ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI RIVALRY OVER FRENCH SOMALILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005700030005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 10, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO0570009Nitt
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY'
Special Report
Ethiopian-Somali Rivalry Over French Somaliland
State Department review completed
Secret
45
10 Mar:h 1967
No. 023')/67B
Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05700030005-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05700030005-4
Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05700030005-4
 Approved For Release 2006/91e1 DP79-00927AO05700030005-4
ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI RIVALRY OVER FRENCH SOMALILAND
Voters in French Somaliland will decide on 19
March whether they will stay with France or opt for
independence. De Gaulle has stated flatly that, if
the referendum goes against the French, they will
pull out lock, stock, and barrel. The issue has
raised antagonisms between the territory's two ma-
jor tribes and may bring about a military confronta-
tion between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic.
Ethiopia deems it vital to keep the railroad from
its capital, Addis Ababa, to the French Somaliland
port of Djibouti in friendly hands, while the Somali
Republic wants to incorporate all ethnic Somalis
within its borders. Paris and Addis Ababa are working
hard for a continued French presence, while the So-
mali Government in Mogadiscio is plumping for a vote
for independence. The French have been cautiously
optimistic that they can obtain by a small majority
a vote for continued ties to France, but a split
in the heretofore solidly pro-French Afar tribal
community suggests that they may be disappointed.
Why The Referendum?
De Gaulle's decision to
permit a new referendum in the
territory, which has been French
for over 100 years, was a direct
result of the unexpected demon-
strations and violence in Djibouti
during his visit there on 25 and
26 August 1966 and similar dem-
onstrations in September.
In the previous referendum,
in September 1958, the territory
had voted by a solid 74 percent
majority to remain French. Most
of the population--variously
characterized by visitors as
"somnolent," "torpid," or "seized
with narcol.epsy"--appeared con-
tent with the French subsidies
and protection, with the increas-
ing social welfare services, and
with the growing prosperity
stimulated by the developing port
of Djibouti. Nationalist senti-
ment seemed to have largely died
out with the death of the Somali
firebrand Mohamed Harbi in 1960.
The demonstrations indicated
that the discontent was centered
in the minority Somali popula-
tion. The majority Afar people
are traditionally antagonistic
to the Somalis, and in return
for official favors and preferen-
tial treatment have been over-
whelmingly pro-French. The Afars,
who inhabit the rural area.. out-
side Djibouti, are mostly nomadic
herdsmen, while the more polit-
ically conscious Somalis dominate
the port city. The basic impetus
SI'.(;KL'I'
Pa e 1 SPECIAL REPORT 10 Mar 67
Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05700030005-4
 Approved For Release 2006/03/11,;,cl DP79-00927A005700030005-4
f `Asia 4 fit
Rioting in Djibouti during
De Gaulle's visit in August 1966.
Approved For Release 2006/03/16 P'P - - -
65933
 Approved For Release 2006/03 1}G-,c F DP79-00927A005700030005-4
for the outbreaks was provided by
festering Somali discontent with
the French policy of coddling the
Afars and with Afar domination
of local institutions since 1963.
The theme of Somali independence
was also clearly evident in the
demonstrations, where it was
pushed primarily by the Somali
Popular Movement Party (PMP).
France was quick to accuse
Somali Republic leaders of incit-
ing their kinsmen, although there
was little overt evidence of
their involvement.
In a speech to the local
Territorial Assembly on 25 August,
De Gaulle had dismissed the "pres-
ent show of agitation as not
enough to demonstrate the demo-
cratic will of the territory."
However, after the demonstrations
were renewed in September he
agreed to permit a new referendum
on the territory's association
with France.
De Gaulle sternly warned the
inhabitants that a "no" vote--
against continued association
with France and for independence--
would result in France's with-
drawal of its representatives,
its aid, and its military forces.
It soon became clear, however,
that Paris was going to try hard
to stay and to make a "yes" vote
as palatable as it could by grant-
ing greater local autonomy. Paris
changed the French governor,
dismissed from his post as Coun-
cil head the solidly pro-French
but now tainted Ali Aref, and
installed in the Council a more
representative coalition of Afars
and Somalis headed by the 1:far,
Mohamed Kamil. The French also
began a series of consultations
in Djibouti and Paris on the
wording of the referendum and on
a new statute. At the same time,
they arrested fourteen of the
independence-minded Somali poli-
ticians.
The Territory Itse-'.f
French Somaliland is one of
the world's most inhospitable
places--8,900 square miles of
desert, salt flats, and rocks.
In the entire territory only
about 300 acres are cultivated
and because of the heat, tae
saline soil, the blowing sand,
and lack of water, there are no
real prospects this can be in-
creased. There is not a single
fresh-water lake or perennial
river in the entire area and
Djibouti gets barely five inches
of rain per year. There is no
industry or manufacturing, and
salt is the only mineral re-
source. Most food and consumer
goods must be imported.
Despite all this, approxi-
mately 100,000 persons marage
to eke out an existence. Some
60,000 live in Djibouti, the only
urban area, depending for employ-
ment on the port of Djibouti,
on the Franco-Ethiopian rr-ilway,
and on the businesses catering
S}iI IR1~;1'
Page 3 SPECIAL REPORT 10 Mar 67
Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05700030005-4
 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05700030005-4
FR H
1 LILAND
AD#N,
Beet tie
-,Jima
EN/YA waji~
Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05700030005-4
 Approved For Release 2006/OW R, : RIkk jRDP79-00927A005700030005-4
to shipping. The rest are nomads
who follow the grass with their
herds in the Somaliland hinter-
land and into neighboring Ethiopia
and Somalia.
Almost all of Somaliland's
exports consist of re-exports
of Ethiopian goods processed in
Djibouti--totaling about $2.5
million in 1964. Imports, how-
ever, are about ten times greater
than exports. This trade gap is
partly closed by Djibouti's
earnings from services it pro-
vides to shipping, but is pri-
marily offset by payments re-
ceived for handling Ethiopian
imports and exports. Djibouti
has been developed by the French
into a modern port with a good
harbor and is beginning to pick
up some of the bunkering and
ship supply business that once
went to Aden.
The 486-mile single-track
railroad from Addis Ababa to Dji-
bouti, 63 miles of which is in
Somaliland, is Ethiopia's only
major rail carrier. Since 1959
ownership has been divided equally
between Ethiopia and France, with
all of the Ethiopian shares and
something over half of the French
shares held by the respective
governments. Until 1952, when
Ethiopia incorporated Eritrea and
its ports of Massaua and Assab,
the line was Ethiopia's only
practical connection to the sea.
Despite the expansion of
Assab and Massaua, about half of
Ethiopia's foreign trade still
moves through Djibouti. It would
take at least three years to in-
crease Eritrean port capacity to
take most, if not all, traf-dc
now moving through Djibouti.
Mounting Eritrean dissidence may
be another long-range reasoai why
Ethiopia would want to hang on
to Djibouti.
Although Ethiopia could do
without Djibouti, the reverse is
not necessarily true. Without
earnings from the Ethiopian trade,
Somaliland could not carry Dn
even its present low level
domestic economic activity.
French aid to Somaliland
takes a variety of forms inc-ud-
ing development loans, grants,
and budget subsidies, but the
total is not especially large--
perhaps as little as $1.5 million
annually. The largest French
commitment to date seems to be
the expansion of the port of
Djibouti, which is expected to
be completed next year. Thus
while the economic benefits which
accrue to France from its pres-
ence in Somaliland are minor, so
are the costs of staying.
French Somaliland's popula-
tion includes some 7,500 Euro-
peans, 8,000 to 10,000 Arats,
mostly Yemenis and South Arabians,
and 1,000 Asians. The native
population of some 86,000-90,000
is divided between the majority
Afar (or Danakil) tribe, which
is related to tribes in Etl.-iopia,
and the minority Somalis. The
latter are made up of the -ndige-
nous Issa Somalis and the so-
called "foreign" Somalis, the
Ishaaks, who have come into the
territory from the northern part
of the Somali Republic.
S1iX RE']'
Page 5 SPECIAL REPORT
Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005700030005-4
 Approved For Release 2006/03/1661 Dg79-00927A005700030005-4
The principal French inter-
est in French Somaliland appears
to be a strategic one. The ter-
ritory is situated at the junction
of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden
and places France at the "southern
door" to the Red Sea and Suez.
The territory provides Paris with
a good port, with a communica-
tions center, and with facilities
for French air, army, and naval
forces. It serves as an advance
base for French activities in the
Indian Ocean, as a convenient
stop for French planes en route
to the Malagasy Republic, Central
Africa, and French-speaking South-
east Asia, and as a way station
to the Pacific nuclear test sites.
Moreover, the scheduled departure
of Britain from Aden next year
almost certainly increases Dji-
bouti's importance in French eyes,
as a last Western outpost in the
face of growing Communist and
Egyptian penetration of the Red
Sea Basin and the Gulf of Aden.
French Somaliland is a con-
venient parking place for Foreign
Legion units which are legally
barred from being stationed in
France. The permanent 3,500-man
garrison in the territory includes
a well-equipped and -trained demi-
brigade of the Foreign Legion
supplemented by a battalion of
French Army troops (about 700
men), 80 French gendarmes from
Metropolitan France, and 200 na-
tive gendarmes (mostly Somalis).
There is also a small French
naval establishment of about 150
men which operates two coastal
minesweepers and some small land-
ing craft, and, serves as a minor
support base for French warships
transiting the Red Sea and Indian
Ocean. A French Air Force unit
of 500 men operates some 15-20
propeller-driven aircraft for
ground support and transport
duties.
Official sources have made
it clear that if the vote next
week goes against France, Paris
will begin a slow, phased. with-
drawal from French Somaliland
and will not sever its ties as
abruptly as it cut those with
Guinea in 1958.
If 25X1
the re eren um is negative, there-
fore, France will undoubtedly
attempt to phase out in such a
way as to guarantee Ethiopia's
interests.
Ethiopia's Interest
Ethiopia's principal interest
i is in seeing that the terminus of
S E C R[ T
Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05700030005-4
 Approved For Release 2006/0316(:; Rl -RDP79-00927A005700030005-4
its main railroad and principal
outlet to the sea does not fall
into unfriendly, particularly
Somali, hands. Moreover, Soviet
economic and military aid to Mog-
adiscio and the growing Communist
and radical Arab advances in the
Red Sea Basin generally have made
the Emperor even more deeply con-
cerned about Somalia's efforts
to detach parts of his empire.
Because of the financial
costs and the technical problems
of running the port, but most of
all because the French Somaliland
populace is generally anti-Ethio-
pian, the Ethiopians have not
seriously aspired to control the
territory themselves and would
much prefer that France remain.
The specter of possible independ-
ence and a French withdrawal,
however, has so agitated Ethiopia
that it has been moving fast to
stake out its claims. The day
after Paris announced there would
be a new referendum, Haile Selas-
sie declared in a special press
conference that French Somaliland
was an "integral part of the
Ethiopian empire" for "historical,
ethnic, geographic, and economic
reasons" and that Ethiopians would
never accept a solution counter
to their interests.
The Emperor has left little
doubt that Ethiopia would, if it
seemed necessary, take over the
territory by force. In an inter-
view with a Le Monde correspond-
ent in October he denied that
military action by Ethiopia would
be automatic in the event ot. an
independence vote, but said Ethi-
opia would act should a French
departure and external threats--
from Somali--lead the people to
ask for Ethiopia's protectiin. He
said flatly that the interests of
Djibouti and Ethiopia were in-
separable and, referring vajuely
to a "federation," that the 'Tench
Somaliland people could only live
in association with Ethiopia. He
summarily rejected suggestions for
partition or for internaticnal
trusteeship. The Ethiopiar -rime
minister recently told a British
diplomatic friend that, if French
Somaliland voted for independence,
Ethiopia would immediately posi-
tion troops on the French Somali-
land border and would go tc the
United Nations if troops of the
Somali Republic attempted to
enter the territory. While Ethio-
pia might bring the issue to the
UN, it is questionable if Ithiopia
would wait for UN action before
moving militarily.
Although there is no hard
evidence, US officials in iddis
Ababa have long believed that
there is some sort of French-
Ethiopian understanding regarding
an Ethiopian take-over of -.he
territory in the event France is
forced to depart,
S 1+. C R N"1'
Page 7 SPECIAL REPORT
Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005700030005-4
 Approved For Release 2006/011,6 ~I DP79-00927AO05700030005-4
The Somali Republic's in-
terest in the French territory
stems from a national objective--
outlined in its constitution--
eventually to incorporate all
ethnic Somalis (in French Somali-
land, Ethiopia, and Kenya) within
its border. Mogadiscio undoubt-
edly feels that if it could ab-
sarb the Somalis of French Somali-
land it would set a precedent for
those in Ethiopia and Kenya. To
t.ais end, Mogadiscio is pushing
hard to get a vote for independ-
ence in the territory--which it
believes would eventually bring
the territory under its con-
tr=ol.
On the diplomatic front,
Mogadiscio is endeavoring to
block any prospects for an Ethio-
pian military take-over. It has
been trying to generate pressures
in the African Unity Organization
(OAU) and the United Nations for
UN supervision of the vote and
for either a French or UN guar-
antee of French Somaliland's in-
dependence. Paris, however, has
ignored such suggestions. Mo-
gadiscio has also offered to
agree jointly with Addis Ababa
to renounce both the use of force
in the territory and any action
to unite the territory with a
neighbor.
Somali Republic leaders have
repeatedly warned that they will
fight if Ethiopia makes any mil-
itary moves toward taking over
the territory. To back up this
threat and to encourage the So-
mali voters to resist French
intimidation, they have moved a
military force to Zeila and
Hargeisa, nearer the eastern bor-
der of French Somaliland, This
task force consists of five bat-
talions, including infantry,
armor, artillery, and antiair-
craft, supported by four MIG-17
jet fighters and two AN-24 trans-
port aircraft,. Some 3,000 tribal
irregulars are reportedly being
recruited to support it. The
force appears too small to block
a determined Ethiopian military
move, but its presence sharply
increases the possibility of a
confrontation.
Local. Politics
In French Somaliland
French policy for the past
several years has been to favor
the Afars and to curb the So-
malis. Early attempts to deal
with the more nationalist-minded
Somalis taught the French to bet
instead on the more docile Afar
people. They have therefore at-
tempted systematically to maintain
the numerical superiority of
Afars over Somalis by immigration
controls and Afar political domi-
nation by careful gerrymandering.
SECRET
Page 8 SPECIAL REPORT 10 Mar 67
Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05700030005-4
 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 ;
-1RDP79-00927AO05700030005-4
In 1963--after trying two Somali
governments--they engineered a
solid Afar majority in the local
assembly and put in Ali Aref as
head of the governing council.
Today, they are still banking on
the Afars, to vote for a continued
French presence.
Local political parties fol-
low the main ethnic divisions,
Afar and Somali. The Afars are
represented by two parties, the
Afar Democratic Rally (RDA) under
All Aref and the Afar Democratic
Union (UDA) under Mohamed Kamil,
the present head of the governing
council. There are also two
parties on the Somali side. The
Popular Movement Party (PMP) under
Mohamed Idriss represents largely
Ishaak Somali people--the so-
called "foreign Somalis" who came
into the territory in recent
years from what is now the Somali
Republic in hopes of finding work
or receiving the benefits of
French social services. The other
Somali party is the Issa Demo-
cratic Union (UDI), which repre-
sents the Issa Somalis indigenous
both to French Somaliland and to
northern Somalia.
The expected general line-up
on voting is an Afar vote against
independence and a Somali vote
for independence, but there are
crossovers. Not all Afars are
opposed to independence, nor are
all Somalis for independence. In
fact, until recently, when Somali-
landers--even outspoken Somali
nationalist leaders such as Idriss
of the PMP--spoke of independence,
it was almost always an independ-
ence still linked to France by
financial and defense ties.
Among the Afars, Aref DT the
RDA views a French withdrawn. as
unthinkable. Kamil of the JDA,
however, has taken a different
tack and has been trying to per-
suade the French to drop the
referendum and institute ins--ead
step by step moves toward inde-
pendence within perhaps five
years, all with continued French
aid and protection. On the So-
mali side, the PMP, the most
militant and pro-Mogadiscic,
wants independence and some form
of federation with the Somali
Republic. The Issa Somali party,
the UDI, wants independence too,
but is opposed to ties or union
with the Somali Republic.
After the French annor.nce-
ment of the referendum, Kammil--
now having replaced Aref as
head of the governing council--
joined his Afar UDA with tLe So-
mali parties in a so-called "op-
position coordinating committee"
to see exactly what the French
had in mind for the territory,
and what the options were. At
that time, apparently no one
really believed that De Gaulle
would actually pull out com-
pletely if the vote was for in-
dependence. A series of confer-
ences with the French was held
locally and in Paris.
In January, Kamil suddenly
announced that he was now atis-
fied with French promises regard-
ing a new statute--that it would
lead to independence--and would
vote for continued association
with France. Other UDA leaders,
however, sharply disagreed with
Kamil's interpretation, as did
the Somali parties. The Afar UDA
SFC RE']'
Page 9 SPECIAL REPORT 10 Mar 67
Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05700030005-4
 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005700030005-4
SECRFIT
split, with part of it opposing
Kamil and coming out for a vote
for independence. The four So-
mali ministers in Kamil's gov-
ernment resigned and several
leaders of the Somali UDI de-
fected to the PMP which reiterated
that it would support an independ-
ence vote. The current line-up
is thus a near solid ranking of
the Somalis for independence, and
a bad split in the heretofore
pro-French Afar community.
The Vote
The referendum question it-
self is simple--asking only if
the voter wants the territory to
remain within the French Republic
but with greater local autonomy--
and is to be answered "yes" or
"no." Part of the local French
community will vote, as will
resident Arabs, mostly Yemenis.
French officials report that
38,931 voters have been regis-
tered: about 11,000 in Djibouti
and about 27,000 outside the city.
Djibouti is overwhelmingly So-
mali inhabited, but the 11,000
figure also includes about 2,500
French and Arab voters. The
27,000 rural voters are in pre-
dominantly Afar country, except
for one district where something
under 5,000 Issa Somalis are
registered. Thus, registered
Somali voters would number about
13,500, while the Afar voters
plus the Europeans and Arabs
would number some 24,500.
Theoretically, these figures
indicate a solid "yes" vote. If
the split among the Afars is not
healed, however, the vote could
be close, or even an upset. One
real problem in estimating the
outcome is the unknown degree of
control party leaders have over
their followers.
Dangers
All the political pushing
and hauling has brought a sharp
rise in ethnic bitterness. This
will make it difficult to govern
no matter what the outcome.
Feelings are running high in
Addis Ababa and Mogadiscio as
well. Demonstrations against
the French, Ethiopians, and Amer-
icans--as backers of the Ethio-
pians--have occurred in Mogadis-
ci.o, and if the vote is a pro-
French "yes" there will probably
be more.
In French Somaliland itself,
if the vote is "yes," there is a
very strong likelihood of Somali-
instigated riots which could en-
danger the Afars, the local. French
SECRET
Approved For PF e` gas~0200~/'oiW.LCI X29-00915766030005-4
 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 CIA-RDP79-00927A005700030005-4
S IR E"1
community, and perhaps even port
facilities and the railroad. The
militant Somali PMP dominates the
city of Djibouti. The railroad
runs through Somali-inhabited
territory, and crosses some 20
bridges between Djibouti and the
Ethiopian border. There has been
some indication that the Somalis
may initiate demonstrations be-
fore the referendum in order to
get world attention and a UN
supervision of the vote.
A "no" vote would raise the
prospect of an Ethiopian military
move, or even a move by the :,o-
mali Republic to try to pre-empt
the Ethiopians. Any move ba
France to permit the Ethiopians
to move in slowly would be ~er-
tain to raise a storm in Mo3a-
discio, and might also precipi-
tate an Ethiopian-Somali clash.
The presence of French forces
would almost certainly deter any
precipitate military move by
either claimant, but after a
French withdrawal the scramoi.e
would be on.
S1-X RE"1'
Page 11 SPECIAL REPORT 10 Mar 67
Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005700030005-4
 Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05700030005-4
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2006/03/16 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05700030005-4