There is no evi- dence that pitched battles be- tween army factions have oc- curred anywhere. The drive to discredit and bring down military leaders con- tinues to be pushed in Peking, as well as in the provinces. Mao Tse-tung is reported in a poster to have complained to the Mili- tary Affairs Committee on 27 Page 6 January that many "old leaders" in the army did not understand his revolutionary objectives. Fresh posters have gone up in the past week attacking Yang Yung, commander of the crucial Peking Military Region (which includes Shansi and Hopeh prov- inces), and many other military figures. It is now fairly cer- tain that Yang, who was in good standing through mid-January, was dismissed about 22 January when he was first criticized. The reason for the sudden downfall of this key military commander is unknown, but presumably he was a casualty of new maneuverings among the leaders around Mao. Recent relevations that the army is not the trustworthy in- strument of control it was sup- posed to be may have hurt the standing of Defense Minister Lin Piao. He is still described in propaganda as Mao's "close com- rade in arms" but he did not ap- pear with Mao at a reception on 3 February for the visiting Al- banian defense minister. In fact, Lin was last seen in public on 26 November when he appeared with Mao at a Red Guard rally. Lin's name is appearing much less frequently in Peking media than a few months ago. Even ar- ticles dealing with military af- fairs either fail to mention Lin at all, or contain only one or SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 *4w, I~Vw two pro forma references to him. Provincial In the past, such articles were studded with references to "Lin's instructions." It is possible that Lin is in poor health, but this would not explain why propaganda tributes to him have diminished. Page 7 Since 24 January Chinese broadcasts have claimed victory for pro-Mao forces in ten of the 28 provincial-level entities in China, but considerable resist- ance apparently persists in most of these. Peking itself has SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 - SECRET endorsed only four of the take- overs--in the provinces of Shansi, Kweichow, and Heilung- kiang and in the Shanghai munic- ipality. New organizations modleled on the Paris Commune of 1871 have been established in these areas to replace party committees, but it remains to be seen whether they can consolidate control and operate effectively. Peking's failure to acknowl- edge victory claims by six pro- vincial radios suggests either that it is not satisfied that those making the announcements are genuinely pro-Mao, or be- lieves that the announcements were premature. The seizure pronouncements issued by "revo- lutionaries" in Kwangsi and Kansu provinces did not use the harsh language characteristic of gen- uine pro-Mao forces in attacking local party leaders. Shensi Province, which had announced a take-over of power on 26 January, seems to be in turmoil again. A provincial radiobroadcast from Shensi on 4 February said that "revolution- aries" were "making slow steps without advancing" and claimed that the key to victory "lies in staging a people's war." The radio went on to exhort "revolu- tionaries" to fight this war in the streets, factories, and rural areas. Page 8 The tone of seizure announc ments indicates that pro-Mao forces are firmly in control of the party apparatus in the East China provinces of Kiangsi, Anhwei and Shantung. Peking's failure to endorse these take-overs may be related to problems involving the loyalty of local military commanders. Economic Aspects Peking has taken measures to protect and distribute supplies of food and other daily necessi- ties in hopes of alleviating the more immediate economic problems resulting from the "cultural revo- lution." Maoist leaders still seem determined, however, to push the revolution despite its dis- ruptive effects on production and labor discipline. In quick succession, Peking on 30 January ordered postponement of the lunar new year celebra- tions, and on 3 February or- dered the military to take control of stocks of food and "other im- portant materials." The celebra- tions were postponed so as not to compound existing difficulties-- intermittent transport stoppages, some consumer goods shortages, and worker absenteeism. The holi- day period is normally an occasion for extensive travel and above- normal demand for consumer goods. SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET I%w Military control of food stocks is probably intended to ensure that food supplies from the below-average 1966 harvest are stretched and distributed in accord with Peking's desires. The transfer implies distrust of pub- lic security organizations, which in the past have controlled food stocks. Since the authority of the Chinese Communist party apparatus has been badly damaged, it is doubtful whether it is effectively carrying out the leadership's latest directives. Whether or not Peking suc- ceeds in alleviating the most pressing economic problems created by the "cultural revolution," the movement continues to generate SECRET Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY future troubles for the economy. The unprecedented lapse in labor discipline of the past month has allowed long-suppressed popular desire for a better life to sur- face. Workers and peasants have been vigorously demanding higher wages, more welfare benefits, re- vised employment practices, a larger share of the crop, more state loans, and even larger pri- vate plots. According to official propaganda, these demands have been kindled by forces opposed to Mao in order to sabotage his "cul- tural revolution." Whatever their origin, these demands represent real grievances. High officials, including Chou En-lai, have felt compelled, consequently, to promise consideration of the demands after the revolution is completed rather than summarily dismissing them. Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET CHINESE STEP UP ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN Peking's drive to goad Mos- cow into a diplomatic break, now entering its third week, appears intended in part to bolster the "cultural revoluticon" by uniting the people against a foreign en- emy. Anti-Soviet demonstrations are reported in major cities out- side the capital, and domestic propaganda broadcasts have warned against a possible coup by pro-- Soviet Chinese. The unprecedented. violence of the campaign and the evident. Chinese determination to push it through to a conclusion suggests, however, that other, equally im- portant objectives are involved. A complete break in diplomatic ties would enormously complicate Soviet problems in dealing with the Vietnamese war, and could confront Moscow with difficult decisions regarding support for Hanoi. If the Chinese succeed in forcing Moscow to take the first step in breaking relations, Peking would blame the Soviets for any tie-up in overland aid shipments to Vietnam. The only feasible alternative to rail transport of major military materiel through China would be shipments by sea. The Chinese have repeatedly charged that Moscow was reluctant to take this step through fear of a confrontation with the US and the Chinese probably believe that in a pinch the Soviets would refuse to ship by sea and thus discredit themselves in Hanoi. Izvestia on 9 February ac- cused China of doing all. it could to break transport links between the Soviet Union and North Viet- nam. This was the first time an official Soviet organ had leveled this charge. The paper also quoted speculation in the Western press that Peking is seeking a break in relations with Moscow in order to isolate the North Vietnamese and stop Soviet deliv- eries. This may be the first step in an effort to shift the onus for any future difficulties onto Peking. The Chinese are apparently stepping up the pressure on the Soviets in Peking. The embassy is under a virtual siege and the Chinese have been taking steps to render the situation intoler- able. Soviet officials have been warned to stay inside their com- pound in order to escape "serious incidents." East European diplo- mats, who have been taking in food and other necessities to the beleaguered Russians, have been informed that their safety cannot be guaranteed if they per- sist. SECRET Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 SECRET ..W Nonstop demonstrations out- side the embassy have made de- liveries of fuel impossible and, according to the Reuters corre- spondent, Soviet diplomats have said that coal supplies will last only until the end of the month. The Chinese could make the sit- uation untenable even sooner by cutting off water and electricity. Despite their difficult situation, the Soviets apparently hope to ride out the current crisis. Reuters reports from Peking that the Russians have laid in several tons of food and have filled the embassy swimming pool with a reserve supply of water. Most if not all dependents have been flown home SECRET Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY Moscow thus appears ready to go to great lengths in order to maintain a diplomatic mission in China. On 9 February Premier Kosygin stated that Moscow would go on doing all it could to pre- vent any "break up in diplomatic relations." He added that "it all depends on the other side." The Russians appear to be preparing against the possibility that the Chinese will take some drastic additional action to force them out of Peking. Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET ANTI-SUKARNO CAMPAIGN IN INDONESIA GAINS MOMENTUM Pressures against Indonesia's President Sukarno continue to mount. Most Indonesians no longer debate whether or when he should be removed but how to accomplish it and what subsequently should be done with him. For the time being, the prin- cipal emphasis is on persuading Sukarno to resign. In addition. to Foreign Minister Adam Malik, several high-ranking army officers and some leaders of the National Party--until recently a Sukarno bulwark--have asked the President to leave the country in order to avoid the necessity of taking legal action against him. Student leaders argue that it is too late to let Sukarno retire quietly and that he must be forced to face congressional action and a court trial. The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS), the country's foremost policy-making body which would be required to take any ac- tion against Sukarno, reportedly is scheduled to convene on 6 March. Anti-Sukarno, pro-army ranks in the MPRS have been considerably strengthened by the addition to the Indonesian Parliament of 108 new appointees, including at least 20 student and youth leaders. Parliament, now with 350 members, sits as a body in the MPRS, whose total membership now is 649. While the regime is placing chief emphasis on the Sukarno problem, it is also making prog- ress in restoring Indonesia's economy and international stand- ing. The recently passed for- eign investment act which con- siderably improves the climate for foreign business activity has now become law. Indonesia has also negotiated an invest- ment guarantee agreement with the United States. Stabiliza- tion measures initiated in late 1966, have helped slow the country's economic deterioration. Indonesia's Western credi- tors are scheduled to meet in Amsterdam on 23 and 24 February to deal with the rescheduling of about two thirds of Indonesia's total debt to Western nations. The other third was rescheduled at a meeting in Paris last Decem- SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET FACTIONAL MANEUVERING IN LAOS Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's rightist deputy, Leuam Insiesingmay, is exerting pres- sure in an effort to bolster his much eroded position within the Laotian Government. Souvanna nevertheless is well set to gain cooperation from the new National Assembly which opened last week. Leuam's failure to secure the election of more than a half dozen or so of his followers in the voting for the new assembly on 1 January substantially re- duced his influence. In the pre- vious assembly his rightist fac- tion held 32 out of the 59 seats. In the pre-election maneuvering Leuam was unable to persuade key regional military commanders to support candidates amenable to his leadership. Since the elec- tion, he has threatened to resign from the formal leadership of the rightist faction--a position of some importance to the nominal balancing of the assembly among leftist, rightist, and neutralist elements--unless Souvanna gives him a greater say in government decisions. So far, Souvanna has been unmoved. He has advised Leuam that if he resigns from the as- sembly position, he must also vacate the deputy prime minister- ship, a considerably more substan- tial office to which Leuam is clinging. Souvanna's assembly position is strong enough that he need not accommodate Leuam. A majority of the deputies have pledged support to the prime minister, and the president of the assembly has agreed to shep- herd his programs through. A much more difficult prob- lem for Souvanna is the question of integrating the neutralist military into the Royal Armed Forces. Discussions have found- ered on the question of revealing the neutralists' true force lev- els. They have been receiving funds and supplies on the basis of inflated strength figures which enable officers to pocket the proceeds of unused allotments. Certain commanders, notably Col. Somphet, are jockeying for the favor of the general staff in Vientiane by revealing the sizes of their fellow officers' units and proclaiming themselves sup- porters of full integration. On the military front, the Communists have again shown their ability to strike at will at ma- jor government installations in many areas by attacking Luang Prabang Airfield on 2 February and destroying a number of tac- tical aircraft. The raid was probably a reaction to the ef- fective government use of Luang Prabang - based aircraft against Communist ground operations. SECRET Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECFZF1 JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MAY RENEW FOCUS ON DEFENSE Prime Minister Sato's man- date from the Japanese elections on 29 January has given him a firmer base for expanding Japan's defense effort. Sato has long favored a strong defense posture for his country. In late 1965, follow- ?..ng Peking's first nuclear ex- plosions, he began publicly sup- porting an increase in Japan's defense effort, and the first serious public debate on Japanese security ensued. :3ato presumably considers tdat the election results con- stituted an endorsement of his publicly avowed support for the 0", including mutual defense arrangements, and of his cam- udign attacks on the Socialists =,-; the minions of Peking. Pe- nq,s recent nuclear explosions d r_ resen : domestic turmoil sci provide a favorable atmo- =,here for discussing defense. ,a e will soon try to push budget F_oposals ::hrough the new Diet ,'age 14 to raise defense appropriations from little over 1 percent of Japan's GNP of about $100 bil- lion to 2 percent. On 2 February Vice Foreign Minister Shimoda told the press that the return of Okinawa might be feasible if the US were assured of un- encumbered use of the bases in R uk us. Shimoda stressed the need for the Japanese to reach a consensus on unrestricted use of the US bases. any ensuing public discussion helps focus attention on the wider problem of Japan's security. 25X6 25X6 25X6 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET `' EUROPE Soviet leaders continue their active diplomacy in Europe. Kosygin is now in the UK promoting, as Podgorny had done last week in Italy, the ideas of detente, European security, and trade. Brezhnev, meanwhile, went to Prague, where, among other things, he must have been trying to deal with problems cre- ated by West Germany's diplomatic maneuvers in East- ern Europe. The Rumanians refuse to be called to account for their recognition of Bonn and have let it be known that they would boycott a meeting of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, at first set for last Monday in East Berlin, if the meeting were held there and if the subject of their relations with West Germany were raised. The meeting was thereupon reset for later in the week in Warsaw, and it now seems likely to bring forth only the most general statement of support for East Germany. In Western Europe, attention remains focused on the crucial Kennedy Round trade negotiations and on discussions over the draft nonproliferation treaty. West German Foreign Minister Brandt, meanwhile, vis- ited Washington this week to discuss the nonprolif- eration treaty, the troop offset agreement, and Bonn's relations with Eastern Europe. SECRET Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 .-r SECRET UK AND MALTA AT IMPASSE OVER PLANNED BRITISH TROOP CUTBACK Britain's plan to reduce its forces on Malta has embit- tered the Maltese, but London now has proposed new talks on the issue which offer some hope of ending the impasse between the two governments. Malta's principal concern is the effect the British troop cutback would have on its econ- omy. London agreed to limited concessions three weeks ago but its final offer failed to satisfy the Maltese. Malta thereupon re- Page 17 taliated by abruptly renounc- ing its defense agreement with the UK and subsequently rejected another British offer. It in- sisted that the British either reverse the decision to reduce their forces there--numbering about 4,300--or get out entirely. To harass the British, the Maltese have withheld tax-free fuel and other supplies and re- fused services for UK units. They also introduced legislation to remove privileges and immunities granted British military personnel. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 NkI SECRET 4111110 Now, however, the Maltese Government has indicated an in- terest in Britain's latest offer to discuss the economic effects of the troop reduction. London also expressed its willingness to talk about rephasing the with- drawals. Maltese Prime Minister Borg Olivier has been under pressure from the left-leaning opposition leader, Dom Mintoff, and from labor unions--whose members would suffer the most from an economic pinch. Mintoff argues that Malta has always been undercompensated for the Western presence. He has made vague claims that he can get economic assistance from Com- munist and neutralist countries. The US ambassador to Malta believes that further harass- BALEARIC ISLANDS ment of British forces might lead to a break in relations and a chaotic internal situation. A breakdown of order or a rapid de- terioration of the economy could lead to the downfall of Borg Olivier's pro-Western government and the return of Mintoff's Labor Party to power. If the two sides do not re- solve the dispute in further talks an effort will probably be made to have NATO play a conciliatory role. It would be asked to ex- pand its proposed study of the im- plications for Malta of the re- organization of the NATO Mediter- ranean Command there to include a review of the consequences of the British force reductions. - R C, SECRET Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY MALTESE ISLANDS Valletta M ALTA 7i rl ISRAEL, lexani~7'1a ~4f Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET VW PACE OF KENNEDY ROUND TRADE TALKS STEPPING UP Participants in the Kennedy Round of trade and tariff nego- tiations are under the pressure of time to show results within the next two months. The authority granted under the US Trade Ex- pansion Act of 1962 to cut tariffs by as much as 50 percent expires on 30 June, and negotiated con- cessions must be in shape for formal approval by then. sible EEC, and particularly French, efforts to revive debate on how to handle the mutual reduction of particular tariffs which are mark- edly higher in the US than in Europe; the US protectionist valuating system for certain chem- icals; and various "nontariff barriers" to trade--the most re- cent complaint being the new US auto safety standards. The principal negotiators --the US, UK, EEC, and Japan, plus the Scandinavians, Switzerland, and Canada--agreed in Geneva last week to press for agreement on the key issues by the beginning of April. To meet this deadline, negotiations within separate com- mittees dealing with specific products such as chemicals, steel, grains, and cotton textiles will have to be sharply intensified. Ultimately, each delegation must be able to recommend to its re- spective government a "package" of concessions balanced among all these sectors. With the crunch thus ap- proaching, the "war of nerves" which has been part of the Geneva talks since their inception has also intensified, and the Euro- pean press has been carrying gloomy reports about the final outcome. These have tended to concentrate on what are in fact likely to be major problems: pos- The EEC--still working out its internal policies and having to reconcile the interests of its six members--remains the main source of uncertainty. Although the community will doubtless be tough to the end, there have been several favorable developments. The EEC's Commission is negotiat- ing more freely than before, and West Germany, with a recession on its hands, seems even more eager to bring about sizable tariff cuts. Also, the French have agreed to push for a community commitment to provide food to less developed countries as part of a global grain agreement. Such a commitment is of great impor- tance to the US, but the Dutch and Germans, in particular, will for financial reasons have con- siderable difficulty accepting it. Thus far, Britain's "prob- ings" for EEC membership appear to have had no impact on the SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET tariff talks. There has, however, been some questioning in the French press whether the EEC should make concessions now to the UK and EFTA countries, since their eventual membership in the E3C would make such concessions superfluous. The problems the developing countries have getting benefits from the Kennedy Round were re-- cently highlighted at a high-level GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) meeting in Argentina. Some of these countries stand to suffer reductions in the pref- erences they presently enjoy in developed-country markets as a result of the Geneva negotia- tions. Differences among the industrialized nations on how to 25X1 "compensate" them for such losses may create another difficult Kennedy Round hurdle. SECRET Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET *ftol MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA Official royal African visits to the US domi- nate the scene this week, with the arrival of King Hassan of Morocco on 9 February to press for more defensive arms aid to counter the Soviet arms build- up in Algeria. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, scheduled to arrive on 13 February, also wants ex- tensive arms aid and may go to Moscow for them if he does not get the huge package he wants from the US. (An article on page 15 discusses the numerous problems that underlie his search for arms.) On the continent, the picture in the Congo brightened a bit when Mobutu indicated willingness to discuss the formation of an international "asso- ciation" to mine and market the copper. In Nigeria, however, the prospects for another meeting of the antagonists are dim, although a meeting of the Su- preme Military Council has been called for later this month. Algeria held communal elections on 5 February and the regime's success in holding them at all may bode well for future elections on a state and national level. The closing days of the Indian general elec- tion campaign have been marked by violence and much heckling of the Congress Party campaigners--even Mrs. Gandhi was struck by a thrown rock. The Greek Crown Council on Cyprus met this week with Cypriot President Makarios in attendance, and Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos announced his intention to continue the dialogue on this thorny problem with Turkey on the ministerial level. Israel says it continues to find terrorist bombs near its borders. Another Israeli-Syrian meeting on the dispute over farming in the demili- tarized zone has been postponed for a week. Saudi Arabia is still sounding out Yemeni anti-Egyptian sentiment to see what if anything can be done about the Egyptian presence in Yemen. SECRET Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 0 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET INDIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN INTENSIFIES Electoral prospects for India's long-ruling Congress Party have not materially changed as the campaign for the 15-21 Febru- ary general election enters its final week. The campaign itself, however, has grown more heated and incidents of violence report- edly have increased. leaders, including Prime Minister Gandhi, have been heckled and even physically assaulted while campaigning in opposition strong- holds. Rocks, tomatoes, and shoes have been thrown at Congress candidates, especially by vola- tile conservative elements in the cities. Congress seems certain to retain a viable, but reduced, working majority in the national parliament. The biggest gains at Congress' expense are likely to be scored by the right-wing oppo- sition parties--the Hindu nation- alist Jan Sangh and the conserva- tive Swatantra. The Indian Com- munists, split since 1964 into two rival parties, are not ex- pected to improve much, if at all, on the 29 seats won by the united party in 1962. On the state level, opposition parties will almost certainly capture one of the 17 state governments--Kerala--and have varying prospects of depriv- ing Congress of its majority in the legislatures of at least five other states. The major opposition parties, eager to destroy the image of Congress invincibility, are strongly on the offensive. They have kept alive the prevailing mood of discontent and dissent by assailing the incumbent Con- gress governments from virtually every angle. Congress Party The extent of pre-electoral violence has given Indian authori- ties cause for concern, with the chief election commissioner warn- ing that such violence threatens to alter the climate of freedom for the elections. Mrs. Gandhi, herself the victim of a well-aimed rock, has appealed to the country to maintain its good record for orderly electioneering. Although several national issues have emerged--inflation, food shortage, currency devalua- tion, and the demand for a nation- wide ban on cow slaughter--none of these is expected to have a decisive effect on the election results. Indian voters, espe- cially in the rural areas where most of them live, still tend to vote on the basis of personality, caste, and strictly local issues. It is in these areas that Con- gress, with the only nationwide 25X1 political machine, has what should be a decisive advantage over its splintered opposition. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET REVIVING OPPOSITION IN PAKISTAN Pakistani President Ayub Khan faces mounting political problems. Although they present no immediate threat to his regime, he must han- dle them deftly lest they be ex- ploited by his reviving opposition. After seven-year retirement imposed by Ayub's military regime in 1960, some of the most promi- nent civilian politicians of the 1950s are returning to political activity and this is changing the cast of personalities with whom Ayub must cope. Some of these so- called EBDOnians--a term derived from the initials of the enabling order which automatically expired on 31 December 1966--are joining his Pakistan Muslim League, and to this Ayub will have to adjust. The more active ones, however, are returning to the opposition. Mumtaz Daultana--a former pro- vincial chief minister and possibly the most important of the EBDO- nians--appears to be having some success in uniting the center and rightist opposition in West Paki- stan. He may hope to unite all anti-Ayub factions on the basis of their opposition to the current in- direct electoral system--one of the few issues on which they agree. However, Daultana has not yet been able to reach an agreement with the extreme leftist National Awami Party, nor has he yet devised a po- sition on provincial autonomy ac- ceptable both to West Pakistanis and to the Awami League, which ad- vocates near independence for East Pakistan. If Daultana succeeds in uniting antiregime elements, Ayub could face his greatest political challenge in several years. Among Ayub's more immediate problems which are subject to op- position exploitation has been the high price of food. This has been an important cause of two major strikes--one of port workers in Karachi, the other a rail strike which temporarily paralyzed trans- portation in West Pakistan. Al- though the government moved quickly to force union leaders to agree to a settlement, recognized labor leaders lost control of union mem- bers to leftist agitators who may have been under Communist direc- tion. The government found it nec- cessary to make large-scale arrests, to fire on strikers, and to use troops to run the trains before the strikers began returning to work. Another, more transitory problem has been a dispute between ultraconservative religious lead- ers and an Ayub-appointed committee as to the exact day on which this year's Ramadan fast ended. Ayub retaliated by "detaining" five of the Muslim leaders, and the arrests appear to have increased popular dissatisfaction. The continued arrival of for- eign aid grain is improving the food situation, and resentment over the Ramadan confusion will disappear fairly soon. However, other problems are bound to arise, any of which would help a revivi- fied opposition to whittle away at Ayub's still great political strength. SECRET Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA TO VISIT UNITED STATES Emperor Haile Selassie ar- rives in Washington on 13 February for long-sought talks with Presi- dent Johnson. He is deeply con- cerned with developments in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin which he apparently sees as a Somali-Arab-Communist con- spiracy and a threat to the Ethiopian empire. The Emperor's foremost con- cern remains his archenemy, the Somali Republic, which has designs on the Somali-inhabited terri- tories of Ethiopia and is support- ing guerrilla activities there. He is worried not only about that country's Soviet-supplied mili- tary buildup but also about its designs on French Somaliland, which is to decide in a 19 March referendum whether or not to with France. Another concern is the Egyp- tian and Communist presence in Yemen and the threat this poses to near-by Aden when the British depart next year. Traditionally wary of Muslim encirclement, the Emperor's fears have been height- ened by stepped-up Arab, Somali, and Communist aid to Eritrean and other dissidents within his em- pire. The Emperor may sound out US attitudes regarding pos- sible Ethiopian courses of ac- tions after the referendum in Lassim Berbera Hargeisa Bender Beil Page 24 SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 `'"~ SECRET French Somaliland. He has al- ready made it clear that he could not countenance a loss of French control to other than Ethiopian hands. In the event of a "no" vote, he may attempt a pre-emp- tive military take-over. additional arms for his army, navy, and air force, although he may be angling for even stronger US backing. Ethiopian officials have already presented a large shopping list of hardware valued at an estimated $161 million. Meanwhile, through bribery and propaganda support, he is aiding the French campaign to achieve a "yes" vote. The French are currently optimistic they will achieve this by a small ma- jority, but they do not discount a surprise. French, Ethiopian, and Somali referendum maneuvers make any estimate hazardous. Haile Selassie's main pitch to the US apparently will be for TALKS BEGIN BETWEEN UNION MINIERE AND CONGOLESE Congolese President Mobutu and Union Miniere have both shown somewhat greater willingness to resolve their dispute, but many important issues remain to be ironed out. Union Miniere, reportedly under considerable pressure from the Belgian Government and from other Belgian firms with inter- ests in the Congo, gave its blessing late last week to a proposal for a new international "association" to mine and market the Congo's copper under contract. Membership in the "association" apparently would be offered to several international mining firms, but Union Miniere, even though nominally excluded from participation, would probably continue to dominate the group through its control of European mining personnel in the Congo. A representative of a firm as- sociated with Union Miniere pre- sented the proposal to Mobutu during a meeting on 6 February. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET Mobutu had earlier turned down terms very similar to this proposal and had refused to con- sider a place in mining and mar- keting for either Union Miniere or its associates. Nonetheless, at. the 6 February meeting he indicated a willingness to use the new proposal as a basis for negotiations. Although the two sides are in. direct communication for the first time since early December, there probably will be many ups and downs in their talks. There are indications, for example that they take divergent views of the "association's" purpose. Mobutu sees the association as a stopgap until he can work out alternative arrangements, whereas the Union Miniere group says it will cooperate only if the Congolese agree to a long-term contract. ALGERIA HOLDS COMMUNAL ELECTIONS The successful holding of Algerian communal elections on 5 February--the first balloting for local officials since inde- pendence five years ago--is the Boumediene regime's first achieve- ment toward putting the country's administration on a firm founda- tion. The regime may now consider it possible to hold elections for departmental councils and ulti- mately for a national assembly. The elections were conducted in an atmosphere of apparent calm. Despite the poor weather, the turnout reached as high as 90 percent in some rural areas and 55 percent in Algiers. The regime had made an intensive effort over the last three -months to arouse interest in the elections, to ex?plain their purpose, and to introduce candidates. The higher participation in rural areas was due to efforts of local gendarmes apparently ordered to make sure the people voted. Also, candi- dates were better known person- ally. The country's sole politi- cal party, the National Libera- tion Front, was assigned the task of preparing the electoral lists, basing selection of can- didates on demonstrated ability as well as on party militancy. Some choice, however, was pro- vided by listing two nominees for each seat. These elections are the final step in the broad program of communal reform, embodied in a Communal Charter adopted by the Revolutionary Council early in January. The regime's aims are twofold: to stimulate and encourage participation in gov- ernmental affairs at the Grass- roots level, and to shift the central government's massive administrative and financial burdens to the local level. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 ``WV SECRET -wov WESTERN HEMISPHERE Much of the political activity in the hemi- sphere last week was related to the forthcoming inter-American meetings in Buenos Aires. The chief task of one of those assemblies-- the 11th Meeting of Foreign Ministers--will be to choose a date, site, and agenda for the proposed inter-American summit conference. Most countries are now reconciled to having the meeting in mid- April at Punta del Este, Uruguay, but a consensus on details of an agenda will be harder to find. Chile, Colombia, and Mexico still insist that an agenda be spelled out before their presidents commit themselves to attend. The Colombian foreign minister has suggested a month's delay in the meeting, even if an agenda agreement is reached. Attendance of several other presidents remains uncertain. Haiti's Duvalier may stay home for fear of not being allowed to return should he leave. Barrientos of Bolivia needs some face-saving agree- ment on his demand that Bolivia's aspirations for an outlet to the Pacific be discussed. One of the matters that was slated for discus- sion at the second of the Buenos Aires meetings-- the Third Special Inter-American Conference, con- voked to revise the OAS Charter--has been dropped. Brazil's proposal to "institutionalize" the Inter- American Defense Board--an independent body with only advisory powers--by making it a formal OAS mechanism ran into such determined opposition from Mexico and Chile that Brazil backed off. Deliberations of the hemisphere's diplomats in Buenos Aires next week could be interrupted by demonstrations or attempted disturbances. SECRET Page 27 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 0 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRETI' FRAUD CHARGED IN NICARAGUAN ELECTION Preliminary returns give Gen- eral Somoza a substantial lead in Nicaragua's presidential election on 5 February, but official results are being announced so slowly that the opposition is claiming fraud in the bal- lot count. regularities during the voting were widespread, mostly in rural areas. Opposition electoral judges in some instances were prevented from tak- ing their places or were otherwise harassed. in several areas ballots were marked on the table 65666 PRESIDENT SOMOZA cases no voting booth was provided. Furthermore, complaints of multiple vot- ing were numerous. `aOVIET-CUBAN ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS CONCLUDED The USSR and Cuba signed their 1967 trade agreement on 1 Febru- ary. The negotiations were pro- tracted, probably because of So- viet determination to hold down the level of aid. Last year when Cuba's poor sugar crop reduced its deliveries to the USSR, Moscow had to increase its support to at least double the $91 million it had already pro- in front of the judges or even out- side the polling station. In some grained to finance the chronic im- balance in its Cuban trade. ,'his brought the total of Soviet eco- nomic credits to Cuba since 1960 to more than ono billion dollars. Significant financial assist- ance will continue this year in the form of the sugar subsidy. The USSR has agreed to pay six cents a pound for Cuban sugar-- more than three times the current SECRET, Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 SI~,CRF'1` market price--for up to 4 million tons in 1967. Havana is unlikely to meet this target, but the good current crop may permit delivery to the USSR of at least 3 million tons---last year's export target. Sugar deliveries probably are to account for most of the 23-percent growth in trade which the new trade pact. establishes as a goal for 1967. The USSR remains Cuba's chief source of foreign support and accounts for half its $1.5- billion foreign trade. China has cut back its trade with Cuba, and other Communist countries assist Cuba reluctantly. The Polish trade agreement this year, for instance, specifies only that trade will "equal" that for 1966. Cuban-Soviet differences over the aims of the aid program were probably a factor in protracting the negotiations, which began last October. For several years the USSR has provided large quan- tities of specially designed equipment and hundreds of tech- nicians to improve Cuban agricul- ture, but Havana. continues to seek more aid for industrial projects. Any problems encountered dur- ing the trade talks had no ef- fect on Soviet military deliver- ies. These have been increased in recent months in an effort to refurbish the Cuban armed forces, and replace worn out or destroyed e ui ment. Recent ar- rivals include eight new naval ships--patrol craft and subchas- ers. S EC R ET Page 29 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 - SECRET - DOMINICAN PRESIDENT MOVES TO SHORE UP POLITICAL POSITION Dominican President Balaguer has been trying to shore up his political position and has demon- strated particular concern over the solidarity of his military and police support. He intends to restore the pay of military and police officers to the level prevailing before the government adopted austerity policies last summer. Balaguer's authorization of a roundup of left-wing dissidents on 22 January was partially in- tended to show the military that he could move firmly to curb anti- government activities. Similarly, his speech on 4 February portray- ing plotting and subversion by the Communists may have been in- tended in part to reassure hard- line military elements that he is not blind to this danger. Relations with opposition elements acceptable to Balaguer are also coming in for presiden- tial attention. In an attempt to isolate and weaken the militant leadership of the left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), Balaguer has named PRD dissident Angel Miolan to be Minister without portfolio. He has also taken a relatively mod- erate and flexible stand in deal- ings with the left-of-center Rev- olutionary Social Christian Party, which has indicated its inten- tions to keep its opposition ac- tivities within bounds acceptable to Balaguer. Balaguer has taken some steps to allay concern among moderates over the sometimes arbitrary ac- tions of the government. He has publicly apologized to non-Commu- nist dissidents who were caught in the roundup of left-wingers last month and now seems willing to accept some of the secondary- student demands that have led to a protracted school boycott. Through his statements and actions Balaguer appears to be consciously attempting to create an impression that he is in full control of political develop- ments and is not threatened by any serious unrest. His assidu- ous cultivation of potential po- litical allies seems to indicate 25X1 apprehension that challenges to his government may be developing SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 W"I% SECRET %ftp BRAZIL PROMOTING TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND USSR The Brazilian trade mission that has been touring Eastern Eu- rope for several weeks has con- cluded its talks there and moved on to Western Europe and the US. The mission, headed by Minister of Industry and Commerce Martins, is part of a major Brazilian ef- fort to expand foreign trade. Brazil has been sending about six percent of its total exports to the USSR and Eastern Europe in recent years, but the volume has been limited by Brazil's restricted capacity to import bloc products. Exports averaged about $100 million annually dur- ing 1964 and 1965, and rose to nearly $70 million in the first half of 1966. In Moscow the Brazilians con- cluded the first deal under last year's $100-million credit agree- ment with the Soviets. A $5-mil- lion credit was extended to fi- nance the construction of a petro- chemical plant in the state of Bahia. Page 31 Brazil is in the market for transport aircraft and, in response to an earlier Soviet invitation, is sending repre- sentatives to Moscow to study the aircraft industry. Bra- zilian airlines' needs and the recent trade and aid agreement have increased the prospects for the USSR's first sale of aircraft in Latin America. Three days of talks in War- saw ended with the signing of a trade protocol that should clear the way for detailed negotia- tions. There was further dis- cussion of an earlier proposal whereby Brazil would purchase $30-60 million worth of Polish merchant ships and pay for them principally in coffee. If con- cluded, it would be the largest Polish shipbuilding deal with any non-Communist country. power complex. complex and the Ilha Solteira Exploratory trade talks were also held in Czechoslovakia. The two countries agreed to put their trade on a hard currency basis immediately. Both sides indicated an interest in possi- ble Czech participation in major Brazilian development projects, including the large US-financed and -built Volta Redonda Steel SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 SECRET Hard bargaining is likely t:o be the order of the day when foreign ministers of the Western Hemisphere meet in Buenos Aires on 15 February. Differences of opinion are already apparent on every item to be discussed at these meetings, the Third Spe-- c_ial Inter-American Conference and the 11th Meeting of Foreign Ministers. One major purpose of the meeting is to make final deci-, sions on amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS). These amendments were drafted by a special OAS committee in Panama almost a year ago, but the follow-up meet- ing scheduled for August was postponed because of the mili- tary coup in Argentina. The most controversial of these amendments is one spelling out US undertak- ings on economic aid, which the ES opposes and other members are eager to adopt. Differences of opinion are also likely over regional eco- nomic integration. According to a press report, the Chilean foreign minister, who is one of the strongest advocates of in- tegration, may not attend be- cause of political problems at home. The US ambassador in San- tiago, however, believes that Valdes will go. If he stays away, strong leadership for any meaningful decisions on economic cooperation may be lacking. Planning for the inter- American summit meeting may also pose problems. Although most members agree that the meeting should be held at Punta del Fste, Uruguay, from 12 to 14 April, some countries find these dates inconvenient because of govern- ment changes and congressional sessions. Furthermore, there is some feeling that it is pre- mature to set a time and place before an agenda has been de- cided on. Observers have been invited from Canada and the former Brit- ish colonies of Jamaica, Trini- dad and Tobago, Guyana, and Bar- bados. Their presence may spark at least informal discussion of the advisability of enlarging the organization, a prospect that some present members view with distaste. By the time the meeting convenes, Trinidad and Tobago may have applied for OAS membership. Barbados, too, has indicated its desire to loin SECRET Fage 32 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 HEMISPHERE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET NEXT WEEK 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4