ULBRICHT CAMPAIGNS FOR EAST GERMAN NATIONALISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005800010002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 28, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

Secre
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Ulbricht Campaigns For East German Nationalism
Secret
45
28 April 1967
No. 0287/67A
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ULBRICHT CAMPAIGNS FOR EAST GERMAN NATIONALISM
The East German (GDR) regime, fearful that it
might become politically and diplomatically isolated,
launched a campaign in early January to counteract
the effects of the West German Government's policies
toward Eastern Europe and inter-German relations.
Massive efforts, unprecedented in scope or intensity,
have been made to build up the East German image as
a separate sovereign state having nothing in common
with West Germany, and to create a public sense of
East German nationality. On the diplomatic front,
the campaign has concentrated on gaining reassur-
ances from the Warsaw Pact states that improve-
ments in their relations with West Germany will not
be made at the expense of East German interests.
To date, these diplomatic efforts have pre-
vented several Eastern European nations from es-
tablishing diplomatic relations with Bonn, but East
Germany's ability to influence future developments
is limited because most of these countries are un-
willing to sacrifice further their own interests
for those of the GDR. The Ulbricht regime will
continue the propaganda stressing its sovereignty;
but the populace is unlikely to react favorably
nor are foreign states likely to accept the re-
gime's arguments.
East Germany's Change in Policy
Although the East German re-
gime has sought to gain accept-
ance of the GDR as a sovereign
state since its creation in 1949,
it had also long paid lip service
to the idea that the two parts of
Germany--despite differing po-
litical, economic, and social
systems--shared common character-
istics. For this reason, it had
sanctioned and even sponsored
various nonpolitical exchanges
between East and West German
members of cultural and profes-
sional groups, sports teams, and
other similar organizations.
In January 1967, however, the
Pankow regime began a campaign of
unprecedented scope and intensity
to build up the image of the GDR
as a separate sovereign state
with nothing in common with West
Germany, and to arouse in the
East German populace a sense of
"East German nationalism."
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To accomplish these twin
objectives, the regime has cut
off those contacts with West
Germany from which it does not
gain political or economic bene-
fits, and has launched a massive
propaganda effort to demonstrate
both the incompatibility of the
"two German states" and the
superiority of the GDR.
In line with this sharp
change of policy, propagandists
have adopted a new terminology
which includes such expressions
as "GDR culture," "GDR science,"
and even "GDR medicine." Since
mid-January, the East Germans
have consistently referred to
the Social Democratic Party of
Germany (SPD) as the "SP of West
Germany." And on 2 February the
GDR changed the name of its State
Secretariat for All-German Ques-
tions to the State Secretariat
for West German Questions. This
office had been created as re-
cently as December 1965 to co-
ordinate GDR contacts with-West
Germany and was especially active
in the first half of 1966 when
the ruling Socialist Unity Party
(SED) proposed to the SPD that a
dialogue be established between
the "two workers' parties" of
Germany.
The Genesis of the New Policy
The effort to negate the
all-German concept and to en-
hance the GDR's image as a sov-
ereign state is part of Pankow's
attempt to counteract the ef-
fects of the new West German
coalition government's policies
toward Eastern Europe and inter-
German ties. In December 1966,
Bonn served notice that it in-
tended to improve its relations
in Eastern Europe and to increase
nongovernmental contacts with
the GDR.
As a significant gesture in
this direction, Bonn reversed the
priorities that had been estab-
lished by earlier West German
governments and acknowledged that
European detente must precede Ger-
man reunification. It then moved
quickly to establish diplomatic
relations wherever possible in
Eastern Europe. These efforts
met with early success in the
case of Rumania, which estab-
lished diplomatic relations on
31 January.
The East German reaction to
Bonn's new policy was predict-
ably negative, as revealed in
December and January by GDR boss
Walter Ulbricht. Characterizing
Bonn's new policy as simply
another version of its well-known
old policy of imperialism and
revanchism, Ulbricht warned East-
ern European states not to be
deceived by the Kiesinger govern-
ment's new tactics.
Ulbricht's stridently nega-
tive tones, however, were not
echoed by his Eastern European
peers, who preferred not to pre-
judge the new West German Govern-
ment. Ulbricht's recurring fear
that the GDR would be isolated
within Eastern Europe was rein-
forced in early January when he
learned that Prague and Budapest
as well as Bucharest would re-
ceive emissaries from Bonn.
These developments led to
feverish East German diplomatic
efforts to convince the Warsaw
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Pact states that they should not
permit their relations with the
Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) to improve until Bonn gave
up its claim to be the sole rep-
resentative of Germany, and until
it recognized the GDR as a sov-
ereign state. In quest of support,
Ulbricht visited various Warsaw
Pact states and signed mutual as-
sistance treaties with Poland
and Czechoslovakia. From the GDR
viewpoint, these efforts have
or R
been successful, at least in the
sense that they have gained re-
assurances that East German in-
terests will not be ignored even
if other Eastern European coun-
tries do eventually establish
diplomatic relations with Bonn.
Abandonment of the
All-German Concept
These diplomatic efforts
have been supported by a variety
A West Berlin view of East Germany's Sovereignty Campaign:
The various objects are labelled "East German man,"
"East German cloud," "East German sun," etc.
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of other moves that stress the
concept of two Germanies and are
intended to gain acceptance of
East German identity abroad and
to strengthen the sense of na-
tionhood at home.
In January, party leaders and
propagandists began stressing these
themes. Thus, SED politburo mem-
ber Kurt Hager, addressing the
founding congress of the Associa-
tion of Film and Television
Artists on 21 January, claimed
that there now exist two separate
German film and television indus-
tries which serve antithetical
purposes. Culture Minister Gysi,
speaking at the Dresden State
Theater's 300th anniversary cere-
monies on 27 January, denied that
a single German culture exists
any longer. The head of the
science section of the party's
central committee told 600 East
German scientists on 2 February
that there was nothing in common
between science in the GDR and
science in the FRG. He warned
that "behind the theory of a
common German science stands...
West German imperialism." A
doctor from Gera was even quoted
as denying the existence of a
single German medicine.
GDR Citizenship Law
and Penal Code
The regime's propaganda ex-
ercises in January and early Feb-
ruary set the stage for the
Volkskammer (parliament) to pro-
claim GDR sovereignty in still a
more insistent fashion. The
Volkskammer on 20 February en-
acted a law creating a new and
separate "citizenship of the GDR"
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for all East Germans--despite the
constitution's provision that
"there is only one German na-
tionality." Although the East
Germans have contemplated such
a law since at least 1961 and
have regarded past. and present
residents of the CDR as de facto
citizens, the timing of the
Volkskammer's action, the wording
of the law, and subsequent state-
ments by regime spokesmen, all
confirm that the law's purpose
is to demonstrate to the West
Germans, the Eastern European
nations, and the East German
populace that the GDR is a sov-
ereign state with no legal con-
nections with the FRG.
In a further move to empha-
size the legal integrity of East
Germany, the regime has also ex-
pedited the presentation for
"public discussion" of the draft
of a new penal code. East German
legal experts have been doing
preliminary work on a new penal
code since 1963, but throughout
1966 the press had indicated that
the penal code and other pending
legislation would not be completed
until 1970. Press commentary has
hailed the new socialist code as
the first in German history and
as a demonstration of the superi-
ority of GDR law over that of
West Germany. Lest anyone fail
to understand the significance of
the new code, Neues Deutschland,
the official organ of the SED,
commented on 8 February that it
would be an "important act of
state sovereignty."
The Special Targets
In other domestic propaganda
the regime has concentrated its
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attacks on two particular targets:
Western cultural influences and
the East German churches, especi-
ally the Evangelical Church of
Germany.
In preparing for the party
congress in mid-April, function-
aries who manage cultural affairs
began in January to propagate the
slogan "Our Love, Our Art for the
GDR, Our Socialist Fatherland."
Such ":Love," they insisted, was
only possible in conjunction with
"implacable hatred of the enemy,"
and in this spirit they launched
a new and broadened assault on
Western cultural influences. As
part of this, all cultural ex-
changes with Bonn which had not
been arranged long in advance
were cut off.
Although Ulbricht's cultural
policy has long been one of the
most rigid in Eastern Europe, the
severity and thoroughness with
which propagandists have denounced
those who reflect any aspect of
current Western culture, styles,
or fads is unprecedented. A
vigorous press campaign, which
has sometimes bordered on the
ridiculous, has been waged
against all things indicating
Western--especially West German--
influence. Neues Deutschland has
criticized East German singers
who adopt English-sounding names
and songwriters who use such
English words as "boy," "girl,"
or "Charlie." Even the Swingle
Singers have been denounced be-
cause their interpretations of
Bach are said to be incompatible
with Socialist cultural policy.
The regime has also clamped
down on more serious East German
artists, criticizing any who do
not follow the precepts of So-
cialist realism in the creative
arts. SED culture functionaries
have indicated that the party
may extend control over works of
art at an early stage in the pro-
cess of their creation. Alfred
Kurella, a regime functionary who
has specialized in "guiding" way-
ward artists, has proposed, for
example, that entries for the sixth
German art exhibit scheduled for
next fall be "judged" before it
opens and preferably before being
completed.
The regime has long sought
to end all connection between the
East German Protestant churches
and the Evangelical Church of
Germany (EKD), and to establish
an East German "national church."
Beginning in January the regime
stepped up its efforts to persuade
or pressure East German pastors
and laymen of the EKD to support
these objectives. Party writers
on church affairs impugned the EKD
as the religious arm of NATO, and
condemned its West German members
as servants of the Bonn government.
Other writers questioned the valid-
ity of the term EKD because it
implied one Germany when "accord-
ing to international law," there
were two.
These pressure tactics back-
fired on the occasion of the EKD
synod meeting of 2-7 April that
was to elect a new church govern-
ing council and chairman. Hoping
that a lack of communication be-
tween the East and West German
members of the synod would aid
its plan to split the church,
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the GDR forced the East German
members to'meet in Fuerstenwalde
rather than in East Berlin, which
had been the site of their annual
gathering since the Berlin Wall
was built. (The Western members
of the synod met as usual in West
Berlin.) Nevertheless the East
German clerics rebuffed the re-
gime by reaffirming EKD unity
in a ringing declaration and by
joining their Western colleagues
to elect a common council and
chairman.
Popular Reaction
Despite the regime's efforts,
the East German people do not ac-
cept the idea that they are, in
some sense, no longer "German."
Although they passively tolerate
the regime, and perhaps do not
trust West German leaders or
anticipate reunification, the
available evidence suggests that
the East German public generally
resents the regime's pressure
tactics as well as its blandish-
ments.
Among writers, few of whom
have publicly defied the regime
in the past, there is open oppo-
sition to the regime's attempts
to dictate artistic standards and
to its denial that there is one
German culture. For example, the
chairman of the Halle Writers
Conference, while speaking at a
district-level SED meeting, pub-
licly attacked Alfred Kurella--
and was applauded by the delegates
for doing so.
Outlook
Ulbricht's de facto rejec-
tion, at the opening of the party
congress on 17 April, of Chancel-
lor Kiesinger's 12 April proposal
to improve inter-German relations
indicates that the regime intends
to continue its efforts to stress
the sovereignty of the GDR and to
avoid East - West German contacts.
Pankow can be expected to continue
both its domestic propaganda cam-
paign and its diplomatic efforts to
sign mutual assistance treaties
with other Warsaw Pact countries.
The time is fast approaching,
however, when these policies will
reach the point of diminishing re-
turns. The diplomatic effort has
temporarily deterred Hungary and
Bulgaria from establishing diplo-
matic relations with West Germany,
but Budapest and Sofia still de-
sire such relations and will prob-
ably respond to Bonn's initiatives
eventually--even though they may
also agree to sign a treaty with
the GDR. Any further remonstrances
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thus could be counterproductive,
and could result in the very iso-
lation that Ulbricht is trying
so hard to avoid.
The GDR also is limited in
what it can do in inter-German
relations. Unless Pankow is
willing to risk the economic and
political sanctions that could
result from taking the two sig-
nificant steps open to it--sever-
ing interzonal trade contacts with
West Germany and imposing a visa
requirement on West Germans and
West Berliners transiting the
GDR--the regime will be limited
to continuing the campaign
largely through propaganda. Since
propaganda has not convinced the
majority of East Germans that con-
tacts with West Germany should be
avoided, or has even brought about
a feeling of East German nation-
alism, the regime will probably
gradually moderate these efforts
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