WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005700030001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 10, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Department review completed
Secret
52
10 Marcia 1967
No. 028J/67
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AGENCY Ai(Cr:.ivh:
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(Information as of noon EST, 9 March 1967)
VIETNAM
The Communists are increasing the pressure on US
forces in northern Quang Tri Province. In Saigon,
conflict between the Military Directorate and the
Constituent Assembly over the powers of a projected
national defense council could intensify the com-
petition between Chief of State Thieu and Premier Ky
as future candidates for the presidency. North Viet-
nam is continuing to improve its air defenses, but
has recently admitted to serious and persistent
economic dislocations.
NEW MOVES TO RESTORE ORDER IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Peking continues efforts to restore order. Recent
moves include steps to extend the army's influence
over civil affairs, to reinstate a few second-level
officials in Peking, and to discipline the Red Guards
and disband their organizations.
LAOTIAN PRIME MINISTER SEEKS CABINET SHIFTS
Souvanna Phouma wants to remove an obstructionist
deputy prime minister and to reduce the influence of
the neutralists. At least for the moment, however,
the powerful Prince Boun Oum is blocking his course.
SOUTH KOREAN PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT WASHINGTON
Seoul intends to play up Chong Il-kwon's trip, and
any US commitments obtained, in the national election
campaign this spring.
Europe
SOVIETS ORBIT SECOND SUCCESSFUL WEATHER SATELLITE
The USSR is sending some of its pictures to the US in
partial fulfillment on the 1962 agreement to exchange
weather information.
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ESRO TO ORBIT FIRST SATELLITE NEXT MONTH
The vehicle, equipped for scientific purposes, will
be launched from California by a US Scout space
booster.
Middle East - Africa
MANEUVERING TO FORM NEW GOVERNMENTS IN INDIA
Opponents of the Congress Party will be in power in
several important states. At the national level,
Mrs. Gandhi is gathering support in her bid to remain
prime minister.
PRESSURES BUILDING UP IN NIGERIA
The verbal battle between Eastern military Governor
Ojukwu and Supreme Commander Gowon has recently
accelerated, amid hints of impending military action.
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Western Hemisphere
NEW BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT
Under President Costa e Silva, who takes office on
15 March, Brazilian foreign policy is likely to be-
come more nationalist=ic and independent, and domestic
austerities may be relaxed.
SANCHEZ WINS SALVADORAN PRESIDENCY
Colonel Fidel Sanchez, who represents the more pro-
gressive wing of the governing National Conciliation
Party, will probably continue the social welfare
policies of incumbent President Rivera, receive the
same cooperation from businessmen and the opposition
parties, and, like Rivera, be friendly toward the US.
Sh;(,RFT
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FAR EAST
Both Hanoi and Saigon are engaged in new politi-
cal. maneuvers designed to influence US policy and
strengthen their respective positions in the current
international debate on terms for negotiations to
end the Vietnam war. Hanoi attempted to fuel its
campaign to force a cessation of US bombing by dis-
patching a delegation to meet with U Thant in Ran-
goon. Although the North Vietnamese apparently of-
fered no new proposals, this gesture of implicit sup-
port for the UN secretary general's three-point plan
for moving the conflict toward negotiations (begin-
ning with a cessation of bombing) probably was in-
tended to encourage him to continue his mediatory
efforts.
The Saigon government's concern over growing
sentiment in South Vietnam for a negotiated settle-
ment and over the international debate on a formula
for breaking the diplomatic stalemate underlies a
series of regime-sponsored demonstrations denounc-
ing a "false peace" and "irresponsible pacifists."
On the military front, Communist forces inten-
sified mortar attacks against US forces and bases
in South Vietnam, particularly US artillery posi-
tions below the Demilitarized Zone which are firing
on. North Vietnamese troop concentrations and base
areas in the DMZ and southern North Vietnam. In-
creasing Viet Cong concern over the potential ef-
fectiveness of Saigon's Revolutionary Development
Program is evident in reported Communist plans to
wage terrorism against RD workers and to mount large-
scale attacks on RD teams.
Peking continues to retreat from the excesses
of the Cultural Revolution, with the army taking
the lead in key areas of political and civil af-
fairs. Mass "rebel" organizations are being dis-
mantled and the Red Guards are being dealt with by
reopening secondary schools and by combining rival
universi Red Guard units into a new "great alli-
ance."
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SECRET
VIETNAM
North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
units are intensifying pressure
against US Marines conducting
Operation PRAIRIE near the De-
militarized Zone (DMZ) in South
Vietnam's northernmost province,
Q_uang Tri. The upsurge may re-
flect Hanoi's sensitivity to
the recent positioning of long-
range US 175-mm. cannons at Gio
Linh and Camp Carroll, two and
eight miles south of the formerly
neutral buffer zone. More than
1,500 rounds of mortar fire
have been directed at these po-
sitions during the past ten days
in an unsuccessful effort to
neutralize the heavy artillery.
The marines have reported
a series of heavy contacts in
this area since 1 March in which
they have lost 89 killed and 289
wounded, versus 500 enemy dead.
Several of these engagements were
with battalion-sized or larger
elements of the NVA 324 "B" Di-
vision.
There have been tenuous in-
dications in the past several
weeks that additional NVA units
have infiltrated or may be pre-
paring to infiltrate into South
Vietnam via the DMZ.
Concurrent with intensified
NVA resistance to action by US
Marines near the DMZ, the enemy
threat to the Khe Sanh Special
Forces camp near the Laotian
border in western Quang Tri has
substantially increased. The
camp has been repeatedly recon-
noitered and, on 3 March, its
forward airstrip was bombarded
in two heavy mortar attacks.
Since elements of the 900-man
US-advised paramilitary garri-
son at Khe Sanh regularly moni-
tor NVA infiltration activities
into Quang Tri Province from
both Laos and the DMZ, it is
possible that the recent harass-
ment reflects a Communist at-
tempt to cover extensive infil-
tration operations.
The 20-battalion sweep op-
eration JUNCTION CITY into the
Communist War Zone "C" redoubt
is in its third week. Physical
damage to both enemy installa-
tions and forces has been con-
siderable but not spectacular,
with Communist losses at 445
killed and 155 weapons captured
thus far. Several hundred pounds
of captured enemy documents may
prove of high intelligence value,
as did the many taken in the
"Iron. Triangle" by Operation
CEDAR. FALLS earlier this year.
Presidential Politics in Saigon
The recent tendency of
South Vietnam's Constituent. As-
sembly to avoid diluting the
executive power of the future
president may lead to increasing
competition between Chief of
State Thieu and Premier Ky, the
potential military candidates
for the office.
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BURMA ' '..
T H A I L A N D
Haiphong
C A M B 0 D I A
Khe Sanh,Special Forces Camp
N O R T H
?
7 I..J ??`
k i
FOPERAT10N G!o Linh
PRAIRIE II 'damp Carroll
DAO PHU QUOC
(Vietnam)
50 1Q0 150 Miles
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SECRET
Last week, for example,
the assembly voted to establish
a military advisory council as
a special institution of the
future government. However,
assemblymen clearly indicated
their desire to limit the coun-
cil's influence to routine mili-
tary matters such as personnel
promotions and transfers. They
left to the future legislature
the decision as to who would
chair the council, as well as
how it would be organized and
regulated.
It is by no means clear
whether this has satisfied Chief
of State Thieu, who earlier had
formally requested the assembly
to provide for such a council to
give the military a legal and
important voice in an elected
government. The council chair-
manship might also provide a
prominent position for Thieu
hiimself if he is not the head
of that government.
If Thieu decides that the
-military advisory council has
little chance of becoming the
strong vehicle he envisages, he
may well make a determined ef-
fort to become the military's
-presidential nominee. Such an
effort would lead him into a
direct confrontation with Pre-
mnier Ky, who already appears
similarly determined, and this
could spell the end of the ef-
fective working relationship
which has existed between them
for nearly two years. This
could pose a severe strain on
over-all military unity--the
key element in the government's
stability during this period.
Hanoi's Economic Problems
North Vietnam's most author-
itative economic spokesman--Vice
Premier Pham Hung--recently ad-
mitted in a speech to a national
planning conference that US bomb-
ings had resulted in production
and distribution problems through-
out 1966. He implied that con-
tinuing shortfalls in meeting
the needs of the people would af-
fect the country's war effort,
and singled out agriculture and
transportation as problem areas.
He also admitted. for the first
time, that the regime had aban-
doned its industrialization
plans as long as the war lasts.
The 1966 grain harvest was
probably the worst in recent
years; food imports scheduled
for the first quarter of 1967
are almost equal to those in all
of 1966. Pham Hung told local
officials that peasants must be
given more material incentives
and more say in the allocation
of grain. The policy he advo-
cated would enable the peasants
to keep some grain which formerly
went to the state. Huncr's only
recommendations for offsetting
continuing manpower shortages
in agriculture were to improve
agricultural techniques and to
concentrate on the development
of local industry in order to
support civil needs, especially,
those of agriculture.
In the transport field, the
vice premier strongly implied
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that supplying Communist units
in South Vietnam would continue
to claim large shares of invest-
ment resources and manpower in
1967. Last year, funds alloted
to this effort were raised one
third over 1965, and since the
bombings began, North Vietnam
has organized labor crews esti-
mated to number more than 100,000
full-time (and perhaps twice as
many part-time) workers for bomb
damage repair and road improve-
ments in the southern half of
the country, as well as an addi-
tional 100,000 to operate the
repair system. Another 20,000
are believed to be similarly em-
ployed on the infiltration routes
in Laos. Some 30,000 Chinese
logistics troops are stationed
in the northern part of the DRV
to maintain and improve lines of
communication into China.
DRV Air Defense Improvements
Reports received during the
past week provide additional
evidence that North Vietnam is
continuing to improve and ex-
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pand its air defense system.
The most recent discoveries in-
clude photography of a new sur-
face-to-air missile (SAM) s)ip-
port and assembly area 12 n.les
west of Haiphong.
These developments apo ar
to be part of a program of up-
grading air defenses which prob-
ably began last November.
Twenty-three new miss Le
sites have been detected s. - rice
November and an additional five
SAM firing units have been added
to the SA-2 order of battle.
The number of AAA guns has risen
to approximately 6,500.
This concerted effort to
enlarge and ir.prove North ~'iet-
nam's air defenses has so far
not affected the scope of US air
operations. Indeed, the over-all
US aircraft loss rate has c:..e-
clined during the past three
months.
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NEW MOVES TO RESTORE ORDER IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Peking continues efforts to
restore order throughout China.
Recent moves include steps to
extend the army's influence over
civil affairs, to reinstate a few
second-level officials in Peking,
and to discipline the Red Guards
and disband their organizations.
The army, which took control
of civil aviation last month, was
ordered by the party's Military
Affairs Committee in a directive
of 23 February to take charge of
spring planting in some areas.
There are also reports that the
army has taken control of food
stocks. In Peking and a few
other cities, it has assumed
control of the Public Security
Bureau.
in line with a recent Red
Flag editorial urging that errant
party cadres be "saved," several
lesser figures who had been
mildly criticized have been re-
habilitated. According to posters,
Tang Ping-chu and Mu Hsin,
abruptly dismissed as editors of
the People's Daily and Kwangming
Daily on 18 January for undef ni ed
"bo-urgeois" mistakes, were cleared
by Chen Po-ta, a leading Cultural
Revolution official, on 27 Feb-
ruary. Wu Te, a Peking municipal
official attacked from time to
time, is also back in good stand-
ing according to a 2 March broad-
cast which, in a rare official
listing of middle-level party
leaders, identified him as a
member of the city's
leadership.
This confirms poster
reports
that
Madame
Mao
had defended
Wu on 20
January
and
ordered
Red
Guards
to let
him
return to
work. Chang
Shu-chih, Honan Military District
commander whom Premier Chou ln-
lai defended last month against
Red Guard attacks, was confirmed
in his post by a 6 March broad-
cast in which Chang supported
army participation in spring
planting.
Several top provincial
leaders also may ultimately
retain their authority. The
number is unclear, but there are
signs that a few provincial
first secretaries--including
those in Tibet and Sinkiang who
have attacked Red Guard organi-
zations since last fall--:may
remain in their posts.
Reports from Peking and
other major cities indicate that
Red Guard organizations are
being merged and :reorganized,
probably to convert them into
conventional mass organizations
tightly controlled by the re-
gime. Most of the youths have
been sent back to their high
schools, which were to reopen on
1 March. A 6 March People's
Daiiy editorial stated that the
schools would emphasize the
study of Mao's works and other
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Cultural Revolution documents
but directed students to spend
"the necessary time" on academic
subjects. It also reaffirmed
Mao's earlier demands that "the
period of schooling must be
shortened, education must be
revolutionized, and the domina-
tion of our schools by bourgeois
intellectuals must not be al-
lowed to continue."
LAOTIAN PRIME MINISTER SEEKS CABINET SHIFTS
Laotian Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma's plans for re-
organizing his cabinet, although
stymied for the moment, under-
score the increasingly rightist
outlook of his government.
The US Embassy in Vientiane
understands that Souvanna hopes
to give the foreign affairs port-
folio to the ambassador to Moscow,
Khampan Panya, a rightist. Under
the Geneva agreement of 1962 this
post is supposed to be held by a
neutralist. Souvanna would then
replace Khampan in Moscow with
Minister of Interior Pheng Phong-
savan, thereby removing the last
neutralist of stature from Vien-
tiane.
Souvanna had planned to begin
the reorganization by replacing
Deputy Prime Minister Leuam
Insiesingmay, who increasingly
obstructs his policies. Leuam,
however, is the protege of Prince
Bourn Oum the powerful political
leader of South Laos. In a dis-
cussion with Souvanna on t., March,
Boum Oum reportedly stood fast
against replacing Leuam, thereby
preventing any immediate