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May 5, 1967
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7A" (, C) Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800 20001-8 secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Secret 47 5 May 1967 No. 0288/67 State Dept. review completed Approved For Release 2017/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0d5800020001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007WF,4-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8 (Information as of noon EDT, 4 May 1967) VIETNAM As the Communists continue their military pressure in the northern part of South Vietnam they have concen- trated on shelling US bases and engaging elite US Marine units. In Saigon the Constituent Assembly is debating the details of the presidential election law. PEKING MAY DAY LINE-UP POINTS TO FURTHER CHANGES The roster in the biggest display of Chinese Communist leaders since November suggests possible shifts in the military command structure, and shows the degrada- tion of Liu Shao-chi and his adherents. CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT REPLACED Sihanouk ousted the moderate Lon Nol cabinet which had come under leftist attack, and installed a new "in- terim" regime designed to strike a better balance be- tween the right and left. SECRET 5 May 67 Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0d5800020001- Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 SECRET Europe PROGRESS IN SOVIET WEATHER SATELLITE SYSTEM With the launch of Cosmos 156 last week, the USSR has two weather satellites in operation, providing almost world-wide coverage. FRENCH GOVERNMENT SEIZES THE INITIATIVE IN PARLIAMENT 12 It will probably get the authority it is seeking to decree economic reforms but the opposition will have another chance if the reforms are not showing results six months from now. YUGOSLAV ELECTIONS STIR GRASS-ROOTS POLITICAL ACTIVITY 13 The elections were the freest yet held. The regime's liberal supporters did well generally, but they re- ceived a setback in Serbia. RUMANIA ACCENTUATES ITS INDEPENDENT STANCE In deciding to stay away from last week's Karlovy Vary conference, Bucharest moved to a position similar to that long held by Yugoslavia. Middle East - Africa THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 15 GREEK MILITARY REGIME DIGS IN Below the surface calm there are fears that the purging of all the moderate political elements can only lead to an inevitable clash between extreme rightist and left- ist factions. NASIR'S VIEW OF US ROLE IN YEMEN In his speech on 2 May, Nasir again attacked the US as the prime supporter of the forces of "imperialism." TROUBLES MOUNTING IN GUINEA The prestige of Sekou Toure's regime is at its lowest ebb since independence due to financial scandals and a sinking economy, but he is likely to survive the crisis. SECRET Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 'p-proved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/25: Cl8 TD927AO05800020001-8 NIGERIA'S WESTERN REGION TAKES A HAND IN THE CRISIS The West has now demanded the removal of Northern troops and looser federal ties to keep the East from seceding. Western Hemisphere "NEW LOOK" IN BRAZIL Costa e Silva's new administration presently enjoys considerable popularity based on its espousal of "humanized" economic policies and nationalistic for- eign policies. DOMINICAN PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL POSITION WEAKENING Increasing right-wing dissatisfaction in the wake of Minister of Interior and Police Amiama's resignation has stirred new criticism of Balaguer. There are re- newed rumors of plotting against him. LABOR UNREST AND MILITARY DISCONTENT IN ECUADOR Strikes and strike threats continue to plague the government, and junior military officers are increas- ingly critical of the government and the constituent assembly. HAITIAN PRESIDENT SQUELCHES INCIPIENT PLOT President Duvalier relieved a number of presidential guard officers of their duties last week in an effort to head off a palace intrigue that may have involved members of his own family. Kennedy Round KENNEDY ROUND APPROACHES FINAL BARGAINING Agreement must be reached shortly if the necessary documents are to be drawn up before the deadline on 30 June. SECRET Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001- Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007IQ LJ /'RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 FAR EAST China has reacted to intensified US air strikes in North Vietnam with charges that the US is plot- ting to extend the war to China. Peking's propa- ganda claimed its air force destroyed five US aircraft which allegedly violated Chinese territory. No specific threats of counteraction were made. China's charges appear designed primarily to deter US air operations near the Chinese frontier. The pace of Communist military action in north- ern South Vietnam increased sharply last week with massive shellings of US positions and an extended engagement between an estimated 2,500 North Vietnam- ese regulars and two US Marine battalions. In Peking, the Chinese staged an unusual May Day celebration which featured the largest turnout of leaders since last November. The roster of the select group surrounding Mao Tse-tung suggests that further changes have been made in the military high command. The absence of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao- ping further underlines their isolation and degrada- tion. The resignation of Prime Minister Lon Nol's cab- inet in Cambodia apparently reflects an attempt by Chief of State Sihanouk to check political infighting and to establish a better balance between forces of the right and left. Sihanouk's action may have been prompted by indications that the prime minister and the army were preparing a major purge of the left, threatening his traditional practice of playing leftist and conservative elements a ainst each other. SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001- SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8 L A O S c 4 MAY 100 MILE{ ;Jf Pleikli soU1COPS CHINS lo Linh 6. H. THUA THIEN PHU BON DUC KHAN HOA NINH ` THUAN QUANG NAM QU,aNG TIN QUANG NGAI QUANG L DUC PHU YEN The Indochina -South China Area (,' SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007/ R(I1A-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8 VIETNAM The tempo of Communist oper- ations in South Vietnam's two northernmost provinces increased sharply during the past week, amid indications of continuing reinforcement of units. On 27 and 28 April, Commu- nist forces shelled US Marine positions at Gio Linh and Dong Ha in northern Quang Tri Province and at Phu Bai in adjacent Thua Thien Province with one of their heaviest barrages of artillery, rocket, and mortar fire to date. The obviously well-coordinated attacks resulted in cumulative US losses of 12 killed and nearly 200 wounded, as well as damage to US aircraft and artillery. In western Quang Tri Province near the Laotian border, two US Ma- rine battalions and an estimated 2,500 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars have been engaged for more than a week in sporadic heavy fighting some six m les northwest of Khe Sanh. The ac- tion began on 25 April when a Marine engineer convoy participat- ing in Operation PRAIRIE IV was ambushed along Route 9 by what was estimated to be an NVA bat- talion. The convoy was reinforced by additional Marine units, and a major battle then developed for control of three strategic hills northwest of Khe Sanh astride key enemy infiltration routes from both Laos and the De- militarized Zone (DMZ). As of 3 May, US forces, supported by continuous air and artillery bombardment, had dis- lodged some elements of the enemy force--now tentatively identified as at least a regiment of the 325th NVA Division--from their heavily fortified hilltop positions. The battle, however, has been costly to both sides-- enemy casualties to date are 473 killed and US losses are 119 killed and 330 wounded. The pattern of the past week's Communist activity in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces sug- gests at least a temporary shift of military attention away from Revolutionary Development teams, South Vietnamese Army district headquarters, and outposts. The massive shellings of US bases are designed to inflict maximum American losses at minimum enemy cost. The action at Khe Sanh is clearly intended to draw elite US combat units into a pro- tracted battle of attrition in terrain tactically advantageous to the Communists. The concen- tration on US targets may also reflect an increasing determina- tion to register a spectacular victory against a major US posi- tion--for its psychological value both locally in the provinces and in Saigon and Washington. Preliminary analysis of bomb-damage photography of the strike on Kep Airfield on 1 May showed three parked MIG fighters burning. At least two other MIGs at Hoa Lac were also damaged. Although the facilities at both fields sustained limited damage, the primary runways appear to be serviceable. SECRET 5 May 67 Approved For Release 2097/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-1 Approved For Release 2007/012 c9J1 PDP79-00927A005800020001-8 Politics in Saigon Considerable anxiety is evi- dent in current Constituent As- sembly debate on the proposed presidential electoral law pre- pared by an assembly drafting committee. This anxiety stems from the desire of both civilians and the military to derive some built-in advantage from the pro- visions of the law. Premier Ky and his support- ers have been concerned that the prospects of the military nominee could be reduced by possible re- strictions on the number or eligibility of candidates, or by a requirement that the winning candidate must have a specified minimum percentage of the total Although the subcommittee had dropped the provision calling for a runoff between the top two candidates, deputies supporting civilians for the presidency may attempt to reinsert it during the assembly's plenary debate. In addition, some provision aimed at restricting the number of can- didates now seems likely to be adopted as a compromise. Certain other differences between the military and the as- sembly over the electoral regu- lations, although not likely to bear significantly on the outcome of the elections, reflect the defiant mood of some of the depu- ties. For instance, the assembly has approved a 3 September elec- tion date out of pique at the Armed Forces Congress for having previously, on its own, announced the date as 1 September. The draft law also states that mili- tary personnel must request leave without pay beginning with the date they file their candidacies through election day. Some depu- ties believe candidates should be completely divorced from govern- mental positions. This issue may arise during plenary debate. Another irritant which could upset relations between the mili- tary and the assembly is the des- ignation of Police Director Loan in place of General Tri as the Directorate liaison contact with the deputies. Loan's heavy-handed method of interjecting Ky's rec- ommendations have already nettled some of the assemblymen. It is possible, however, that many of them fear Loan's security appa- ratus enough to submit to pressure tactics. The final form of the contro- versial provisions will be decided upon in the next few days of as- sembly deliberations. The in- terests of the military establish- ment appear to be well represented through sympathetic deputies in the Democratic-Alliance bloc--the largest and most influential as- sembly grouping-,-and it does not appear likely that the present draft presidential. election regu- lations will be seriously altered. SECRET Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007IO1 ? L; IqjRDP79-00927A005800020001-8 PEKING MAY DAY LINE-UP POINTS TO FURTHER CHANGES Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai joined 150 other officials at a mass May Day rally in Peking in the biggest turn- out of Chinese Communist leaders since last November. The list of names for this huge turnout points to possible changes in the military command structure and the further isolation and degradation of Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and their adherents. Mao and Lin spent the day cruising from gathering to gather- ing in an open car, followed by 13 other politburo members, mili- tary leaders, and Cultural Rev- olution officials. Mao appeared quite healthy and alert 25X1 on the rostrum, where he remained for 90 minutes. The roster of the elite group in Mao's motorcade suggests that further changes have been made in the military high command. The only military men aside from Lin were acting Chief of Staff Yang Cheng-wu, Minister of Public Secu- rity Hsieh Fu-chih, the top army commissar Hsiao Hua, and Su Yu, a capable officer who had been in political limbo since being replaced as chief of staff in 1958. Su's return to prominence Page 5 in company with these three tends to confirm poster reports late last month that the four had been named vice chairmen of the party's Military Affairs Com- mittee. Reportedly, they have replaced three members who have been under heavy Red Guard at- tack--Hsu Hsiang-chien, Yeh Chien-ying, and Chen Yi. Several politburo members, including these three, who have been castigated through posters and demonstrations, turned up in their proper formal ranking on the Tienanmen rostrum with Mao. Their presence does not mean that they have been restored to good standing. All were point- edly excluded from the motor- cade and from small elite groups which joined Mao in various cere- monial events during the day. Their appearance, however, makes more conspicuous the absence of such major propaganda targets as Chief of State Liu Shao-chi. Several high-ranking mili- tary officials from the prov- inces showed up at the rally, including the commanders of the Lanchow, Tibet, Kunming and Foo- chow Military Regions. Their presence in Peking may be a sign that a parley of regional mili- tary officials is under way to decide how to handle local political SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001- Approved For Release 2007//Qy?5kpI4\-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 disturbances. There is evi- dence, however, that Peking does not fully trust at least two of these commanders--those from Kunming and Lanchow. They may have been brought to Peking to get them out of the way while their commands are being reor- ganized. There are, in fact, several signs that the drive to remove local military commanders is be- ing stepped up. Numerous posters highly critical of local command- ers have been displayed in Peking in the past two weeks. Poster's allege that in Kansu Province, for example, two party secre- taries supported by a deputy com- mander of the Lanchow Military Region used civilians and troops to rout Red Guards from a news- SECRET Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY paper office on 18 April, result- ing in the death or injury of several hundred. A deputy com- mander in Chengtu allegedly has instigated similar clashes six times since 4 April. 25X1 5 May 67 Approved or a ease 007/01/2 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 SECRET CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT REPLACED The ouster of the moderate Lon Nol cabinet in Cambodia rep- resents another effort by Chief of State Sihanouk to strike a fresh balance between the right and left in Phnom Penh. In announcing Lon Nol's resignation on 30 April, Sihanouk explained that it resulted from "grave dissension" among "im- portant leaders" in the govern- ment and the National Assembly. Sihanouk has long played leftist and conservative elements against each other, and his latest move may have been prompted by indi- cations that the prime minister and the army were preparing a major purge of the left. One of the reasons given for Lon Nol's resignation was the recent dis- appearance of two leading left- ists who had been charged with complicity in recent antigovern- ment disturbances. The Cambodian left has at- tacked the Lon Nol government since its establishment last Oc- tober, largely because of its lack of leftist representation. Sihanouk's support continued, however, until the outbreak of dissidence in western Cambodia last month and an upsurge in leftist agitation undermined the Lon Nol government's position. The new "interim" cabinet, which was announced on 2 May, contains no major surprises. It is dominated by old-line conserv- atives, among them the new prime minister, Son Sann, Sihanouk's chief economic adviser. The in- clusion of two prominent left- ists, however, indicates Sihanouk is determined to make it less vulnerable to attack from the left than its predecessor. Si- hanouk has stated that the Son Sann cabinet will hold office for only one to three months, in the "hope" that the political situation will then permit the installation of a more permanent government. The army, meanwhile, is con- tinuing sweep operations against what it terms "Communist" dissi- dents in western Cambodia. Si- hanouk has also moved to meet popular discontent in the area by naming a new governor of Battambang Province, center of SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 Approved For Release 2087/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-> Approved For Release 2007/O /rjgRDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 SECRET Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007/09L2fE.I iWDP79-00927A005800020001-8 EUROPE The Soviets displayed no new military equipment in this year's May Day parade. They are probably waiting until the 50th anniversary celebrations in November to show off their newer weapons. Defense Minister Grechko's May Day speech contained the standard denunciation of US policy in Vietnam and the standard specter of a nuclear-armed West Germany. The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee's re- convening has been postponed from 9 May until 18 May in order to give the US and the USSR more time to work out their differences over the draft nonprolif- eration treaty. The main problems are the safeguards article and the question of whether nuclear states should retain a veto on amendments to the treaty. Prime Minister Wilson's long-awaited announce- ment of a new bid to join the Common Market implied that he will accept the existing community with mini- mum conditions, although possibly for tactical rea- sons he stopped short of a flat offer to sign up. Some Labor backbenchers will be vehement in their opposition when Parliament debates the subject next week, but Wilson is certain to get overwhelming en- dorsement for a formal application. The next impor- tant steps rest with the EEC members, and all inter- ested parties are waiting to see what line De Gaulle SECRET Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001- Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007/01k2pj qDP79-00927A005800020001-8 PROGRESS IN SOVIET WEATHER SATELLITE SYSTEM Soviet efforts to develop a weather satellite--including nearly three years of flight testing---have apparently culmi- nated in a decision to proceed with establishing an operational system. With the launch of Cosmos 156 on 27 April, the Soviets have two operating weather satellites in orbit., indicating that develop- ment has been completed and that they have confidence in the sys- tem. Soviet statements also in- dicate that the USSR has decided that a space weather system is both desirable and feasible. Cosmos 144 and 156 are in almost circular orbits more than 300 miles high at inclinations of 81 degrees, giving almost world- wide coverage. The planes of the orbits are perpendicular, result- ing in nearly maximum frequency of coverage for a two-satellite sys- tem. The light and dark sides of the earth are each scanned twice daily. the SL-3 launch system (the SS-6 with a Lunik upper stage), the satellites weigh 3,000 to 5,000 pounds and use solar cells for electrical power. Moscow is sending cloud maps and other data from both satellites to the US over the weather "hot line" under the terms of the bi- lateral agreement on cooperation in space. So far, however, the data is not being sent as quickly as the agreement calls for. The initial satellite weather data provided to the US by the Soviets came from Cosmos 122 in 1966, the first of the test vehicles to op- erate satisfactorily and the first to be publicly identified as a weather satellite. The Soviets will probably launch more weather satellites to replace those which malfunc- tion or to provide increased The satellites are equipped with both television and infrared systems. The television provides day-time pictures of the earth and its cloud cover with a resolution approximating that of similar US systems., The infrared equipment permits analysis of cloud cover and meteorological conditions both day and night. Orbited by SECRET 5 May 67 Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001- Approved For Release 2007:A-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8 FRENCH GOVERNMENT SEIZES THE INITIATIVE IN PARLIAMENT The government's decision to seek special powers for six months in order to decree economic reforms reflects both the serious- ness of the problems it faces and its lack of confidence in parlia- ment. The reforms are intended to prepare France for full compe- tition from its five Common Market partners when the last tariffs within the EEC are removed on 1 July 1968. There are measures to modernize inefficient indus- tries or regions or to redirect their efforts, to assure full employment, to increase state as- sistance to unemployed workers and to put the social security system on a sound financial foot- ing. To avoid seeking a majority in parliament in favor of the enabling legislation, the govern- ment probably will take advantage of a constitutional prerogative whereby the bill will be adopted automatically unless a majority of the membership supports a cen- sure motion. This tactic spares dissatisfied deputies from having to go formally on record in favor of the bill and places the burden of gaining a majority on the opposition. The opposition Federation of the Left has already announced its intention to introduce a Page 12 censure motion and expects support from the Communists and many of the center deputies.. The Gaullist camp, however, supported by indi- vidual center deputies, is ex- pected to hold a thin edge. Gis- card d'Estaing and his Gaullist- allied Independent Republicans are unhappy over a procedure which robs them of any opportunity to influence the nature of the pro- posed legislation. The government is banking, however, on Giscard's reluctance to take responsibility for bringing the government down in the face of an implicit threat of new elections. The government's real problem is to get under way a program which, within six months, will stimulate economic growth. With the French balance of payments running a small deficit, the gov- ernment will try to avoid infla- tionary measures that would make French exports less competitive. Some measures will be highly un- popular. Should the government's economic reforms fail to show satisfactory results by next fall, the parliament would be emboldened to strike back, possibly by re- fusing to pass crucial legisla- tion. More important, defections from within De Gaulle's own camp could seriously erode his parlia- mentary base. SECRET 5 May 67 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/253.iF 79-00927A005800020001-8 YUGOSLAV ELECTIONS STIR GRASS-ROOTS POLITICAL ACTIVITY Yugoslavia's elections last month produced some surprises as well as a few major defeats for the regime. The elections were to fill assembly (parlia- mentary) seats at local, repub- lic, and federal levels and were the first real test of the rota- tion principle adopted by the 1963 constitution. About one half (some 14,000) of the seats in the various assemblies changed hands to conform with legislation prohibiting deputies from suc- ceeding themselves. The elec- tions were also a test of the regime's policies which had been designed to encourage competition for the seats and to curtail the direct control of the party over the selection of candidates. The regime's complicated system of filtering candidates up through local, republican, and federal levels (only local elections are direct) generally resulted in choices acceptable to the party. Local voters, however, took a particularly strong hand in the process. In one constituency, angry crowds disrupted a political caucus to prevent its rejection of their candidates. In other caucuses, "mild panic" broke out as many party hacks found themselves passed over in favor of younger, more popular men and women. The party suffered a definite defeat in Serbia. Approved nom- inees for five out of the ten vacant seats in the country's highest parliamentary body, the Federal Assembly, were beaten by opposition candidates who cam- paigned against the regime's pol- icies. The most notable loser, Foreign Trade Minister Nikola Dzuverovic, lost by a three to one margin to a partisan hero of World War II. His opponent, and the winners of the other four seats, won by playing on dissat- isfaction among the peasants and by condemning the country's economic reform program as alien to their interests and to the interests of the republic. The regime had established a freer election process to help rid itself of the conservative, partisan type who resist Yugo- slavia's liberal programs. The leaders will be aware that these very people used the elections to defeat the party's more lib- eral candidates in Serbia. Nevertheless, it seems doubt- ful the leadership will reinsti- tute cumbersome controls to en- sure election of only party-spon- sored candidates. A conservative reaction against the ouster of Aleksandar Rankovic last summer was to be expected in Serbia, but backers of the liberal programs fared well in the other five re- publics. The regime will prob- ably continue the policy of en- couraging a real choice among generally acceptable candidates. SECRET Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001- i Approved For Release 2007ft1prb: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8 RUMANIA ACCENTUATES ITS INDEPENDENT STANCE Bucharest, by deciding to stay away from the all-European Communist Party conference held last week at Karlovy Vary, moved perceptibly closer to a position long held by neighboring Yugo- slavia. This decision climaxed an unprecedented number of bilateral contacts with Communist parties of both NATO and Warsaw Pact coun- tries as well as with the Yugo- slavs. To further emphasize its disapproval, the regime's press published a wave of articles, one of which flatly states tliat the establishment of both internal and foreign policy lines is the "...exclusive business, the un- alienable right of each Commu- nist party." Bucharest based its decision not to go to the conference on differences with its Communist allies much broader than were evident when it decided not to attend the Moscow consultative meeting in March 1965. At that time, the disagreements were limited essentially to ideologi- cal issues within the Communist camp, for example, the Sino-So.- viet dispute, and Soviet hegemony. This time, however, Bucharest also stressed its unilateral right to have relations with any country, such as West Germany. Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY This "active coexistence" line resembles Yugoslavia's po- sition and, this similarity--along with the greatly stepped-up con- tacts between the two parties-- indicates that their joint absence from the Karlovy Vary meeting was no mere coincidence. The Ruma- nians and Yugoslavs have made at least nine party-government ex- change visits since last November. President Tito and Rumanian party chief Ceausescu have met twice during the same period. More intensified party con- tacts between the two countries can be expected in view of their common concern for European secu- rity, and their mutual apprehen- sions about Soviet hegemony. Ceausescu reportedly plans an of- ficial visit to Yugoslavia next month. In their pursuit of Euro- pean security the Rumanians will probably continue to give strong public and governmental support to the Group of Nine--an informal United Nations group of which they are members and which promotes friendlier relations among all European countries. Both Commu- nist mavericks believe that mean- ingful progress toward European security can be made only at the state level rather than through Communist party meetin s such as Karlovy Vary. 25X1 SECRET 5 May 67 pprove or a ease 11 Approved For Release 2007/01 QIE'f2DP79-00927AO05800020001-8 MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA The food crisis in India is reaching serious proportions and will remain acute until at least the end of the year. Economic strains stemming from two years of drought are contributing heavily to the political difficulties India is experienc- ing. The election for president is scheduled for 6 May, and the Congress Party candidate, a south Indian Muslim, has only a 50-50 chance to win. The loss of this post by Congress would further erode support for Mrs. Gandhi's government. In Turkey, the split in the opposition Repub- lican People's Party (RPP) further fragments the political opposition and strengthens the ruling Justice Party. Disturbed by the RPP's increasing drift to the left, 48 center-oriented senators and deputies resigned on 30 April. World-wide reaction to the Greek coup has been strongly antagonistic. This is particularly true in the USSR and Eastern Europe which harbor large Greek-exile communities. For events in Greece it- self see page 16. Nasir in his speech on 2 May portrayed the US as Egypt's real enemy, and praised the "honorable stand of the Yemeni Government" in its recent ac- tions against the US AID mission. In Africa, the prestige of Sekou Toure's re- gime has fallen to its lowest ebb due to financial scandals and a sinking economy, but the regime is expected to survive. Tourd most likely will react by lashing out at "foreign corruption." He has already directed that all foreign missionaries be expelled by 1 June. Nigeria is still on the verge of breaking up. The Western Region's leaders now say that if the East secedes so will the West. SECRET Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001- Approved For Release 2007/ RJIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 GREEK MILITARY REGIME DIGS IN The two-week-old military regime continues to tighten its hold on the country, and no or- ganized resistance has developed. Below the surface calm, however, there are fears that the purging of all the moderate political elements can only lead to an in- evitable clash between extreme rightist and leftist factions. Prominent political personal- ities of both the center and the right are dismayed by recent events. They doubt that there can be any speedy return to any form of representative government. They believe that eventually the extreme left may be led or driven to armed resistance. For now, however, Communist elements--the presumptive organizers of guer- rilla resistance--are all but paralyzed, because most of the "hard-core" troublemakers have been rounded up and sent to de- tention centers on outlying is- lands. The most prominent political detainee is Center Union deputy Andreas Papandreou, whom the coup leaders regard, as Greece's "enfant terrible" and the man most re- sponsible for the country's drift to the left. Andreas apparently will be detained until the regime is satisfied that his power to foment a revolution from the left is broken. Cyprus has not been affected by the coup in Greece. Both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots reacted with caution, and the coup leaders may be too preoccupied with events at home to concern themselves with the Cyprus problem. There has been predictably strong adverse reaction to the coup around the world, particularly from East- ern Europe and the USSR. Both harbor large Greek-exile communi- ties from the Communist guerrilla war of 1947-49. Government and public opinion in Western Europe has been almost unanimously crit- ical of the take-over. After discussions with UN representatives from the Communist countries, UN Secretary General Thant asked the Greek representa- tive to urge his government to follow the usual judicial proceed- ings in dealing with the political detainees. SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007/01 / ICS P79-00927A005800020001-8 NASIR'S VIEW OF US ROLE IN YEMEN Nasir, in his speech on 2 May, once again attacked the US as the prime supporter of the forces of "imperialism" which are out to thwart the goals of all "progres- sive" regimes. He concentrated on the alleged US and British- backed factions in the Middle East, claiming they are trying to negate his influence in the area. He also denounced the "puppet Kings" Husayn and Faysal, made a passing swipe at Bourguiba, and directed a number of jibes at Israel. Regarding the current Yemeni crisis, Nasir praised the "honor- able stand" of the Yemeni Govern- ment and referred to the alleged involvement of US officials in the Page 17 recent bazooka attack on an ammu- nition dump at Taiz. Yemeni. Deputy Premier Juzailan and the commander of Egyptian 25X1 forces in Yemen, Talaat Hasan Ali, made a quick trip to Cairo on 26 April. The arrested Americans will 25X1 likely be released after their propaganda usefulness has been exploited because Nasir probably is reluctant to brave the storm that would ensue if they were harmed. SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 Approved For Release 2087/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-> Approved For Release 2007% 1~~-CQ-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8 TROUBLES MOUNTING IN GUINEA The prestige of Sekou Toure's regime is at its lowest ebb since Guinea became independent in 1958. Tour's extensive grass-roots po- litical apparatus and his long- standing precautions against an army take-over will probably keep him in power although a major political upheaval cannot be ruled out. Problems have been piling up lately. A number of highly placed officials have been implicated in financial scandals involving state trading enterprises. Some of them have been arrested, demoted, or have opted for exile. The re- gime is pushing a clean-up cam- paign, which began with the cre- ation earlier this year of a con- trol commission to oversee the activity of the state enterprises. In addition, Toure promised this week to punish without clemency those involved. Financial scan- dals are not a novelty in Guinea, but the latest have been more se- rious and have exposed senior of- ficials. Toure may be able to gain some political benefit by his punitive measures, but popu- lar respect for public officials has been further undermined and Toure's own confidence in those around him shaken. The general decline of the economy also has been continuing. Food shortages and power failures threaten in Conakry, and local markets upcountry are low on stocks. There have been reports that the government has not been meeting its payrolls--including those at some military facilities. Moreover, bankruptcy proceedings against the foreign-owned iron mining company, which had been one of the few going concerns in the country, have just been con- cluded. Toure's most likely reaction to his accumulating problems will be to lash out at "'foreign cor- ruption." He holds European busi- nessmen at least partially respon- sible for the scandals. He be- lieves French officials may have been involved in last month's "defection" to Paris of one of his old friends who resigned from the Guinean diplomatic service. Antiforeign sentiment already has been stirred up by the capture of a French-officered Ivory Coast fishing boat which the Guineans claim was lurking offshore near Conakry for subversive purposes, and by a world-wide press campaign that Toure's overthrow is immi- nent. The first Guinean retaliation has been directed at Christian clergy and foreign missionaries, who were placed under restriction last month. The major new item in Toure's May Day speech was the announcement that all missionaries would be expelled by 1 June in order to "Africanize" the churches, although the real causes probably stem from their less than whole- hearted support of the regime and the frequency of their contacts SECRET Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007/01ACRiDP79-00927A005800020001-8 NIGERIA'S WESTERN REGION TAKES A HAND IN THE CRISIS Western Reg=ion leaders have now increased the pressures on the head of the federal military government, Lt. Col. Gowon. 25X1 all Northern troops in the western Region must be re- moved. Gowon reportedly agreed and set 31 May as the deadline i pen InClty MID- WESTERN FERNAN~0' PO (Sr+.) for transferring Northerners out and bringing Yoruba troops back to the West. Northern troops comprise about 80 percent of the battalions in the region and are the principal power base of the Northern-dominated federal gov- ernment in Lagos. The Western leaders also handed Gowon a resolution passed by the Western "Leaders of Thought" meeting the day before. These po- litical leaders called for both N I G E R SECRET Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 * Maiduguri Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001- Approved For Release 200 7gt1I k IA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8 the removal of Northern troops and the secession of the Western Region if the Eastern Region were allowed or forced to secede. All peaceful means, the resolu- tion stated, should be used to keep the East in the Nigerian federation, even if this results in yielding to Eastern Governor Ojukwu's demanas for looser ties between the regions and the fed- eral government. The departure of Northern troops from the West would vir- tually complete the regionaliza- tion of Nigeria's military and police forces. Most Eastern Ibos in the military, including the navy, and in the police in Lagos, the West, and Mid-West--perhaps as many as 2,000-2,500--have re- cently returned to the East. The removal of Yorubas from army units outside the West, together with the Ibo migration to the East, will contribute greatly to inef- ficiency and mismanagement because these two tribal groups have long provided the more technically qualified personnel throughout Nigeria. It will also reduce po- lice and military capability to handle civil disturbances. Further concessions to the East, as proposed by the Western leaders, as well as the removal of Northern troops from Lagos and the West would not sit well with Northern hard-line military officers, nor with many of the high-level civil servants in Lagos. Gowon is to be allowed a guard unit in the capital. There continue to be reports, however, that Ghanaians and a group of leading civilian politicians from all regions are attempting to bring Gowon and Ojukwu together. If Gowon agrees to ease the gradually increasing pressure he has been putting on the East, and if Ojukwu believes the East may now be able to profit by Western pressure on Gowon, Ojukwu may be willing to postpone his reported plans to secede the Eastern Region by the end of May. SECRET Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 prove or a ease 2UDM'1-126:"CIA-F21DP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007IO1J CIRI'iDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 WESTERN HEMISPHERE Troublemakers were almost completely unsuccess- ful this year in their annual efforts to cause dis- turbances during the May Day period. The only major disruption took place in Ecuador, where the Guayaquil labor day parade erupted into a fistfight between pro- Moscow and pro-Peking Communist factions who are vying for control of a labor federation. In Guatemala, Com- munist plans for violence were disrupted by a police raid which netted documents detailing plans and lists of targets. In a clash with Communists, government security forces wounded and captured a long-time party member who also was a leader of the Rebel Armed Forces. Fidel Castro was in full prominence at the Cuban celebration but apparently fulfilled an earlier prom- ise to share the spotlight by letting Acting Minister of Defense Juan Almeida hurl the usual invectives at the US. Old records of Che Guevara's voice were used to perpetuate his image as a leading revolutionary. Cuba's repeat of calls for armed struggle in Latin America will sustain the anti-Castro attitude of some governments and further irritate pro-Soviet Communist leaders in the hemisphere. In other d-velopments right-wing dissatisfaction with Dominican President Balaguer has increased and there have been more rumors of antigovernment plotting. On the other end of the island, Haiti's President Duvalier nipped a suspected plot by transferring and dismissing some of his elite guard. He has probably not solved the problem completely, however. Argentina's President Ongania has kept the lid on labor and student activities and in Brazil the authorities have so far coped with several student anti-US demonstrations. This agitation has not spread into other elements of the populace. The Bolivian military continued its attempts to encircle guerrillas in the southeast, resulting in minor clashes. SECRET Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-0 Approved For Release 2007?/efiR--RDP79-00927A005800020001-8 "NEW LOOK" IN BRAZIL The new Brazilian Government which took office on 15 March, is enjoying considerable domestic popularity. This is largely a reflection of President Costa e Silva's success in playing upon Brazilian pride and nationalism and upon popular hopes for a re- laxation of the economic austeri- ties of the Castello Branco ad- ministration. Costa e Silva's popularity may be short-lived, however, unless he can show some positive accomplishments--partic- ularly in the domestic economic field--in the relatively near future. Of immediate interest to most Brazilians is the effort under way to "humanize" the more stringent aspects of the former government's stabilization pro- gram. The government's prime goal now is said to be "develop- ment" rather than fighting infla- tion. Rent increases have been eased, certain tax hikes delayed, and income tax exemptions in- creased. There is as yet, however, no evidence that the government is prepared to take the less pop- ular complementary measures--such as reducing expenditures to com- pensate for reduced revenues. The new administration has greatly changed the method and style of government operations. Instead of maintaining the highly centralized organizational system that had characterized the preced- ing administration, Costa e Silva has delegated extensive authority to his ministers. The initial re- sult appears to be uncoordinated policies set up by able but ambi- tious cabinet officers. No one has yet had to make a tough, un- popular decision, and it remains to be seen whether members of the administration can submerge their desire for personal ag- grandizement and work together as a team. Costa e Silva's emerging for- eign policy also reflects the drive to broaden his popular base of support. "Independence"--pre- sumably from the US---is the watch- word, although the government has taken this tack in public pro- nouncements far more firmly than it has in private. Some key pol- icy shifts have occurred. For example, the government has turned its back on establishing an Inter-American Peace Force. Costa e Silva has also won con- siderable domestic approval with his impassioned defense of Brazil's "right" to the advantages of nu- clear technology and his call for the formation of a Latin American atomic community. The government's "new look" in foreign and domestic policy has not yet developed sufficiently to form a definitive pattern. It is becoming clearer, however, that US-Brazilian relations, while re- maining good, are likely to diverge more frequently as the Costa e 25X1 Silva administration strives to at- tract domestic support. SECRET Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007/01 / ECIR P79-00927A005800020001-8 DOMINICAN PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL POSITION WEAKENING Increasing right-wing dis- satisfaction with Dominican Presi- dent Balaguer has led to renewed rumors of antigovernment plotting. Dissidents are not yet capable of seriously threatening the govern- ment, but Balaguer's political position continues to erode. Luis Amiama Tio's resignation as minister of interior and police last week has contributed to the unease. Many political factions had viewed him as a counterweight to "trujillista" elements in the government. The leader of the Social Christians, for example, said that the replacement of Amiama with another prominent "anti-t:rujillista" was vital to national stability. Balaguer's appointment of Carlos Goico Morales to the post did not stem the discontent. Goico is a long-time friend of the President and is considered a good administrator, but he served in Trujillo's cabinet and has been described as one of the dictator's "foremost panegyrists." Another of Balaguer's personnel actions that stirred strong private criti- cism was his reinstatement of one of Trujillo's most feared and brutal police officers, one-time colonel. Carlos Herrand Blyden. Rightists are continuing to exploit the "trujillista" issue to gain a wider following. Some are reported to be talking of the need for an "Argentina-type" military take-over to solve the country's problems while others are promoting an "anti-trujillista, anti-Communist Dominican Freedom Front." The coup rumors, as well as allegations that the US has withdrawn support from Balaguer, may originate with rightist ele- ments which hope to undermine confidence in the regime. One danger in the current situation is that Dominican mod- erates--who often sit on the political sidelines--will seek to disassociate themselves from the government. Indicative of this possibility was an editorial in the respected Santo Domingo daily, Listin Diario, which noted that much of the public was preoccupied with the reasons behind Amiama's resignation. It said that Bala- guer's "loyalty to primitive ele- ments" in the government, as well as their official conduct gave opponents a pretext to act. The paper called on Balaguer to use his authority to "create public confidence" that the government will not tolerate repression and violence. Balaguer has promised a public response to Amiama's resignation and in it he will probably address his other critics. In the past Balaguer has tended to explain away much criticism--whether well 25X1 intentioned or not--as designed to discredit the government. SECRET 5 May 57 Approved For Release 20x7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-$ Approved For Release 2007MYIC2WEY].-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 LABOR UNREST AND MILITARY DISCONTENT IN ECUADOR Strikes and strike threats continue to plague the government of interim president Otto Arose- mena. Public employees struck for 36 hours last week to protest a measure before the constituent assembly that would eliminate some 400 government jobs for budgetary reasons. The strike ended on 28 April after the assembly agreed to observe civil service regula- tions regarding a reduction of force, but the government did not capitulate to the strikers' demand that the measure be shelved. The Telecommunications Workers' Union (FENETEL) walked out on 27 April to protest alleged government inaction on a FENETEL- proposed bill that would create a government-owned communications monopoly. Communications were virtually paralyzed throughout the country for a day, and there were some acts of sabotage against telegraph lines and communications equipment. The FENETEL strike has been suspended pending further assembly action. In addition to the public employees strike and that of FENETEL, a number of other minor strikes occurred throughout the country. For the most part these have been settled or suspended, but additional walkouts involving banana workers and railway workers are scheduled during the next few weeks. Military grumbling against the government and the constituent assembly is increasing. Junior officers in particular are annoyed because the assembly has allowed some of its members--such as ex- president Carlos Julio Arosemena-- to harass and denigrate the armed forces. The officers were also perturbed that the government, the military high command, and the armed forces delegate to the as- sembly, General Banderas, did not defend the military in the face of these attacks. On 26 April Banderas spoke out strongly in the assembly for retaining in the new constitution the president's power to use the armed forces to maintain internal order. His speech and the lessening of labor tensions have cooled tempers, but a residue of discontent remains. SECRET 5 May 67 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/ZWt',CRfWP79-00927AO05800020001-8 HAITIAN PRESIDENT SQUELCHES INCIPIENT PLOT President Duvalier relieved a number of presidential guard officers of their duties last week and reassigned them to posts outside Port-au-Prince. No reason was given for the transfers, but it appears that Duvalier acted to head off a palace intrigue that may have involved members of his own family. This is the first time that Duvalier has been known to have removed any officer from his elite Presidential guard. One of the officers transferred, Jose "Sonny" Borges, was one of the regime's leading propagan- dists. He had been in charge of the government radio station and was reportedly very close to Duvalier. Approved For Release 20Q Duvalier's moves may have been set off by a dispute within the president's family--specific- ally between his sons-in-law, the ambitious presidential guard of- ficer Max Dominique and Director of Tourism Luc Foucard. Some of the presidential guard officers who were transferred were close to Dominique, suggesting that Duvalier acted to clip his wings. Suspected plotters have been removed from Port-au-Prince and separated from each other, thereby diminishing any immediate danger they may have posed to Duvalier. The president retains one of his strongest weapons, his ability to provide funds for his personal power structure, but some plotting can be expected to continue. 25X1 SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 7/01 /25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0Q5800020001-1 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 8t9-00927A005800020001-8 KENNEDY ROUND KENNEDY ROUND APPROACHES FINAL BARGAINING Four years of Kennedy Round negotiations are nearing their end. Final agreement must be reached shortly if the necessary documents are to be drawn up before 30 June, when the President's authority under the 1962 Trade Expansion Act expires. Differences, primarily between the US and EEC, are still to be re- solved, however, before the final "package"--containing a reasonable balance of concessions among all the major participants--can be com- pleted. If differences remain, there could be a general withdrawal of concessions already offered and a drastic "unraveling" of the liber- alization of trade which the whole undertaking was designed to achieve. The Common Market's position on agriculture is a major problem in large part because it does not provide adequate assurance that US grains will have continued access to the EEC market. The EEC has tentatively accepted the idea of a world food-aid program for the less developed countries as one way to dispose of surpluses, but the actual amount of such aid the Six may be willing to finance will be small. Moreover, the Community insists on including feed grains in any cereals agreement--a provision which could undercut the competitive advantage of the US in this area. EEC "offers" on other agricultural products are also meager. On the industrial side, the ma- jor issue has been the EEC's insist- ence that all its proposed reductions in chemical tariffs be contingent on the US' abandoning a tariff valu- ation procedure--American Selling Price (ASP)--which substantially in- creases the prices of certain im- ported chemicals. The US is willing to request congressional authority to abandon ASP, but holds that it could not show Congress a "balanced" package if all the EEC's offers on chemicals are conditional. Thus each side uses grains and chemicals as a gage of the other's willingness to liberalize agricultural and in- dustrial trade, respectively. It may not be until the final bargain- ing sessions that an attempt will be made, if at: all, to trade off concessions in one area for those in the other. The EEC Council met again early this week to consider the commis- sion's latest report on the status of the negotiations, and the commis- sion is reported to have been given additional leeway to try to meet the US demand for a "two-package" approach on chemicals. It is likely; however, that the commission will continue to seek some softening in the US position on agriculture, and any deal will still be subject to council endorsement. The commission is in a position;. of great responsibility again. It will try to present the council next week with "nearly final" deals reached in Geneva, figuring that none of the Six want to risk an in- ternal Community crisis at that point over disagreement on the EEC's offered concessions. SECRET Page 26 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 SECRET SEC RET Approved or Release 200 /01/25 IA - DP79-00927A005800020~001-8~~ Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2097/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-1